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Control, Conflict, and Motivation in Socio-Cultural Context

A thesis submitted to Middlesex University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of doctor of philosophy

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Middlesex University Business School

January 1998

ABSTRACT

The central argument of this thesis is that unlike in the West, organizational behavior in the Middle East and the Indian sub-continent is, predominantly, not a function of work/task-related imperatives but largely determined by the broader socio-cultural context, norms and values of the respective societies. Based on extensive interviews and participant and non-participant observation in the Middle East and sub-continent, and content analysis of media reports and literature, the effects of the respective socio-cultural contexts are documented in terms of three key determinants of organizational behavior, conflict, control and motivation.

The thesis examines traditional and modern 'Western' sources of literature regarding control, conflict and motivation and the nature of culture itself and draws attention to the need for modification in certain 'Euroamerican' theories when applied to the strong social, familial and cultural structures, values, beliefs and assumptions present in the two other cultures investigated. Recommendations are put forward as to the kind of changes in the socio-cultural context of the Middle East and Indian sub-continent, if organizational behavior is to be transformed.

In conclusion, a picture emerges of the stark differences between the cultures in terms of status, incomes, role of family and state, social control, family structure, population pressures and religious control - all of which are evidence of the predominance of the socio-cultural context in determining organizational behavior. A theory is offered stating that organizational behavior is primarily a derivative of the structures and functions of broader socio-cultural institutions. A corollary of the said theory is that patterns of control, conflict, and motivation are strongly influenced by the structural-functional properties of a socio-cultural system, and hence, 'intrinsic motivation' is a rare phenomenon.

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It is customary of writers to mention those who helped them write but rarely does one mention those who, in some way, have discouraged them. In my case there were quite a few but it will serve no purpose to name them. However, for the sake of record, I do state that there were many, and the fact that I have almost finished this work and am writing the last lines, shows that discouragement may also help by provoking perseverance, perhaps tenacity. Since 1991 when I undertook this work, there have been times, each year, when I would abandon this whole project, but come back with a desire to do for which I was reprimanded. I wonder if I should thank those as well who didn't want me to carry on?

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Introduction and Explanation of the Key Terms Used in this Work

The 'Sub-continent': The term refers to the three countries of the Indian sub-continent namely, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, which constituted one country prior to 1947; Pakistan separated from India in 1947, while Bangladesh in turn separated from Pakistan in 1971. Although there are wide cultural dissimilarities between and within the said countries, we are concerned in this work with their common cultural and organizational characteristics. Where there are organizational or cultural variations, these have been made explicit.

'Asians in Britain', 'Asians in the Middle East', or the abbreviation 'Asian': The term refers to Indians, Pakistanis, and Bengalis, domiciled in Britain and Middle East respectively, and deals with their common cultural/organizational characteristics, unless otherwise mentioned.

'Middle East': The term refers to the Muslim Middle Eastern countries, particularly the Arabian Gulf (GCC) states. Most findings do not pertain to the Christian Arabs.

The abbreviation 'Eastern': We shall use the abbreviation 'Eastern', for convenience sake, to refer to empirical deductions that are equally and interchangeably applicable to the Indian sub-continent, British-Asian, and Middle Eastern cultures and organizations.

'Euroamerica', the 'West', or 'Western': The terms refer to the common socio-cultural and organizational characteristics among the United States and Western Europe. Although there are many cultural and organizational dissimilarities [see endnote 1] between the said countries, for the sake of comparison, the typical and commonly found socio-cultural and organizational characteristics of the countries constituting 'Euroamerica' or the 'West' have been counter-juxtaposed against the same of the sub-continent and the Middle East.

Definition of 'Culture': Although researchers have shown flexibility in the range of applicability of the culture concept, many definitions of culture are remarkably concentrically applied to large social aggregates, while the term "subcultures" deals with smaller groups in the mainstream culture. Gregory (1983: 339) has quoted Spardly and McCurdy that the concept of culture in anthropology is "*most fully developed*" as "*culture concerns all aspects*

of a group's social behavior". Hofstede's (1980) division of countries into "cultural areas" is analogous to the concept of "culture continent" in Patai (1973);

"even two such widely separated cultures as of Morocco and Iraq appear quite similar when compared with, say, the Greek, or Italian (p. 25) ... to represent 'the West' and 'the Arab World' as if each were a homogeneous entity requires a high level of abstraction and generalization. In reality, both 'worlds' can be construed as homogeneous only when viewed from a distance. These... considerations... suggest the use of the term 'culture continent' for both the Middle East,... and the Western world; and to insist that each of these two 'culture continents' is made up of several, mutually delimitable 'cultural areas'(p. 278)".

We have used the term 'culture' as representing all those common social factors mentioned in definitions quoted below, and found in broad geographical regions:

Whyte (1961: 30), "[Culture] refers to the pattern of belief and behavior of a society".

Barnouw (1963: 68-69), "A culture is... the configuration of all of the more or less stereotyped patterns of learned behavior which are handed down from one generation to the next through the means of language and imitation."

Hoebel (1971: 208-211), "culture is... the integrated sum total of learned behavioral traits which are manifest and shared by the members of a society... Culture is, wholly the result of social invention... social heritage transmitted by precept to each new generation..."

Kroeber (1963: 8 & 60-61), "...the mass of learned and transmitted motor reactions, habits, techniques, ideas, and values - and the behavior they induce - is culture... the humans that come under its influence behave and operate quite differently from the way they would under another culture... Taylor says that 'culture or civilization is that complex whole which includes knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, law, customs and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society'. Linton equates culture with 'social heredity'. Lowie calls it, 'the whole of social tradition'... social and cultural, are closely related concepts."

Our definition for culture is not unique: Hofstede's (1980) findings that prestige, wealth and power are of crucial importance to social relationship in some societies but less important in other societies reminds one that researchers have long argued that it is possible to extract dimensions of cultural differences in various societies (Triandis, 1972). Linton and Kardiner (1945) developed a concept of "basic personality type for a society" defined as:

"that personality configuration which is shared by the bulk of the society's members as a result of the early common experiences; it does not correspond to the total personality of the individual but rather to the projective systems or .. the value of attitude systems which are basic to the individual's personality configuration. Thus the same basic personality type may be reflected in many different total personality configurations".

A similar idea is presented by Triandis (1982: 86):

"Hofstede, similar to Wallace, Born, LeVine, and others, argues that people carry 'mental programs' developed in early childhood when particular actions are rewarded and punished. Socialization continues in other contexts such as schools and organizations. Members of a particular culture gradually, 'get shaped' to use similar mental programs".

Many researchers who subscribe to the culture and personality approach, see the situation not as one sided but as an interrelationship, and emphasize not just the early enculturative experiences but the ongoing process of mutual interaction throughout one's life. There have been criticisms on the abstractions "personality types", "national culture", or "modal personality" but the basic concept is widely accepted. Hence Patai (1973: 18), defines "national character" as *"the sum total of the motives, traits, beliefs, and values shared by the plurality in a national population"*. Karl Young referred to a relevant concept as "collective psyche"; Kroeber (1963: 101-102) uses the term "ethos" to refer to the distinctive character, spirit and attitudes of a people, culture, era, etc.. Hoebel (1971: 221) explains how the concept of "type" does not deny the existence of individual differences. *"The character of each individual is unique, for one's experience never matches those of another... But the... configurations of the cultures of different societies produce distinctive personality types..."*.

Definitions of 'Control', 'Conflict', and 'Motivation': The said three concepts are widely employed in organizational behavior literature, and have been used here in their widest possible definitions so as to allow for cultural variations in the understanding, interpretation and use of these concepts. Narrowly applicable definitions are likely to be culture-bound so much so that organizational behavior and social-psychology have been accused of being 'monocultural' subjects (Chapman, 1992). However, when a definition is broad, its aspects are likely to be found in many cultures, thus facilitating search for common as well as differentiating characteristics. The said concepts will be elaborated where referred to in the text of this work, and in the context of the empirical investigations.

The Key Research Problems

I have taught Organizational Behavior (Western text books) in Pakistan, Britain, and the Gulf, in three languages (Urdu, English and Arabic) over the last ten years and realized that Organizational Behavior grew as an academic discipline mainly from Euroamerican organizational experience but both have shown remarkable diffusion almost all around the world. However, I have frequently observed, during my various jobs, that there are wide differences in organizational behavior across many countries so that one commonly finds that, (1) organizations with similar goals and Euroamerican technical/operative methods, in various cultures, do not employ similar methods of control, conflict resolution, and motivation;

(2)the nature of conflict and means of conflict resolution are dissimilar in various societies and in their organizations; (3)people in various cultures are not motivated by similar aspirations, ambitions, goals and status symbols, and that, (4)people in various cultures do not subscribe to similar views of control, conflict and motivation.

In 1990, when I enrolled for a PhD, I was interested in the relationships between organizational behavior, democracy, and ethics. However, the areas of study that such a project entailed were considered too wide-ranging for a doctoral thesis. A compromise was reached by picking up, for studies, factors of organizational behavior that reflected processes of democracy as well (namely control and conflict) and another factor that over-lapped organizational behavior and ethics (namely, motivation). And, because I had exposure to the sub-continent and British culture, in addition to that, over the last two decades, I had read numerous European and American authors, I proposed that studies of the three factors be conducted in their socio-cultural contexts. In 1992, when I went to teach in the Arabian Gulf states, I added the Middle Eastern comparative dimension to this work.

I defined my research problems as trying to find out, by empirical studies,

- (1)the similarities and dissimilarities in control, conflict and motivation patterns found among the organizations in the three cultures in question;
- (2)explanations for similarities and dissimilarities mentioned in point (1);
- (3)socio-cultural factors that give rise to similarities/dissimilarities mentioned in point (1);
- (4)relationships between findings regarding the socio-cultural and organizational factors.

The aim was to theorize from the data of my empirical studies in order to answer questions such as: Why is it that while private enterprise in the West, in conjunction with government efforts, has succeeded in eradicating coercion and mass poverty, this is not the case in many underdeveloped countries of the Indian sub-continent and the Middle East which claim to follow the Euroamerican economic system? Why are control and conflict-resolution methods, long discarded in the West because of their ineffectiveness, still being used in the sub-continent and the Middle East? Why is there greater manifest conflict in sub-continent organizations compared to Western? Why is there no manifest conflict in Middle Eastern organizations? Why is there many times more employee alienation from decision-making in the Middle Eastern and sub-continent organizations compared to that in the Western? Why has motivation for the vast majority in the said cultures been reduced to money seeking? And finally, what if any, is the nature of 'intrinsic motivation'?

In short, I have tried to see what is the significance of socio-cultural factors in determining organizational behavior. This I have done by empirically observing, in depth, native organizations in countries of the sub-continent and the Middle East, and those managed by Asians in Britain, and comparing them against the Western (studied through secondary, literature based sources). The main aim is to see how, and in what ways, organizational behavior is differentiated, in the said three cultures[1], by virtue of their dissimilar social and familial structures, values, norms, beliefs, and much of what the term 'culture' encompasses.

A description of the methodology that I have followed, and a justification for using qualitative and 'grounded theory' methods, have been given in chapter one.

A shift of my theoretical orientation from a 'class' perspective to a 'culture' perspective

In my early evaluations of several possible research designs for this work, I tried to formulate ways of seeing socio-organizational control and conflict in terms of the nature and kinds of the socio-economic classes of the said three cultures. I tried to work out if it was empirically possible to measure the extent of social development in terms of falling class barriers, reduced inter-class conflict, the nature and extent of upper-class control over lower classes, and the nature of motivation in different classes.

My said theoretical preconceptions were based on extensive readings of Marxism in my youth. Marxist extrapolations over very long periods of socio-economic history, whereby exceptional events are ignored, show that in certain regions of the world, societies progressed from primitive-communistic-tribal towards slave-owning ones in which slaves and masters, for example, constituted two distinct classes in general despite the fact that examples maybe found of slaves who managed to become kings themselves through clever manipulation and intrigue (for example the slave kingdom in Egypt). In the latter periods of history, several societies managed to abolish slavery and a feudal system evolved in which serfs/peasants and the landlords formed two distinct classes in general. One must, however, see the differences in such class systems in various cultures; for example, when serfs in Russia were not legally

[1]I do not know of a work that has particularly aimed at comparing socio-organizational behavior in the said three cultures though I have found relevant insights in works such as Patai's 'The Arab Mind', Galbraith's 'The Nature of Mass Poverty', Myrdal's 'Asian Drama: An inquiry into the poverty of nations', and many others mentioned later.

free to leave their masters, in Britain they were not bound to stay with their masters, and, during the same period, in the Middle East, a fugitive slave could be killed by his master with no ensuing social/legal reprisals. In my early 'theoretical speculations', I often used logical extrapolations of the kind as follows: If we link the aforementioned three historical antecedents with their following subsequent events in each region, that; (1)there were violent revolutions in Russia; (2)in Britain there was a comparatively peaceful passage of a share of power from the landed aristocracy to the emerging bourgeoisie, latter, an extension of franchise in the form of vote to skilled workers (male householders in towns), still latter, to all propertied adult males, and finally, to all adult persons, and; (3)there has been little significant transformation in the Middle Eastern cognitive culture; then we may logically extrapolate from the Russian situation that high controls may lead to violent transformation; from the British situation that moderate controls may result in gradual transformation in socio-political power sharing; and from the Middle Eastern situation that extreme controls can curb social transformation. However, although the said deductions seem plausible and intellectually justifiable, logical extrapolation is often not recommended in theory construction, and, one also must add other relevant variables to the analysis.

However, as I gathered my empirical data, I discovered that people in the sub-continent and the Middle East do not form social-action/protest groups on the basis of their economic class membership but on the basis of common profession, caste, region, language, religion, tribe and ethnic background. In the Middle East, in addition to class barriers, we also find tribal barriers so that some tribes and certain socio-cultural groups are barred from rights to jobs that bestow high authority and power in the society; people from some tribes and certain socio-cultural groups may not be accepted as equals, in many ways, by the other usually dominant tribes. I found that while the objective empirical referents of an economic class are not difficult to define, empirical studies on the theoretical bases of economic classes are hard if not impossible to conduct in safety from the ever present risk of running into conjectures. More over, the empiricist may refuse to accept the class-based approach to social analyses on grounds of observations whereby members of a certain economic class exhibit behavior patterns which class theorists would normally expect from members of another class; for example, in a revolution supposed to be led by the working classes, some members of the aristocracy would be found participating against their supposed class interests thus showing the significance of cognition more than that of class membership. I found that

the subjective and complex nature of structures of the said societies necessitated seeing conflict (whether at interpersonal, group or organizational level) in the context of groups formed on the basis of similar cognitive cultures rather than on the basis of economic class membership. Many cultural factors were found to cut across economic classes: Tribal-religious values for example, are common among workers and the upper classes so that the control patterns learned from the said values are often applied as much by workers on each other as by employers. Likewise, the approach of the economic-political elite towards social conflict and control was found to have parallels in the attitude of managers towards organizational conflict and control both in the Middle East and the sub-continent.

Therefore, it maybe said that the nature of progress of societies towards reducing class barriers and less control and conflict has been different in various regions depending upon several cultural, circumstantial, social, religious, historical and economic factors. Historical-cultural conditions can either support or hamper organizational functions and social development. Marx (in Edwards, R. 1979: 17) noted the same about socio-economic development: "*People make their own history... but under circumstances directly found, given, and transmitted from the past.*". For example, in Britain, there were cultural reasons (in addition to economic), such as the Protestant ethics, for granting manual workers an acceptable socio-economic status which is in stark contrast to the negative status most often and commonly attributed to manual work in the sub-continent and the Middle East: If economic prosperity was the basic causal factor for uplifting the status of manual work, then we would not find tremendous degradation of manual workers in, for example, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States which are among the richest countries of the world.

The significance of a holistic approach

It might seem to my reader that I have incorporated too many variables, related to many fields of knowledge, to be able to do justice to in one work. However, although involving many variables makes data collection and analysis difficult, a holistic understanding of the situation requires the incorporation of as many relevant variables as possible:

"...acceptable ethnographic work... should deal with the totality of all social, cultural, and psychological aspects of community for they are so interwoven that no one can be understood without taking into consideration all the others..." (Malinowski, 1922: xvi).

The functional or dysfunctional state of organizations reflects many aspects of the whole society. Participants in the organizational processes bring with them all the socio-

cultural learning and conditioning so that many analyses of organizational effectiveness isolated from the broader socio-cultural context lack essential profundity and predictive validity in the long term. The more one investigates, the more it is revealed that in the sub-continent and the Middle East, organizations cannot be profoundly studied in isolation from the broader socio-cultural structure, norms and values. Organizations, in fact, are very cultural institutions and the reason that they have been studied by Western researchers as significantly independent units is again a characteristic of the Western culture where system boundaries are much more clearly defined than is the case in many underdeveloped cultures.

The following pages contain chapters on my research methods and descriptions of empirical investigations, findings, the evidence used in generating various theses, and recommended solutions regarding the issues raised in this work.

Notes and Explanations

[1]For example, Inkson et al (1970), showed more document formalization in American than in English firms. Graves (1972) found differences between British and French managers regarding concepts of authority and communication; French managers were more concerned with role authority whereas English managers were more concerned with personal authority; communication was shared more evenly with British managers and was therefore more complex, whereas the French managers had a greater commitment to individual autonomy within specified role constraints, and made greater use of formal communication.

Tannenbaum (1974) found variations of management principles applied in five countries. He found that departmentalization, specialization, unity of command, and the scalar principle, were followed in all countries with modifications; in the US, the said principles were modified by equalitarian cultural values and informal human relations; in Austria there was more bureaucracy, and in Italy the said principles were applied in a more traditional personalized manner with patrimonial control. In terms of reward systems, in the US and Austria there were highly differentiated rewards and benefits according to rank; and in Italy there was a greater emphasis on status differentials. Tannenbaum's control graphs seem consistent with known structural and cultural differences among countries; Italy was the most hierarchical among the three capitalist countries, America the least, with Austria falling in between the two. American plants had a greater total amount of control with participation of employees in everyday decisions more than is true in Europe. Italy was found to be the most traditional, and reflected a rigid authoritarian, family-centred pattern with a paternalistic orientation of the business elite. Italian managers were reluctant to delegate authority and tended to think of their authority in terms of personal power rather than a necessary function within the enterprise. The enterprise was seen as some sort of personal kingdom. The Italian manager, compared to the American manager, was less supportive of a democratic ideology with respect to superior-subordinate relations. Labor unions in Italy were more radical than unions in the United States, but their thrust was more in the direction of future revolutionary change than with running the factory today and tomorrow. American unions, on the other hand, negotiated for reforms within the operation of the present system.

On the
Research Methodology
followed in this work

Chapter One: An Introduction to the Researcher and the Methodology Followed

I have mainly used descriptive and qualitative methods because I aimed at examining socio-cultural-organizational relationships in the greatest existentialist depth possible. It is obvious that this kind of research does not usually allow the use of methods where strict operational definitions and measurements can be made. However, at places, I have used simple statistical comparisons. My methods of data collection have been intensive (case studies, interviews) as well as systematic (regular observation over a long period, content analysis etc.). Because my studies in three cultures deal with broad ranging hypotheses and theories, I am unable to claim to have made the rigorous methods of qualitative coding obvious for other researchers to see with such details as may be credited to many studies conducted in the context of one language and culture. The details of each step that I took would be unmanageably complicated, lengthy, and too cumbersome to be readable, but I shall give essential details where possible.

I had learned the significance of classification in research from my studies of biology and had been subconsciously following a method of social analysis that had much in common with the grounded theory method though I came to know about the latter only in 1993. I had been noting my observations ever since my graduation in physics. I taught experimental physics (1975-76) but my fascination with social sciences forced me to do my second graduation in psychology and take an internship at the Lahore Mental Hospital and the 'Fountain House' (1977), an institution for the rehabilitation of mental patients. The high curiosity and the sober excitement of dealing with the 'mentally ill' at an early age urged me to keep writing 'something'. In those days my notes were often vague but they helped me see a relationship of mental illness with social control when I noted that many people locked in there could not be called mentally ill; some were there simply because their relatives, for one or the other reasons, had convinced the generally laid back doctors that the persons were mentally sick. The head of the 'Fountain House', a psychiatrist of high repute in Pakistan, had even invented an "Islamic psychotherapy" which rested on the belief that religious rituals could rid one of mental illness, for mental illness was a divine curse in retribution for one's sins. I, however, saw the reasons for many mental problems in abuse and poverty caused by over-population. My experience with the Family Planning Association as a voluntary worker greatly helped me understand the cultural aspects in many forms of behaviour.

Later, I learned that in taking notes, one should be formal, systematic and 'scientific'; for example, that while taking notes, one should not express his opinions but simply 'describe' behaviour. I used to make photocopies of my diaries, cut the photocopies into pieces containing 'common themes' and pack them in large envelopes or boxes one each for each category (an old form of computer cut-and-paste function). However, I did not use the paragraph numbering and file card method which Turner (1981) suggests and therefore, writing all observations in one diary, chronologically, meant a lot of perspiration in later classification, but it allowed me to be quick in writing the first notes: I have seen many who cannot overcome the first barrier of taking notes immediately when the memories of an observation or conversation are fresh. When I got a mini tape recorder, I realized that recording conversation of vital importance could put people off from conversation. However, noting in the diary too resulted in the suspicions of many of my colleagues at the University where I taught (1987-89), that I was writing about the 'bad' state of our institutions.

My earlier notes were about events that I thought were somehow 'important'. After some years I realized that many of my observations had a common pattern, that some kind of events recurred frequently and could be seen as typical instances about certain socio-economic groups of people. For example, the businessmen who dealt with the bank, where I worked as a credit analyst (1981-86), had many behavioral aspects in common and differentiable from their employees, and this 'fact' had implications for the nature of control in their organizations. Although my observations were not limited to specific activities and themes, the bulk of the data that I gathered, until I formally engaged in my doctoral work, was related to socio-organizational behaviour. I had not looked for specific types of organizations or activities because socio-cultural-organizational behaviour can be studied in any and all organizations and activities.

Methods of data collection may depend on some cultural considerations:

I was fortunate in getting enormous opportunities to enter in organizations: As a lecturer (1975-76 & 1987-89), I had access to several offices of the education department of our state. As said earlier, I had been an internee in a mental hospital and a rehabilitation center. During my student life at the Punjab University (1978-80), other than being on internship with Grindlays Bank (1979) and ICI (1980), I observed the political activities of various religious and students organizations. During my years as a bank's credit analyst, I

was able to secure intensive knowledge of our clients, more than thirty well known Pakistani and multinational companies[see endnote 1], which knowledge constitutes some of my detailed case studies. I later used these case studies in conjunction with interview based comparative studies to enhance the validity and reliability of my findings. When I resigned from the bank to work as a finance manager with a shoe manufacturing company (1986-87), I was able to add valuable information about the way most Pakistani business was run.

During my said job at the bank, in the evenings, I often used to go to two hospitals where my sisters worked as doctors, and using their reference (a positive use of the sub-continent nepotism), would study the various procedures, practices, and working conditions of doctors and nurses. Whilst lecturing in Pakistan, I had to arrange internships for our students in more than a hundred public/industrial/commercial organizations and made personal visits to many. Later, many of my students worked in several types of organizations in middle/ senior positions and were usually happy to let me carry investigations there (the advantages of the sub-continent life-long respect for liked teachers) and trust with information knowing that I shall be discrete in using it. I was lucky again in the Middle East to have, over a period of four years (1992-96), more than a thousand mature students most of whom were private or government officials in senior or middle levels and willing to share large amounts of information with me. But without this chance to learn about the natives through long-term student-teacher interaction, detailed conversation about the socio-cultural aspects of their lives, physical observation and informal interviews, I would not have been able to gather deeper information particularly through formal research methods, because, in the Middle East, the use of questionnaires or interviews for research purposes is seen with strong suspicion unless the aims of the research are strictly commercial or related to the propagation of the state or cultural/ religious supremacy of the Arabs. This has been reported by researchers from various Middle Eastern countries[see endnote 2]. Quite often, it is not only the authorities but one's colleagues too who suspect the motives behind a research survey because of many's fear that surveys might result in the discovery of some of their weaknesses; the idea that criticism may lead to improvement is alien to the Middle Eastern culture. Open criticism is often considered as tantamount to the critic's presumed disruptive intentions. More over, interviews and questionnaires which aim at straight deduction from 'word of mouth' often produce misleading information because of the hyperbolic manner in which Arabic language is used among the Arabs[see endnote 3], the general Arab abstinence

from true self-critical expression (dramatic-unrealistic self-lampooning which makes people laugh is appreciated) and a proclivity for self-justification and self-glorification.

When I was gathering data about Asians in Britain (1990-92 & summer 94) and wanted to know the working conditions and the working class culture deeply, I followed Malinowski's advice[see endnote 4] of living right among the subjects and found a job for myself for four months in an English factory (twelve hours a day and six days a week) among Asian workers and supervisors. I was able to get this job because the Asian supervisor and I had a common friend: Such informal methods of data collection may not be available in the Euroamerican contexts where the values of privacy and reservations imply that things must be done more formally, the advantage of which is that whatever information you get, can be trusted as more reliable than that obtained in the sub-continent and in the Middle East. However, this does not imply that all in Euroamerica can be taken at face value.

The skills I had subconsciously developed over decades in communicating to people and using the right manners and approach to obtain deeper knowledge of phenomena were usable with respondents from the sub-continent but proved largely irrelevant in Britain where greater emphasis was placed on prior written requests and formal means of communication. I then realized that methods of data collection are, to a large extent, culture-bound and, to yield the most, should be designed in accordance with cultural requirements. For example, in the sub-continent it is not considered impolite, except among the very rich or the high ranking, if one (perceived 'educated', and 'properly' dressed) shows up at someone's door for an interview without prior appointment. On the other hand, such an attitude is not normally welcomed in Britain where most want to be interviewed at the workplace. Because, in Britain, social differences at the workplace are not as obvious as in the sub-continent and the Middle East, a foreign researcher may not easily know much about the subject's social class and patterns of familial behaviour. For such reasons, my findings about the British situation in this work have primarily come from secondary sources.

Drawing conclusions from data is affected by cultural familiarity or lack of it:

While the aforementioned 'informal' data collection may yield richer and deeper information, a prime requirement is that the researcher must have lived long enough in the particular culture to be able to discern reliable information from the other. Lack of experience in language and its meaning may make it difficult for researchers to correctly

categorize whilst conducting research in alien cultures. I may explain this point by an example: If a researcher were to ask a poor worker in the sub-continent, "why do you do this kind of work?", a customary traditional answer he would get is, "well, what else can 'we' do?; this is what my father and his father have done for generations". Now, I know of a researcher from a prosperous country who interpreted the above answer as "the Eastern love for traditional professions" and hence entirely missed the point which is as follows: When a poor sub-continent man gives the above given answer, what he usually means is that, "we are a low income people and have been so for generations; we are low class and there are enormous barriers to our entry to upper income groups - hence we have been 'like this' for generations and shall continue to be 'like this'": A researcher who, (i)has lived in the native culture long enough, (ii)has acquired skills and sensitivity to interpret people's cognition, and, (iii)knows of the reflections of objective circumstances behind the use of language, would see fatalism (the cognitive aspect) and material poverty (known through long-term observations of physical conditions) expressed in the given short answer. However, because our said foreign researcher from the developed country had presumably and most probably, (i)not experienced the limitations which a society without any form of social security but with a meanest form of exploitation imposes upon the lower classes, (ii)been brought up in 'free' (or indifferent) environment where sons are not bound to take up their father's profession, and, consequently, developed 'romantic' notions about the "Eastern family values whereby sons carry the father's profession", and, (iii)been brought up to trust people and take their word at face value, he therefore interpreted the given answer as "Eastern respect and love for family-traditional professions". The given example demonstrates the importance of carrying out long term observations of, (i)the physical conditions, (ii)cognition, and, (iii)ways of using language, to be able to interpret the true meaning of words used by a certain people. To carry out such observations the researcher must have, (i)a regularly reflective and probing mind, and, (ii)skills in unearthing the exact realities by the use of repeated questions aimed at seeking the exactly intended meanings from people not well versed in the use of appropriate language.

Despite the limitations mentioned above, at times, an outsider may be able to evaluate a situation or a system with greater objectivity than those who have grown too familiar with the culture to be able to see both its advantages and its dysfunctions. For example most Muslims and the Filipino Catholics, spell bound by religious indoctrination, cannot see the

social disintegration and human degradation caused by their overpopulating family structure even though the evidence is overwhelming and obvious to many foreign agencies. Likewise, while it is obvious to many from other cultures, many British people, perhaps in their ideological commitment to place individual differences at the core of education, overlook the fact that a child has first to acquire certain uniform/standardized linguistic, mathematical and conceptual skills before being able to express individuality in using these. Although it may easily be established by comparative studies that too little control at a young age can be as alienative to learning as too much control, most British to whom I have talked, do not see an abandonment of 'active socialization' as a major cause of alienation from learning, particularly in relatively difficult subjects such as mathematics and natural sciences.

Criticism of literature is affected by cultural familiarity or lack of it:

It is not easy to criticize the conceptual schemes of authors whose empirical referents are not known to the critic. It is difficult to evaluate descriptions of socio-organizational situations one has never been in. There has to be a feeling of some kind of association, rivalry or animosity to generate thoughts and to motivate one to review or criticize. For example, I have frequently observed that the British often naively appreciate the values, norms, religions and expressions of certain non-Western societies which, to the one who has lived in and knows well, are full of obvious dysfunctions and hence easy to criticize. Likewise, I had to make great efforts to be able to evaluate theories and models of certain Euroamerican systems and societies I had not personally experienced and, at times, I had only logical extrapolation to rely on.

A defence of using idiographic data collection methods in this work:

I have made greater use of the old fashioned idiographic methods than is in vogue in modern studies. I have found the said method particularly helpful because of its exclusion of many problems of finding equivalence for concepts and terms whose empirical referents are hard to fathom in various cultures. Case descriptions serve as a true empirical basis from which concepts are deduced, sharpened in definition, and clarified. I have tried to do so wherever I could, and the sensitivity for differentiating the typical from the atypical, acquired from using several kinds and methods of observations and analysis (details in the following sections) over a long period, has been one safeguard against relying on 'anecdotal evidence'

and 'generalizing from the specific', risks often associated with the use of case studies.

In the case studies mentioned below, one can see the real culture of the sub-continent organizations, the intrigue at the promotion of a rival contender, suspicion, mistrust, jealousy, rivalries, filling the ears of bosses with actual or false allegations of injustice or bribery against a 'culprit' to show one's loyalty to the organization (or to the perceived powerful superior), boasting of power and authority, guarding company's secrets with undue zeal and fervor, etc: Such behaviour forms the major bulk of organizational and social life in the sub-continent and the Middle East, but, expectedly, is not accounted for in Western organizational theories except for such references as 'informal organization' or 'grape vine' etc. For example, from the following cases of average real life situations[see endnote 5], I was able to gather support for my own observations of, for example, how easy it was for people in many cultures, compared to that in Europe, to rush to conflict with serious allegations against the contenders; such conflict-proneness is epitomized in the Ethiopian case of "The Promotion of Ato Desta" (Knudson, 1967); the embezzlement of low motivated employees in an Indian public transport system[see endnote 6] (my similar observations in Pakistan and the Middle East were helpful in deducing the link between low motivation, money motivation and corruption); recruitment and appointment of employees on the bases of affiliations with the winning political party in Ghana (see my analogous findings in the sub-continent and the Middle East), money motivation to the extent of seeking 'tea allowance' among poorly paid and exploited Indian semi-skilled workers[see endnote 7]; conflict in India between rival trade unions charging each other with misappropriation of union funds, ignoring the interests of workers, and accepting illegal favors from management, strikes and physical attacks on managers[see endnote 8] (similar situations abound in Pakistani industry); high money motivation of the employees of Trastos, S.A, who wanted to be fired only so that they could get the statutory one month's wages for every year of service upon discharge; (I found similarities among some Pakistan Armed Forces officers, and among the Middle Eastern workers where working conditions were harsh); the resentment of Indian workers at being asked to do janitorial work[see endnote 9], their reluctance to put complaints on paper for fear of annoying the superiors prior to coming up for promotion, and the meanness and petty squabbling over small sums of money. Case descriptions analogous to my own findings ensure me that my observations have not been inaccurate or misplaced.

The use of concepts as absolutes and quantifiable could be misleading:

Over the years, interest in qualitative approaches to studying sociological phenomena has increased because of a growing disillusionment with the universal usefulness of quantitative research methods[see endnote 10], operationalization of sociological concepts, quantification of sociological entities, and measurements of psycho-sociological traits (Martin and Turner, 1986; Chapman, 1992). No matter how precise the measurements, the measured remains a quality. However, when data are sufficiently precise, statistical techniques can simplify understanding them (Goode and Hatt, 1981: 313-314). Many[see endnote 11] advocate multiple modes of research for single phenomenon (Pugh et al., 1975: 65; Turner, 1981: 243).

However, many doctoral dissertations and researches on organizational behaviour, particularly those about the sub-continent, reveal the risks of using conceptual abstractions in absolute meanings. For example, see the scores of 'conclusions' about 'management philosophy and style in Indian industries', in the two volumes, 700 pages each, nearly half consisting of questionnaire obtained ticks, Yes, No, or grading in between, replete with monotonously meticulous statements; just two paragraphs from the said book should suffice:

"Sectoral comparison shows the public sector management style to be less participative, more coercive, but less indeterminate than the private sector management style. The style in the public sector (64 percent responses) looks to be less participative than in the private sector (78 percent responses) in terms of the views 'to a large extent' and 'to some extent'. The former (36 percent responses) happens to be more coercive than the latter (8 percent responses) in respect of the positions 'little' and 'very little'. And the former (nil) is found to be less indeterminate than the latter (14 percent responses) in relation to the view 'no opinion'. The textile industry management style is a little less participative, more coercive, but less indeterminate than the engineering industry management style....." (Tayal, 1988: 575); "... age-wise analysis shows the philosophical orientation to be primarily normative in the younger and elderly age groups but to be indeterminate in the middle age group. Sector-wise, normative orientation is found to exist in both the sectors. Whereas no clear-cut pattern of philosophy is identifiable in the textile industry, there is predominance of normative philosophy in the engineering industry. Philosophical orientation in the case of paternalistic managers and qualified professionals is indeterminate, but there is presence of normative philosophy in the case of experienced professionals in the private sector. The orientation of the qualified professionals is indeterminate whereas we find the experienced professionals in the public sector to be normative in their philosophy." (Tayal, 1988: 748).

After reading scores of pages of statements as quoted above, one feels little improved in his understanding of the 'management philosophy and style in Indian industries'. One criticism that must be made here is the use of concepts in an absolute form whereby one gets a false impression that coercive or normative philosophy in India has much in common with

the same in Europe; this ignores the relativistic nature of meanings, that for example, 'coercion' in Saudi Arabia is a very different phenomenon from that in Europe. Much could be clarified by describing and elaborating the empirical referents of concepts and theories.

An abstract of the methods of data collection used in this work:

1-Field notes of long-term participant and non-participant observations of nearly a hundred sub-continent and Middle Eastern private and public industrial, commercial, financial, educational, health, political, religious and governmental organizations (1981-96).

2-Field notes of medium/short-term participant/non-participant observations in two British and around twenty British-Asian private industrial, commercial, financial and educational organizations in Britain (1990-92 & summer 94).

3-Secondary source observations that could be checked for reliance. For example, I have made use of the direct observations of my colleagues who were interested in observing organizational behaviour patterns in many organizations.

4-Informal observation at the social level in assessing the poverty/ affluence levels and gaps among classes (observation is sharpened by reading and theorizing about observed facts); in analyzing familial patterns of behaviour among sub-continent working class families (where family life is not much of a secret and even street brawls are not uncommon) whom I visited as a volunteer for the Family Planning Association, and in understanding the behaviour patterns of several middle and upper class families whom I used to visit in the capacity of a tutor to their children, as a friend to the family, or as a regular and intimate visitor for one or the other reason. My observations were systematic where possible because I had learned the technique and was interested in seeing if some socio-psychological theories could be verified by observation.

5-Physical evidence (slums, condition of housing, clothing, diet) has been valuable in imparting to me a sensitivity to determine social class membership of my interviewees and subjects. I have also gathered information about conflict patterns by physical evidence obtained by visiting the sites of work and conflict, witnessing property damage caused by industrial strikes, religious and political agitation, arson, violence, police action, etc.

6-Case studies, for noting patterns of motivation and social control, of around forty individuals, including workers, managers, teachers, scientists, doctors, engineers, lawyers, psychologists, leaders, entrepreneurs, traders, a few high ranking dignitaries, known to me

in one or the other capacity and whose socio-organizational life I have followed for several years. In deducing from cases, I have sought to avoid the dangers of 'generalizing from the specific' by, (i)gathering a very large number of cases, (ii)gathering and following the cases for several years until it was possible to see what was typical, (iii)relying only on the typical for deductions and, (iv)combining case study based deductions with those from other sources of data collection mentioned in this section.

7-Qualitative coding of transcriptions of around seventy intensive unstructured/semi-structured interviews (1990-96). The interviewees were mostly past or present employees of various organizations, from similar occupational and social backgrounds as mentioned in item 6 but most were related to business organizations in one or the other capacity.

The sampling method for interviewing: In the beginning, I thought of having a sample of selected employees of some selected English firms and those of some comparable sub-continent and Middle Eastern firms, but a comparison of a few industries was not enough for our purposes for, unless the sample was to be very large, interviewing was unlikely to lead to a valid analysis of behavioral patterns characteristic of a culture and society: Random intensive interviews of as many persons as possible, and of varied social backgrounds could generate more representative information than those conducted in a selected few companies.

A major problem lay in the difficulty of obtaining an unbiased sample, which difficulty I solved by conducting interviews for several years (1990-1996), in as many cities as possible, from a cross section of socio-economic classes, and from as many respondents as were willing to spare an hour or more. I stopped interviewing at a stage when I had obtained enough information to see the standard events so much so that the nature and contents of any further information often became predictable. As I have coupled the data from my long-term observations with interview-based information, I feel that this has almost solved the problem of having a representative sample for the said cultures.

The method of interviewing: In the beginning I used structured interview questions but then moved on to unstructured ones as these were found to be more helpful in getting wider ranging information. I preferred the location of interviews to be in the household so that the interviewee could feel at ease and I could find about his socio-economic background by physical evidence of quality of living, without asking many cumbersome, possibly embarrassing questions.

8-(a) Literature from various writers on the sub-continent and the Middle East, about

social, religious/cultural norms and values, the validity of which work was checked intermittently in intensive discussions in 'study circles' involving lecturers, intellectuals, students etc. (1975-1988). (b) In writing on the social and political contexts of conflict, I have made use of the several kinds of documents, such as government publications about the labor policies, industrial relations ordinances, employee union membership, economic reports, and, institutional records (bonuses, payroll, paid holidays given to employees etc.).

9-Findings in the Middle East were derived largely from close interaction with more than a thousand mature Arab students, and interviews with around two dozen Indian, Pakistani and Western managers and around fifty workers and employees in various native organizations (1992-96). The findings are more validated by the fact that the said students were mostly adults who came from all sorts of socio-economic backgrounds, were employed in many government offices, the Amir's secretariat, ministries (of health, education, civil planning and agriculture, telecommunications and petrol), in the army, police, courts, private commercial and industrial companies, banks, telecommunications and oil and gas companies, and therefore constitute a strongly representative sample of the entire population of the Gulf states. Because many students came from other states of the Middle East on exchange programs while the teachers came from five Middle Eastern countries, these provided a good sample for observation of common and general behaviour patterns in the Middle East. I have corroborated the findings with observations of many of my English and American colleagues who have worked at other Middle Eastern organizations and universities, with readings from relevant Arabic books, with literature regarding the Middle East, and with detailed discussions with my Arab colleagues, particularly from Egypt. The findings are also supported by the observations of many English teachers at the British Council who have worked in Saudi Arabia, Oman, the Emirates and Egypt. The observations extend to motivation in general and at work, and the nature of control and conflict in the Middle East.

Data analysis and developing links between categories:

Though I used to write observations as soon as I could and reflect upon them, in the beginning I sought patterns only in thought, not on paper. When I felt that a category had taken a certain permanent shape, I then used to write it down. However, I produced a very large number of classifications only to realize that I should limit my observations to very relevant themes and confine the categories to those about which frequent observations were

made. I then became more formal in writing notes and focused on relevant themes in the subsequent data collection and analysis.

In arriving at the categories related to the socio-cultural context of organizations, I have also analyzed, where possible, the contents (in terms of the structure of the ideas and facts presented) of: (i) relevant books and documents on the society, culture and history of the three cultures; (ii) books and pamphlets for religious and nationalistic indoctrination (for social control), (iii) television programs and plays, news and articles in papers and journals, (for motivation, status symbols, social control and conflict), (iv) political and propaganda pamphlets (about social control and conflict), and (v) literature relevant to control, conflict and motivation. The details of the 'content analysis' method are available in Goode and Hatt (1981: 330) who suggest that content analysis can be done by symbol count, item analysis, and by thematic analysis. Likewise, it is also possible to analyze the response to spoken and written materials.

During the process of classification of events (obtained from observations and interview transcriptions) in the relevant categories, I added and excluded incidents and recorded some in more than one category until it became clear that only the incidents truly illustrative of a category were included therein. To facilitate further addition, I gave numbers to the categories and defined each in longer titles. Sometimes, I found that two categories were in fact two aspects of one phenomena (e.g. non-work control and personal control were joined as one category) and, at other times, that a category in fact dealt with many distinct phenomena and could be spilt into several (e.g. non-work motivation was spilt into various kinds of motivation). However, there was considerable over-lap between categories related to the three variables that are the focus of this work; the said over-lap only serves to show that there are strong relationships between the three and that all three are joined by an underlying socio-cultural context in which the events occur.

The interview based data forms one supportive and descriptive base of the various theses of my theoretical formulations. My primary aim in conducting these interviews was to specifically count the number of regular narrations and see if they confirmed the validity of my previously acquired sensitivity to what was typical, a modification and confirmation of the various theses that I had been constructing for the past several years.

A word of caution is due here: Interview based data can be criticized as impressionistic assessment of interviewees. In the sub-continent and the Middle East, in

particular, interviewee statements may not be true to reality. Hence interview data has to be used with caution and in conjunction with information obtained from alternative sources. However, the nature of my themes is such that misrepresentation of reality on the part of a few interviewees cannot significantly affect the conclusions drawn but reflect some further cultural phenomena, such as, 'cultural conditioning in cognitive distortions', and, 'the level and extent of subjective interpretation of commonplace realities of life, conditioned and reinforced by cultural rewards, sanctions, values and taboos'.

Many social psychologists argue (Howard, 1994) that a comprehensive account of a social structure must include the actor's cognitive system (mental representation and information manipulation translated into thought). During data collection and analysis, a cognitive approach to understanding patterns meant not only to observe behaviour but also inquire about the feelings and perceptions of the actors. The subjective and objective aspects of the situation were noted to supplement each other. Although the cognitive bases of behavior may or may not lie in objective/material circumstances, the two sets of observations (cognitive and material) are often interrelated if not causally connected, which, for the researcher, means shifting attention regularly from the subjective to the objective and this is the approach which we have followed in this work. For example, in studying conflict, observation of the circumstances which probably led to certain perceptions and feelings which in turn led to the observable conflict, were studied in entirety. Conflict, when understood in cognitive terms, can reveal itself long before it may happen and therefore the cognitive approach is richer in tracing potential conflict; the approach also has implications for conflict-prevention in that the existence of conflict-prone assumptions or prejudices in the populace that supplies the organization with its manpower, points to a greater need for organizational socializing and incentives to refrain from conflict. A cognitive approach to conflict resolution, for example, stresses the need to borrow ideas from what is known in psychotherapy as cognitive therapy; for example, in certain cases, cognitive therapy would assume that the assumptions of a group about an "enemy group" could be changed. Likewise, in studying motivation, the stimulus from the subject's material needs was studied along with his cognition about the status or value of various kinds of work. In studying control, I looked at the perceptions, rationalizations and justifications of people using various methods of control, the desirability and the material causes and consequences of the said methods.

The details of classifying data in ways which facilitate arrangement of the material

to reveal patterns or properties are available in several books and articles on the grounded theory (see Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 1968, 1978). The methods of dealing with these problems have been highly idiosyncratic (Turner, 1981: 229) and maybe left to the judgement of the researcher[see endnote 12] who should get the required knowledge of methods and their basic logic.

On the level of complexity:

Modern researchers often seem to possess an ability to narrow down their investigations to a limited and manageable number of variables and to look at phenomena at micro level. To me, variables usually seem to have relationships and cannot be studied in their own right, but in a macro-holistic perspective[see endnote 13]. Hence, my data became very large and complex[see endnote 14] with around twenty categories each for the three cultures and several core concepts (described in chapter seventeen pp. 257- 259, as structures and functions of socio-cultural institutions having analogies in organizations). However, I was able to reduce the complexity by; (a)analyzing intermittently and, (b)extending the period of data analysis to around four years (1992-1995) although I kept gathering more data during the same period. Longer periods help when the data is enormous; the nature of thought processes is such that we feel a need to get out in order to return after having absorbed and understood[see endnote 15]. Switching thoughts from one category to another without having resolved questions about the first often helps return with solutions in hand.

The most common difficulty I faced was in keeping focus on workplace instances and not stray away to their social context: It was at a later stage that the frequent recurrence of the said difficulty turned out to be a major discovery of this work; that organizational boundaries in the sub-continent and in the Middle East are much less clearly defined than is the case in Europe and United States, and that what differentiates research in organizational behaviour in the said societies is the greater need for incorporating socio-cultural analysis into research in the former countries than in the West.

In the earlier stages of data analysis, I was keen at attributing cause-effect properties to categories (e.g. between certain social values and coercive control) but I soon discovered the difficulties in proving causal properties (were social values the cause or the result of coercive control?) though it was relatively easy to show the relationships through logical extrapolation. I could only defer such theses for further data collection, remembering the

dangers of 'logical elaboration' as exceeding the bounds of the data and building up speculative theoretical edifice upon a fragmentary empirical base (Glaser, 1978, in Turner, 1981: 238). Glaser finds 'conceptual elaboration' desirable as against logical elaboration but Turner suggests that whilst keeping in view Glaser's warning, the theorist must learn the skill of constructing a range of abstract variations upon a given concrete piece of evidence.

After the initial formation of various theses from the aforementioned methods of data collection and analyses, I have kept submitting them for critical evaluation to those interested, including a dozen intellectuals from the sub-continent, Middle East, and Britain. I have kept a vigil for information that affected the reliability of my findings and, in the light of such information, kept modifying the said theses until convinced that these theses, which are aspects of my theoretical formulations, are based on reliable and valid data, and that the said theses do reflect the typical situations in the said three cultures.

Considering conditions under which the links between the categories hold:

This to me was a very important stage of theory formulation because of my greater interest in the links and in the contexts in which such links seemed to hold. For example, in the Islamic countries, there is a link often made between the kind of dress one wears and his values, so that the imposition of a certain kind of dress code is often a means of social control. Dress codes in the Western culture are not likewise, and with such intensity, related to social control. Perhaps the best way to disprove causal effects of conditions under which links between categories hold is to see if similar links are found in various conditions. If links are found to hold only in certain conditions, then this is a case for relating those conditions to the said links. For example, the finding that greater coercive control existed in the sub-continent and among the Middle Eastern migrant workers than among British Asian workers, enabled me to link coercive control with the absence of social security, but the fact that coercive control was exercised by financially secure people, and in the family as well, enabled me to add a cognitive-cultural dimension to the occurrence of coercive control.

When the categories for the three cultures were finally established, I saw several links between them emerging out of the data themes, particularly and especially in comparative terms; if I had categories for one culture only, I would not have been able to see the links between them with such greater depth and ease as only the comparative data imparted to me. I could see a fascinating analogy here: A person who lives and thinks in terms of the

'categories' of only one culture, and does not see those of another, is hindered in his capacity to see the links between the 'categories' of his culture, and hence, either underestimate or overestimate the characteristic features or the structural-functional properties of his culture in providing the essential social base for harmony, cohesion, integration or the opposite.

A preliminary assessment of the resultant formulation:

I was unsure whether I should call the three resultant formulations (given in pages 257, 258 and 259) 'models' or 'theoretical sub-systems' of 'socio-organizational behaviour in three cultures'. Although the terms 'theory' and 'model' are often used interchangeably, Rubenstein & Haberstroh[see endnote 16] see the main differentiation between a theory and a model as related to the model conclusions being '*logical consequences*' of model premises, versus the theory conclusions being subject to '*empirical verification*'. The differentiation however, is dulled by Champion's (1975: 14-15) insertion about theoretical propositions too being '*a logical explanatory and predictive scheme from which testable hypotheses can be derived*'. I believe that models, like theories, are subject to empirical verification though in less complex ways than those used for the verification of theoretical assertions. Regarding our three theoretical structures, summarized on pages 257-259 and representing analogies between organizational and broader socio-cultural behaviour, and some induced relationships between the discovered categories in the three cultures, perhaps it would be appropriate to call them 'theoretical formulations' or 'theoretical sub-systems' which, joined together, provide evidence for 'a theory of socio-organizational behaviour' stating that organizational behaviour is primarily a derivative of the structures and functions of broader socio-cultural institutions. The evidence is to be seen in the analogies and relationships mentioned above. A corollary of the said theory is that patterns of control, conflict, and motivation are strongly influenced by the structural-functional properties of a socio-cultural system, and hence, 'intrinsic motivation' is a very rare phenomenon.

In assessing the process of my research work, I may quote that the fundamental questions to ask about all research techniques are related to the precision, reliability, and relevance of the data and their analysis; (1)how precise the observations are? (2)can other scientists repeat the observations? and (3)do the data actually demonstrate the conclusion? If the data do not satisfy a rigorous logic of proof, the conclusions remain doubtful (Goode & Hatt, 1981: 313). However, Turner (1988: 111) states that because in qualitative enquiries,

the researcher relies on 'soft' data, very few conclusions can be justified solely by reference to the method used. Hence generalizations from such a study have to be self-justifying; the researcher using the grounded theory approach is exposed and cannot hide behind an array of techniques as is often the case with other forms of research. Any theory emerging will reflect the researcher's intellectual grasp, creativity, sensitivity and understanding, as well as the quality of his data-gathering methods[see endnote 17]. The evolved theory should have the attributes of (i)a closeness of fit with the area being studied and, (ii)a degree of complexity that should reflect the complexities of the world which has been studied (Turner, 1981: 240). I believe that my theoretical formulations, presented in the later pages, do meet the above quoted criteria. Regarding the last step of the grounded theory, that is, making connections to other existing theories, we shall deal with it in the last chapter.

In the following pages, findings from the empirical studies have been described and discussed in the form of categories arrived at through the above mentioned methods.

Notes and Explanations

1. This has been termed 'action research'; researcher's working in the organization helps getting data which outsiders may not have access to.

2. An assistant professor from Alexandria reported the following: "When I was doing my dissertation for my MBA, the restrictions upon questionnaire and interview based surveys nearly brought me to tears. My topic was "workers attitudes towards non-financial incentives". In the organization where I did the research, the chief manager insisted upon seeing all the questionnaires after they had been filled in by the employees and then he used whitener to delete what he thought was an inappropriate description of the company working and other conditions by the workers. It was Jamal Nasir's period and all researches had to be approved by the government before they could begin. Even survey sites and questionnaires had to be approved by the authorities. When I finished my MBA dissertation, the professors refused to allow it to be published because it went against the "government line". I protested and finally a compromise was reached; the professors said that they would grant me a grade for my dissertation, equal to the average of the marks I had obtained in other subjects on condition that I will not publish the thesis in any form. At that time we blamed it on the "communist government". But now that we have a democracy, the situation in Egypt is the same. For my Ph.D, I have to get the questionnaire approved by the authorities and don't know what would happen to the thesis but I have carefully selected a topic that has little political implications. I have my questionnaire brought from the university of Michigan; they might say I was not honest (original) because I got my questionnaire from another researcher in America, but I have the authorization from the said university to use it. The Michigan questionnaire gives details about its reliability and validity and so I can't be attacked on those grounds either. The doctoral candidates in the Egyptian universities are supposed to take an entrance test which tests how much they have read from various books. In Syria, you cannot

get admission to a Masters course unless you support the ruling party".

3. On the nature of the use of language by the Arabs, see Patai, R. (1973: 41-72), chapter titled, "under the spell of the language" where he talks about the fundamental weaknesses of the Arabic language, its ancient ambiguities, rhetoric, exaggeration, over-assertion, repetition, lack of proper time sense and verb/tense structure, and the often 'black and white' vision so that H. Hourani called the Arabic language, '*the flawed mirror in which they [the Arabs] see the world*'; Biblical Hebrew had similar weaknesses but it has since rid itself of them. Most Arabs claim that Arabic, being 'holy language' cannot be modified.

4. The details of the ethnographic method are available in Malinowski's works and in many others which it would be futile to reproduce in this work but a glimpse should suffice: Malinowski (1922: 1-25) explains his principles of methodology under three main titles: First, the student must have real scientific aims and know the values and criteria of modern ethnography. Second, he should put himself in "good conditions of work", i.e live right among the natives. Finally, he has to apply a number of special methods of collecting, manipulating and fixing his evidence. Good training in theory and acquaintance with latest results is not identical with being burdened with preconceived ideas which are pernicious in any systematic work, but the ability (the main endowment of a scientific thinker) to foresee problems which are often revealed to the observer by his theoretical studies. Malinowski states that each phenomenon should be studied through the broadest range possible of its concrete manifestations, each studied by an exhaustive survey of detailed examples. If possible, the results should be tabulated to some sort of synoptic chart, both to be used as an instrument of study and to be presented as an ethnological document. However, Malinowski adds that there are numerous phenomena of great importance (the imponderabilia of actual life) which cannot possibly be assessed or recorded by questioning or computing documents, but have to be observed in their full actuality. These are such things as the routine of a man's working day, the tone of conversation, social life, the existence of strong friendship or hostilities, and of passing sympathies and dislikes between people; all these have to be scientifically formulated and recorded by a trained observer. He stresses that from all points of sociological or psychological analysis, and in any question of theory, the manner and type of behaviour observed in the performance of an act is of the highest importance. The details and tone of behaviour ought to be given besides the bare outline of events, that behaviour is a fact, a relevant fact, and one that can be recorded (Malinowski, 1922: p.20). Finally, in a scientific field work, the native views, opinions and utterances must be recorded, for in every act of life, there is first the routine prescribed by custom and tradition, then there is the manner in which it is carried out and lastly, there is the explanation to it contained in the native mind. In short, behaviour and cognition must both be recorded.

Turner (1988: 112) has recommended ethnographic fieldwork for formulating grounded theory but describes the fieldwork method in the context of stages of grounded theory as that the fieldworker observes, looks, listens, interviews and records a continuous flow of experience. He then divides and subdivides the enormous material into sections and subsections for manipulation. Agar (1986, in Turner, 1988: 112) has used the term 'strip' to refer to the units of data with which an ethnographer works: a strip he regards as 'any bounded phenomenon against which an ethnographer tests his or her understanding'.

5. Some cases quoted here were prepared by the Administrative Staff College of India, and reproduced in Knudson, 1967.

6. The case of Manaland Road Transport Corporation was prepared by Jagannadharao S. Abburi, Osmania University, India, reproduced in Knudson, 1967.

7. The case of Bhopil Limited, prepared by Francis A. Menezes, Training Officer, Voltas Limited, Bombay, India, reproduced in Knudson, 1967.

8. The case of Precision Instruments Limited was prepared by Ashwini Kumar, reader, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, India, and the case of Nadir Ali & Company, prepared by Abad Ahmed, Reader, University of Delhi; reproduced in Knudson, 1967.

9. The cases of Baba Textile Mills and Coastal Works Limited, prepared by Mrs. Asha Chary, Instructor, University of Bombay; reproduced in Knudson, 1967.

10. A study by Francis J. (1991) titled "When in Rome", about interactions of hypothetical Japanese managers with hypothetical American managers, uses no real information about any naturally occurring social event. Francis used a scenario-based written manipulation to operationalize the cultural behaviour of target individuals. She states that given "*the difficulty of conducting research with real target individuals from different cultures*", the success of her approach could contribute to "*more efficient and effective research designs*". Chapman (1992) deplores the intellectual bankruptcy of the said study which claims that research without any real subjects could be "more efficient and effective" and states that the indifference to real life is made all the more incongruous by the trappings of statistical analysis, hypothesis, levels of significance and the like.

11. In providing directions for future research in organizational behavior, Pugh, Mansfield and Warner (1975: 64-65) stressed the need in studies to:

(i) Integrate the different levels of analysis (individual, groups, organizations and organizational environments) within the compass of a single, interwoven theoretical framework.

(ii) Attempt to increase links with psychology, sociology, industrial relations, public administration, political science and other originating disciplines of organizational behavior. Modern researchers of organizations seem no longer concerned whether their approach is sociological, psychological, economic or otherwise; for example, the study of organizations by Pugh and Hickson was carried out by a multidisciplinary team (Dunkerley, 1972: 89).

(iii) Have the virtues of comparative research (factorial-statistical) whilst not losing those of idiographic, clinical and processual studies.

(iv) Be more methodologically sophisticated and take account of larger numbers of variables at the same time suggesting a move from simple correlation analyses of the relationships between variables taken in pairs, to contingency types of analysis in which the relationship between a pair of variables is examined as it is affected by (contingent upon) a third variable. The methodological ability to treat several variables is critical to the future integrative development of organizational behavior. Systematization across a much wider conceptual range of variables is an important part of this necessary though difficult integrative process. Monolithic approaches (e.g., the postulation that 'job enrichment, democratic leadership, or system 4 management are good) are inadequate and need to be replaced by a contingency approach using wider conceptual schemes, e.g. the approaches of Lupton, Heller, and the Aston group.

(v) Take account of the need to interrelate cross-sectional surveys and longitudinal

studies to supplement each other so that adequate theories of organizational behavior could emerge (Pugh, Mansfield and Warner, 1975: 17-18).

Reformulation of problems in wider conceptual terms, as part of a continuous learning cycle of description, theory building, testing, refining, more adequate description, etc. is the only way to develop a valid, generalizable (usable) body of knowledge (Pugh, Mansfield and Warner, 1975: 56).

12. It is now widely accepted that the researcher's cognitive processes (subconscious perceptual processes) and limited information handling capacity influence the handling of qualitative data and the nature and direction of his observations and analysis (Glaser, 1978 & Bailyn, 1977 in Turner, 1981: 228). Subjectivism is characterized by a nominalist, anti-positivist, voluntarist and idiographic approach towards research while objectivism is characterized by a realist, positivistic, deterministic, and nomothetic approach. In social science theories, an intermediate position between objectivism and subjectivism is suggested. However, many writers go too far in stressing the subjective element in research, especially when they stress that even natural science research (Polanyi, 1958; Selye, 1964; Watson, 1968; Ravetz, 1971 in Turner, 1981: 228) must be considered the product of an interaction between the researcher and the phenomena under study: While it is true that theory formulation in natural sciences at a high level of abstraction could be influenced by the personality and choices of the researcher, most writers do not mention that the basic natural science empirical research "is" safe from subjective conclusions because of the replicability of the findings by all well-trained researchers and even by students; I have taught experimental physics, and studied biology and chemistry, and I can quote hundreds of experiments in these sciences that lead to similar conclusions if adequate procedures are followed; were it not for the replicability of findings all over the world, natural sciences would not have made their progress in having a uniform and unified base of knowledge, and natural scientists in many fields in all countries of the world would not have been able to share knowledge with remarkable similarity in procedures, research methods, and findings. The high objectivity of natural scientific research can be seen in uniform calculations in mathematics, mechanics, electronics, nuclear physics, and aerospace sciences whether conducted by the Russians or the Americans.

13. Such an approach has been recommended by several authors who criticize many studies for their focus on very small sections of the subject, with short-term practical ends in views and with little or no empirical attempt to relate these small areas to any other parts of the field (Pugh, Mansfield and Warner, 1975: 59). Many writers (Thompson, 1975: 1; Pugh et al, 1975: 57) have mentioned that the total research effort has been somewhat fragmented so that what we have is case studies, comparisons of small numbers of organizations, crude typologies, and broad ranging poorly substantiated theories. It seems that many empirical researchers have tried to overcome the problems of comparative analysis by selecting one or few levels of analysis. Selecting narrow levels of analysis could lead to the dangers of reductionism (Dunkerley, 1972, p.64).

14. Bailyn (1977: 101, in Turner, 1988: 119 and Turner, 1981: 229) suggests that analysis of survey data needs to be pursued within an appropriate degree of complexity in the data: At too high degree of complexity, the analyst is overwhelmed while at too low a level of complexity, very little emerges in the theoretical propositions; dearth of interlinked conceptual relationships offers only a low level of analysis. "... Miller's (1956) long-

established observation [is] that the maximum number of variables which can be held in short-term memory is 'seven plus or minus two'... a theoretical sub-system under analysis should have between five and nine major elements in order to yield an interesting outcome... [But] discussion of scope, of focus and of levels of complexity arises as much, if not more, from the capabilities and limitations of the researcher as from the constraints of the area under investigation." (Turner, 1988: 119).

15. This happens in daily life as well; if you have forgotten a name, the more you stress your memory, the more the name may evade you but if you give up, you may suddenly find one day, without any need or a clue, that the name pops up spontaneously in your memory when you were not expecting it and you wonder why, in the first place, you forgot it. It seems that the unconscious does not sleep but keeps thinking even when we are sleeping. Sometimes, we wake up and find that a riddle that we couldn't solve and had given up, has been solved by the unconscious when we were sleeping; it then, as if, wakes us up and presents us with the solution. Sometimes, rarely though, the solution appears in a dream albeit in a distorted fashion, and hence not usable.

16. Rubenstein and Haberstroh (1966) differentiate between a model and a theory *"theories are structured such that the conclusions derived from them can be placed into correspondence with empirical hypotheses and confirmed or refuted by experiments. Models, on the other hand, are systems standing in the place of another, usually more complicated, system or object"*. The authors state that conclusions derived from models are the *'logical consequences'* of the premises of model structures and that whilst a theory can be refuted by a *'single contradictory empirical finding'*, a model is not exposed to refutation but can continue to be useful provided that it yields some correct or useful conclusions. A theory is expected to yield only true conclusions. Champion (1975: 14-15) defines a *'theory'* as consisting of an *"interrelated set of assumptions and propositions (arranged so that a logical explanatory and predictive scheme is constituted) from which testable hypotheses can be derived"*, and a *'model'* as a *"set of organizational characteristics which permit portrayal of that organization from a particular viewpoint or dimension... Models act as classificatory schemes upon which theories can be constructed... theories and models are very much related to one another but identical neither in form nor in function..."*.

17. The act of knowing includes an appraisal and this personal coefficient, which shapes all factual knowledge, serves as a bridge between subjectivity and objectivity (Polanyi, 1958: 16 in Turner, 1988: 115). *"A consequence... of encouraging investigators to participate in the act of knowing and to develop skill and connoisseurship in knowing is that they are likely to supplement their analytic understanding with what Polanyi variously calls 'personal knowledge', 'tacit knowledge' or 'craft knowledge' of that which they seek to understand. In its nature, the essence of this 'personal knowledge' is difficult to express articulately: as Polanyi comments, 'We know more than we can say.' But personal knowledge nonetheless provides a background of experience and expertise which enables us to appraise that information which we wish to absorb and employ explicitly. In the light of this tacit knowledge, we treat, as Polanyi puts it, 'the experience of our senses as cues' to an array of possible theoretical accounts which would express our deepened understanding."* (Turner, 1988: 116).

Empirical Studies,
Discussions and
Conclusions

Chapter Two: The Role of the Perceptions of Socio-Economic Status, in Motivation and Control in the Sub-continent and the Middle East

(a) Perceptions of status have implications for motivation

In the sub-continent[1], various kinds of ideas of status are openly manifested, stressed, preoccupy the minds of most organizational participants, and extend even to the most commonplace aspects of life. For example, even in prestigious organizations such as Pakistan Petroleum Limited, there are segregated dining rooms; there is an 'officers' mess' and, on another floor in the same building, there is a 'staff canteen'. There is an easily noticeable and large difference in the quality of food, seats, tables and utensils that are used in the officers' mess and in the staff canteen. There are three divisions in the toilets, ironically, in one hall, bearing plaques saying, 'Staff', 'Junior Officers' and 'Senior Officers'. In most industries, there are no toilets for manual workers so that they are supposed to go out in time of need. I have not seen such divisions in Britain.

The status symbols for white-collar employees in most organizations in the sub-continent were found to be air-conditioners (air-conditioners are only for top managers except for banks and companies that are centrally air-conditioned); telephones and the number of telephones on one's table (having one's own telephone is often a status symbol; public telephones are rare and even if one finds one, it may not be usable); the size and quality of the office table; the quality of chairs and office equipment; the location of one's office in the company premises; whether one's office is private or shared (in companies and banks that cannot afford larger premises, managers separate their offices by partitions not always for functional reasons but for a manifestation of prestige as well); the number of subordinates one has; having a private secretary and a company car.

The status symbols in the society were described by most respondents as, having a car, type of house one lives in, where the house is located, one's station in community such as who one is related to or linked to, what type of social interaction one has, what type of society one comes from, what one's father used to do, what one's brothers and cousins are and do, what one's family is; for example, if one's father is the president of a large multi-

[1]As noted in the 'Introduction', most of our empirical observations are equally valid in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India because, being parts of one country in the past, the three share remarkable similarities in social and organizational cultures.

national company, or a wealthy businessman, or has his own servants and a large house, membership of various clubs, life style, if one has been abroad, where one went for holidays, what kind of furniture one has etc. People talk about these things in order to assess each other's status. Evaluating each other's worth was reported to be the most common point of conversation between newly met people in urban social gatherings. The purpose of such 'evaluation' is often to decide if further social relations with the person should be pursued or not. One is often brought to repute or disrepute by where he lives, what type of parties he attends, what type of people he mixes around with etc.

The status symbols described above affect the possibility of one getting a job. Most interviewees reported that people who are better placed in life, that is, people who belong to the upper section of the society in terms of their station and position, have far better chances of getting better paid jobs and more powers. But then these people are likely to have more education as well because of their money irrespective of their performance in the schools, even if they were average performers they would have an additional support of their parents to go to a better college or university particularly with the newer education system whereby a monetary donation to an academic establishment may secure a place for a student regardless of his lower than average performance. Education is not free for all in the sub-continent and even if the under-resourced sections of society get education, there are many other social hurdles that they may not be able to cross; for example, practically, they may not be able to provide a good reference which is a major factor when one applies for a job. Because of one's social condition, because his father was a minor clerk or a junior official, one may not be able to put up an impressive bio-data irrespective of high qualifications. Although there is a certain amount of merit-based employment in the system, and one with a lower ascribed status may not be turned away from all jobs, the one with high status contacts is often reported to have greater chances. This finding is commonly reported in news papers and other mass media, and is supported by cases reported in daily life.

Social bargaining power: The concept of social bargaining power is linked with non-work control attitudes, authoritarianism, motivation patterns, and is not as deep rooted in the Western culture as in the Asian. It is hard to define this concept in sociological terms and therefore I would try to explain it by examples. I might give here one example from real life: I was once attending the annual management meeting that was to decide on how much increments should be granted to the staff of a certain Asian-Arab bank. There was one

officer, who happened to be the nephew of the governor of that province, and another senior officer, more qualified and more suitable for the job, from a not well known family background. The general manager, whilst granting to the nephew of the governor, double the amount of increment than that granted to the senior officer of humble origins, gave the following reasoning,

"he [the nephew] has a Mercedes and would probably be spending half his salary on petrol - [the other] doesn't have a car, so give him [the nephew] about double".

The social background of a person in the sub-continent is many times more relevant, in determining one's prerogatives and privileges at work, than work-related factors such as qualifications and job-related skills, not to mention several other socio-economic privileges available in the society.

A short reference to the role of dress would not be out of place here to stress the significance of the extent to which status and prestige plays a very strong role in the sub-continent. In fact, a whole treatise could be written about the ways in which various kinds of dress and clothing can show a man's social, economic, ethnic, linguistic, provincial and religious background. A common and simple example is that one can usually tell a poor worker from a middle class or rich man by his dress. Most upper class people in Pakistan wear shalwar-kameez to show their nationalism, but they expect their bankers and their managers to wear Western suits and tie and be well dressed: The affluent client may talk to the latter in Punjabi (a symbol of being carefree and informal) but he wants the latter to look and behave polite and civil. The affluent client expects that people worthy of his status, shown firstly by dress, should come to visit him.

Having provided an introduction to the kinds and types of status symbols and the way they influence the psychology of organizational participants, I proceed to my case studies in some sub-continent organizations to show how work is 'sectionalized' into categories of 'prestigious, less prestigious, and manual/physical-centered occupations' at the level of workers who are at the lowest rung of the organizational hierarchical ladder. We shall then move on to the next hierarchical level and see the resentment and grudges, between 'the ranker clerks and the junior managers', on the basis of social and economic status symbols, in a large Indian finance company. Finally, we shall see the role of status symbols and socio-economic power at the highest level of organizational hierarchy in the Ministerial Departments of a provincial Civil Secretariat in Pakistan.

(b)The cultural prejudice against manual/physical-centered trades & occupations

The findings in the empirical studies conducted for this work often revealed people's perceptions of the worthiness of types of trades, occupations and professions. Manual or physical-centered occupations are placed at the lowest end of the spectrum of worthiness[2]. We may begin with the cultural perception of the worth of manual occupations and pass on to the perceptions of 'higher' occupations, jobs, ranks and departments:

(i)The historical nature of the phenomenon: The concepts of 'worthiness' of work have been transmitted historically from the feudal and tribal past whereby members of higher feudal classes and the tribal chiefs, did not engage in manual trades. In the caste system, only the lowest castes, the 'shudras' and the 'kamis' performed manual/physical tasks. Among Muslims, the higher classes mostly engaged themselves in the conquest of other regions, in running the affairs of the regions under their control, and in patronizing those with religious-philosophical or literary merits. Manual occupations were left for the lower classes. Agriculture was considered an inferior profession; in Islamic history, we find that the peasant Ansars in Medina were considered inferior to the Meccan Quraish who were the religious leaders [see the collection of Islamic aphorisms by Imam Bukhari]. Several idioms in the sub-continent reflect the lowliness of 'Araeens', the farmers.

(ii)The non-work content of the lowly perception of manual occupations: Detailed analysis of the contents of interviewee statements shows that the perception of the lowliness of manual occupations is subjective and cultural in nature and hence has little to do with the nature of the work itself. For example, when the interviewees used the terms 'lowly', 'base', and 'inferior' for works such as sweeping and cleaning or washing dishes, they could not substantiate why these jobs were so perceived. Hence, in this kind of evaluation and ranking of various occupations and trades, it is not the work content of the professions but the historical attitude towards those who engage into such professions that counts for the evaluation of the worthiness of the work.

(iii)The relationship of reward not with actual work: The relationship of reward with the perception of the lowliness of the trade, and not with work per se, becomes obvious when we see enormous difference in the wages of workers in the sub-continent and the Middle East

[2]Culture creates sentiments regarding the appropriate type of economic enterprise for an individual and has a strong influence upon the way in which work at lower levels of organization is viewed (Whyte, 1961: 31-35).

compared to the same in the West. Wages for manual work are much lower than even the social security payments to the unemployed in the West. But the said relationship does not supplant the labor market conditions of demand and supply because in cases of scarcity, manual workers may ask for comparatively higher wages which again would be a minor fraction of the wages for similar work in the West.

(c) The consequent psychology of motivation

We may begin a description of the motivation situation in the sub-continent by looking at the way in which manual/physical-centered trades are demeaned and point to people's desires to raise their social status by finding non-menial jobs. The non-monetary (and hence the cultural) aspect of the demeaning of manual/ physical-centered occupations becomes obvious from the finding that one who does non-manual work within the same income group is perceived to be of a higher social status. For example, many office assistants and clerks earn less than what some workers do but the former would still be perceived as having a higher status than the latter and, other factors being same, given preference in socialization or say, in an arranged marriage proposal. An occupation that involves sitting on a chair and having a table for doing paper work is considered worthier than a manual-centered occupation. An Indian manager reported that work which involved reading and writing was considered so high in status by female workers that they quarrelled amongst themselves to get it though this did not entail higher wages.

Within the category of manual work, the most low perceived is sweeping/cleaning which, in homes where there are no servants, is considered to be the job of women. Men, perceived 'higher sex', would consider it an insult to sweep/clean which jobs, in Pakistan, are done either by Christian minorities or women wherever Muslim men can find other jobs.

The problem of 'manual versus dignified work' shows in Pakistan International Airlines where it was reported that when, for example, a technician is promoted to a higher grade and called an 'officer', he comes the next day and says, "because I am an officer now, I will sit on a chair in front of a table as it is below my status now to work on the shop floor". The said technician has worked all his life on the shop floor, and he is not fit for the work of an officer, but he refuses to work on the shop floor considering a technician's job, which he has done well for years, as below his newly acquired dignity. He is a skilled technician, but he can get more money only if his designation is changed to an 'officer' which change reduces his usefulness for the organization.

As a finance manager in a large company, I once received a consignment of stationary at an odd hour when no peon was available and so I decided to lift the packages myself to the office, but my accounts assistant refused to carry packages because he thought it was below his status to lift things. In a certain area, I observed that the local shop assistants refrained from sitting with construction workers in one lunch room even in evenings when the workers had taken a bath and wore as clean clothes as the shop assistants did.

Those who have been engaged into 'low jobs' such as sweeping, cleaning, breaking stones, lifting baggage, carrying bricks and other construction material, etc. would not normally be welcomed as a guest in the homes of same-income people engaged in non-manual trades such as office clerks, government employees, bank junior employees and companies employees in junior non-manual categories. One in the latter kind of jobs would normally consider it a humiliation to engage into 'low jobs' of the former kinds.

The 'shame and humiliation' associated with manual/physical-centered occupations was also found in the statements of my British-Asians interviewees who came from non-manual occupational background in home countries but had to work in British factories despite their prejudice against physical-centered occupations: When Asians from non-manual occupational backgrounds came to Britain, many accepted working in factories because of the enormously high wages that British companies offered to them compared to what they could make in any kind of work in home countries. In terms of their earnings, Asian workers in Britain rose to become at par with very high income groups in home countries; groups such as medium-size business owners and very highly paid company managers. British Asian workers earn many times more in Western factories than what most Asian doctors, lawyers, lecturers, engineers and bank and company managers earn in home countries and this fact has served as an impetus to British Asian workers to engage into factory jobs and bid farewell to the cultural prejudice against the said occupations, but only to an extent: Among Asians in Britain, the same cultural divide of manual versus higher jobs is still shown when it comes to marriage and socialization; manual workers would not be as welcomed as others into the homes of those who run businesses or are employed in office-related jobs.

Giving up the cultural prejudice against manual occupations, particularly against cleaning and sweeping, was by no means easy especially for those whose "forefathers had had higher status" and who came from families that had for long seen manual/physical jobs with disdain and contempt. The 'humiliation' that these people had to go through after

accepting the jobs of factory workers is reflected in the narrations from many interviewees. One interviewee, a graduate from Pakistan, comes from a large tribe-family in which some relatives have reached higher ranks and could be placed among the upper middle classes, but some live in poverty; hence the belligerence as well as the pride of the poor in the family because the "relatives are high placed". The said interviewee was lucky in that he got a very highly paid job in a decent working environment but the 'shame' of sometimes having to sweep the factory floor, with others, was so great, especially "in front of the female workers", that after having several quarrels with the supervisor, he finally gave up his job: Note that a man in the sub-continent is not supposed to perform tasks that are culturally supposed to be women's. Domestic cleaning, especially in the presence of women, is considered to be one of the 'unmanly' tasks, which aspect becomes clearer when we observe that even manual workers would not do many domestic chores in their homes (other than those tasks which require physical strength beyond the capacity of women in which case the male members of a family may take pride in displaying their physical strength by doing the particular job). In rural areas, collecting cow dung to be used as fuel, lifting pales of water from wells, sweeping and cleaning in homes, cooking and washing clothes and utensils are tasks under-taken usually by women. In the cities, cooking, cleaning, sweeping, washing and ironing clothes are supposed to be women's jobs inside homes. But in hotels and restaurants and at business and public places, these jobs would be done by men because women are neither allowed nor safe working at many business and public places. However, women of some very poor nomadic tribes engage themselves in poorly paid construction and kiln jobs. Ironically, a male cook in a restaurant would consider it a disgrace to cook at home in front of his female kin.

Although the respondent mentioned above denied that he refused to sweep for reasons of a 'cultural conditioning' and gave alternative reasons for refusing to sweep, his reasons, that he wanted to learn 'higher things', were obviously invalid because he stood better chances of 'higher learning' by retaining his job and saving enough money to go for higher studies; more over, the vehemence, the anger and the use of words like "bloody cleaning", his statement, "not in front of women as well", and the use of words, "hate", and "self-respect", and his subsequent denunciation of other Asian workers who did sweep as being "sycophants" (because the other Asian workers had long been in Britain and adjusted to the work requirements, the interviewee thinks that they had lost self-respect and were flattering

the Whites: "they downed themselves; they are bloody working here for twenty-five years but they are always like that [i.e. stayed at the level of a factory worker]", make it obvious that he held the common sub-continent perception of the baseness of manual/physical tasks. As the interview progressed, it became clearer that he had not only considered manual tasks as inferior but, after having spend more time in Britain and finding it impossible to evade manual jobs, was becoming increasingly aware of the vanity of his cultural prejudice so that by the end of the interview he admitted that he regretted giving up his high paid job for a trivial reason. That he refused to sweep for reasons of culturally instilled prejudice is also evident from his refusal to wash dishes in another job which he thought would be working on a counter (paper work and public dealing) perceived to have a relatively higher status. In the latter parts of the interview, he accepted that he should have changed his attitude earlier, but the change came too late to keep the good job.

Another reason often observed for the lowly self-concept associated with manual work is the demeaning ways in which manual workers are addressed to by those engaged in higher esteemed trades and professions - owners of large private businesses being held at the top of public esteem. One example of the said manner of addressing is that in the Urdu language there are three versions of the pronoun 'you' (like the German du and zie) and the use of either version correlates with the difference between the social and economic status of the addresser and the addressee. The use of the lowliest form of 'you', which is 'tu', for a man of non-manual and higher social back-ground (if he is not a close friend) could lead to serious reaction and insults in response. For a man of some respect, only the highest form of 'you', that is, 'aap', could be safely used. From among numerous events narrated by interviewees showing the lowly attitude towards manual workers, see the following:

'I realized that one could sit and trim, found a chair, sat on it and began trimming. After a few hours, I went to the toilet. When I came back, I found that the owner had taken my chair away. After a while, he shouted at me, "hey you! come here!". I said in a calm way, "I told you my name, you can call me by my name, my name is not hey you". He said, "well that is how I call my workers and that is how I shall call you"'.

(d) 'Prestigious, less prestigious', and manual/physical-centered occupations

A case study of a large Indian industry reveals the extent to which a cultural prejudice against manual/physical-centered occupations may motivate people to seek either non-manual jobs or jobs where the 'knowledge content' over-rides the manual content of work, hence uplifting the self-esteem and the social status of the job occupant. The organizational

structure in this kind of companies is a very long hierarchical one, created apparently to satisfy the promotion-related status desires of the management staff. There are chances for the operators to become supervisors but not executives. In this pharmaceutical industry, working in the sterile area does not require much manual labor but careful monitoring of weights, measurements and ratios of medicines, that is, it requires some knowledge and expertise. If the wages in the sterile area would have been higher, we might have been inclined to attribute the reasons, for the strong desire to work in the sterile area, to higher wages there, but, as reported, working in the sterile area does not in itself ensure higher wages; hence the reduction in the manual work-content and the increase in the knowledge content of the job was a significant motivation, other than the chances of promotion to higher ranks, for the operators to work in the sterile area, and this led to conflicts in the industry:

"It was a very burning issue and sometimes it could blast off and some worker would refuse to work. They wanted to work in the sterile area and not everybody could be sent in there, we, the managers decided that these guys should be shifted around all the other units of the company. But they used to get frustrated and angry and one of them would bang the executive in his face".

Note the similarity in attitude towards manual work between the above mentioned workers in India and that of our aforementioned interviewee in Britain, and the dissimilarity in that while the interviewee in Britain could live on social security, the workers in India were bound to stay because there is no social security system in the sub-continent, and this dead-end increased their frustration leading to aggression. Many such cases show an intricate relationship between motivation and conflict.

(e) Cultural/monetary degradation of manual workers in the Middle East

Disdain for those engaged in physical-manual crafts is a common element of the Middle Eastern culture. The oil rich Gulf states, UAE, Qatar, Libya, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia have for long resorted to import of labor and domestic servants from poorer countries because of the local disdain for such jobs. Refusal to accept manual work at high wages but acceptance of clerical work at low wages has been reported by many authors (Darity, 1965). Another author notes that the low status of manual work in Egypt fosters class consciousness and inhibits cooperation, communication, and opportunities for advancement (Langenderfer, 1965). Patai (1973: 113-117) has described the general Arab aversion to physical work, and its effects upon their socio-economic development in great detail. He traces the roots of this

aversion right to the biblical curse of Adam pronounced by God,

"Cursed is the ground for thy sake; in toil shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life. In the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground, for out of it wast thou taken; for dust thou art and unto dust shalt thou return" (Genesis 3: 17-19),

and finds this attitude diametrically opposite to the Protestant ethic, which considers work as something that ennobles man.

(f) Socio-economic classes correspond to organizational hierarchy

During the period I worked for a large bank, we had a subtle kind of conflict between the experienced rankers and the fresh MBAs who had been taken in higher positions despite having no experience in banking. The rankers resented having the MBAs in senior positions and used to say,

"these MBAs are a new kind of bureaucracy that has been imposed upon us though we know more about banking than these fresh university out-put and still they have been taken in at higher posts and at higher salaries".

A typical situation of various socio-economic classes coming together at workplace but staying aloof from each other, occasionally resenting each other's social power, and showing class antipathy in apparently non-class disputes, comes from the description of a large Indian private finance firm in which the lowest layer of management was supervisors who were basically rankers, had been taken for clerical jobs, and their growth was just an annual increment in their salary package not based on further promotions but linked to inflation. A typical person in this category would be 40 plus, with a secondary education, who has put in around 15 to 20 years of service in the organization. In due course some had been promoted to the supervisory category but that was the upper limit for them; they could not expect to rise to higher levels of management and, to their vexation, there was a large influx of young new managers, squeezed in between the upper management and the said lower, resistant clerks. An average period of service which a new young manager would put in this type of organization was three years after which he was likely to leave for a better opportunity elsewhere. These junior managers, who were academically more qualified but at the early stages of their work lives, were mostly unsuccessful in managing the resistant rankers who had served longer with the company. The subtle conflict between 'rankers' and 'qualified professionals' was an issue which used to surface almost daily; the rankers used to comment and observe,

"these youngsters come with their high flashing qualifications, stay for a couple of years with the organization and use it as a launching pad to land into a better position elsewhere while we are the people who have given our life and blood to this organization but we are made to sit in the basement pushing papers around. We are not given any say in the decision making, we have been reduced to clerks because we do not have the degrees though we actually do all the jobs while the young managers keep coming and going".

The young managers' contribution could not be seen because by the time they could claim to have achieved something for the company, they were poised to leave. Note that, as reported, there was no such resentment between the junior, middle and the upper management; the three levels of managers normally come from compatible social, economic and hence educational backgrounds and therefore, despite conflicts among individual managers, there is little such group-antipathy between layers of management as is seen between the lower staff and the junior managers. Besides, the three layers of management do socialize with each other and share many similarities in life styles such as the way they dress up, the papers and journals they read, topics of conversation, the clubs they attend etc. One was in the middle or the upper management because of experience and what they had in common with the junior management was similar level of academic qualifications.

On the other hand, there was little social interaction between the junior managers and the clerical workers. In the Indian context, the two positions under discussion would also be linked with one's economic status (the status of one's family) because people who get higher education, invariably come from a more affluent set-up of the society. They had a privilege over the lower educated clerical people which used to be obvious; for example, the managers would have a higher standard of living, they took annual holidays to go to places, they usually had dual sources of income when they had working professional wives. Then there was always an age-gap between a young manager and his ranker subordinates; often the gap was that between a son and a father. The subordinates came by public transport but the young managers had cars - a high status symbol.

The clerks and the supervisors come from the lower social and economic sections of the society, while young officers and above ranking officers/managers normally come from the middle or upper income groups even in merit based organizations. This needs explanation: Merit, in the sub-continent, is mostly seen as either experience (not excluding the socio-economic status of the person) or education: For a higher position in an organization, much greater emphasis is placed, during selection, on educational qualifications as against the British situation where experience often leads to superior positions in

businesses[3]. But in the sub-continent, while the upper classes may get higher jobs even without proper education, for the middle and lower majority, education is the main key to hope for any senior rank or a non-manual job, and because education, especially higher education, is not free for all, the lower income groups are systematically excluded from being able to join an organization as officers. The situation is best reflected in the Armed forces where the JCOs (Junior Commissioned Officers) and the COs (Commissioned Officers) constitute two distinct, largely class based divisions with different attitudes and outlooks towards various aspects of life styles and living conditions so that if a JCO gets his commission after hard work and after getting educational qualifications by studying in his spare time, he has to change his life style considerably in order to be socially accepted among the commissioned officers. A certain JCO, who got his commission through hard work and studies, and hence retired as a colonel, once told me that he knew only three JCOs in his regiment who got their commissions; all three subsequently divorced their peasant wives in order to remarry educated and 'modern' women so that they could attend the social gatherings of commissioned officers.

The aforementioned issue of 'junior managers being resisted by rankers', was not resolved. No one in the firm thought that there was a solution to it. Not only the said company but all other established companies of this kind have similar kind of hierarchical structures, and all have the problems of two or more socio-economic groups resenting each other. The 'two levels' situation is also seen in the civil service and in government jobs where we have gazetted officers on one hand, and non-gazetted staff on the other, so that one in the former category is more likely to have a middle/upper class background while one in the latter category is more likely to have a lower class background. It may therefore be safely deduced that the hierarchical levels of a typical organization in the sub-continent have a direct correlation with the socio-economic class structure of the society. That the older subordinates resent the young managers being placed above them, implies that the British system of promoting those who work better for the company, despite their socio-economic status or education, is better for harmony in organizational relationships, and to give opportunity to

[3]"At a recent British Institute of Management conference, Lord Young, the Employment Secretary, deplored the fact that 40 percent of the three and a half million managers and supervisors in Britain had no qualifications at all, and 80 percent had no qualifications relevant to management" (Cowling et al., 1988: 211).

the lower classes rise in the hierarchy.

However, there are other types of organizations controlled by families who have their say in every decision. These companies are less education-centered and more performance-centered in the way they reward personnel: If one performs well towards the profits of the company, he would rise in the hierarchy whatever his academic level.

(g) The nature of motivation in the Ministerial Departments at a Civil Secretariat

From below in the hierarchy of ranks in the Ministerial Departments, there are section officers, deputy secretaries, assistant secretaries, additional secretaries and then the secretary. With every secretary there is his department but there is also another department attached to it headed by the director. The functions of an attached department are the implementation of the orders or instructions that are issued by the secretary's department after being received from the Minister. Almost all ministries have a similar organizational structure. Work distribution is done by the secretary, on the basis of which section a certain additional secretary is dealing with, and has implications for motivation and related conflicts. The common issues of conflict at the Services and General Administration Department are of various types. Some conflicts, as reported by the interviewees, are "personality clashes"; some conflicts arise out of the way work has been distributed. As reported by the interviewees, distribution of work is related to who has got more socio-political powers and authority. When distribution of work is done on the basis of who has greater clout, it results in unequal division of work. At the Services and General Administration Department, some sections are considered 'important' and some are considered 'unimportant' and therefore there is resentment as one thinks he has been given 'unimportant' sections while another has been given 'important' sections. One might feel that he is being ignored by the superiors. Also, some get assignments that are deemed 'important' while another may get work that is not particularly considered important: Dealing with cases that involve public contact is considered 'important work' because such work normally results in building relationships and contacts which the dealing officer could exploit in future to his advantage. Jobs that do not involve public contact are not considered of much importance. Officers generally want work that could wield them certain powers. They usually want cases or assignments where there is greater public contact, public relations, where they can enhance their importance and value. For examples, there is a section called, 'Non-Gazetted Employees Affairs'. An officer

dealing with the non-gazetted employees of the Secretariat, in the course of his duties, would normally come into contact with lower ranking functionaries - those on grade 15 or below: An officer dealing with low ranking staff would be just listening to their problems all the time - problems of unfair recruitment, or problems of transfer, etc. and therefore may not feel himself to be an important person. Likewise, if an officer is dealing with the service matters of school teachers who are teaching in far flung areas and are less likely to visit him in his office, then he would feel ignored because he would be dealing with routine matters of leave sanctions or pensions etc. Similarly, dealing with the cases of very senior officials too does not pay off because these officials would normally get their jobs done by calling in on the Secretary or the Minister of Services & General Administration, on phone, or in person; they would not normally come to see section officers or deputy secretaries because they would consider such an act as falling below their status. Hence, dealing in cases of very high officials does not make the staff being discussed feel self-important. But, on the other hand, there are cases of, say, the Health Department: One dealing in Health Department cases would get good contacts established with the officials of the local Health Department and this could lead to great help in return; if he or his family is sick, they would have access to doctors and free medicine that otherwise might not be available. There is little monetary gain involved here but if one may establish good relations with equi-status people in other departments, it could pay off sometime. A doctor would be more considerate to the one with whom his file, for promotion or transfer, is lying. Likewise, although the Electricity Department is a separate and independent department and have their own secretariat, their files and cases related to service matters come to the Services & General Administration Department. If an officer in the Services and General Administration has an electricity problem in his house, a fault in the circuit, or he wants a three phase connection for his air-conditioner, he need not go to the Electricity Department and wait to get the problem rectified; he would just call them, introduce who he is, and they would help him much quicker than they would somebody else who is not of much significance to them.

Then there are, known in the local slang, 'effective/ineffective[4] departments', and

[4]Note the altogether incorrect meaning of the words 'effective' and 'ineffective', used here by personnel, quite thoughtlessly; the meaning of 'effectiveness' conveyed here is not related to functional imperatives and goal achievement but to the power, money, and status that a department with a larger budget and high public contact offers to its official.

many officials strive to get transferred from an 'ineffective' department to an 'effective' department where they can make more money. Some departments are called 'nominal departments', such as the Fisheries Department or the Archaeology Department: If someone is appointed the Director General of the Archaeology Department, he will not have as much power and influence as he will if he was transferred to the Education Department because the Education Department has got thirty thousand employees and a many times larger budget. There are two thousand educational institutions on which the Director of Education can exercise his control; it is a big rise in status, power and prestige as his administration would then include public dealing on a vast scale. Such departments are called, 'effective departments'; the Health Department being one of these. There are large sums involved in managing these departments and many officials strive to get into these.

(h) Perceptions of social class and respect worthiness have implications for control

Most factory managers reported that, on an average, once a month, there was a verbal or physical conflict among the foremen and the workers, but such conflict between a manager and a worker/supervisor was very rare. I found a consensus[5] among the managers interviewed both from India and Pakistan, about the difference in the level of respect which workers expressed for their supervisors, whom they considered as one of their own (coarser) social class, and that which they expressed for their managers, whom they considered coming from a higher (polite) social class. Thus when supervisors, who are in direct contact with workers on a daily basis, cannot handle a situation of conflict, they call in the senior managers and usually a compromise is reached. In one large Indian factory, the decisions regarding the promotion of workers were taken at very senior levels, often at the level of the managing director (this would be very unusual in Western companies) in order to prevent conflict between direct supervisors/executives and workers on the question of promotions:

"The top management wanted to take the responsibility on its shoulders so that there

[5] It is not uncommon to find many interviewees sharing similar kinds of observations and drawing similar conclusions about certain cultural phenomena. Consensus among interviewees reassures the researcher that his conclusions are sound. If the researcher has done sufficient observation prior to conducting empirical studies, he would not find many interviewees who disagree with his own deductions. It is nevertheless a pleasant surprise to find interviewees in different countries sharing remarkably similar deductions about some cultural phenomena.

should not be fights going on the shop floor between supervisors and the operators; supervisors in contact with workers could say that it was the high-ups who had decided whether one should be promoted or not."

Some reasons, for the aforementioned different levels of respect, that I have picked from interviewee narrations, are the following:

(i)The power to reward and punish: The workers felt that the managers had greater authority than the foremen had, to sack a person. If a foreman threatens a worker that the latter would be sacked, the workers have in mind that the issue could always be settled at a higher level of management, that a manager would listen and be the judge.

(ii)The role of language: In the sub-continent, the language and the manner of speech is linked to the addressee's socio-economic background and level of education. The manner of use of language also shows the respect or deference one has for the other. For example, one can get more attention from policemen in Punjab if one is well dressed and talks to them in Urdu. In Pakistan, the higher managers usually talk in Urdu (the equivalent of which in Northern India would be Hindi) which is more polite than the coarser vernacular. The foremen promoted from lower ranks speak in the coarse workers' vernacular and therefore they are perceived by workers to be at a lower social level; workers do listen to them too but when they reply, they do so in the way as they would to their fellow workers. Polite language usually creates a distance between the workers/foremen on one side and the manager as a respectable person on the other side. If one wants to give greater respect to an educated man, or seek greater respect from others, he might talk in English, more so in India where almost all educated people can speak English. The manner of speech plays an important role in relationships and this is true probably of all countries in the world[6].

(iii)Social/economic class: Most foremen and workers come from the same social class and though this makes them more at home with each other, it also becomes a barrier

[6]Dostoyevsky has talked about this in many of his novels where many characters from the Russian nobility seek prestige by speaking in German or French, considering Russian a comparatively 'low' language. In 'Crime and Punishment', a bankrupt and demented wife of a Russian General seeks the sympathies of a crowd by exhorting her children to speak in French. In the sub-continent and the Middle East, many scholars (except when they cannot find proper translation of English terms in local languages) seek greater attention and prestige by inserting English or French phrases in their diction or in writings. Such use of another language is related to the perceptions of the 'greatness' of the civilization whose language is used.

in accepting the superior authority of a man from the same, so-perceived, lower background. However, most managers are from among the middle classes and get more respect than do the foremen, provided the former do behave as one from a 'better' social background. About the foremen, as one manager said, "the workers are less likely to be controlled by him because he is with them and from them and at their social level". Less regard for a superior who "was one like us", is not peculiar to workers only because many managers and professionals too have reported similar lack of regard for a superior who was "one from us". Hence the cross-cutting among hierarchical levels of a cultural phenomena that maybe described as follows: In several interview narrations, we see this very important cultural element of societies that are patriarchal, authoritarian and sectionalized on the bases of social/economic class or tribe, whereby control power over others in organizations is related less to rank, designation and official position in the organization, and more to the social and economic status. This cultural element is most clearly shown in most Arab controlled organizations where the member of an 'inferior tribe' would not be exactly obeyed, even in the armed forces, by the members of 'superior tribes' even when the former holds a higher rank than the latter in the organization. The above mentioned cultural element is also shown in cases of an attitude of 'not taking orders' from a senior who has the same salary and designation as the others but has been placed as a team leader because of his high performance. Hence the relation of control power more with social/economic position and less with official designation.

(iv)The role of education: Educated foremen were found to be in better control of workers. Managers, who are more educated and have greater expertise and knowledge of the work, get more respect from skilled staff, technicians, and professionals.

(v)The role of distance: Many statements show that regular direct contact lowers esteem especially for one in a work-allocating role so that the daily grudge gets accumulated. But among a technically skilled workforce, the presence of expert and knowledgeable managers raised the morale of the workforce (skilled workers identify themselves more with the management than with the unskilled workers). In a high-tech organization, it was reported that the skilled workforce resented the staying away of a higher manager from the workplace. Hence it maybe concluded that while production managers may leave the daily contact with unskilled workers to the supervisors, and intervene only when the latter cannot handle a situation, with a skilled workforce, their frequent presence is recommended.

Summary and contributions of chapter 2 towards the Grounded Theory to be proposed

(A) In the sub-continent motivation to work is shaped by the following socio-cultural factors:

(1) There are very wide income and consequently culture-symbolic differences between socio-economic classes.

(2) One's position in the organizational hierarchy corresponds to one's socio-economic class membership (upper classes in the top ranks, lower classes in the lower ranks); this is obvious not particularly in the armed forces and the civil service but in the private sector as well.

(3) In addition to merit-based considerations, one's socio-economic background affects, positively or negatively, one's opportunity to get higher education, job and related powers.

(4) Jobs are categorized with respect to associated status symbols in terms of (in order of worth or value attached) 'prestigious, less prestigious, and manual/physical'. Jobs are also classified in sexist terms as 'manly and feminine' among the traditional majority.

(5) There is a historically transmitted cultural and monetary degradation of manual jobs. Hence, the less the manual content of a job, the higher the associated motivation and value.

(6) The above mentioned factors lead to a system of rewards that is not exactly linked to the nature and amount of work done. Hence manual workers get wages that are a small fraction of that for similar jobs in the West, but business profit margins are many times higher than that for comparable businesses in the West. (*Finding 6 explains finding 1*).

(7) People are generally motivated by the desire to achieve high social status symbolized by several kinds of material possessions, life styles, and the use of dress and language.

(8) In sub-continent organizations, in addition to work-related considerations, the prerogatives and privileges of an employee are also affected by his social class background.

(9) In white-collar jobs, people seek posts and positions that could grant them more contacts, authority, and socio-political and financial powers.

(B) Organizational control is affected by the following socio-cultural factors:

(10) A person's power to control (indicated by compliance to his decisions) is enhanced if he,

(a) belongs to a perceived higher social class,

(b) belongs to a higher hierarchical level,

(c) uses a kind of language associated with a higher social class,

(d) has higher education, knowledge and skills and is able to relate them to work,

(e)keeps an adequate distance from subordinates, that is, (i)does not frequently interact with, in case of, unskilled workers who are accustomed to rough language, (ii)interacts frequently with skilled and qualified personnel.

(C)The above findings were found valid in the Middle East as well, with a qualification that 'tribal membership' compounds the effects of 'socio-economic class membership'.

The findings explain the role of 'socio-economic classes' and 'tribal memberships' in general, in motivation and organizational control. Due to acute class differences, barriers, and associated prerogatives and privileges, we find a strong motivation for 'social mobility' both in the sub-continent and the Middle East as people strive to join the next higher social class.

The findings shall be taken to our Grounded Theory to show that,

(i)orientation and motivation to work is determined by socio-cultural learning and prevalent attitudes towards the perceived value of work;

(ii)organizational control is facilitated or hampered by the subordinates' culture-based perceptions of the social class of the one delegated with the functions of control.

Chapter Three: The Role of the Sub-continent, British Asian and Middle Eastern Family in Determining Patterns of Behavior, Differentiated from that of the Western Family

The family situation is of relevance to this work because the Eastern[1] businesses are more dominated by family and kinship structures of the owners than are the Western. The aims and objectives of most Eastern businesses are exclusively determined by the owning family, partly because the Eastern lower classes are demonstrably more obsequious of authority than are the Western lower classes and also because of the differing patterns of motivation between the said societies[2]. In the interviews for this work it was found that not only do the owner family members occupy key roles and are the only major decision makers in most Eastern businesses, they also undertake supervisory activities even if the business is a fairly large one. There are comparatively few examples of partnerships where partners determine the goals and controls of business.

A detailed study of the family is beyond the scope of this work but the family system, family values and the nature of family relationships is of relevance to the extent the family situation influences control, conflict and motivation patterns in organizations. This is supported by observations regarding analogous behavior in the family and in organizations: In the traditional sub-continent and the Middle East, where the only socially acceptable mode of life is based on a closed family and kinship structure, control and conflict-resolution methods of the family/tribe are subconsciously learned and repeated in the work-place. As family ownership (overt or covert) of business remains the most common form of control of resources of production, family politics of the owners is often replayed in the workplace. More over, patterns of motivation, control and conflict have a lot to do with the values and ideals that one's family persuades one into in early life. In other words, familial behavior patterns have parallels in organizational behavior: For example, the behavior of children in Europe is not as much subject to parental control as it is in the sub-continent; this is analogous to the observation that the behavior of workers in Europe is not as much controlled by managers/employers as it is in the sub-continent; hence the often observed sub-continent

[1]We shall use the abbreviation 'Eastern' for convenience sake, to refer to findings that are applicable to the sub-continent, British-Asian, and Middle Eastern culture and organizations. The later three terms have been defined in the introductory chapter.

[2]For a description of the sub-continent motivation patterns, see chapters 2 and 4.

employee's view of the top manager/owner as the 'mai-baap' which literally means, 'mother-father' and the idiomatic translation of which is 'a patron' or a 'father-figure'. It has been noted by several authors on the sociology of family that family is the first and foremost institution where patterns of behavior are learned[3]. Engels has gone as far as to suggest that the emergence and the nature of private property and the state are strongly linked to the emergence of patriarchal society, monogamy and the family[4].

The family situation is relevant also because of the fact that the Eastern family system has demonstrably shown greater success in conditioning the younger generation into set patterns of motivation (money, status, authority, education, religion, dogmatism), control (segregation, authoritarianism and power) and conflict (exclusive family, groups/ sub-groups, in-groups and out-groups, racism, regionalism, etc.[5]), than has the Western family. This is partly because family, arranged marriages, and prohibition of inter-communal marriages (excluding a few major urban industrial cities) is the only mode of social life accepted in the Eastern societies. Rare exceptions maybe tolerated but not without strong social disapproval.

Some differentiating factors between Eastern and Western family systems:

(a) The imposition/significance of the exclusive/closed family in the former:

As a consequence of a society which legitimizes no other mode of social life than the one based on large kinship family [*khandan* in India and Pakistan, and *Aaila* in the Middle East] and clan [*bradari* in India and Pakistan, and *Qabila* in the Middle East], there is many times more family involvement in the ownership of businesses in Eastern enterprises than it is in Western companies; family members are usually the first to be trusted and relied upon

[3]"...the family is that group within which the most fundamental appreciation of human qualities and values takes place... the qualities of truth and honesty, of falsehood and deceit, of kindness and sympathy, of indifference and cruelty, of co-operation and forbearance, of egotism and antagonism, of justice and impartiality, of bias, dogmatism and obstinacy, of generous concern for the freedom and fulfillment of others, of the mean desire to dominate - whether in overt bullying or in psychologically more subtle ways".

(Fletcher, R., in Morgan D.H.J., 1980: 92)

[4]Engels, Frederick, The Origin of Family, Private Property and the State, Progress Publishers, Moscow.

[5]For a description of these aspects of endogamous family-based divisions, see chapter 5.

(blood is thicker..) and this has cultural reasons and significance often expressed in the values of the sub-continent and Middle Eastern societies[6]. Deviations are penalized by various sanctions and means of control: In the sub-continent one who does not marry and produce children would find it very hard to retain self-confidence because of the perpetual and strong criticism from relatives, friends and colleagues. In many major Muslim sects, it is forbidden to say the funeral prayers for the lifetime celibate because celibacy is regarded as a sin:

"Family is an institution outside which life is unthinkable. Allah has commanded that one should not stay unmarried, for marriage is a shield against sin. Wives and children are the beauty of this life. Whatever we earn is for our families, parents, relatives, and their children" (A commonly expressed value).

These social values have not changed for centuries and their net effect on people's capacity to act as socially responsible individuals is demonstrably less than benevolent. However, the concept of clan is blurring in larger cities partly due to the effects of increasing industrialization and the emphasis is now on a larger form of the semi-Western kind of 'nuclear family'. At the least, sons and their families are usually kept in close contact if not staying together, and share the parents' business and wealth. Under the Islamic law of inheritance, when the parents die, the daughters are given only one fifth share in parents wealth but this is often denied because of the sub-continent cultural claims that daughters receive their share in the form of dowry when they are wedded. In business, these values are often seen in the form of ownership patterns and titles such as 'Khwaja and Sons', 'Baber

[6]Patai (1973: 93-94) notes that even in thoroughly Westernized upper-class urban Arab families, the claim of kinship is still much stronger than anything known in the West. Arab culture can still be termed "kinship culture" and is still characterized by "familism" as it has been in the past. He defines familism as the centrality of the family in social organization, its primacy in the loyalty scale, and its supremacy over individual life. The traditional Arab family (as well as the Muslim family in the non-Arab parts of the Middle East) is characterized by six features, each of which supports and strengthens the dominance of familism in Arab life: it is extended, patriarchal, patrilineal, patrilocal, endogamous, and occasionally polygynous. Familism has been so deeply embedded in the Arab mind that larger social aggregates have traditionally been conceived as mere extensions of families. The lineage is but an enlarged super-family; an entire tribe, even if numbering thousands, is considered the offspring of one single, mythical or eponymous ancestor. By a maximal extension of this kinship principle, all Arabs are considered or believed to be descendants of either of the two primal fathers; all inter-Arab conflicts are merely "family quarrels". The extension of the principle of familism in another direction results in the participation of the individual in all larger social groupings, not on an individual basis but through his family. Political parties, wherever they have developed, are similarly the outgrowths of families and of the family-based relationship (Patai, 1973: 282-283).

Brothers', but female ownership or sharing is not observable in Muslim owned businesses though in the ownership documents of many businesses, one finds shares of wives, mothers and daughters added primarily in order to increase the number of profit sharing partners.

(b) Greater familial influence over children:

Greater control is exercised by Eastern parents over children; e.g. almost no freedom is allowed to children in choosing life styles, religion, ideology and marriage partners and comparatively less freedom in choosing professions. Control may be exercised by all three means; normative, utilitarian and coercive[7]. In propertied classes, a son who does not marry in accordance with parent's wishes, may be disinherited from family property. Over-feeding, pampering and spoiling children is but one kind of creating perpetual dependence of the children on parents. People with enough means not only make their sons totally dependant on the parents, they also get them married to parents' choice and then also look

[7]See; 1-Edwin T. Prothro, *Child Rearing in Lebanon*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Middle Eastern Monograph Series VIII, 1961; 2-Hilma Granqvist, *Birth and Childhood Among the Arabs*, Helsingfors: Soderstorm, 1947; 3-Hamed Ammar, *Growing up in an Egyptian Village*, RKP, London, 1954; 4-Horace M. Miner and George de Vos, *Oasis and Casbah: Algerian Culture and Personality in Change*, Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan, 1960.

'All those who have made first-hand observations of Arab family life agree that the incidence and severity of corporal punishment administered to Arab children is much greater than is the case in the Western world. Local and individual variations aside, the general situation in the Arab family is that it is the father who is severe, stern, and authoritarian, while the mother is, by contrast, loving and compassionate. Reports from various parts of the Arab world make explicit mention of the mother's attempts to prevent undue severity on the part of the father. However, a study of Lebanese mothers found that they 'were more likely to approve of the [disciplinary] actions of a severe father than those of the non-severe fathers'. (Patai, 1973: 26-27).

'Since the Arabs are convinced that it is primarily the early childhood influences that form character and personality, and since subordination of one's ego to the authority of the father (and/or the actual head of the family) is a cornerstone of the Arab social edifice, the children are disciplined, if necessary severely, to subordinate their own personal interests to those of the family as represented by the father or grandfather. The feeling of shame is inculcated into the young generation by shaming techniques, for example, by comparing one child with another' (p. 106). 'In childhood, those who exercise control over the individual are father, mother, aunts, uncles, siblings, cousins, and other members of the extended family. Later, the control group becomes co-extensive with the functioning social unit. Everybody is personally known to everybody else, and this in itself makes for very effective social control, which is reinforced by the age hierarchy. The older a person gets, the smaller the number of those to whose judgement he must defer, and the larger the number of those who must defer to his' (p. 78-79).

after the grand children in which case, many a rich men's sons do little more than extend their parental life styles, values and beliefs.

Among the lower and working classes, where means of utilitarian control are not available, the use of coercive control over children is not uncommon. Hence many poor coerce their sons to work as soon as they are six or seven in which case the children must give almost all their wages to the parents. Many examples of desperate parents living off their daughters wages are also observed. Note that the total absence of any form of social security system enables many kinds of family dependence to persist and prevail; there is little alternative available to those caught in the familism dependence trap.

In the West, family values often refer to one's duty towards one's spouse and children first, and to one's parents to some extent. But in the sub-continent, a son is supposed to value his parental family more than his nuclear family, while women are generally supposed to serve their husband's will as a first priority. This is an outcome of a social value which stresses a son's duty to his parents more than to his wife, and is often a source of resentment on the part of many modern Indian wives. Perhaps the idea could be explained by an apparently trivial example but one which reveals a very deep element of the sub-continent family values: An Indian worker in a Gulf country was given a visa to bring one family member. I heard him asking his fellow workers if he should bring his mother or his wife to live with him, and they recommended that he should bring his mother, saying, "you can get ten wives but you can have only one mother". Family values in the sub-continent primarily mean adhering to the religion, beliefs, values and the culture (including such trivial things as cooking methods) of the parents and any deviation from parental style of living is strongly criticized and unapproved by the society - except when the nuclear family migrates to another city or town where its parental culture is not known to the immediate social contacts. But even for such a nuclear family, if it does not conform to parental culture, there would be social disapproval back home.

Most interviewees, when asked to point out certain differentiating traits between Indians and Europeans, noted that an Indian was likely to be far more under the influence of his relatives and parents than a European would be. Indian parents play a key role in teaching children that they should look for money above many other things, like for example, one interviewee was sent by his parents to work for more money in the Gulf where he lives a lonely and painful life under strict control of his employer despite that he comes from a

well-off family in India. Many interviewees, whilst agreeing that parents play a big role in imparting money motivation (for details, see chapter four), added that the average Indian parents, in old age and with enough money, are less likely to be as materialistic as younger Indian parents would be. Family influence on an individual, or parents' influence on children, is strong particularly because of one's economic bondage to the family, and because outside the family, the society does not provide an equivalent either in terms of social security guarantees or approval. One may have been rebellious in youth, but when in old age, he is more likely to follow the established norms and do with his kids what he faced as a child. More over, in most cases, there is a very large and significant contribution of one's parents in getting education, a good job, a proper place in the society, and in getting a life partner and so a typical Indian feels obliged and when the time comes for him to repay, he does [the observation is supported by Singhal and Misra's (1994) study of 80 students in India finding that expectations held by parents, teachers and peers are the most powerful determinants of the perceived importance of achievement goals].

However, there are significant variations in family values within India. For example, the Goans (Goa was formerly a Portuguese colony) behave more like the happy-go-lucky kind of Europeans and so do the Anglo-Indians. Goans and the Anglo-Indians, despite having some elements of the Indian mainstream culture, are a sub-culture and a separate distinct group, with their own value system. Anglo-Indians, being a cross-breed between the British and the Indians, have inherited certain values from their British part of heritage. Anglo-Indians exercise less control over their children because they have learnt it from their British forefathers and passed it on generation by generation. Parsees too are more like the Anglo-Indians in terms of control over children and are more likely to have a Western life style than a traditional Indian one. The Parsees and the Anglo-Indians, both have lesser controls over their children compared to the other Indians but while the former has been a community of high achievers, the latter mostly live average lives though in a European life-style. Hence the relationship of control over children, to achievements of various kinds, needs the inclusion of several other factors into the situation. What is clear, however, is that a lot of values, norms, and prejudices are learned at the family level and passed on to the progeny.

Regarding how family can condition a child into sheer money motivation, many say that the basic problem is that of very high gaps in standards of living in Indian neighborhoods. Unlike Britain, where a neighborhood usually consists of people of a

comparable economic class, in the sub-continent, one finds very high economic differences in one neighborhood, which create high inferiority-superiority feelings, reinforced by daily interaction and unequal treatment among neighbors. Inferiority/superiority complexes have been noted as a major factor behind obsessive money motivation. The British take for granted the similar design and size of houses in one locality, and many would not be aware of how good it is to have neighbors who are not 'very rich' or 'very poor'. Contrary to the general impression of the goodness of the Eastern joint family, the greed among members of one family could often lead to family ruin. Feuds and disputes over ancestral property, between brothers and sisters are not uncommon.

(c) Greater control over women than over men:

In most Muslim societies and, generally, in the sub-continent, women must always marry to the one selected by their kin. The preference for endogamy is also found in the Middle East but while an Arab man is free to marry a non-Arab woman, an Arab woman is not normally allowed to marry a non-Arab man. At times, economically independent women in the cities take their fate in their own hand though not without social disapproval and criticism. Murders of women who decide on their own to marry the one not approved by their family are reported in newspapers. At the workplace, greater non-work control is extended to female workers, and the incidence of sexual harassment is not uncommon.

(d) Extension of family relations to relations at workplace:

This is often shown in the sub-continent and in the Middle East, where many close relatives of senior state officials, ministers, members of Parliament and owners of private business and industry enjoy almost the same prerogatives and privileges as the office bearers do. In the more primitive Afghanistan[8], a newly appointed minister, in the cabinet formed

[8]Afghanistan has never been a colony of a developed country and hence retains the primitive tribal-feudal characteristics in almost entire purity: In many ways, imperialism, so often denounced as unethical conquests, has been a blessing for many countries which got benefited from the cross-cultural transference of the developed consciousness and efficient state/judicial practice of the governing nations. Indira Gandhi once said that the British left in India a bureaucracy, and the English language, without which it would be impossible to unite and develop an India where most regions with different languages found a common means of communication only in English language and where the uniformity of state bureaucratic procedures laid a common foundation for the development of a democracy and an acceptable civilization. The British influence also enabled many Indian Muslims to give up polygamy, endogamy, and marriage in childhood.

by the so-called President Burhan-ud-din Rabbani, sent his brother to the ministry saying, "my brother deserves the honor of being the minister as much as I do".

We have discussed the nature and effects of nepotism in the sub-continent, in chapter nine. In Britain, where hiring and firing is in the hands of British-Asians, nepotism is not uncommon but while being a relative could entitle one to get a job and some privileges, family quarrels may also be taken to the workplace. In a certain British factory, a Pakistani supervisor was the brother-in-law of a worker. After dismissal from his job, the said worker reported to the Industrial Tribunal that he was victimized by his brother-in-law on the basis of certain family quarrels that had nothing to do with his performance at work.

(e) More use of coercive control but excessive freedom in upper classes:

Regarding means of control, it is safe to conclude that there is comparatively more use of coercive control in Eastern families than it is in the Western. Most Eastern elders exercise rather personal control over the younger ones, quite excessively at times; socialization through snubbing and criticism and emotional black-mail or psychological control are quite common among all Eastern classes, particularly among the working and the middle classes. However the effectiveness of control is likely to be greater when the parents have significant property which is to be transferred to the children on condition that they have pleased their parents during the latter's life-time.

At the workplace, where family members play the role of supervisors, and events of injustice of some kind occur, they cannot be effectively complained against. In the interviews it was found that the typical means of control which Eastern family members employ at workplace are coercive and utilitarian. Criticism in front of others has cultural roots; in many Eastern families where the child is routinely criticized in front of those present on the occasion, and often in front of his friends and class-fellows, he may feel humiliated. However, it has been observed that children often repeat parent's behavior when they grow up and parallels to this may be drawn in the psychology of abuse where the victim, having suffered from abuse and oppression, may at the same time be learning patterns of abuse which he could repeat on others in future; this partially explains the reasons for the perpetuation of authoritarian cultures. In the upper class families, there is also a reverse observation in that male children are allowed so much freedom that they may turn out to be totally insensitive to human rights. Hence the oft-reported sexual abuse of poor peasant and worker girls by the feudal lords and the employers.

(f) The general exclusion of social, ethical, legal and governmental concerns:

The Eastern family interests are generally and comparatively exclusive of social, governmental, national and non-religious yet ethical and moral human interests. Greater loyalty is shown towards kin[9] than towards the society, government, nation and mankind as a whole; for example, where a family member is involved in crimes that lead to family profits (embezzlement, illegal transactions, unfair deals etc.) the Eastern family is more likely to support him/her than is a Western family. Apart from the common observations in this respect, a number of religious and traditional quotes and commands are available to support the priority of kin over others (*Awal khuvaish baad darvesh*: First relatives, then the poor) in terms of rights and duties many of which come into conflict with common and social justice[10] as understood in the West. Close family control over business provides ease in the maneuvering of resources and assets, greater share of profits for the kith and kin, and secrecy which is essential for tax evasion, for seeking governmental and bank loans, and for immunity from various Employment and Industrial Relations Legislation. Hence the preference for family ownership of business over other kinds of ownership. While I could not find examples in Eastern businesses of non-family employee prosperity, through hard and honest work alone, interviews with British-Asians reveal that many British-Asians of humble origins, who worked for Western businesses, rose to higher ranks and prosperity[11].

[9]"The obligation to support one's kinsman in a quarrel with an outsider exists all over the Arab world, irrespective of the question of right or wrong." (Patai, R., 1973: 231).

"The question of rightness of one claim over the other is not a paramount issue so far as one's obligation to support is concerned. Thus, if different 'ahls' [lineages] quarrel, each can expect support (or neutrality at the very least) in his own kin group." (Ayoub, 1965: 13).

Aune & Waters (1994) have shown that the familial Samoans are more likely to deceive for the sake of group/family or authority based concerns while the individualist US Americans are more likely to lie to protect their privacy or the feelings of the target person.

[10]See the rights of parents and spouses in Islam whereby elders have more rights than the young, men have greater rights than women, but the ideas of common weal, society, and state are not the least developed when compared to the European practice.

[11]A Pakistani engineer in a Western company, at the age of thirty-five, owns two houses and earns around £35,000 per annum though his parents in Pakistan were very poor. Another interviewee came to Britain as a fourteen year old and began working in a brick kiln. He is now an assistant production manager in an English owned factory and makes more than £30,000 per annum. Twenty years ago, his parental family in Pakistan could hardly meet the ends and his relatives who stayed behind, are still poor peasants who live in mud houses in a village where there is no electricity and no roads.

While in the West, in general, the family system includes respect for social, legal, government and collective concerns of the community, the Eastern family system is exclusive of such concerns to an extent large enough to breed extreme selfishness, jealousies, intrigue and mutual hatred. Divisions between family and non-family in the sub-continent and most Muslim societies are too sharp to allow for a true social mixing and harmony to prevail. Examples may be seen often in such behavior as employing poor children to be the servants of one's own children: one may commonly see rich people pampering their own children and, at the same time, scolding the servant children for petty mistakes. Keeping servant children at food and clothing only, is not uncommon.

In the sub-continent, most private business is owned by large kinship families so that in the seventies, there were only twenty-two families owning the vast majority of private industry in Pakistan[12]. Over the years, many other families have joined the list of the twenty-two and the interests of many of these kinship clans have extended to having a public limited facade to a family dominated business. Cases of apparent public limited companies but in fact being run mainly for the interests of a family are becoming common in the sub-continent. In such cases, one family holds the majority shares and most directors belong to the family. During its inception, a public limited company needs big names to be able to float shares in public. To win people's trust, the names of influential and known people are added to the list of the Board of Directors; the influential allow their names to be used for one or the other interest. But once the shares have been sold and the company gets the capital it requires, the family may get rid of unwanted directors. In many cases, even some family members leave the company after syphoning off large chunks of public money, so that in case of bankruptcy in future, someone else would get the blame. One advantage of issuing public shares is that the owning family has more capital to invest, hence more returns for themselves and, in case of losses or bankruptcy, they can salvage more of their own capital though at the cost of the share holders' money, many of whom are not well versed in business methods to be able to protest effectively or to detect embezzlement.

In India also, family ownership, management and control of business (with or without a public-share facade) is a predominant way of doing business. Most native private

[12]Business International Corporation; Investing, Licensing and Trading Conditions Abroad, Confidential report supplied to multinationals and interested investors in Pakistan, Sept. 1981.

organizations are controlled by large kinship families and family members are placed on key managerial posts because in such jobs trust is more important than performance (one could be working on the other side of Law, such as for tax evasion, manipulation of government policies and various declarations), and because the said businesses have far better chances of controlling family members than others if they do anything against business interests.

(g)The nature of British-Asian family business reflects much of the same at home:

There is a strong patriarchal pattern of behavior exhibited by British-Asian families which own businesses in Britain[13]. The extreme form of patriarchy is one in which the patriarch is the sole power in his domain of patriarchy so that he has the powers also to make internal laws and to enforce them as well. The most notorious form of patriarchy is well known in the behavior of the Italian Mafia bosses, but British-Asian business owners avoid violence and physical crime to a very large extent.

Summary and contributions of chapter 3 towards the Grounded Theory to be proposed

We have seen in this chapter that the sub-continent and Middle Eastern family (referred to here as the Eastern family) is differentiated from the Western by the following factors:

(1)Procreative family (extended family in the sub-continent and tribal family in the Middle East) is the only mode of social conjugation allowed in the two cultures save a tiny section of the few modernizing urban areas of the sub-continent. In the West, staying unmarried and other modes of conjugation are not legally or socially disapproved.

(2)Family ownership, with or without a public facade, is the primary and most common mode of business ownership and control in the said cultures.

(3)In family businesses, the owning family members occupy key managerial positions; non-family managers are not the least as entrusted with decision making as those in the West.

(4)Eastern family exercises greater control over children and women than does the Western. Freedom of choosing life style, marriage partner, religion, ideology, and profession is severely limited in the former. Among lower classes, coercive control over children and women is not uncommon. Among upper classes, pampering is another means of binding the

[13]For detailed case studies and interviewee reports of the way British Asian family business is managed, see pages 282 to 290 of this work.

child to parents. In addition to control through social sanctions (in both cultures), in the sub-continent, absence of social security enables the family to have greater economic control over members.

(5) Easterners are many times more likely to be influenced in their decisions by their relatives than are the Westerners.

(6) Eastern family values mean adhering to parental life style, beliefs, values and culture, and being loyal to family interests even when these come into conflict with individual, social, legal, governmental, ethical and human interests (exclusivity vs Western inclusiveness).

(7) The Eastern family has shown much greater success in conditioning children to set patterns of control (sex-class segregation, authoritarianism) motivation (money, status, power, prestige, education, religion, dogmatism), and conflict (exclusivity of familial interests and endogamy leads to narrow based grouping and subgrouping, in-group/out-group psychology, racism, regionalism, sectarianism, described in following chapters) than has the Western family.

(8) In India there are significant variations in family values between communities; the Goans and the Anglo-Indians, for example, give more freedom to their children and have many values in common with their half-ancestors namely the Portuguese and the British, respectively, while the Muslim Indians take part of their culture from the Arabs (the Indian Islam is a hybrid of Hindu traditions and the Arab Islam).

(9) During empirical studies in Britain, it was found that the nature of British-Asian family system and business reflects much of the same in home countries.

These findings explain the role of family in shaping patterns of control, conflict, and motivation in general during the formative years. Finding (1) explains the reasons for over-population, over-supply of labor, and the consequential poverty in the sub-continent which, in conjunction with the absence of any universal state social security system creates vulnerability to coercive control, economic dependency over family, mass neurosis and the consequential communal wars and obsessive money motivation that we shall discuss in the following chapters.

The findings shall be taken on to our Grounded Theory in the last chapters to support our notion of family planning and a liberalization of the 'Eastern' cognitive culture (at least to allow exogamy), as primary solutions to mitigating coercive control, communal conflict and obsessive money motivation.

Chapter Four: The Key Motivation in the Sub-continent, Middle East, and for British Asians

It is safe to generalize that the vast majority of Easterners[1] considers money as its main, and most often, the only motivation to work. It maybe argued that money could be a key to other motives such as increasing the feeling of security, raising family, acquiring high status and luxury, etc. albeit none of which could be job-specific; money motivation alone maybe fulfilled through any kind of work that yields money. From the interviews, it was possible to deduce that Easterners pursue money with greater vigour and often at the cost of many other aspects of life[2]; all interviewees stated this in clear terms[3]. For example, whereas English workers like to socialize in the evenings, Asian[4] workers in Britain want more work; night shifts are their favourite where these offer extra rates, and over-time work is relished; in many British factories where the Asians work for twelve hours a day and six or seven days a week, the English workers work eight hours a day and five days a week. There were numerous interviewee statements supporting the aforementioned conclusion, though at times money motivation was coupled with other factors such as liking the company of friends at work, liking the work, and job security etc. Even when the respondents mention motivation other than money, there were some answers to other questions that showed the links to money motivation. For example, one interviewee told about non-monetary motivation but then said she left the job because the wages were reduced. Because of some embarrassment that is normally associated with the admission to money motivation, an interviewee would say that, for example, "quick money was not the criteria but I wanted some change", but in a longer conversation, having forgotten the inhibitions, the same

[1]As explained earlier, we shall use the abbreviation 'Eastern' for convenience sake, to refer to findings that are applicable to the Indian sub-continent, British-Asian, and Middle Eastern culture and organizations.

[2]Simmel and Mark (1991), while relating the evolution of money-based economy (from the times of barter exchange) to the fragmentation of social forms and the growth of individualism, show that money connects more and diverse groups of people now than has ever happened in history. But while money provides a continuing motivation for productive activity, it also promotes stress, anxiety and the risk of becoming an end in itself.

[3]See excerpts from interviews on pages 290 to 293: "Typical Statements....."

[4]'Asian' in this work means 'British-Asian', and a person whose origins are in the sub-continent, countries, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, as defined on page 1.

respondent may become more candid and hence admit to money motivation.

Immigrants during the 1950s and 1960s were welcomed in the British industry because there was a huge surplus labour demand but little surplus demand in clerical and white-collar jobs on which the local people were happy to work. Thus there was little incentive for one to study[5] or develop skills for white-collar jobs. Moreover, working conditions in the English factories, (at that time there were mostly only English factories) were a kind of blessing for many immigrants who came out of the stifling capitalist/feudal exploitation in the sub-continent where they were usually hired at a pittance and fired at a whim. The better working conditions in English companies offered the least compulsion for workers to look for a replacement of factory work and this was clearly observable in the interviewee statements. As Karl Marx once wrote, "without necessity and compulsion there is no revolution", most workers in English factories stay there longer [see chapter 13] because, despite routine problems, there is little necessity or compulsion to move away and the only motivation they have to work, namely money, is reasonably fulfilled in English firms. This again supports our conclusion of money being the major Asian motivator. More evidence comes from that all interviewees stated that more money was the only cause for Asian workers in Britain to go on strikes (note here the relation between conflict and motivation; details in chapter 13).

The factors that influence Easterners to pursue and spend money in a way dissimilar to the Western way of pursuing and spending money[6], maybe classified as follows:

(a) Differences in familial/social structure and obligations

Money seems to be of importance to people all over the world but there is a difference in that the Eastern familial commitments and social structural obligations place

[5] Among factors explaining low school achievement of minority students, Erickson (1987) listed pessimism regarding chances of employment.

[6] Handy (1981: 45) recognizes the significance of money as motivating agent and appropriately mentions the cultural bias against talking about money. Although the vast majority in most countries seeks money as an instrument to other needs and talks about what accompanies money, i.e. status, success, independence, security etc., cultural differences are quite sharp in the way money is made, pursued, spent and flaunted. Cowling et al. (1988: 93), after listing a number of characteristics of monetary rewards (association of money with valued objects, its instrumentality in satisfying other needs, its symbolism, etc.), state that very little research has been carried out about what meaning money has for different people.

much greater emphasis on making money than do the Western: Eastern men are culturally pressured to provide for parents, wife and children for a much longer period than Westerners are. Women are not allowed to work in a 'promiscuous' (as most traditional Eastern men perceive the workplace particularly when domiciled in the West) environment though some may work from home if such work is available, or in the company of a number of Eastern women. Male children must be supported financially until they are on job. Girls have to be brought up and, in the sub-continent, huge expenses are required to marry them and only then the father maybe exonerated from responsibility towards his daughters[7]. Thus most British Asian workers prefer to spend almost all of their time (other than that essential for sleeping and eating) at work, until it becomes a compulsive habit. Many in Britain are strongly motivated to find loop-holes in the social security system [see chapter 13], and in the sub-continent, seek bribes to increase earnings in order to fulfil familial commitments. To add to this compulsion, they are culturally oppressed to get married, have large families, and lead a rather expensive life in that a lot of money is wasted in showing off the wealth, on wedding dresses, jewellery, over-eating of rich food, owning property, and keeping relatives happy, not to mention the health and psychological problems arising out of the said life style. It may be noted here that in most Eastern families, even if they are not well-off, eating simpler food is seen as debasement and a low-class activity. In the sub-continent, offering only lentils, vegetables, or plain rice (without mutton and/or chicken) to a guest could jeopardize the relations between the host and the guest; beef is considered the diet of the poor and not offered to guests of higher status.

There are many examples to show that parents in the sub-continent raise their children and socialize them with obvious expectations that the latter would help them financially, particularly in their old age; this becomes one motivation (at times negative) to work, particularly for sons in low property-owning and property-less classes. Note that in the sub-continent there is no welfare system and no old-age pension for the vast majority, and therefore parents have to be looked after by working children. However, this attitude of

[7]While in the sub-continent and among British Asians, the burden of paying a dowry is on the bride's father, among the Arabs and tribal Pathans, it is the bridegroom who is obliged to pay a sum (equivalent to £ 20,000 or more in the Gulf states) to the bride's father. Hence while daughters in the sub-continent carry the stigma of being a burden on their parents, among the traditional Arabs and Pathans, they are often seen as an investment.

expecting children to provide for parents persists even among those Asians who have spent decades in Britain and should be expected to feel secure, as a last resort, with the state old-age pension. Hence, many teenagers are forced by parents to work and bring in money. Many young men have to give up education in order to help finance the marriages of sisters for which their parents had done little or no planning. On the other hand, the English are not socially compelled to marry and have children, their wives and grown-up children may work and fend for themselves, and they do not have too many obligations towards their relatives.

Sub-continent workers are keen to work abroad, away from their wives and children for years, because they can earn more by doing so. We may note here that, paradoxically, when the motivation is focused around money, people may be willing to work for very low wages. Many Asian employers in Britain have been able to hire Asian workers at £1 an hour primarily because a large number are willing to work longer hours at low wages, because of money motivation alone. Many Asian women's motivation to work at wages close to or less than income support level [see chapter 13] reveals a cultural factor, their generally known love for keeping gold and jewellery, a traditional security item in the household. A marriage is seldom accepted without gold as part of the dowry.

(b) Money motivation due to the significance of economic status

As noted in chapters two and three, socio-economic class distinctions are much more obviously observed in the sub-continent than in the Western world. Therefore, the associated inferiority complexes make the crossing of class barriers a compulsion for the majority. In the sub-continent, whether one has enough money or not (excluding the very poor and beggars who have nothing to gain from pretensions of being well-off), one would still have a strong desire to show to his relatives and his immediate community that he is 'well off'. Such attitude is also observable in the Middle East where people frequently take unaffordable loans to buy new gadgets of technology, newer car models, newer furniture and decorations etc., and to spend on expensive weddings, only because often they feel jealous of others who have the said products, or suffer from inferiority feelings if they cannot have them [see endnote 1]. Education becomes but one means of elevating one's social and economic status and thus great emphasis is placed by the middle classes on getting academic qualifications. Note that education, in this context, means little more than getting certificates and degrees because where these are obtained through illicit means, they carry almost equal de facto

value, and also because a learned person but without official accreditation is not valued equal to the one who has an officially issued academic certificate. In the upper classes too, children are encouraged (and this often includes expensive private tuition) to get degrees mainly so that greater prestige can be claimed. One major factor, other than the possession of wealth and property, often considered in evaluating an arranged-marriage proposal, is having such academic qualifications as could assist in earning money; thus one having a degree in business, medicine or engineering is more likely to be preferred over another (keeping other evaluation points constant) who has a degree in, say, literature, political science, social sciences etc. Contrary to that in the West, a degree in law is not worth much for a property-less person because most lawyers are not likely to earn much.

(c)The flaunting of wealth makes others seek more money

We have already mentioned the various ways in which money is wasted and flaunted among the Easterners so much so that those who have less, may feel marginalized unless they too are 'in the swim'. Many examples show how higher status colleagues in an organization may flaunt their higher salaries in non-monetary ways, such as treating less earners as if they were base and low. There are deep cultural roots behind the money-grabbing motivation born out of the immense social power and prestige possessed by the upper classes. Social power also means being above the law[8], which makes it very luring to rise to the top. Hence the sub-continent expatriates' dream of returning to the home country as wealthy, high status people, is as observable during conversations as the sight of the immigrants showing off their possessions on visits to home countries. A young British Asian interviewee told that his parents had been buying lands in Pakistan (to be seen as high status land-owners in home country), for decades, cultivated by peasants, but they themselves live on DSS benefits in Britain, saving money by ignoring their children's basic needs, forgetful that their children will never go back to, what to the younger British Asians is an alien and backward country:

"they are sending it all back, thinking, oh, we are always gona go back; they have [*passionately*] kids here who, like, I am not going to go back because that's not my country; even though I have got a clash of cultures".

[8]In the Islamic law (the *Sharia*), a murderer can offer 'blood money' (*Qasas*) to the relatives of the victim, and if the relatives accept it, the killer may be set free. See the case of the two British nurses accused of killing a colleague in Saudi Arabia, Sept., 1997.

(d) Compensation for low manual-work status by money

As discussed in chapter two, manual work is considered degrading and base. In certain circumstances, many try to conceal if they have been engaged in manual work. Many emigrants, when they return home after having made some money, in their efforts to be accepted in higher social class neighbours, try to disguise the nature of their employment abroad if they have been engaged in manual work of some kind (for example, a mechanic would say that he was an engineer, a hospital assistant would say that he was a doctor). But once a higher social status has been irrevocably acquired, one may proudly boast, in order to stress the value of his achievement, that he has progressed from a lower occupational background to a higher. Whilst interviewing, one may note cultural beliefs and assumptions reflected in people's words and tones, such as the following words of some interviewees illustrate: "I had to start right from the shop floor - with all my qualifications, I had to start from sweeping floors. After a few months, I was lucky, that I got apprenticeship", or, "I was upset that I couldn't carry on with my education, that I could not achieve my ambitions in life and had to become a worker". The underlying assumption behind the above quoted statements is that doing manual work is degrading to an educated person. Having achieved a 'higher job', people take pride in talking about it: "At that time, I was the only coloured or Pakistani who ever came to that position as an under-cadre. Prior to me there was no one in such position". Note in the last statement that the mentioned rank was a perceived achievement and acted as a motivation during the interviewee's life when most of his countrymen "could not rise above the level of a skilled worker".

(e) Higher salary in higher ranks in the sub-continent/Middle East compared to that in Britain

People in the said two cultures are often seen in a relentless pursuit to rise to higher ranks because the gap between the average lowest paid and the average highest paid in a typical sub-continent/Middle Eastern organization is almost ten times larger than the same gap in Britain. In British Asian organizations too, promotion brings monetary benefits and hence the said pursuit is observed. However, the reverse of seeking higher ranks is observed in those English firms where differences in the salaries between workers and supervisors are not high; the majority of British Asian workers has been reported to shun the responsibility that comes essentially in the Western organizations with a higher status. Many noted that Asian workers did not go for English classes since they did not want to be promoted beyond

operators of machines, and that if they were given extra work, some would even mess up their work deliberately, so that they should not be promoted. The reported reasons for not seeking higher positions are that most workers in Britain earn more than lecturers, teachers, doctors, government officers etc. and so most do not feel the need to study. That British Asians do not pursue education and promotion with such vigour as those in home countries, supports the finding that money is their major and primary motivation.

(f) Money Motivation in the Sub-continent: Combination of class, culture, religion and caste

(i) The religious preaching factor:

Hinduism stresses contentment and looks down upon most materialistic desires. But people differ in the way they are influenced by such doctrines, so only a few follow exactly what is preached. Contrary to Hindu doctrine, excessive money motivation is widespread among Indians, showing that religions may react by stressing the opposite of what is found in real life. The same is true about the preaching of Islam and Christianity in the sub-continent and the Middle East. Moreover, a religion may be preached differentially and have dissimilar effects: This is shown in that, on an average, the North Indian Hindus, as reported by many interviewees, are more materialistic than the South Indian Hindus, showing that religion is only one of the many factors that influence people's behaviour. The North-South difference exists among the Hindus because the treasured goals, or the factors influencing one, have been handled differentially; for example, a North Indian child, more than a South Indian child, is likely to spend his childhood in an environment where money is highly revered and pursued. On the other hand, a South Indian child is more likely to have a certain amount of spiritualism imparted to him; more importance is placed on contentment and non-monetary considerations. It therefore seems that the religion factor has to be qualified by observations whereby the effect of religion is diluted or intensified by other factors; for example, the European Christians are, demonstrably, not as money-oriented as are Christians in the Middle East and the sub-continent.

(ii) The caste factor:

In the Hindu system of castes, the Vishwas, the middle ranking caste, have traditionally been ordained to trade and be commercially oriented more than the others. This was observed by many Indian interviewees. About the Shudras, the lowest caste, most said that they were motivated more obsessively by money in reaction to their placement in the

lowest caste: If a lowest caste Hindu makes a lot of money and becomes rich, it does increase his status in society. But money does not often entitle a rich Shudra to marry a Brahman's daughter; While a Shudra can get rid of a lot of limitations because of his wealth, the stigma or burden of being born in lower caste will continue, depending upon the peculiarities of the individuals involved in the situation; a Brahmin, a highest caste Hindu, may choose not to be sensitive to caste difference and get married to a low caste but rich Shudra, but it would not be because of ignorance of caste difference but because he/she chose to be insensitive to this difference. Indira Gandhi, a Brahmin, married a Parsi, but still people kept voting for her. If Indira Gandhi was a common woman, her marriage to a man of a so perceived "low religion" would have been a serious burden for her in the pursuit of her career. Generally, even if low caste people make lots of money, they would find it very difficult to gain social acceptance among the upper caste groups. This is reportedly true of all under-privileged persons in India. Indians are changing but, it is often reported, one from a low background has to cross many hurdles, and some hurdles may not be crossed at all.

On the other hand, if a Brahmin, a highest caste Hindu, is very poor, he would still get some respect but, it was often reported, material things are becoming more important than the other considerations so that the caste factor is becoming less and less important. More importance is now being placed on the possession of wealth, especially in urban India.

(iii)The socio-economic class factor:

Some interviewees placed more emphasis on the effects of socio-economic class in one's money motivation[9]. They argued that an affluent European and an affluent Indian would not show much difference in their patterns of motivation, and so would a middle class Indian and a middle class European. In other words, an average European and an average Indian, in the same socio-economic class, would not show a significant difference in their needs because, after having fulfilled certain common needs, they would be looking forward to satisfy higher needs. The sum of such reasoning is that while there is a minor cultural dimension to money motivation, the underlying factors which drive individuals to money would be more or less the same the world over for people in the same socio-economic class.

[9]In non-Marxist literature, motivation is often not linked to one's economic class though tacit hints have been given in some theories, for example, McGregor tacitly recognizes the differentiated manifestation of motivation among economic classes; "...motivation is different under different economic conditions" (McGregor, 1960-a: 120).

When questioned about the much greater and obsessive money motivation found in the sub-continent than in Europe, these interviewees argued that in the sub-continent, the immense gap between the rich and the poor made the vast majority, i.e. the lower classes, very strongly motivated to rise up the social ladder. Once thus motivated in their early lives, even if they became affluent, the desire to make more persisted. These interviewees argued that the obsessive money motivation among the lowest caste Hindus, was not a caste-characteristic but a consequence of their having historically lived in circumstances of dire poverty. In the sub-continent, the most acceptable explanation for obsessive money-seeking was the big gap in the satisfaction of the basic needs of the vast majority. The said reasoning implies that if there was as immense a gap between rich and poor in Europe as in the sub-continent, and if the vast majority of Europeans too was poor, the same obsessive money motivation would appear in Europe as exists in the sub-continent. However, these interviewees seem to ignore the different familial responsibility structure of Asians which, even when domiciled in the affluent Europe, drives them to make money with greater vigour than most Europeans do.

(iv) The level of socio-economic development of a society:

Some interviewees argued that cultural differences between societies were of little significance in money motivation, and that it was the level of socio-economic development of a society that decided the extent to which money motivation could be found in that society. These interviewees observed that if we compare an average European with an average Indian, in terms of Maslow's need hierarchy, there was a vast gap in the level of need satisfaction of the two; an average man in Europe would be at a higher level of needs fulfillment compared to an average Indian. Therefore, the reasons for money motivation have less to do with the placement of a person in India or in Europe, and more to do with what type of needs he had already satisfied. In other words, Indians and Europeans, being at different levels of satisfaction of their needs, have differentiated money motivation which has little to do with their respective cultures. When pointed to the fact that it was because of a cultural difference that the Europeans had managed to evolve a social security system which drove compulsion and depravation out of motivation, some argued that the evolution of the social security was more of an accidental nature reflecting the higher development level in Europe.

(v) The sub-culture factor:

Some interviewees argued that a sub-culture plays a strong role in the determination of money motivation because individuals are deeply involved in their culture which has its

own goals and systems of pursuing those goals. Hence people from various cultures act in dissimilar fashions. For example, despite being in the same cultural context of Europe, Jews have different type of monetary goals than those of non-Jewish Europeans. Usually Jews are more commercially driven which can be seen in all generations of Jews; Jews in the fifties were different from non-Jews in the fifties and so on. The aforementioned North Indian-South-Indian difference in the pursuit of money supports such reasoning.

Asian motivation at higher levels

When asked about motivation to work, most Asian entrepreneurs mention self-growth, business expansion, establishing more businesses, self-satisfaction and enhancing family prestige and social status as their motivators. It is obvious that during a formal interview, the above mentioned information is all one can get. Thus, we shall be limited in our analysis of motivation at higher income levels by the difficulties in getting deeper information through formal interviews alone and therefore refrain from generalizations in this respect. However, it helps question the self-acclaimed motivators of Asian entrepreneurs, to present some instances of Asian upper-class motivation which reveal the political and social power gaining ambitions of many entrepreneurs. In some cases, political ambitions were fulfilled at the cost of the organizations and moral obligations to the country which provided the opportunity to amass fortunes. Such examples as given are not a unique and rare occurrence; there are numerous examples of a similar nature but because I am bound in this work to present only recorded evidence, and abstain from presenting the greater mass of information obtained through unrecorded interviews, I shall stick to a few cases only.

In talking about the deliberate and self-planned closure of a large and profitable Indian clothes manufacturing factory in Birmingham, a respondent revealed some very disconcerting information which shows that the dual nationality system may help those who want to avoid governmental intervention. The said factory was so successful that the Indian owners could get heavy loans from banks; they invested the borrowed money in India where they had senior positions and contacts with the Indian Congress Party and after abandoning the factory in Birmingham, they left for India in pursuit of political-economic goals.

I had some idea of these transactions in my experience as finance manager with a large shoe manufacturing concern in Pakistan where government loans granted for the import of new shoe manufacturing machinery from Britain were expropriated. Second-hand

machinery was purchased and a fake auditor verified the machines as new. Similarly, loans on building construction were also half expropriated and, after having invested the funds in British real estate, the factory in Pakistan was declared bankrupt only one year after the trial production; I could see many similarities between the two cases.

It can be safely deduced from common observation and information that most sub-continent entrepreneurs are not motivated by the same ideals as many industrialists in the West have historically been: First, in terms of common weal, there are no likes of Robert Owen in the sub-continent and second, because almost all organizational systems, as well as manufacturing technology, are conveniently borrowed or purchased from the West (or from Russia, particularly in India), there is little concept of research, development, and initiative geared towards meeting indigenous socio-economic needs through creativity and invention. In these circumstances, organizations become little more than money-grabbing tools where participants struggle to grab a greater share of wealth at the cost of human relations and the long-term survival of the organization. Not only do the workers feel little sense of belonging to the workplace, many entrepreneurs too see the factory or business as a means of achieving ideals that rest elsewhere in the society. There are few industrialists in the sub-continent whose interests lie solely in industry but there are many whose real ambitions are to achieve political and social power through wealth accumulation which makes trade and industry little more than a means for achieving the said ambitions. The social and cultural system with its strict class distinctions determines that the industrialists and entrepreneurs would not see it as their right place to be in the company of lower-ranking employees; most workers in medium/large organizations do not even know who owns the business and would not be allowed to meet the owners. On the social side, segregation of sexes and arranged marriages within one's class, preserve class barriers in such a way that the participants in an organization continue to live in segregated economic classes [see chapter 2]. Thus, motivation for the Asian entrepreneurs has little to do with the problems and prospects of their employees but is much more focused on keeping the family name in a prestigious position, preserving and enhancing social standing, and maintaining an upwardly mobile style of life, luxury, prosperity, and fame, often at the cost of moral and legal considerations. While a lot is written about the corruption in public sector, the corruption of private enterprise has been a taboo subject, mainly because criticism of private business in the sub-continent is quickly reprimanded by allegations at the critic being a communist (atheist in Muslim countries).

Summary and contributions of chapter 4 towards the Grounded Theory to be proposed

(1) In the Middle East, the sub-continent and among British-Asians, the vast majority considers money as its main, often the only, motivation to work. But money is a key to the satisfaction of motives such as increasing feeling of security, raising a family, acquiring high status and luxury, etc.

(2) A majority is motivated to work for non-work related goals.

(3) Asian workers in Britain are less interested in social life after work than in making money through over-time/work in night shifts. English workers want to socialize in the evenings.

(4) Most Asian workers want to work twelve hours a day and almost seven days a week while English workers prefer an eight hour work day and five/six days a week.

(5) When British-Asian workers did go on strikes, seeking more money was the prime reason.

(6) The reasons for seeking more money among Easterners were given as follows:

(a) Large families and the consequential greater familial economic commitment; for example, Eastern men are supposed to provide for wives, children, parents, and destitute relatives;

(b) large networks of relatives and the consequential greater social obligations such as giving gifts on weddings and child births;

(c) greater economic burden on men because of segregation of sexes among Muslims, such as for example, wives and daughters are not allowed to work;

(d) sons must be financially supported until they are on jobs, and daughters must be brought up until they are married off;

(e) men in the sub-continent are obliged to provide huge dowry for daughters' weddings and pay for expensive celebrations on weddings, child births etc. On the contrary, Arabs and Pathans are obliged to pay to the bride's father. Easterners are supposed to pay for meals for hundreds of guests who arrive on funerals and other occasions of gloom or happiness;

(f) a lot of money is spent on eating rich food (eating simple food is considered a debasement and low class activity) and on the consequential health problems, on jewelry (obsessions of segregated females), wedding dresses and dresses that must be bought on 'special occasions';

(g) as explained in chapter 2, status is very important to Easterners and money brings all the material possessions that enhance perception of status;

(h) flaunting of wealth in several kind of 'jealousy generating occasions' which many Easterners enjoy, makes others seek more money;

(i) most Asians who came to Britain were from poor, rural, and working class backgrounds and as such had inferiority feelings which they sought eradication through making money;

(j) education in Britain does not bring as large difference in earnings as in the sub-continent, hence lesser motivation among British Asians for education, than that found in their home countries.

(7) Social security provisions in Britain have not mitigated the Asian drive to make money but visibly enhanced their drive to spend or waste it in the manner described above. Child benefit and family credits etc. have demonstrably increased the Asian drive to procreate.

(8) A multi-causal explanation for the sub-continent/British Asian money motivation deduced from interviewee statements lists the following factors behind money motivation: the sub-continent religions, caste, socio-economic class, level of socio-economic development of a society and sub-culture.

(9) Among the sub-continent/British Asian upper classes, in addition to the above given reasons for money motivation, there are goals of socio-political power sought through money made in business. Political goals are often highly valued and attained at the cost of legal and moral obligations to society. Ownership of businesses is instrumental in seeking socio-political goals; hence we find in organizations, lack of research, development, technological advancement and other such imperatives albeit where these are instrumental in seeking non-organizational goals.

(10) The above mentioned findings are also valid for the Middle East except that dowry is not paid by the bride's father but is paid to him by the bridegroom. The said custom shifts the expensive burden of marriage from the bride's family to the bridegroom. Hence men in the Middle East are hard pressed to seek large sums of money (and scores of goats to be slaughtered, etc.) in order to get married.

These findings explain how the sub-continent and Middle Eastern cultural focus on a particular type of procreative familialism and family-centered social life, which glamorizes weddings, child births, familial festivities imitated from the mannerisms of various Royal families around the world, compounded by segregation of sexes, places incredible strain on people to seek money. For all the familial reasons given above, a lot of money, time and

energy is required which diverts attention of people from creative intrinsic motivation (if there is any). Work and organizations become instrumental in seeking money to satisfy the ever growing socio-familial demands. Among the upper classes, many business owners who want higher socio-political status see their organizations as instrumental in making money needed to spend in, say, ultra luxury living, election campaigns, intrigues etc., which leaves the question of organizational development largely unattended.

The findings shall be taken on to our Grounded Theory in the last chapters to support our notions of family planning and a transformation of 'status oriented' cognitive culture as primary solutions to mitigating obsessive money motivation and giving some respite to the sub-continent and Middle Eastern families in all socio-economic classes to think about work-related motivation, or intrinsic motivation, or at the least, to spend some time in educating themselves about the seething environmental and social problems that threaten the very fabric of many societies because of the illusionary life styles mentioned above.

Notes and Explanations

1. The significance of such perception/ cognition is relevant to Marketing. An example would clarify this point: In 1966, Lee (1966: 107) argued that *"the cultures capable of designing and manufacturing new products select and design almost all of them on a self-reference basis"*. He gave much statistics to argue that the Midget Motors of Ohio could manufacture and sell its low-priced, 80 miles a gallon "King Midget" to Pakistan but didn't do so because of the American SRC of big car luxury. He also showed that inexpensive, fibre-board and angle-iron houses could be sold to the poor who live in shanties and can afford such a house; in times of floods, the proposed house could be dismantled and moved elsewhere, unlike the shanties. Lee's native graduate students conducted a survey to show that the proposed business was attractive. With the benefit of hindsight now, I quote that the Bhutto government (1972-76) did both things; it built a cheap 'people's car' that was the equivalent of the 'King Midget' and, a 'people's house', the equivalent of Lee's suggestion. Both projects failed miserably. The reasons lay in the sub-continent attitude of 'keeping face'; the ownership of a 'people's car' or a 'people's house' was perceived as a deliberate placing oneself into the category of "those who cannot afford better" (and face the inferiority feelings), while not owning either could still be attributed to reasons other than being "branded low status". For the shanty dweller, it didn't matter whether he lived in a "straw and wood plus mud house" or an "angle iron plus fibre-board" one, particularly when the former could be made without any monetary cost. While Lee's approach in suggesting the cheaper car and house was functional, he had to give a logical mind to the Pakistani buyer to make his proposals succeed; the behaviour of an average person in the sub-continent or Middle East, unless forced by sheer poverty, is determined more by the "status" and 'face-keeping' concepts than by logic or functionalism; most Indians noted the functional benefits of 800cc Suzuki cars only after observing that Suzukis were driven in affluent countries.

Chapter Five: Conflict and Favouritism in Organizations on the Basis of Regional, Linguistic, Religious, Caste, Tribal and Ethnic Background

In the Indian sub-continent, most actual or potential non-work-related conflict in organizations reflects the actual or potential communal conflict existing in the society because the organizational participants bring their social learning along with them. The mentioned conflict is commonly observed in many sub-continent organizations, particularly in those working in multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, socially and politically volatile regions.

In Pakistan, the most politically volatile region is the province of Sindh where two major ethnic/linguistic communities, which call themselves 'nations', have for long been competing against each other for control of material resources, especially jobs, and hence for control over the organizations that provide these jobs, such as schools, colleges, hospitals, universities, and public and private businesses. These two major communities are the Sindhis, who are the ethnic inhabitants of the province of Sindh, and the Mahajars (meaning 'the immigrants') who migrated from India when Pakistan was made by dividing the Indian sub-continent. The Sindhis speak Sindhi while the Mahajars speak Urdu and are therefore also called the 'Urdu-speaking'. There are many cultural dissimilarities between the two communities though they share the common religion, Islam[1]. Inter-marriage among Sindhis and Mahajars is rare, and the lower and middle classes of the two communities usually do not socialize with each other.

When the Mahajars came to Pakistan, on the pretext that they were Muslims and wanted to live in the newly formed Islamic country, they mainly settled in Karachi, the largest Pakistani city, and Hyderabad where there were growing business and job opportunities. Karachi, a port city, was a commercial success and so thousands of job seekers

[1] Pakistan was formed under an idealist unitary belief about society that one religion makes for one nation but this has not stopped people from resorting to violent conflict on the basis of the aforementioned divisions. The imposition of one national language Urdu, is widely recognized to be an initializing factor behind the Bengali alienation from Pakistan. This and a series of factors led to the violent separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan. Quoting an example of riots between Bihari refugees (who speak Urdu) from India and native Bengalis (who speak Bengali), leading to a loss of 500 lives, in a Western mill in former East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), Lee (1966, p.112) states; *"the error here was the confidence that the workers' common Islamic religion would override status, language, economic and value differences. An American result of the same kind of SRC [self-reference criteria] was the mixing of Catholics - Irish and Italians - in early New England industry."*

from the provinces of Punjab and NWFP also came and settled here so that its population swelled from 4 to 13 million in a period of 40 years. The Punjabis and the Pathans, all Muslims, see themselves as culturally and linguistically incompatible to each other as do the Sindhis and the Mahajars. Hence Karachi became a multicultural city with four major communities competing for jobs and resources. As the population out-grew (6% per annum) resources and jobs, the social scene of unemployment, under-employment and disappointment was set for communal mistrust, suspicion, hatred and violence[2]. During the last decade, many Sindhi movements claimed that Sindhis have been deprived of jobs in Sindh by alien Urdu-speakers and Punjabis who get jobs relatively easily as they started in officially required education much earlier than did the Sindhis. As a counter-measure, the said movements wanted a large number of Sindhis to have academic degrees so that they could get jobs and a larger economic share for the Sindhis.

At present, the violence between Sindhis and Mahajars has ebbed but there is now more violence among sub-groups of Mahajars, Punjabis, Pathans and the peace-keeping army and police, and to add another dimension to social conflict, between the religious divide of Shias and Sunnis that cuts through the aforementioned divisions.

It is in this context that many stories of conflict in multi-ethnic organizations, such as Sindh University[3], become self-explicable. The Sindhis do not usually accept non-

[2]Some authors have argued that poverty breeds conflict situations. Marx saw the causes of conflict in the class society, but this does not explain greater intra-class perception-based conflict. The significance of 'perception' in conflict behaviour is shown in that many groups whose objective circumstances demand a conflict, either do not enter into conflict (the power dimension) or have conflict with the wrong groups (e.g. intra-class conflict amongst badly exploited labour, bloodshed among religious sects,).

During the last three decades, I have lived amidst intermittent conflict situations and have personally observed police action, firing, deaths, student protests, wild cat strikes, mass movements and demonstrations, communal riots, arson and destruction of public property. I have kept regular, direct and through news media, observation of several incessant conflicts and found that lessons learnt from socio-political conflicts may be applied to organizational conflict, because the human element and needs are a common denominator. For example, in most conflicts, I have found a recurring common cognitive element, which Pondy (1967) states as, "*the perception that some other person or entity acts against one's interests*". Some personalities could be conflict-prone with biological causes, as recent medical research (level of saratonium in blood) has tried to show.

[3]For a detailed account of Sindhi-Punjabi-Mahajar conflict in the Sindh University see pages 294 to 296.

Sindh at Sindh University. The students are accustomed to too much cheating and copying in the examinations and when a non-Sindhi teacher tried to stop it, most students began demonstrations and protests against him so that he had to resign. The work-related problems at Sindh University had to do with excessive student cheating and corruption, but the conflict based on regional background left little room for dealing with work-related problems. Although Karachi University has somehow managed to isolate itself from the communal conflict in Karachi and maintain a high standard of education, the Quaid-e-Azam University and the Punjab University, where the standard of education is comparatively high, are located in regions where communal conflict is almost non-visible. The provinces of Punjab, NWFP, and the Federal Area comprise a population mix that is not as culturally heterogeneous and over-populated as that in Karachi. Hence there is little regional/ethnic social conflict in these areas. It is therefore relatively easy for Quaid-e-Azam University and Punjab University to maintain standards of education, and for many organizations in these regions to stay out of ethnic conflict. A marketing manager in a British multinational in Pakistan reported that problems of intra-organizational conflict mostly arose in their Head Office at Karachi (a multi-ethnic city) while in their Lahore (a comparatively culturally homogeneous city) office they did not have these conflicts, except for minor ethnicist comments by the regional managers, and the same was the case with their workers unions.

Organizations manned by culturally homogeneous people do not face open conflicts of the kind mentioned above. Also, the higher the social and economic status of a person, the less likely he is to engage in ethnic/community based conflicts unless he has enough to gain from such conflict. A higher level of secular education could also create more tolerance for different cultures. Thus, company managers at a higher level of social status are less likely to engage in open conflict on a regional/ethnic basis. Though there may be subtle hints thrown at managers from a different caste or regional background, it happens only when other differences are sharp, when positions are taken, and when there has to be a tug of power, precipitated by other conflicts, then some may attribute a man's shortcomings to his caste or his regional background. In other words, regionalism was found to be exploited only when there was a need for it in the organizational politics and ambitions of the managers[4].

[4]Dahrendorff (1958) held that there is, "*built-in conflict associated with the dichotomy of positive and negative dominance... produced by the necessary authority structure*", but this does not explain conflict within one hierarchical level.

Regional and ethnic conflict may show itself at higher social status levels in subtle forms and be felt at times of recruitment, inter-departmental transfers and promotions. At the Oil and Gas Development Corporation of Pakistan, an Urdu-speaker geophysicist reported that he was transferred many times from one geological division to another because his Punjabi seniors wanted him to keep starting from scratch in terms of organizational relations, so that they could get their favourite persons promoted. A production manager in a high-tech defence industry reported that the higher management had taken away his powers to hire because they thought that, being a Mahajar, he would probably hire most from among the Mahajars.

Examples of lack of tolerance for other communities are common in Muslim organizations. At the Bank of Credit and Commerce (BCCI), there was a common feeling that the first to be hired and promoted were usually the Lucknow Shias, then the other Shias, and then the Sunnis and Ahmadees. Entrepreneurs belonging to one religious sect would be more willing to do business with entrepreneurs of their own sect than with those belonging to another. Even in sales, a sales manager may find a client with a different value structure not willing to deal with him though he would buy the same product of the same company from a sales manager with the same faith as his own: Having values and beliefs similar to the client's, implies greater possibility of getting business.

Many reported about the regionalism of Pakistani management in the MNCs operating in Pakistan. In a British multinational, personality clashes took place for reasons such as the marketing manager being Punjabi while the finance manager was a Bihari.

Interviews with Indian managers also reveal conflicts based on one's regional, linguistic and caste backgrounds in the Indian organizations. A production manager in a very large Indian pharmaceutical industry reported several incidents of favouritism. His colleague from the state of Karanataka used to favour some candidates from Karanataka and this led to a conflict because the others began to say, "this guy is favouring those". In Bangalore there is a mix of people coming from many Indian states to work; many from the other states have settled there for a long time. Those who could speak the local language did not face much discrimination but people from the North or Andhra could not speak the local language and interact with the locals. Conflicts arose between speakers of different languages;

"sometimes, it used to go to such a state of agitation that one would spit on the floor, swear, and shout vulgar words about the other groups."

Group membership based on region, religion, caste, and ethnic background, becomes

one base for favouritism in hiring, selection and promotions. It was often reported that in India it is not only the question of regionalism but also the question of caste; for example, Brahmins, the highest caste, even if they are from different regions and speak different languages, form one community and support each other[5]. Likewise, if the lowest caste, the Shudras, come from different regions and speak different languages, they would still support each other. It may be said that caste membership over-rules regional and language differences. However, many interviewees added that in India, to some extent, merit does count in cases of promotion, but the definition of merit again involves social considerations discussed in chapter two (socio-economic class and educational background).

While inquiring about possible reasons for the aforementioned conflict, I found the main reasons in over-population which leads to a rat race for dwindling resources, jobs and security, and the consequent psychology of suspicion, mistrust, neurosis and paranoia [see endnote 1]. Experiments in psychology on the effects of over-population on rats show that they become increasingly violent as their population out-grows resources in a controlled residential environment. Other than over-population, reasons may be seen in the strictly closed family and kinship system described earlier. The reason for kinship systems being so dominant is often reported to be the high sectionalization of Indian society in aforementioned terms. Determining whether the kinship system or sectionalization is the cause of the other, puts one in the 'chicken and egg' situation as to which came first. More over, within one religion, there are further divisions on the basis of regions: A North-Indian Hindu would

[5] A Note of Caution: Note that the incidents reported by the interviewees and quoted in this section may not fulfil all criteria of veracity and fairness of judgement. For example, the incident of many Brahmins being promoted by the Brahmin top management in an Indian organization, narrated by a father (a deputy general manager in a large Indian company) to his son (a production manager and our interviewee), may not have happened exactly as described: There are times when fathers in the sub-continent tell tales to their sons, in order to win the sons' respect and loyalty, and to boast that they have done a lot for the family against many odds. It is not impossible that the father in this case could be rationalizing his own reaction to some frustration at not being able to rise to the level to which many of his colleagues rose. Only by following the lengthy procedures of jurisprudence it may be determined whether someone was discriminated against and whether considerations of merit were ignored. But this does not invalidate our point in this chapter, that there is friction among people on the basis of region, language, caste, tribe and ethnic background and that the affiliations based on same region, caste, or ethnic background could wield certain powers to some or serve as a drawback to some others, and that this form of group formation is not known to exist in Western organizations with such explicitness as it does in the subcontinent.

prefer to work with a North-Indian Hindu; then there would be their ancestral background added; a Hindu from Punjab is likely to prefer to work with a Punjabi-Hindu who speaks the same language comes from the same area; this becomes a cultural group in itself.

A suitable explanation of the Indian way of group formation commonly offered is that people generally find it easy to work with their own kind so that even if one's own kind brings some disadvantage, one is prepared to put up with it. Sometimes, one is able to place more confidence in one's own kind and there are certain jobs in which trust is more important than performance. Thus, we find a strong cohesion among likes and a strong tendency not to employ groups who are unknown. There is an active discrimination as people promote their own cultural group. In the interviews, many statements were found supporting the above given explanation: "we are a bit scared of taking people with whom we are less familiar"; "it is the culture, and the management culture is a part of it, that people feel safe with their own kind". The conflict-related consequences of favouring one's own kind were obvious in many statements: For example, in Pakistan International Airlines, it was reported that favouritism led to non-work conflict and inequitable treatment. Those who receive inequitable treatment from the managers tend to quarrel with each other and follow the favoured if the favoured ones tend not to work and do what was called "look busy do nothing". Inequitable treatment was often reported to have led to a loss of motivation.

The relationship of community membership to achievement; the effects of favouritism and discrimination; some groups prosper, others suffer

It may be shown statistically that certain communities, when compared to certain other communities, have a higher percentage of achievers. But whether achievement motivation came first or the control of business, commerce, and hence the resources required for being high achievers, came first is debatable. For example, Muslims in India have a strong general feeling that they are discriminated against because of their minority status. But then, literacy rate among Muslims in India is far lower than the average literacy rate in India and so most Muslims are not well prepared for the job market. The literacy rate among Anglo-Indians and Parsees is almost one hundred percent and they do not feel discriminated against. The Parsees have been a community of high achievers and control a lot of the commerce. Their achievement in terms of literature, commerce, arts, finance and education seem far higher when the percentage of achievers among Parsees is compared with similar percentages from

among other groups. Parsees are a small but cohesive community[6], very well provided for and much looked after by members of the same community and free from certain problems which inhibit many other Indian communities from achieving as much. For example, among the Parsees there is no institutionalized segregation of sexes and both men and women are free to take employment or do business which means that the financial burden of supporting a family rests on the shoulders of all adults and not just on the men. More over, Parsees and Anglo-Indians do not have a cultural prejudice against family planning and thus they do not let their family size go out of hand as most other Indians do, particularly the Muslims (not only in India) whose plight is an obvious support to the population theory of Reverend Malthus. It may therefore be deduced that aspects of a group culture either inhibit or foster traits essential for motivation, social development, prosperity and consequent group harmony.

It may be said that the high achievements of the Parsees[7] give them a "halo effect", but this only shows the significance of religious and social grouping in India: Because the Parsees own a lot of businesses, they are more likely to give and find jobs for a Parsi man. If we see the ratio of job applicants among Parsees and the jobs available in Parsi businesses, the result works out to be very favourable to the Parsi job applicant. This works in a cycle; because one is assured of a good job at the end, he would put more effort in education, get a job and then prepare his off-spring for a better future. This pattern of behaviour is observed in the Parsees but not in the Muslims or in lower caste Hindus because, firstly,

[6]Parsees in Pakistan are a closed society. They seldom reveal their worship places and social customs to others, usually socialize and stay within their community, and normally forbid their children from interacting with other groups. But then in Pakistan, Parsees feel threatened from Muslim fundamentalism and need to protect themselves as do many other religious minorities such as the Ahmadees and the Christians. In India, the Parsi culture is not threatened and therefore, like the other Indians, the Parsis have reservations for out-groups only in giving jobs, and in marriages.

[7]Common motivation theories do not link motivation to the individual's membership of a social group though in many works, not directly dealing with motivation, strong links of motivation to membership of a social group have been recorded. For example, Weber (1976) noted that many of the 19th century nouveau-riche entrepreneurs were either Jewish or Protestant, and that their minority status in society urged them to further accumulation of capital and wealth in order to obtain an entry into 'society'. We obtained similar findings whereby Asian workers in Britain showed much greater money motivation than did the White workers; likewise, in India, the minority Parsees, and in Pakistan, the Ahmadees (prior to the official declaration of Ahmadees being 'non-Muslim') and the early Mahajars, were reported to have made more money than have members of the majority social groups.

there are no existing leads in commerce, business etc. and not enough role models. Muslims are ten percent of the Indian population, but we do not see that ten percent of Academicians or top businessmen etc. are Muslims. There are also regional discrepancies; for example, Muslims in the province of Bihar are reported to be the most under-privileged when compared to Muslims in other Indian regions.

The sub-continent culture of divisions shown in conflict among Asians in Britain

During my empirical investigations in Britain, I found that most British Asians live within their own cultural bounds. Not only do they resist learning many newer patterns, but actively strive to keep their children from being influenced by elements of other cultures, even if the learning of such elements could be highly desirable in terms of inter-community relations and for the good of British Asians themselves. For example, while many regional, ethnic, linguistic and cultural barriers may be broken down by inter-cultural marriages, many groups actively attempt to stop inter-marriages so that even organizations employing Asians only, show conflicts among Asians. Numerous instances of conflict between people following different religions or having dissimilar cultures, were reported. One such conflict took place in Manchester. In a large Indian textile company, a love affair between the Hindu production manager and a Muslim girl worker resulted in the production manager converting to Islam and marrying the Muslim girl but, simply because of the affair between the two, the Muslim workers in the factory caused a lot of trouble. Because the majority of workers there were Muslims, the conflict became serious. The Muslim workers refused to cooperate with the manager, refused to obey his orders and worked as they liked; when there was an emergency order to be shipped, the workers would not stay to work. They also approached the girl's family and put pressure to an extent that she left her parents and took up residence elsewhere. We may note here that because the conflict took place in Britain, the most the resenting workers could do was to disobey the manager and harass the girl. But many instances of intermarriage in the sub-continent have led to riots and issues of law and order[8]. In Britain, some Asian fathers are reported to have killed their daughters for going out with men of a different religion [for conflict based on racial grounds see chapter 14].

[8]Where the causes of conflict are primarily cognitive, they may not be directly traceable in the objective situation of the actors. When questioned about the rationality of conflict, people often produce arguments that bear little logical relevance to their situations.

Tribal conflict in Middle Eastern organizations

Observations implying aforementioned deductions were also reported by many immigrant employees in the Middle East. Intra-organizational conflict among nationality based groups was frequently reported. At a certain university in the Gulf, staff from several nations intrigued against each other, each nationality forming a cultural group. The English lecturers felt that the 'Egyptian Mafia' was controlling the university resources and administration so that when a certain English teacher was fired, the reasons for dismissal were attributed to the said teacher having a skirmish with an Egyptian Dean.

The equivalent of the sub-continent non-work intra-organizational communal conflict, in the Middle East, is non-work intra-organizational tribal conflict. For example, some prominent tribes in the Gulf with attributes of 'worth' (or lack of it), are the Al-Saud, Al-Thani, Al-Quari, Al-Haajri, Al-Muhanadi, Al-Mari, Al-Suadee, and many others. There are jokes and opinions about the so-perceived 'lower' tribes. Personnel from one tribe are reported to support men from their tribes and have subtle clashes with personnel from the other tribes. Some clashes, leading to insubordination, occur even in the armed forces; an army officer reported that among his seniors, there is a Major who is an Al-Quari, and there are two officers in the immediate lower rank who are from the Al-Haajri tribe. The Al-Haajris sometimes do not attend the meetings called in by their senior, the Al-Quari, and at times refuse to obey his orders. The said interviewee is lower in rank to all of these and if he goes to the Al-Quari Major with an application for a leave which the latter does not approve, the Al-Haajris may approve his leave in reaction to the Al-Quari's decision. On the other hand, if the Al-Haajris refuse his leave application first, he can go to the Al-Quari and get the leave sanctioned in reaction to the decision of the Al-Haajris.

Great details about the Arab tribal group formation, lineages, moieties (dual descent traditions), etc. are available in anthropological literature. The conflict proneness as an outstanding character of the Arab tribal mind is admitted both by Arab and non-Arab historians. But we are not concerned here with the details of historical nature of Arab divisiveness except where such divisions show in organizational conflict and modes of conflict resolution. At the moment, an artificial wave of oil-based prosperity has kept the level of social conflict low but there are genuine fears in many states that any ebb of the artificial prosperity tide could bring the hibernating germs of extreme control and violent conflict back into the foreground. This has already begin to show in Bahrain. One perceptual

source of conflict between various population elements lies in the insulting anecdotes and proverbs which groups have about each other; this reminds me of the derision of my students for the Bedouins. One student in particular evoked laughter from the city dwellers. When I inquired about why they laughed at him, they said, "he is a Bedu - has no manners". In Afghanistan, much bloodshed has reportedly been triggered by insulting jokes between the Pathans and the Persian-speaking residents of Kabul.

Tribal identification patterns have been maintained by most Arabs and carried into the modern world by patrilineal descent which has resulted in greater alienation between tribes. Affluence of the oil rich states has enabled them to avoid internecine wars but rivalries continue in many subtle forms and may show suddenly to the amazement of an outsider. In a Gulf hospital, a woman of the Al-Quaris was moaning in pain in her private ward when a curious woman of the Al-Mari tribe peeped in. The two began to quarrel and both phoned home asking for their husbands' help. In half an hour, about two dozen cars (a Rolls Royce among a lot of Mercedes) carrying men from both tribes, arrived in the hospital compound. However, upon finding that it was a 'women's squabble' they went back.

Patai (1973: 218-226) summarizes such conflict proneness at all social levels as that the tradition of fighting, of one's own group being arrayed over and against another group occupying a parallel position within the social structure, of the incessant pressure to promote and prove the superiority of one's group, is a major contributing factor to the conflict-proneness which still characterizes Arab relations on all levels of kinship, social, and political organization. Internal fighting is so abundantly attested in all parts of the Arab world that one must accept the truth of the general situation described. Strife has its historical antecedent and underpinning in the age-old Arab virtues of manliness, courage, aggressiveness, bravery, heroism and vengefulness, which have been extolled by poets for more than thirteen centuries and survive in the Arab's consciousness. Those interested in the psychological formation of conflict-proneness would find Patai very revealing. Patai (1973: 218-226) quotes numerous examples from Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Iraq and Jerusalem to describe the child rearing practices whereby the competitiveness and sibling rivalry instilled by Arab mothers into their children results in a keen sense of rivalry in the adult Arab mind. The closer the two groups (spatial proximity), the greater the hostility. The proximity between a pair of "favourite enemies" maybe as close as two sections or quarters in one village or town. Occasionally, the leading families of the antagonistic factions manage to transform their followers into

political parties, which situation is similar to what I observed in Pakistani rural areas and among the tribal Pathans of Pakistan, and the Afghans. The same is reported about the African tribes (for example, Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi) so much so that it maybe regarded as the hallmark of the primitive tribal societies to form rival groups around tribal membership, the modern tribal form of which is tribal political parties. In Pakistan, the notable families often build their political power base from among their owned villages. In 1988, as the presiding officer of a polling station for two neighbouring villages, I found the villagers making two separate queues for casting their votes. Upon inquiry, they told me that for a Provincial Assembly seat, each village had its own candidate who had the support of the entire village. Dwellers of the two tribal villages would not stand in one queue to cast their votes. During the polling, a tribal fight broke out between the two queues which took one hour of hot negotiations to subside. After the polling was done, I checked the adult population figures for each village and found that we might as well have compared the number of adults in one village against that of the other village to declare the results of the elections. After the vote count, we (the staff) were brought to the headquarters by an armed police escort. At the next polling station, four men got killed in a similar tribal-political violence that led to exchange of fire (note the limitations of 'democracy' in tribal-feudalism).

In Iran (Loffler, 1971: 1077-1091) and Afghanistan, among the tribal Pathans and in the rural areas of the sub-continent, socio-economically influential mediators are used for conflict resolution [see endnote 2]. The Arabs mostly rely on either mediation by a higher status third party, or calling conferences in conflict situations and pay little attention to whether the method is a success or not (Patai, 1973: 228-246). Patai satires the Arab proclivity to calling conferences as "conferentitis". In the sub-continent as well, when rural people settle in cities and towns, they carry on the tradition of conflict resolution through mediation. The '*bradari*' system which is the modern form of sub-continent tribalism (diluted by the geographical spread of clan members), uses mediation for conflict resolution[9].

[9]Black (1989) has argued that because culture is deeply implicated in the constitution of all human experience, a culture-free approach to studying conflict and conflict-resolution is unprofitable, and that researchers in conflict resolution should take into account their own cultural assumptions.

Prospects of change are greater in non-segregated societies

There is some hope that the social situation of divisions, favouritism and discrimination might give way to simple merit considerations in the Indian urban areas, because of industrialization, and the increasingly strong influence of Western civilization. The rural/urban divide in India is very obvious; people with same caste, religion, language, and economic class would behave differentially in the two sectors because urbanization has broken some age-old barriers so that people are far more socially mobile and more concerned with one's present position than with his caste. Rural areas are still very segregated societies in terms of castes. Young couples in urban India tend to have less children and follow a Western oriented life style and, as often reported by interviewees, most urban India now falls in this category. In this social change, India has an advantage that it is not institutionally segregated in terms of sexes and hence there is greater possibility of arranged marriages based on religion, region, caste, and ethnic considerations, giving way to marriages based on freedom of choice. In India, co-education and non-segregated workplaces are allowed. Boys and girls can meet and have friendships in which the social institutions do not object. But in Pakistan, non-related boys and girls are not normally allowed to see each other regularly on any pretext. We can therefore say that Indians do not follow an institutionalized social policy of segregation; although many Indian Muslims have some restrictive moral standards for women, they are not in a majority and do not reflect the Indian society as a whole. On the other hand, in most Muslim countries, because of the institutionalized segregation of sexes, and marriages based on elders' decisions, there is little hope that the said group barriers will break.

Summary and contributions of chapter 5 towards the Grounded Theory to be proposed

We have seen in this chapter that,

- (1) Most actual or potential non-work conflict in the sub-continent organizations reflects that in the society at large. Conflict based on regional, linguistic, religious, caste, and ethnic background is more visible in organizations located in multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and socio-politically volatile regions.
- (2) Organizations suffering from the mentioned non-work conflict are severely handicapped in the performance of their critical operating tasks and may turn into pseudo organizations.

(3) Countries which seek repression of regional conflict by the imposition of an idealistic unitary view of nation-state, religion etc. are mostly unsuccessful because of a lack of a materialistic integration of poorer regions and classes. This has parallels in managers imposing an idealistic unitary view of organization but without attempts to material or social integration of lower ranks.

(4) Population in the city of Karachi, as in scores of other large cities, has almost quadrupled in the last fifty years due to over-procreation and immigration from other regions. As the population has out-grown resources and jobs, the social stage of unemployment, underemployment and disappointment has served as a bedrock for communal mistrust, suspicion, hatred and intermittent violence.

(5) Finding 4 is supported by the findings that people in higher economic classes, or with stable livelihoods, are not found directly involved in the aforementioned kind of conflict. However, even higher level employees, managers, scientists, professors etc. have been reported to have subtle non-work conflicts on the aforementioned grounds for organizational politics and as unhealthy competition for higher posts.

(6) Formation of informal non-work groups in organizations is also based on the same grounds as those used for conflict. Membership of a certain communal group could increase or decrease one's prerogatives and privileges at work. Hence allegations of favoritism or discrimination in hiring, selection, and promotions are not uncommon in the sub-continent and Middle Eastern organizations. Even in sales, having similar beliefs and values as the client's has been reported to help getting orders. However, the said considerations do not always override merit based considerations.

(7) Certain communities in India are generally prosperous yet certain others are generally poor. Prosperous communities are in a better position to look after their members. However, reasons for the prosperity of a certain community cannot always be attributed to favoritism. For example, Muslims in India usually claim to be discriminated against but they also have one of the highest population growth and the least literacy rate. The relatively prosperous communities, Parsees and Anglo-Indians, do not let their family size go out of hand.

(8) Asians in Britain have similar prohibitions for inter-communal marriages and, to a lesser extent, similar inclinations to communal mistrust as in home countries.

(9) Similar conflict as mentioned is found in the poverty stricken regions of the Middle East but the formation of groups, even political parties, is based on either religious or tribal

grounds. In the oil rich regions of the Middle East, informal group formation is based on tribal and national (Egyptian, Tunisian, Palestinian etc.) identities often reported to favour or discriminate on the said bases at the cost of organizational efficiency and effectiveness.

(10)Methods of conflict resolution in the Middle East are; (a)use of intermediaries, and, (b)calling conferences of senior members at organizational level, and tribal elders at social and political level.

(11)There is evidence suggesting that in the urban areas of India, because of industrialization and growing influence of 'modern culture', segregation and communal divisions are diminishing as more and more inter-marriages are becoming acceptable.

These findings show how conflict based on regional, linguistic, religious, tribal, caste, and ethnic background can be brought into organizations from the society at large, to the detriment of organizational effectiveness and efficiency. The chapter explains how the sub-continent and Middle Eastern overpopulating closed familialism, coupled with prohibition of inter-communal or inter-tribal marriages has preserved communal-tribal identities and, in conditions of scarce jobs and resources, led to a common psychology of communal suspicion and mistrust reflected in;

(i)non-work communal conflict and,

(ii)allegations of favoritism and discrimination in hiring and promotion as people seek to promote their own cultural group at the cost of other groups.

Imposition of an idealistic unitary view of national-state or organization has been ineffective in solving the problems which are essentially materialistic in nature.

The findings shall be taken to our Grounded Theory in the last chapter to suggest that communal-tribal suspicion could be reduced by,

(i)people voluntarily reducing their family size to a manageable level;

(ii)transformation of the conflict prone cognitive culture through literature and mass media propagating social harmony and liberalization of attitudes;

(iii)greater acceptance of inter-communal, inter-faith marriages etc.

Hope comes from examples of less segregated urban regions in India where industrialization and growing influence of 'modern culture', have diminished communal divisions as family planning and inter-communal marriages are becoming acceptable.

Notes and Explanations

1. The significance of cognitive states in studying conflict and the limitations of operational definitions

"Conflict has been defined as the condition of objective incompatibility between values or goals, as the behaviour of deliberately interfering with another's goal achievement, and emotionally in terms of hostility. Descriptive theorists have explained conflict behaviour in terms of objective conflict of interest, personal styles, reactions to threats, and cognitive distortions." (Kilman & Thomas, 1978: 386). Coser's (1958) definition of conflict as, "a struggle... in which the aims of the conflicting parties are not only to gain the desired values but also to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals...", seems to cover most aspects and variations in different situations and cultures. Pondy (1967) gives four usages of the term "conflict", as antecedent conditions to some evident struggle, affective states (e.g. animosity), cognitive states, and conflictful behaviour ranging from passive resistance to aggression. However, Katz and Kahn (1978: 613) take the operational definition of conflict as the "collision of actors", and ignore Pondy's above mentioned first three usages of the term, saying that these are "appropriate questions to understanding conflict but not to defining it": Reducing definitions to operational ones could be useful in empirical studies with narrow focus, and game theories (where the objective is to find the basic elements or "atoms" of conflict process by studying its dynamics in simplified situations), but has limitations if the objective is to attain a comprehensive knowledge of conflict as it happens in real life, to understand potential conflict and the socio-cultural (cognitive and material) origins of conflict. An operational definition of conflict as the 'collision of actors' may help in understanding the behavioristic dynamics of a conflict in process but would offer little help in conflict resolution where the causes have strong cognitive dimensions. More over, narrow definitions limit our observations of conflict in its many forms; for example, the quoted definition of conflict (as "collision of actors") sees it as necessarily involving interaction, but in real life, one actor may not reciprocate the aggression of the other and yet conflict be carried on. Examples where conflict was one sided and its causes were primarily cognitive, have been quoted in my study of British Asian workers (see chapters 12, 14, and 15). In intra-individual conflict (neurosis) there are no visible actors but symbolic-cognitive understanding is required. Hence, most conflicts can be better understood by looking at the cognitive states of the actors, animosity, and the extent to which these are culture bound.

I have observed conflict between groups with largely compatible aims (e.g. non-synergy business takeover bids, conflict between religious and political parties). There are cultures in which the possibility of conflict will be less if rival businesses/groups hold equal level of power and means at their disposal, in which case, instead of conflict, there would be greater likelihood of "collusion" if the parties know that none can "win the war" and more can be gained by collusion (e.g. price fixing and creating barriers of various sorts for weaker rivals). In the sub-continent, private businesses are more likely to take conflictual stance and damaging attitudes against rivals and coveted businesses if the latter are in weaker retaliatory positions. While a powerful rival would be invited to form a collusion, a weaker competitor would be pushed out by the use of many possible means. This brings us to our recurring theme; the holistic approach whereby conflict maybe better understood in relation with control (power) and motivation, and in terms of cultural learning of the participants.

2. Tribal Methods of Conflict Resolution:

In the Arab world, mediation on the tribal and village level has for centuries been the traditional method of settling disputes, and the same method has, in modern times, been adapted for settling political and military issues within and between Arab states. The greater the prestige of the mediator and the deeper the respect he commands, the better the chances that his efforts at mediating a dispute will be successful. For this reason, the role of mediator is traditionally assigned to members of special descent groups, who have a high ascribed status. The mediator must be a person whose impartiality is beyond question, who enjoys such a high status that neither of the two disputants can in any way exert pressure on him. Preferably, he should be a wealthy man, so as to preclude any suspicion of being accessible to bribery. In sum, the ideal mediator is one in a position, because of his personality, status, respect, wealth, influence, and so on to create in the litigants the desire to conform with his wishes. While the efforts of the mediator usually begin in the form of separate meetings with the two litigants, they culminate in one or more joint sessions attended by both parties, as well as by their kinsmen and other supporters. The decision of the elders is accepted by the disputants and their kinsmen, without any legal means of enforcement, simply because the judgement, once pronounced, represents an ethical and moral imperative. It is in this manner that the folk mores serve as a solid basis for social control (Antoun, 1965: 7).

The mediators are neither expressly interested in determining the guilt or innocence of any party in the dispute nor the rightness or wrongness of one claim over the other. They do not judge. Thus, even if a case has been brought before the court - in all Arab countries there are government-appointed and police-backed courts of justice - and the court hands down its verdict, this does not eliminate the need for mediation. A court verdict does not lead to a reconciliation; in order to restore peace in the community and maintain the solidarity of the group, mediation must continue until reconciliation is achieved. Of course, once a court judgement has been issued, reconciliation is more difficult to achieve. It is not surprising, therefore, that there is considerable resistance to the use of courts (Ayoub, 1965: 13).

Another important traditional Arab social institution, sometimes used for conflict resolution is deliberation in the council of elders of the area in which the weight of each man's opinion depends on his age, the size of his family, his reputation, eloquence, and personality. The tribal council never votes; it only deliberates and discusses. The shaykh of the tribe is not a chairman of a meeting but rather a host. Once the shaykh feels that a definite majority of the council inclines to a certain view (in which of course, they may well be influenced by the shaykh's own opinion), he will summarize the prevailing views, and at this point, without any formal vote, all know what decision has been reached. The lack of success in resolving a conflict at any one particular conference merely means that an additional conference has to be convened (Patai, 1973: 239-240).

One needs an intermediary in order not to be cheated in the market place, in locating and acquiring a job, in resolving conflict and legal litigation, in winning a court decision, in speeding government action and bureaucratic procedures, in establishing and maintaining political influence, in finding a bride, and in fact, for the social scientist to locate and convince respondents to give an interview. In both village and town, the Zaim - the powerful leader of a major family - has the important function of mediating thereby keeping disputes out of government courts (Farsoun & Meyer in Patai, 1973: 232).

Chapter Six: Authoritarian Values, Coercive Control and Interpersonal Conflict

In the sub-continent and Middle Eastern industry, supervisors, foremen, managers or owners often use coercive control[1] over workers who too have authoritarian psychology (though without significant powers). Many production managers reported that when their foremen supervise the workers, they usually instil a fear of punishment, that the latter may be sacked. Serious warnings precede the sacking of a person; normally a charge sheet is issued, but if the issue is serious, one may be fired on spot. Moreover, at the workplace, as elsewhere in society, typical cases of interpersonal physical conflict reflect elements of the authoritarian/ autocratic culture. Through qualitative analysis, one can pick out from the events described in such cases[2], the reflections of a culturally instilled concept of a certain type of masculinity which includes haughtiness, dominance over others, desire to be seen in positions of total authority, a mixture of inferiority and superiority complexes, use of personal authority, and similar related traits. One significant and commonly observable trait of an authoritarian/autocratic personality, often found among the Arabs though not exclusive to them, may be mentioned here: In general, it can be defined as one behaving in a submissive manner to the one perceived powerful, but being domineering to those perceived weak. The trait can be placed on a spectrum of intensity of its expression, the extreme form of which is shown in a combination of sycophancy or flattery for those perceived strong and rich, but in what amounts almost to cruelty for those perceived as weaker and poor. In some cultures, we see many taking undue advantage of the considerate and polite, but they turn docile and meek for the strong and domineering if the later enjoy a high socio-economic

[1]Unlike that in the sub-continent and Middle East, in Western industry and religious organizations, coercion is not normally used. Hence Etzioni (1961-a-b-c) suggested three major types of organizations and compliance methods; total organizations use coercive power and result in alienative involvement; work organizations (industry) use remunerative power and generate calculative involvement; normative organizations (religious, educational, social service) use normative power for moral involvement: "*organizations that have similar compliance structures tend to have similar goals, and organizations that have similar goals tend to have similar compliance structures*" (Etzioni 1961-c: 147): While this could be true in the West, there are many work, religious, and educational organizations in many 'Eastern' countries which use coercive power either alone or as a factor. Hickson & McCullough (1980: 49) suggest that in most cases a mixture of the three types of power is used.

[2]For cases and excerpts from interviewee statements regarding authoritarian values, coercive control and inter-personal conflict in the sub-continent, see pages 296 to 300.

status[3]. There is a very large difference between the concepts of personal strength and manliness prevalent in most Western countries and those in the Eastern countries. It is beyond the scope of this work to describe these concepts in detail but we may refer here to some prevalent values which affect business and organizations and must be understood by managers; for example, a sales manager reported that he had to keep a moustache only because, without one, he looked younger and people did not pay attention to what he said; a manifestation of the kind of authoritarianism whereby a slim man, a weak man, one without a moustache, may not be paid as much attention as a burly, strong man would be. Therefore, most managers, supervisors, foremen, police and security men, must have a strong body and preferably a moustache. Lean men in the police departments are normally placed on office duties. Talking loudly is often essential for getting listened to. If, for example, one is trying to make a sale to a traditional sub-continent man by speaking in soft tones, the prospective buyer might dismiss all that is said.

In chapter two we mentioned certain aspects of male stereotypical expectations whereby certain tasks, such as domestic cooking, cleaning and washing clothes and utensils are considered unmanly. Using polite language in many situations is also considered unmanly. Crying, except in the event of the death of a close relative or friend, and on religious and national sentimental occasions, is also considered unmanly. On the other hand, the female stereotypical traits, deduced from informal conversations and interviews, are that where men must express anger and combative behaviour, women should succumb to weaker manifestations such as crying. An aggressive female would be tolerated only if she belongs

[3]Dr. Ammar ('*Fi Bina al-Bashar*' [On the Building of Man], in Patai, 1973: 108-110) notes Egyptian modal personality traits as follows:

(1)Ready adaptability as either a genuine flexibility or a readiness to express superficial agreement and fleeting amiability which is meant to conceal the situation and hide the true feelings - the second aspect bred by cruel rulers; the refusal to accept authority or leadership and its disapproval from the depths of the consciousness, and this despite the external veneer which people display toward the leaders and which consists of rites of respect when it implants fear and dread in their souls.

(2)Self-assertion as an exaggerated assertion of the personality, and the persistent tendency to demonstrate one's superior powers, to dominate things, and show scorn for others. This is not the kind of self-assurance which results from self-confidence and the proper understanding of the relationship between personal capabilities and external situations. It is, rather, the result of a loss of confidence and a lack of desire to assess situations objectively. By means of removing responsibility from himself to others, it becomes easy to justify any embarrassing situation or dereliction of social responsibilities.

to the upper classes, or has enough economic means to be able to live independently, or if her husband has a lesser economic/social status than hers, or if she has little to lose from social disapproval. Likewise, men with meager means of survival, dependent upon others for their livelihood, may succumb to such weaker behaviour as is considered more typical of women in the sub-continent. Hence, house boys, drivers, cooks, gardeners, and other menial servants, dependent upon the charity of a rich and domineering employer, and with little alternative employment opportunity, may become too obsequious and submissive to be seen as typical male stereotypes.

Favourable attitude towards what may be called an 'Eastern style of manliness', is not reserved for men alone: Women in the sub-continent and the Middle East often subscribe to this view by wanting men to be authoritarian, by ridiculing men who do not want to dominate women, and by being authoritative themselves whenever they can. In fact many middle and upper class women in typically Eastern societies support male dominance primarily because of the easy life (however vegetative, thoughtless and vain) it provides them when all decision-making powers are left in the hands of men. Because resourceful Eastern men would not allow women to do more than stay at home and indulge in fancy clothes, jewelry, perfumes and controlling the servants, women in turn find it easy to exonerate themselves of responsibilities that involve the pain of thought, action and the worries of possible failure.

Some differences in the attitudes of female workers compared to those of the male workers, were expressed by Indian managers as follow; women were different in their reactions to not getting a promotion in that they would become very touchy, especially if they got low marks in promotion tests, they would start crying, and if one was strict with them, they would cry all the more, so that it became difficult for a manager to handle the situation; while men were given more manual work, heavy work such as lifting things, women would normally do packing or other work that requires less physical effort. In terms of conflict, it was reported that the situation, in non-segregated factories, between men and women, was good in that men tried to refrain from conflicts and work faster. But in segregated sections, there were many conflicts between workers. Because of less effective protest from women when faced with less than expected rewards, and women being more amenable to control than are men, most Asian employers prefer female workers and children where such recruitment is possible.

Authoritative or Democratic Management?: Situational Demands

Managers in high-tech industries reported that if they were rough and authoritative with their staff, they could have a number of conflicts and insubordination at hand. However, being democratic in authoritative environment is not easy; whilst trying Theory Y and participative style of management, one must be vigilant in getting feed-back about the results of experiments in changing the style of management: In an authoritative environment where a workforce has long been accustomed to strict discipline and coercion, the newer styles of management, especially when applied by one or a few managers and not by a majority, may be interpreted as signs of weakness, lack of managerial skills and knowledge ("he is new and doesn't know how things are done") and even suspicion from those who have been totally accustomed to traditional management styles. Quite often, workers take advantage of a lenient manager if they see that only through him they can gain privileges and benefits (hit the wall where it is weaker[4]), hence jeopardizing their benefactor's job. An Indian manager observed that with a strong union backing, workers could press on with unreasonable demands. In 1976-77, the Bhutto government in Pakistan was paralysed by agitators; amongst them were hundreds of thousands of workers who did not realize how much Bhutto had done for the lower classes and could still do if allowed to stay in power. The subsequent Zia's Martial Law regime took most of workers' privileges back and was nevertheless supported by millions from the working classes who approved of Islamic autocracy (for details of the relationship of protest to authoritarianism, see chapter 15). Several interviewees reported that employees may take the instructions of democratic managers lightly if the former are

[4]Conflict proneness playing a role in organizational ideology was shown by Thomas (1976) who found that supervisors who emphasize peace and cooperation tend to evoke such behaviour from their subordinates. However, if the causes of conflict were present in the socio-economic, cultural or motivation circumstances among the subordinates, then the supervisors would be limited in their ability to evoke peace and cooperation: In my study of low paid Indian workers in a large Indian pharmaceutical industry, it was reported that the cooperative supervisor was perceived by the workers as "soft and vulnerable to pressure" and hence more pressure was put on him to get undue advantages; likewise, in a Gulf university, wealthy mature students who wanted their degrees the easy way, pestered the cooperative teachers to teach the least and pass them without doing enough work; attempts of the teachers to bring some standards to education were strongly resisted through pressures aimed at making it difficult for the teachers to stay in jobs. But in my study of Pakistan International Airlines manufacturing units with reasonably well-paid technical staff, I found Thomas's aforementioned thesis valid.

accustomed to working under an authoritative style[5]. Even among managers, the work may be distributed such that docile managers are over-loaded while others take a free ride.

However, skilled workers perceive their status as being higher than other workers, identify themselves with the upper levels, and want to participate so that their self-esteem should remain high. Thus, a production manager can be democratic with a skilled workforce. We may deduce from descriptions during processes of change of operative methods and techniques in many organizations, that the management of technological change becomes easier if all concerned staff are taken into confidence and the necessity and benefits of change are explained before undertaking the process. Management of change also requires creativity on the part of those involved. During this process it sometimes becomes necessary to depart from the established procedures and norms of doing a job. Only by persistent efforts at creating newer methods, staff participation, discussions and explanations, can the arduous task of change be accomplished[6]. A Theory X style of management is not as likely to bring

[5]Gouldner (1954) showed that while the use of impersonal rules decreases the visibility of power relations and, in the American culture of egalitarian norms, decreases in power visibility increase the legitimacy of the supervisory position and therefore decrease tension within the group, there was an unintended consequence: "*Rules increase knowledge about minimum acceptable behavior*", thus depressing behavior to the minimum level; this leads to closeness of supervision which in turn increases the visibility of power relations, raises the tension level in the work group thereby upsetting the initial balance based on the institution of rules. March and Simon (1958: 37) criticized the Gouldner model as leaving a puzzle unexplained; "*why is increased supervision the supervisory response to low performance?*", and sought the answer to the puzzle in the authoritarianism and punitivity of supervisory role perception. However, their suggestion, that "*appropriate manipulation of equality norms, perceived commonality of interest, and the needs of supervisors will restrict the operation of the dysfunctional features of the system*", would not work in societies where organizational levels directly correspond to sharply differentiated socio-economic classes, equality norms are not effective and there is a low perception of commonality of interest. Hence, in the sub-continent and the Middle East, close supervision and coercive control for the lower classes is widespread.

[6]Katz and Kahn (1978: 327-330) propose that the hierarchical organizational structure is suitable only when individual tasks are minimal in creative requirements, compliance is enough, identification with organizational goals not required, speed in decision-making is more important than participation, and minimal change is required by the environment. On the other hand, the advantages of democratic organizational structure are shown in an opposite set of conditions when appropriateness of organizational change are more important than the speed of adaptive decision making, when individual roles require creative efforts and broad understanding of organizational functions, and motivation has to come from identification of one's goals with those of the organization.

about the necessary changes in operative methods in a high-tech environment as is a participative style of management.

In order to find out what kind of management style would be the most appropriate in a given situation, the following factors may be considered;

- (a) the length of period during which the workforce has worked under domineering/authoritative management;
- (b) employees' level of intelligence, self-esteem, self-confidence, education, training, and skills;
- (c) employee perceptions of the 'weaknesses and strengths' of the manager, and
- (d) prevalent values and norms regarding authoritarianism.

The last factor is of prime importance because in some cultures, authoritarianism is so deeply ingrained that a quick departure from it may not always bring the desired results in the short term.

Summary and contributions of chapter 6 towards the Grounded Theory to be proposed

- (1) Coercive-utilitarian control is often employed in sub-continent and Middle Eastern industry which may lead to interpersonal conflict between supervisors and workers.
- (2) The culture-instilled nature of authoritarianism is evident from the observations that it is employed not only by those in authority over the lower ranks but also among the workers themselves. Moreover, the male head of the family, particularly among the lower classes, exercises dominating behavior over women and children.
- (3) A modal concept of masculinity in the sub-continent and the Middle East includes traits such as haughtiness, seeking dominance over others, and a desire to be in positions of power and authority for the latter's own sake.
- (4) The authoritarian personality seeks dominance over those perceived to be in weaker social or hierarchical position in the organization, but behaves submissively to those perceived stronger in social status or higher in the organizational hierarchy.
- (5) Perceptions of one's physical strength are often important in the job of a supervisor, foreman and police; a soft tone is usually not paid attention as much as a commanding voice.
- (6) Favourable attitude to the said 'Eastern male authoritarianism' is shown not only by men but most women too subscribe to it.

- (7) Male and female stereotypical expectations are still prevalent in the traditional majority of the sub-continent and the Middle East and have implications for organizational control.
- (8) Because of less effective protest from women and children when faced with less than expected rewards, Eastern employers prefer female workers and children where possible.
- (9) Non-segregated workplaces show less incidence of interpersonal conflict than do segregated ones; i.e. there is less interpersonal conflict when men and women work together.
- (10) Managers in high-tech industries reported that skilled personnel do not succumb to authoritarian control and hence participative management was preferable. With unskilled workers long accustomed to authoritarian control, democratic management could be construed as 'lack of managerial knowledge' or signs of weakness.

These findings show that management styles reflect attitudes towards authoritarianism in society at large. An authoritarian society fosters authoritarian traits which then show in organizations in the form of coercive control. Authoritarianism is not specific to men for most women also subscribe to it by favouring the domineering traits of 'Eastern authoritarianism'. Authoritarianism may result in interpersonal conflict.

Authoritarianism often recedes when people acquire education and skills. Hence, skilled workers prefer participative management style.

Managers who want to shift to participative and 'theory Y' style of management should take the following factors into consideration;

- (a) the length of period during which the workforce has worked under domineering/authoritative management;*
- (b) employees' level of intelligence, self-esteem, self-confidence, education, training, and skills;*
- (c) employee perceptions of the 'weaknesses and strengths' of the manager, and*
- (d) prevalent values and norms regarding authoritarianism.*

However, a profound organizational development towards participative management requires cognitive cultural transformation at the social level.

The findings shall be taken to our Grounded Theory to show that coercive control exists because of vulnerability of workers to such control, caused by mass poverty and oversupply of labour. Later, we shall present some solutions to reduce such vulnerability to coercion.

Chapter Seven: Pressure Group Conflict in Tribal-Feudal Authoritarianism

The Indian sub-continent consists of regions where there exist primitive tribal societies (such as the Tribal Areas, and much of NWFP in Pakistan), feudal societies (the rural areas of the provinces) and capitalist societies (the major cities). But the transition from one form of society to another does not mean that old attitudes are always substituted by those commensurate with the ethos of the new society. India is commonly regarded as the largest democracy in the world but the vast majority of its population lives in primitive tribal-feudal conditions within which capitalist values are exercised only in their crudest form.

The essence of tribal and feudal attitudes was patriarchal behaviour where the tribal chief, feudal lord or the local village *chaudhary* were the patriarchs who had the power to reward conformism and punish non-conformism to tribal-feudal ethics as a way of keeping power and control in their hands. One significant element of tribal ethics was the loyalty of the people to the patriarch. In classical Marxist theory, it was propounded that different economic classes behaved in dissimilar fashion but it is also observed that different economic classes in one country share aspects of a similar culture and consequently have similar psychological traits. Uniform traits in a patriarchal society are shown in the followers of a patriarch learning how to be a patriarch, fostering desires and struggling actively not to get rid of a patriarch but to be mini-patriarchs themselves even if, among the lower classes, they can do so only in their families.

Some aspects of patriarchal cultures have been noted by authors such as Robert Cunningham (1988: 119-127). Among Cunningham's observations applicable to the sub-continent is the dislike of superiors of challenges from subordinates. In authoritarian cultures, such a dislike may extend even to those challenges that concern organizational effectiveness and moral issues. Because of the patriarchal desires of many superiors to be seen as more capable than others in 'controlling' the organization, they show dislike for subordinates who criticize something in the way the organization is run; dislike may result in getting the subordinate transferred or writing adverse remarks in his annual confidential reports (ACRs). This happens even in scientific research organizations and with professionals; events supporting the significance of loyalty were narrated by interviewees from various organizations. Examples of victimization for less than obedient behaviour came even from professors and head masters (for details see chapter 8).

Cunningham defines "Patriarchal" as "*a condition of obeisance, loving concern, and*

responsibility between the male head of a family unit and a less significant relative", but this definition limits patriarchy to family unit and replaces the power seeking and controlling aspects of patriarchy with "loving concern" which, though true in certain situations at the family level, is not visible to a significant extent at the social level of patriarchy. Cunningham has observed patriarchy in Middle Eastern organizations but he does not seem to be aware of the punishments inflicted upon non-conformers: First, patriarchy is not limited to family affairs though it is true that the family head is a patriarch at the family level and that patriarchal behaviour is learned first of all at the family level. But patriarchy also exists at tribal and feudal social level and it also shows itself in the behaviour of the heads of organizations in patriarchal societies; the head master of a school, the director of a government department, the manager of a factory or a bank, and even a Minister of state in the Middle East and the sub-continent show behavioral aspects characteristic of patriarchy: A patriarch may chose to be benevolent to its subordinates, or domineering at times. In terms of power-seeking attitudes, we observe that many Asian and Middle Eastern owners and top managers do their best to centralize authority and use several tactics to achieve greater control over decision making and organizational practices. In the sub-continent, having "pocket unions"[1] is one such tactics of centralizing control and this enables top management or owners to have greater control over organizational affairs. Many owners and managers argue that sometimes it becomes necessary in factories to have pocket unions so that political parties could not infiltrate into unions, hooligans could not create trouble, and unnecessary disputes could be avoided. There are some organizations where the workers are illiterate and passive and give in to greater control but equally, there are other organizations where the subordinates have their own pressure groups, political and influential contacts, and unions through which they resist attempts at greater downward control, and seek a share in the control of the organization. The managers or heads of organizations who want to stay in full control, have their own means to resist pressure groups and deny the subordinates a share in decision making. Hence the potential for conflict.

[1]The slang term "pocket unions" is commonly used for workers unions created by the employers themselves so that no alternative or genuine union could be formed in the organization. Pocket unions enable the employers to have their own decisions accepted by the employees. At times, the leaders of a genuine workers' union are "bought" so as to turn the said union into a "pocket union".

Various sections of the sub-continent population in large cities and towns are showing signs of a shift from 'obeisance to patriarch' towards an exercise of self-acclaimed rights through pressure groups and unions[2]. Though the modern patriarchal role of many capitalists is highly accepted, in state departments and in many public and private companies, pressure groups and unions contest for greater control over organizational affairs and resources. During my empirical investigations, I found that in a large tanning factory, and in a very large shoe manufacturing factory (both highly profitable), the illiterate and docile peasants from nearby villages come to work and show no ambitions to go beyond a pocket union. These workers live in a feudal society where the traditional way of life teaches them to believe in fate, and accept their station whatever it is. One could believe that these workers are complacent because they have no issues at the factory, but further inquiry revealed that they did have several problems; they were low paid and faced humiliation at the hands of the supervisors, as the production manager reported,

"Our workers know well that the factory is not the sole supplier of their bread. They have to do something else to supplement their incomes, their wages are never enough to meet their basic needs. They have low levels of motivation and they have no hopes that their plight will get better."

Hence a strong case for attributing docility, despite occasional outbursts of interpersonal conflict, to the feudal regard for patriarchs - in this case the patriarchs being the managers/owners of the factory. However, in contrast to the mentioned peasant-workers' docility, in a nearby Education Department and the Provincial Civil Secretariat, rival pressure groups of seniors and subordinates battle to take charge of the organizational affairs.

In the major industrial areas of the sub-continent, feudal values are dying away and industrial strife is not uncommon. A detailed study of pocket unions, genuine unions, strikes and disputes in the sub-continent often crosses the realm of organizational behaviour and runs into the social psychology of poverty, violence, and criminology which is beyond the scope of this work. Therefore, in order to elaborate the subtle, and hence less obvious, aspects of control-centralization, power seeking, and the ensuing conflict between unions and higher

[2]In terms of 'cultural borrowing' or 'diffusion', note that the said transition does not seem to be taking place, at least with much visibility, in the countries that were not colonized by European powers for an effectively longer period. Hence, the Gulf countries, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia, show the least signs of the mentioned transition which is very visible in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and to some extent, in Egypt.

management, I have chosen to describe comparatively 'polite' organizations such as Ministerial Departments in the Civil Secretariat, schools, universities, and organizations that hire professionals such as the Oil and Gas Development Corporation, Pakistan International Airlines, some multinationals in Pakistan, and some prestigious private businesses.

The equivalent of private industry pocket unions, in state departments such as the Ministerial Departments in the Civil Secretariat, is to have a pressure group of patronized employees. The process of creating pressure groups by senior officials to get support is known as "lobbying", a very familiar term in the said organizations. Keeping informal supporting groups on the basis of loyalty to the senior is a typical remnant of patriarchal behaviour. In the Ministry of Services & General Administration, I was told, there is conflict at various levels between informal groups. One group has loyalties with one 'additional-secretary', and the other group is loyal to the other. There is little direct contact between the subordinate staff and the secretary and hence little direct loyalties of the subordinate staff to the secretary who deals with them indirectly only through his 'additional-secretaries'. The lower staff is divided in its loyalties to either of the three additional-secretaries who are usually contenders for the post of the secretary if the latter is to be transferred or retired for which a possibility, however small, always exists.

From the narrated events of conflict, reasons for conflict, the process of conflict and its resolution, I have picked several typical traits of authoritarian-patriarchal organizational cultures, and studied the role of unions and informal groups in organizational conflict. For example, from the study of a certain school[3] where the head master had created an informal group of favourite teachers whom he used to favour while the others said that he should treat all in an equitable manner, it was possible to see the head master as a patriarch who, (i)used his powers to please the loyal subordinates and punish the disloyal, (ii)sought to enhance his control by creating supporting groups and by disrupting the control-seeking activities, democratic though, of the others, in one way or another, and, (iii)disliked challenges from subordinates and punished the challengers where he could.

In several other case studies, we note that, (i)the seniors want to behave as patriarchs and have pressure groups at their disposal; (ii)employees who are supported by their own influential pressure groups, stand better chances of saving their jobs, promotions and

[3]For detailed case studies, see pages 300 to 303.

transfers; (iii) not well-connected employees cannot afford to challenge their seniors for indecorous acts, for the former risk being punished in that their promotions would be delayed, they could be demoted, transferred to undesirable places, or even dismissed from the job; (iv) well-connected employees and strong pressure groups can counter the authority of a senior who is not a member of a strong pressure group, or not as well-connected as his subordinates are, in which case, the subordinates have greater political power than the senior has. Thus a head of department may not be able to exercise authority over his subordinates unless he too is well-connected, or has the support of a stronger pressure group.

More observation of pressure group politics comes from descriptions by the staff at a Provincial Civil Secretariat: There used to be a reverence for, or fear of, the heads of departments among the subordinates a decade or so ago, but now it is diminishing because of the spread of political power. In the past, the secretaries could threaten one with dismissal but now some subordinates have greater political influence so that they may even get a secretary transferred from his ministry. The power base of these well-connected subordinates is their relationships with prominent politicians and employees' unions. The Secretariat has a union of the non-gazetted staff. The gazetted officers have their respective associations. The unions have powers as pressure groups and there have been strikes on issues of salaries, allowances, promotions, against price rises and inflation, if employee files are stuck up somewhere in some department, if their promotion cases are stuck up in a bottle neck in the processing pipe line, for example, in the Selection and Promotion Board's procedures. The initial stage of a strike usually takes the form of protest by tying up black bands around arms. The next stage, if demands are not met, is a 'pens down strike'; employees on this kind of strike appear in the offices but do not do any work and consequently, the suffering public builds up a pressure on the government to end the strike, to give in to the employees' demands, or to use some other methods to end the strike. The third stage is to leave offices and march in a procession towards the Chief Minister's or the Governor's Secretariat or towards the office of a Minister or a certain head of department, depending upon who the target of the strike is, or who is deemed responsible for the grievance that is the cause of the strike. Slogans are raised and speeches are delivered. Sometimes there is hooliganism.

When the government is informed about a certain strike or a notice to strike, the senior officials concerned, usually the secretaries, call meetings. Negotiations are made with the union officials who have called the strike. The Minister or the Chief Minister could be

informed depending upon who has the decision making powers regarding the demands of the employees. Usually the demands of the employees are within the powers of the Ministers to meet and strikes have been called off within days, at the most, a week.

The secretariat unions were not reported to have called for strikes against government corruption, abuse of powers, unfair allotment of land or other social problems but they have been on strikes only on issues concerned with their employment privileges and such demands as mentioned earlier. They may also go on strike, though rarely, against a particular department if that department has been ineffective in providing its services; once there was a strike against the electricity department because of a prolonged power breakdown.

In the public sector industries, some unions are quite powerful and have what is commonly known as 'nuisance value' in that, through hooliganism, they may thwart the attempts of management to improve productivity or take certain measures for increasing the profitability of the company. In Pakistan International Airlines, a manager stated that if they followed the progress reports of employees strictly, they might have union problems of various kinds at hand. The unions of lower ranks and manual workers have greater nuisance value in that, because of the nomadic life style of many, they have little to lose in terms of personal belongings and community respect, if they resort to destruction of property and violence (usually public transport busses are burned; private property has seldom been touched in demonstrations and protests). On the other hand, white collar workers, clerks and officers, whose permanent addresses are easily traceable, and who have some respect in the local community, cannot easily resort to hooliganism for fear of being traced, and also because they do not want to lose community respect, very important in the sub-continent in order to have some kind of de facto citizenship rights. Hence the most they can do in protest is to have peaceful marches to the offices of the authorities concerned or to go on no-work strikes. Another reason for the lower staff unions having more powers was given by respondents as possessing the power of being the collective bargaining agent. The staff unions are recognized by the ILO and have certain contracts with them renewable after every two years. Their rights are, by law, protected by the ILO charters, but this does not mean that the said unions have de facto rights too, because, in most cases, the unions have little recourse to the relevant authorities if the ILO charters are violated. In the sub-continent and Middle Eastern private industry, the ILO charters are hardly paid attention to.

The influence of pressure groups on appointments, transfers and promotions

The bureaucratic model of control has shown a tremendous potential for cross-cultural application. Some form of bureaucracy with stated aims to implement policies and programs through standardized/impersonal procedures, to serve the masses with equity, exists in almost all countries, but Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy is not empirically found (Dunkerley, 1972: 26; March & Simon, 1958: 28). Although in their appearance, the sub-continent bureaucratic systems and functions are little more than modified European bureaucratic systems, the two are not the same in their effects. While the European procedural patterns are imitated and sometimes modified in the sub-continent, the European bureaucratic principles of equity in treatment, impersonality in functions, and merit based hiring and promotions are often reported to be influenced by the inequality norms of a class and caste based society, personal power-seeking desires of officials, and the familial nepotism of a family-centred society. There is strong evidence, from tax collection, land allotment, national development corporations loans of various sorts, sale of public companies, sanction of government loans, operating methods and range of services of city municipalities and developmental organizations etc. that bureaucracy in the sub-continent, largely, does not follow the European moral principles of citizenship and equity: Pressure groups and hooligans use the bureaucratic procedures to obtain privileges not available to all citizens.

The British legacy of merit based Selection Boards, Civil Service Examinations and Promotion Commissions have made a hybrid with the primitive patriarchy so that the result is a chaotic interplay of pressure groups, patriarchal favouritism and some merit based considerations[4]: Unlike the developed countries, societies in transition from tribal/feudal to nascent democracies still retain a very important aspect of tribal-feudal patriarchalism whereby rewards (employment and promotion are but modern forms of rewards) are seen as patriarchal prerogatives little linked to the merit and functional needs of the organizations. This is shown in the role of pressure groups in the government employment practices. For example, the CTA (College Teachers Association) had reportedly got its men inserted into the Ministry of Education because they wanted to have control over transfers, promotions, appointments and grade-fixations etc. of the political allies of the ruling group of CTA. The College Teachers Association was reported to be under the control of the fundamentalist

[4]See detailed cases in pages 300 to 303.

party, the Jamaat-e-Islami which, through its pressure-group politics and threats of using the strike weapon as well as violence, has, over the last twenty years, got several of its fundamentalist members appointed as lecturers. Hence, one incentive for many to join influential political parties is the possibility of getting jobs through pressure group politics. In some Pakistani universities, getting some members of Islamic Party appointed as lecturers was an annual practice during the late seventies and early eighties. Pressure group politics to get employment is also seen in Britain in local council employment where the Asian minorities have a major say in the selection process.

The office bearers of CTA can influence major government decisions such as who should be appointed Director of Education, but only to an extent: The bureaucrats and the politicians have their own vested interests. When they appoint an undeserving (therefore weak in his own conscience) candidate (such appointments do not fulfill the regulatory criteria), to a top position, he can then be asked to do what the government requires, that is, get the relatives and allies of officials and politicians appointed to new vacancies on an ad-hoc basis, to be turned permanent later through further intrigue in the Public Service Commission. The CTA and unions of this kind, are supposed to protest against such illegal appointments but CTA in fact supports the government, because its president also gets his men appointed on an ad-hoc basis. The net result is a coalition of corrupt unions and corrupt government. The elected party cannot effect the said practices unless it has the support of functionaries in the bureaucracy and in the unions. In such an organizational culture, the ability of an individual to stay honest is severely limited, which itself has implications for motivation (for details see chapter 9).

In 1995 a Provincial High Court[5] declared the employment of 487 officials as null

[5]The sub-continent courts of justice, a legacy of the British period, conduct their business predominantly in English and use the same or modified versions of the British designed Indian Penal Codes. It is not uncommon to see the courts showing impartiality and fairness especially when presided by fair-minded judges whose numbers in Pakistan are dwindling partly due to the increasing regression into primitive Islamic penal system. Upholding the law by resisting pressures from the patriarchs on one hand and the pressure groups on the other, is by no means easy. During the Zia regime, Islamic Courts were formed to work parallel to the British system but the Islamic courts have jurisdiction mostly in criminal offenses. The vast majority of civil suits and those related to the rules and regulations of government and private business, are still dealt with by the British system of jurisprudence because there is little in the *Fiqha* or the *Sharia* (Islamic Law) that could address the problems of modern business and society.

and void because these people were appointed without proper selection procedures being followed. The High Court decision explains the ways in which pressure politics had been rampant in the government appointments of lecturers, teachers and civil servants. When the Ad-Hoc Appointments Act was abrogated by the High Court and the ruling was being reviewed by the Supreme Court, the elected government transferred some relatives of the Judges of the Supreme Court to the best positions in governmental departments with larger budgets and more powers, in order to influence the decision of the judges.

The extension of conflict between political parties to trade/students unions

Frequent examples of non-work conflict in organizations come from observations of personnel dividing themselves into groups based on their affiliations with national political parties and, instead of debating on issues related to their organizations, involving themselves in conflict on the basis of political affiliations. Many trade unions, employees associations, and students unions in the sub-continent frequently stray away from their organization-related and work-related objectives because of the affiliations of the employees to the major political parties, and the infiltration of political party agents into almost all unions that matter in gaining popular support for the parties. The sympathies of union members with different political groups arise also out of the need to obtain and secure employment in organizations controlled by these powerful political groups. For example, during the Zia regime, Pakistan International Airlines Employees Union was dominated by the Mahajars and the Jamaat-e-Islami and therefore, it was mostly Mahajars and the nominees of the Jamaat-e-Islami who could get jobs in PIA. When the Peoples' Party took over, nominees of Peoples' Party were able to get jobs in PIA and so the present PIA Union is dominated by supporters of the Peoples' Party. Often, the reasons for conflict, basically, are non-work related political issues. For example, there are two groups in the PIA Employees Union; one group supports the Peoples' Party while members of the second group, called the 'Anti-Group', support either the Jamaat-e-Islami or the Muslim League, and therefore they criticize the policies of the 'Ruling Group' which is the Collective Bargaining Agent. Members of the CBA group try to stop members of the 'Anti-Group' from doing many things, which hinderance is a usual cause of conflict.

In most sub-continent universities and colleges, students' parties are funded by national political parties to further the causes of the latter. A typical situation in educational

institutions in Pakistan is that students' parties are branches of the political parties which finance the students to keep them available for demonstrations and strikes for political purposes. Hence, conflict among students parties is often an extension of the conflict among political parties[6]. In most educational institutions, students' union activities have little to do with education, let alone improving the standards of education. I see the primary cause for a predominantly irrational conflict behaviour among Pakistani students in the culturally instilled desire to express strength, power, and high emotion as substitutes for academic hard work and a struggle based on long-term rationality.

Summary and contributions of chapter 7 towards the Grounded Theory to be proposed

(1) Tribal-feudal patriarchy is found in the sub-continent and Middle Eastern societies some of which are progressing towards being capitalist-democratic. Patriarchal attitude is expressed in organizations by father-figure seniors who seek to enhance control by,

- (a) directing rewards towards the loyal, and penalizing the disloyal subordinates,
- (b) creating supportive groups among staff,
- (c) disrupting control seeking activities of others, and
- (d) curbing challenges from equals or subordinates.

Where there are more than one patriarchal seniors contending for higher posts or resources, the subordinates may face 'conflict of loyalties'.

(2) Patriarchy is related to desires for centralizing control/power self-justified by seniors on account of curbing hooliganism, unnecessary disputes, and politicization among staff.

(3) In most public/governmental organizations, subordinates resist centralization of control by creating pressure groups, unions, and building contacts with political and influential persons. The heads of such organizations fight back by doing the same. Hence a potential for conflict.

(4) In public and private industry, seniors seek power and control by creating 'pocket unions' or 'lobbies' of loyal employees to counter the activities of genuine or other unions if any.

(5) In the sub-continent, modes of conflict resolution are patriarchal (mediation or decision-making by the influential seniors) influenced by pressure group politics and lobbying (creating supportive groups). The patriarchs are amenable to pressure from well-connected

[6] The Peoples Students Federation is a branch of the Peoples Party; Islami Jamiat-Tulba is a branch of the Jamaat-e-Islami; Anjuman Tulba-e-Islam is a branch of Jamiat Ullama-e-Islam, and the Muslim Students Federation is an off-shoot of the Muslim League.

employees or unions possessing, at the least, a 'nuisance value'. Strikes are a means of getting demands accepted.

(6) Employees, subordinates or seniors, who are supported by influential pressure groups, stand better chances of saving their jobs and transfers, and getting promotions. Subordinates can counter the authority of a senior if he is not as well-connected as they are to a strong pressure group. Not well-connected subordinates cannot challenge a senior for indecorous acts, if any, for the former risk being demoted, transferred to undesirable places or even dismissed from jobs.

(7) Unions having a 'nuisance value' can thwart managerial attempts to raise productivity.

(8) Pressure groups have strong influence on appointments, transfers and promotions and are used by many as vehicles for nepotism and other forms of corruption.

(9) Many trade/students unions stray away from their true objectives because of affiliations with political parties. Such affiliations arise out of a need to obtain employment through political contacts. Political parties finance these unions to use them in demonstrations. Hence conflict between rival trade/students unions is often a 'proxy war' on behalf of their patrons.

(10) In the Middle East, unions and associations are totally banned, except perhaps in Egypt.

In the sub-continent, a hybrid between, (a) the British legacy of merit based Selection Boards, Civil Service Examinations, and Promotion Commissions, etc., (b) the primitive patriarchalism, and, (c) the emergence of 'democratic freedom', has resulted in a chaotic interplay of merit considerations, patriarchal favoritism and the influence of pressure groups. Those supported by influential patriarchs and pressure groups stand better chances of gaining employment, promotion, and control over organizational resources. Those who want to be selected/promoted on merit but face discrimination, may use the British left rules and regulations in courts.

The findings shall be taken to our Grounded Theory to show that,

(i) a culture creates, in its own historically specific way, specific patterns of control, conflict, conflict resolution, and motivation, and,

(ii) the type of a democracy is 'culture-specific': In circumstances of over-population, scarce resources and absence of basic livelihood security, people make frantic attempts to use institutions of democracy to self-advantage in a Machiavellian sort of manner.

Chapter Eight: The Relationship of the Formation and Existence of Pseudo Organizations with the Cultural Nature of Control and Motivation

I have abstracted the term 'pseudo organizations' from a large number of participant and non-participant observations, interviewee statements, case studies, and informal reports about organizations wherein the employee behaviour is directed at keeping an appearance of work which, in fact, lacks purpose and rationale tied to the stated objectives of the said organizations. It is not possible to produce all the said empirical observations here but a few examples of pseudo organizations or pseudo functions therein should suffice:

(1) Many prominent trading and manufacturing concerns, and state offices, in the sub-continent and the Middle East, have insufficient arrangements for proper accounting so that the owners/managers cannot even tell if they are making a profit or a loss. One observes unreliable procedures for stock taking, hence of detecting embezzlement, and incorrect accounting procedures used by employees who have little knowledge of accounting. One reason for the existence of such private businesses was found to be the desires of non-business people, who happen to be in possession of large sums of money for one or the other reason (oil money, inheritance, possession of land that has increased in value, long term savings etc.), to run businesses just because of the associated status and prestige.

(2) Armed forces in the Middle East, with modern weapons and systems, but whose senior-most officers show not the least interest in the basics of military strategy and warfare tactics. Among the lower ranks, one listens to such reports as, that during certain military exercises, the soldiers didn't dig trenches because "it was too hot".

(3) Ministries and distinct international councils (such as the Gulf Cooperation Council) with departmental offices full of files, papers, computers, and employees, but no one seems to be able to explain why many unnecessary procedures are being followed. One meets high officials who do not know of vital principles of control directly related to their organizations; principles such as that non-enforceable and vague laws put the legal system to question, and that resolutions and laws passed by higher political bodies must be implemented through certain procedures, etc. Many senior officers see their jobs as meticulously checking papers, signatures, and putting stamps for authentication but cannot offer appropriate reasons for doing so.

(4) Islamic courts where the *qazees* hand down subjective and inequitable sentences which the police does not always carry out exactly as stated in the verdict [details in ch. 15].

(5) Custom officials following policies and procedures that have little rationale, such as meticulous examination of goods and trade papers for lorries, when using the country in question only for transit but being kept at bay for days if not a week, thus creating unnecessary difficulties for businesses in other countries.

(6) The civil services in many third world countries often rely on imitation. It does not need much investigation to show that ideas and practices in the relevant departments of the Western governments, often reappear later in the ideas, procedures and practices of many third world civil services. In Pakistan, the imitation of British post-war nationalizations and the recent imitation of its opening of financial markets and privatization of state industry are but two well known examples. Third world bureaucrats who go for education and training to Western universities and administration institutions, often return with photocopies of plans designed by Western experts. The plans, with few alterations, sooner or later appear in the native organizations, while much that needs sensitivity to native conditions is left unattended.

(7) Several cases of failure of UN bodies/World Bank developmental programs in achieving their objectives in many under-developed countries (see page 308), and the wastage of huge sums for development, highlight the culture confusion problem whereby experts from one culture were unable to understand the human imperatives of another culture. These imperatives were the main cause whereby organizational practices successful in one culture failed to achieve objectives when used in another. Many development economists now suggest giving funds to native NGO's, to avoid managers of one culture managing projects in another, but this (as explained in pages 135 to 137) would aggravate the problem further.

(8) The private sector is not far behind in the creation of pseudo organizations for the sake of personal gain. The case of a large Birmingham Asian factory has been quoted in chapter 4; the said factory was run successfully only to borrow money from banks. Once a large amount of loan funds was available, the owners escaped with it to India and the factory was closed. In the sub-continent, where governments are keen to boost investment in the private sector, a very large number of politicians, feudal lords and other dignitaries, borrow heavily from state developmental finance agencies on pretext of building a new large-scale factory, plant or trading business, and then misappropriate the sums by channeling them into personal assets. Once the total amount of the sanctioned loan is received over a period of a few years, the fake organization on which basis the loan was secured, is declared bankrupt and sold, often bought back, at a price which is a fraction of the misappropriated loan. These

matters have become too well known in the sub-continent to require elaboration in this work but the noteworthy point is that the motivation of the owners of such organizations is not usually derived from good business management or quality production but from political ambitions or seeking positions that bestow power and status in community. Many spend the misappropriated sums on election campaigns and get elected.

Characteristics of Pseudo Organizations: (a) Misplaced controls

The line-hierarchical organizational pattern is still the most favored in the Middle East[1]. Even hospitals, universities and schools are run as centralized, line-hierarchical organizations in which those in the middle and lower ranks are not supposed to do beyond their strictly specified duties, responsibilities, and instructions. A suggestion of a change in something which was designed by another, or which falls in someone else's decision-making powers, is often considered a challenge to the 'intelligence' of the decision-maker and could lead to inter-personal conflict. Hence, in most organizations about which interviewee reports could be obtained, quite often, ineffective and misplaced control procedures were followed with a ritualistic diligence and scrupulosity. This happens most often in organizations where the effectiveness of their operations is either hard to determine in the short-term, or where no attempts are made to measure the said effectiveness. However, where the effectiveness of operations was immediately determinable, misplaced controls were not visible, such as, for example, in the banks, though some current information shows that even some central banks' financial statements cannot be relied upon. The following examples may suffice to show misplaced controls in Middle Eastern organizations:

(i) The Departments for Immigration: Despite immigration controls and penalties as strict as for serious crimes in Europe (the immigration control procedure involves fingerprinting of all those who come to stay, legally, for three or more months), the number of illegal immigrants in all Gulf states is very large. In Saudi Arabia, where the passport of the immigrant always stays with the employer, the requirement of an 'exit permit' before leaving

[1] A random sample of two hundred officials in the Arabian Gulf private business and government departments was asked about which organizational model would they prefer for their organization. Eighty percent answered in favour of the line-hierarchical organization. When asked why they preferred this model, eighty percent said, "because it is employed in the military and works more 'effectively' than the other types of organizations".

the country has kept thousands of illegal immigrants, who do want to go back home, trapped in the country. These illegal immigrants cannot ask the authorities to issue them exit permits because of the horrible penalties instore for illegal immigrants. In 1996, the Emirates Immigration Authorities allowed all illegal immigrants to leave the country without having to require an exit permit before a three month dead-line; the number of people who availed this opportunity was so large that the dead-line had to be extended by more than a month to enable all to get seats in the airplanes, and even then thousands could not leave in time.

(ii)The Driving License Issuing Authorities: The Authorities claim to be so stringent in driving tests that even a British license is not acceptable to some, and yet the common observation of driver behaviour on roads leaves little doubt that a large number subscribes to the 'courage, not caution' kind of driving. Hence a high accidents per vehicle ratio.

(iii)Ministries of Finance: Although the vast oil revenues keep many ineffective controls of the Gulf Ministries of Finance from showing, improper accounting/auditing and excessive wastage of funds is commonly reported so that comparatively minor crises in many states have resulted in unsustainable cash flows even for as short-term periods as one year.

(iv)The Police Departments and the Courts: In Saudi Arabia and in many Gulf states, because of terrible punishments for drinking and sexual relations, many drink and have sex in dead secrecy, but the death penalty for rape and amputation for theft is dysfunctional in that it has reportedly often lead to the greater crime of murder to prevent identification.

(b)Control by subtle coercion

The procrustean methods of familial control on the child, reported elsewhere in this work, are paralleled in organizational control on the subordinates albeit in milder forms. In many Arab and sub-continent organizations, subtle and under-hand ways of coercion have been reported as methods that are hard to point at or prove as acts of wrong-doing, reportedly designed to keep the subordinates tense, in a sort of fix, and in extreme forms, neurotic. The ways of subtle coercion in the Arab organizations were found to be as follow: (i)the boss would keep the subordinate(s) unnecessarily and obviously waiting for hours; (ii)the boss would enigmatically refuse to meet the subordinate(s) for days and weeks; (iii)the boss would call the subordinate(s) for a meeting and postpone or be absent without providing a reasonable or even understandable excuse; (iv)the boss would send orders and refuse to invite any participation of the subordinates in decision-making, planning etc. thus putting

pressure on the subordinates to fit their work to his plans; (v)the boss would withhold vital information regarding organizational/operational affairs, or, rarely though, provide incorrect information, thus keeping the subordinate(s) in a fix, and because they cannot work without the right information, they would stay in anxiety and keep guessing if they are to be transferred or sacked; (vi)the boss would instruct subordinates not to cooperate with a new subordinate who was sent in by a higher office without consultation with the boss. The boss would strictly instruct that the subordinates should not guide, convey necessary information, or induct the new-comer in any way that could facilitate the adjustment of the latter in the department. The purpose behind such behaviour, reportedly, is to frustrate the new entrant to resign by himself, thus saving the need on the part of the boss to directly confront the higher authorities and keep his relationship, with the later, unmarred by possibly telling, 'I tried my best to adjust your nominee but he was not "up to the mark"'.

(c)Control on personal beliefs and activities

A major difference between Western organizations and the Muslim owned is that in the latter, the focus of control is often misplaced from work-related objectives to the employees values and beliefs[2]. In Western organizations, personal behaviour is not subject to control unless it threatens company objectives.

In most Muslim countries, including Pakistan which is an electoral democracy, oppression of freedom of expression is institutionally ingrained at the level of family, schools, colleges, universities and nearly all public and private organizations. Individual freedom in the Western sense does not exist in these societies and hence in their organizations. Fundamentalists in many Muslim countries are usually vigilant in finding non-conformers and taking several measures to expose them and, at least, get them expelled, particularly from educational establishments. The only way a skeptic can survive in such an organization is by pretending that he does believe; staying in a job is essential because there is no social security system to fall back on. Regarding personal control in Islamic countries, enormous data is available but I have picked examples only from those on higher professional and management jobs [see endnote 1] as these show the subtle, and hence less obvious, forms of control rather than the blatant control exercised on the lower ranks.

[2]For detailed case studies, see pages 304 to 308.

The social control structure in most Muslim countries is such that mostly those people who cannot have ideas in conformity with the prevailing ideologies, stay in a perpetual fear that sooner or later they are going to get fired[3]. Fear becomes a strong impediment to their creativity: A professor in an Egyptian university was murdered for taking part in a debate against fundamentalism. One interviewee said,

"when I recall my nineteen years of lectureship, I feel that all this time, in real terms, I have just been saving my job. The point is, if we have to spend our energies in preserving our jobs, running after files in the offices of government functionaries, then the whole point of the development of students' potentials, the prime objective of our jobs, is lost."

In Pakistan, when the members of the Public Service Commission hold interviews for candidates for civil service appointments, they usually want one to be able to recite *dua-e-qanoot* and *ayat-al-kursi* (prayer verses). Ten percent marks are reserved for recital of prayers, ten for knowledge about the Islamic ideology of Pakistan, thirty for the relevant subject, ten for knowledge about international affairs, and forty percent for the grades the candidate secured in his academic qualifications. That there are only 10 percent marks for recital of prayers and 10 percent for the ideology of the Islamic State does not mean that a candidate stands a good chance of employment if he is otherwise good, for if he cannot recite the prayers or does not show enough knowledge of Islamic rituals, he would usually be asked to go home and memorize the rituals. Placing emphasis on the strength of a candidate's knowledge of Islamic rituals while evaluating him for a job that has nothing to do with such knowledge, is but one example of the non-work and cultural factors of control playing a dominating role in Pakistani organizations. In addition to this, each candidate for a government or semi-government job has to sign an affidavit stating that he does not belong to the Ahmadiya minority sect. Non-Muslims do not stand any significant chance of getting jobs or being promoted outside the small quota reserved for them. The practice of religious control is not peculiar to government organizations only but is common in private businesses as well, except for a few employers who are liberal enough to ignore the religious side of their employees. A marketing manager reported about a private sector firm that he was asked to recite *dua-e-qanoot* in an interview conducted for a managerial post. One job applicant got

[3]"...we have no scientific centers and no research institutes, and those which do exist are lifeless and do not function... we oppress the talented people and drive them away". (Dr. Salah al-Din, "The Pillars of the Disaster: A scientific inquiry into the reasons of the defeat of June 5th"; excerpts translated from Arabic, quoted in Patai, R., 1973: 263-264).

impatient and said, "I have come here for the job of a finance manager - not for the post of an Imam", at which he was instructed to leave immediately. Such things are happening in the private sector which does not need to follow the government line. For example, R.P. is a purely commercial organization but they too ask candidates for jobs to recite *dua-e-qanoot*. Most often, survival of non-conformists depends upon the values and belief structures of the employers. While in the state departments and public companies there is some chance for non-conforming employees to stay on job by using rules, regulations and courts as means of support, in private organizations they can only rely upon the owners' sympathies, if any. A finance manager was reminded time and again by the owners to pray in the afternoon, and an accountant was fired for not praying. A Pakistani production manager said:

"Since our General Manager returned from *umra* (a pilgrimage to Mecca), he has been praying five times a day and so are many among the lower management. Many deliberately stand close to the General Manager in prayers so that he could see that they are praying. Once he is transferred, many would stop praying".

Some Japanese experts were called in by P. Polyesters for the erection of their new plant and machinery. After the completion of the project, the Japanese celebrated by having champagne. A Pakistani engineer joined the Japanese and drank some champagne. After the party was over, the owners of the company called the production manager into their office and instructed him to sack the said engineer. The production manager requested the owners to give the man a month so that he could find another job to which they conceded. There are many instances where the owners have sent employees to prison for certain non-work personal activities. In a Gulf state, a technician and a Filipino maid, both non-Muslims, were sent to prison by her employer on charges of drinking[4].

People reared in strict Muslim cultures often develop intrinsic desires to control others' behaviors where they can. In fact control over others is the leitmotif of Muslim and many Eastern cultures; this is observable in everyday organizational life where the seniors try to be seen, "in full control of the situation". There are several possible reasons for such a controlling behaviour: Mostly it has to do with the early teachings in which the role models

[4]Many Muslim writers find justification, in strongly disguised language, for control on personal values and beliefs; for example, see Rahman & Al-Buraey (1992) who use terms such as "spiritual rewards and spiritual advancement" to demand that Islamic organizations as compared to secular organizations should consider a new order of performance evaluation that corresponds to Islamic faith and belief at the individual, organizational and social levels.

are domineering, ruling, and conquering patriarchs who (tacitly) won't listen to reason but impose the supremacy of their creeds by physical power, exhortations, or by cunning manipulation of others. When subjected to such teachings in a solemn and glorified manner in early childhood, many begin to foster desires to be 'mini-kings' wherever they can.

(d) Very low internal motivation, lack of personnel initiative and creativity

The aforementioned culture of penalistic authoritarianism leaves scant room for job-related creativity and initiative for most managers. At the societal level, the emphasis on 'thought and action control' by the 'patriarchs' (fathers, teachers, relatives, authorities, capitalists, feudal-lords, employers etc.) in the family, educational establishments, workplace and private and state organizations, in order to preempt in securing their high-up positions, demands that creativity and initiative in subordinates be substituted by loyalty and obedience. On the other side the collective religious-cultural emphasis on carrying on with the fossilized-dysfunctional life styles closes many doors of experimentation and progress.

People with domineering psychology, if they have the essential background of a high-social class or family, often end up as higher managers. When faced with a colleague or a subordinate who has better ideas about how to run the organization, they may feel threatened or react to the inferiority feelings generated by someone else's brilliance, and thus may result what is often called 'a personality clash' which are one common form of managerial conflict in the sub-continent and Middle Eastern organizations. Many cases, obtained during my empirical investigations, reveal the extent to which creativity and challenge from subordinates is curbed and punished in organizations. In these cases, we discover intricate networks of organizational politics, personality clashes, 'control by penalizing' attitudes of state and private functionaries, conflict at various levels of organizational hierarchy, and the way in which creativity and the desire to do good for the organization and society (related to motivation among professionals) is hampered by dogmatism and prejudice. Many in their youth are more prone to show initiative for organizational development but as time goes by, they learn that staying in a job is more important than coming into conflict with others even for the sake of organizational development. Economic status becomes relevant here, in that managers from upper class reported that they could afford to quit jobs when faced with barriers to the expression of their ideas, but many lower and middle class professionals and managers reported that they have to give up initiative in order to stay in jobs.

(e)The relationship of rewards with patriarchal generosity more than with work

Among the tribal Arabs, rewards and incentives for the natives are linked with a certain 'patriarchal generosity [or anger]' more than with the quality and amount of work per se. The said relationship between rewards and patriarchal generosity is visible in salary determination in the Gulf states offices; the amount of salary a native gets is related to, in addition to one's job position, the social status of one's tribe (members of the ruling tribe get the highest amounts and even a large monthly allowance from the day they are born), one's marital status, the number of one's children, and the extent of one's familial commitments. In addition to regular monthly salaries, house building allowance, and marriage allowance to pay for the bride, most native officials keep sending applications for more financial help from the rulers, through the Ministries of Public Welfare, to travel abroad for medical reasons, to repay their loans for expensive cars or mobile phones, or because they have a large family and cannot fulfil all commitments. In such an environment, motivation to work is largely replaced by learning the tactics to extract more from the patriarchs.

Why do Pseudo Organizations Exist?

Hard intellectual work and serious thinking often entail a challenge to one's position at home, at workplace, and in society, and imply some kind of conflict with the traditionalist majority in the sub-continent and an even greater and more stubborn majority in the Middle East. The consequences of the said conflict could be disastrous for the individual as he risks being socially isolated, and even putting his physical survival in danger. Therefore, most individuals learn and resort to outward conformity for long until they get shaped to perform even those organizational functions whose teleologic substance is almost absent[5]. For the lower and middle classes in the sub-continent, staying in job is important because there is no other recourse to basic livelihood. Hence, a major characteristic of a pseudo organization is that the objectives of its personnel stray away from the intended objectives of the organization and become almost entirely self-related so that, in most cases, survival in the

[5]'Fahlawi personality' flourishes in societies focused on old and deeply entrenched traditions, disinclined to seek new solutions to old problems. Such a society assigns certain rights to people without taking actual qualifications into account. The great force of 'face' and shame concepts channel people of a weak and conforming character into the direction of 'Fahlawism'. When the individual's attention is focused on the externals of his behaviour, true values are apt to be pushed into background (abridged from Patai, 1973: 112).

job or self-prosperity is the only objective the said personnel achieve. Even intellectuals and professionals succumb to the said behaviour, for, there is no social security (DSS) system[6]; hence many native 'experts' often use a reliance upon foreign systems and borrowed ideas as a means for survival or prosperity even if the foreign systems do not work in native conditions. Bernard Shaw once referred to such intellectuals as 'prostitute intellectuals'.

An Elaboration of Pseudo Organizations from some Middle Eastern Ministries of Education

In the Middle East (and to some extent in the sub-continent) the creation of professional and technical knowledge has long been reduced to translating Western books and articles into Arabic. The subjects related to business and management, for example, have for long been simply Arabic translations of popular American and British texts[see endnote 2] with little related to the native conditions, and little added by the 'authors' themselves; because the majority of people know only the Arabic language, most believe that the books are the genuine products of Arab scholars. However, the tragedy does not lie in translations but in that the Western design is copied only in its appearance and not in its spirit. The fact is that there would have been great progress in intellectual improvement if the entire spirit of the Western intellectual world had been imitated. The Western design is in fact implemented after being maimed by the native spirit; the phenomenon is obvious in the following example: In several Gulf Ministries of Education, some experts saw that in the said countries, the entire secretarial, sub-engineering, laboratory assistance, office management, accounting and computer operating jobs were done by foreigners because the natives had no skills required to do these jobs. In a simple, logical manner, they recommended that the countries needed technical colleges where natives should learn the skills to do the mentioned jobs. Because in Arabic there is no clarification of terms such as the difference between 'a certificate, a diploma and a degree', or 'a college, a faculty, and a polytechnic[7], many of

[6]Bernard's (1938) 'inducement-contribution equilibrium', states that an individual participates in the organization only as long as the contributions he makes to the organization are equal or less than the inducements he receives. However, in a no alternative situation, the individual is forced to stay even if he receives very little compared to his efforts.

[7]In Arabic, there is little distinction between a certificate, a diploma, and a degree shown in that the words '*shahada*' and '*sanad*' interchangeably denote all the three. Likewise, the word '*kulia*' meaning 'completely, entirely, or fully' is now used to denote a school, faculty, college, or academy.

these 'technical colleges' were called 'faculties of the universities' and their running was supposed to be managed and supervised by university syndicates called the '*Majlis*' (see the desire for centralization of control). These 'faculties of technology', or 'technical colleges', taught, as parts of a single curriculum and to the same students, on the one hand, courses related to higher management, such as; principles of management; human resource management; auditing and accounting, project management, commercial law etc., and on the other hand, courses such as, Arabic typing and shorthand, English typing and shorthand, etc, that is, courses supposed to be required by typists and stenos. The students getting a Diploma in Office Management are given 'higher jobs' or promotions on the merits of having obtained the said diploma, because the relationship between certain academic qualifications and the job contents or specifications is not well established in the native mind.

Using their Western cultural experience as a subconscious background, the said experts included 'English shorthand' in the syllabus for a specialism in 'office management'. The said experts could not know that the natives considered it an insult to be in junior secretarial jobs which, the natives had learnt to believe, were meant for manual workers from 'poor countries', and hence a negative status was ascribed to the said jobs. For more than ten years, scores of mature students (already in 'higher' jobs) have been registering each year for the said course. For more than ten years, teachers have been teaching 'English shorthand' to students who do not know English language and yet the students are somehow getting their certificates and promotions to 'higher jobs' while secretaries still come from abroad.

When I wrote to the concerned authorities about the impossibility of teaching English shorthand to students who do not know English language, they replied that a change in syllabus was not possible because this required the approval of the University Syndicate members who do not take advises from the 'field staff' but from 'higher experts' (the word 'field staff' had all the negative connotations, attached to it, of the teachers being 'low ranks'). Furthermore, the said authorities pointed that because the students were being taught English language as well, the question of 'not knowing English' did not arise. The said authorities failed to note, (i)that after passing out, let alone the use of shorthand, the vast majority of students could not answer very basic questions in English; (ii)that English shorthand can be taught only after the students have acquired listening and comprehension skills in English high enough to be able to pick up dictation; (iii)that the invention of dictaphone had made the arduous learning of shorthand superfluous even in English-speaking

countries, and, (iv) that, in addition to the mentioned problems, because the students were learning Arabic shorthand (which was a confusing adaptation of Pitman's English shorthand) as well, the usage of similar symbols to represent different sounds in the two languages had rendered them too confused to be able to acquire a lowest acceptable level of skill in either of the two shorthand languages. To add to the impossibility of reforming that 'mock education system', I was advised to refrain from bypassing formal channels of the hierarchy. Such a situation would be unimaginable to arise in a Western education system.

Many Arab rulers, in their love for Arab nationalism, decided that education be given in Arabic, but students were also supposed to learn English as a compulsory subject. While all the courses on offer were translated from English to Arabic, English-speaking teachers were also brought in to teach the English language related to the said courses. The latter often admitted that they had been unsuccessful in making most of the local students learn to a least acceptable level of fluency because, in the secondary schools, where the students are supposed to learn basic English, all is taught in Arabic with lip service paid to the teaching of English language. The translations of various subjects into Arabic could not convey the true spirit of the knowledge because the said knowledge was created in a culture which had requirements and a vocabulary the acceptable equivalent of which does not exist in Arab culture or language. The Arab scholars' desires not to accept foreign words in the so-claimed 'pure and holy' Arabic, often results in inappropriate and humorous translations for such minor objects as car, railway station, typist, employer, etc., let alone complicated concepts.

The purpose of the technical colleges, that employees with skills be provided from among the natives was never achieved because the culture-bred superiority feelings of the students did not allow them to take 'lower jobs'. Most of them were already on high jobs and had been sent in by their employers because of a rule that they should have a university '*shahada*' to be promoted. The subjects were taught in a manner that gave an appearance to the technical colleges of being vocational institutions, but in fact they often taught the wrong subjects to private and public high officials (such as an army or a police captain, or a civil servant) to enable them get a promotion. The vocational jobs are still manned by foreigners. The said technical colleges are thus an obvious example of pseudo organizations.

A clearer understanding of why pseudo organizations exist, comes from my five years of observations of the type of motivation and the nature of controls among people who man such organizations; the following describes misplaced controls in the Gulf Ministries of

Education, and the nature of motivation in more than a thousand officials (our mature students) from various state organizations, the civil service, and private business.

(i) Very low motivation among the mature students to study and work

The students do not pay fees but are paid, by the state, a sum of £100 per month to attend and study. An estimated ten percent of those admitted to the university, took the stipend for the term but did not show up in classrooms. As for the rest of the students, the common attendance pattern was that most did not attend classes in the first week and during the month of Ramadan. In other weeks they were usually late by an average of a quarter of an hour in a two-hour class and wanted to leave around half an hour before the finishing time. More over, the 'mid-day prayers' and the 'evening prayers', for which the time fell during lecture hours, took away at least another fifteen minutes each from the teaching time.

At times of unusual events, such as if the air-conditioners were not working effectively, or if there was a special football match taking place, most male students would not attend classes. Many customarily asked to be given leave because of certain domestic or personal "urgencies". In large classes (exceeding thirty) almost half never stopped talking despite requests or warnings. Many brought their pagers and mobile phones to have excuses to go out to answer incoming calls. They would express great annoyance if marked absent or given less than desired marks in class assignments. Some would come just before the class-end, interrupt the lecture, and demand straight away that the teacher show them the attendance register and mark them present. During a lecture, many students kept entering and leaving the lecture room. To make them time-conscious[8], the teachers were instructed to take attendance after every hour, which activity further reduced the teaching time but proved ineffective. The students were told that more than 25% hours of absence would disqualify them from taking tests. The limit was then raised to 33%. But instead of being punctual, a very large number began haggling with the teachers to be marked present, as if it was the teacher who was at fault for marking them absent. A further significant part of the lecture time was wasted in the students' protestations and procrastination about their attendance

[8] Precision is a phenomenon of industrial society; you must be on time for work. In preindustrial cultures, when people have more leisure, they fill their time with long discussions, long greetings, and exaggerations which is a cultural phenomenon with socio-economic foundations. As anybody who has lived among Arabs can testify, they are much less concerned with time than are Westerners (abridged from Patai, R., 1973: 65).

records. The desire to try newer and newer methods to make them realize the significance of time, and sensitivity for the lecturer, exasperated me, until I learned to deliver a lecture while the students frequently entered and left the classroom. I even learned to ignore each new entrant's loud greetings to the class; at times I would continue whilst two relatives or friends gave each other their traditional kisses and hugs in the middle of the lecture room.

From the very first lecture, many students began asking what questions were important for the examination that was supposed to take place after one and a half months. The focus of attention of most was not on what was being taught but to wriggle out 'vital information' from the teacher about the examinations. Whatever attention the students paid to the teacher, the subject or to the hand-outs, was strictly examination-oriented. Once, in reply to their question if the topic I was teaching was important for the examination, I said, "no", only to find that they immediately began to chat among themselves. After realizing that this happened each time I said "no", I, in order to keep them as attentive as possible, would say that the topic was "very important" for the examinations. Close to the examinations, the students almost pestered the teacher to give them only a few questions that were to appear in the test papers. The situation was further aggravated by the cultural learning of the students to press on and on until 'success' without doing the least work[see endnote 3].

Each attempt of the teacher to begin a new topic was met with protests and exclamations 'oh!' in such a somber and serious manner that startled me in the beginning and never fails to upset me even after four years: Because, in the semester system, a lecturer is responsible for preparing the syllabus, delivering lectures, preparing examinations and marking the papers, the students knew that by checking the teachers' advances towards newer topics, they would get less material to read for the examinations. Hence they kept a pressure on the lecturer to get the least number of hand-outs and least amount of knowledge. If the teacher was stubborn, they would resort to other means of 'bringing him down'. During my first week, when I insisted on proper conduct, the entire fourth semester went to the Head of the department and demanded that I should be replaced by another teacher.

Before the examinations, the pestering, flattery, and telephone inquiries went far to get information about the question papers. Hence an average situation was that if the students were to answer five questions, they had already got between ten to fifteen on which they were to concentrate. The entire amount of knowledge that they got in a fourteen week duration semester, for one subject, could be averaged out, at best, as around ten A4 typed

pages. Despite all this, on average, half in the first semester, and one third of the students in the second and third semesters failed. Those who failed were given endless chances to pass their failed courses. Hence, there was a second round of examinations after which the students could register again with the new same semester class. In the fourth and fifth semesters, the teachers tried their best to pass around 90% of their students for it was not possible to carry a large number of 'old students' along with the new ones. A student could not be asked to leave the university without a degree, unless he himself wanted to do so. If the students were made to do honest work, there was immediately a conflict at hand, but if their demands were met and they were allowed to do what they wanted to do, the situation would become very friendly and cooperative though not oriented towards good work but towards a good interrelationship. I often used to ask my students what they wanted to become in life. Many would not reply. Those who replied, almost always said that they wanted to be a '*mudir*' (an in-charge or a manager of a department or a company) or work for well paying and prestigious organizations such as oil and gas companies, the telecommunications organization, the Ministries, or the Amir's office[9]. Despite the fact that vacancies for teachers were filled from foreign countries, most students were averse to being a teacher. As most were already on jobs, their main objective in coming to the university, as they often said, was to get the certificate and the promotion that came with it. Some aimed at taking up their fathers' businesses but did almost nothing to prepare them for running a business.

The effects of "thought control" in the Arabic schools appear later in the university students, a vast majority of whom could memorize from the hand-outs and write, not without difficulty, the answer in short memorable points, but would not write a line from their own experiences. Before the examinations, the students tirelessly asked time and again, "will you not fail us if we write things in our own words?", showing that in the schools they had been totally discouraged even from using their own words; many reported that they had been told in the schools to write exactly as was written in the books. They would come time and again, "where in the hand-out, is the answer to this question?", and if I would tell them that a

[9]In trying to find possible causes of low motivation among my Arab students, I found help in Malinowski's observation about the Kiriwinian that the Trobriand worker is guided by a very complex setup of traditional duties and obligations, beliefs in magic, social ambitions and vanities: "*It is important to realize that a Kiriwinian... must be prompted by some duty imposed by tribal standards, or he must be lured by ambitions and values also dictated by custom and tradition.*" (Malinowski, 1922: 156).

certain two or three pages was the answer, they would say, "this is too much, can't you give us two or three lines which are the right answer to a question?". A vast majority is averse to explanation of terms and concepts, and to quoting examples, but happy with a rote copy of what is in the hand-out. Items of somewhat higher complexity are beyond their comprehension, for which I see the reasons in a prohibition of creativity enjoined upon the Muslims by strong beliefs in fatalism: The ritualistic and too frequent use of the word '*Insha-Allah*' (Allah willing) not only reflects fatalism but is often used as an excuse for one's own inactivity[10] by laying the blame on divine determinism[see endnote 4].

However, note that those Arab students who are sent to Western schools at an early age, turn out to be comparable, in their motivation to learn and in their IQ level, to their Western schoolmates. Hence the significance of early socialization and good schooling.

(ii) The relationship of rewards with patriarchal generosity more than with work

I was able to see the aforementioned relationship of reward distribution with the traditional concept of Arab 'patriarchal generosity' (or anger) in that, in many cases, students who had not even answered the questions in the tests requested to be passed. One student went to his teacher and said, "my sister and wife took the same test; you have passed my wife but you have not passed my sister". The teacher explained that marks depended upon the correct answering of the questions. The student, like many others, either failed to understand this commonplace logic or pretended that he did not, and said, "alright, if you want to pass only one of them, then pass my sister because she has yet to marry and, with a university certificate, she would get a better husband". Another student who had not come

[10] One student, Abdullah, an official in a certain ministry, used to attend the class for, say, a quarter of an hour, and then, on pretext of going to the toilet, would not return. He would later claim to be marked present because, as he said, "I was in the class". When he had done so for four or five times, the next time when he asked if he could go to the toilet, I said to him, "please come back in ten minutes". He said, "*insha-Allah*". For a moment I forgot that I, because my passport said I was a Muslim, could be persecuted for challenging divine determinism and said, "don't say, *insha-Allah*, say *insha-Abdullah*". The whole class suddenly stopped their usual chatting and got attentive. Abdullah returned with a perplexed face and said in a somber tone, "teacher, what was it that you said?". I hastily made a point, "what I mean is that Allah does the 'big things' and He has given you the authority to do the 'small things'; such as going to the toilet and coming back is in your power and you need not refer to Allah for such a petty thing". Abdullah was not pacified, he said, "what if I die in the toilet? how can I come back if Allah does not want me to?". Before the debate could result in an unpleasant situation, I said, "I understand your point". He then left and, as was customary of him, did not return for the rest of the two hours.

to the classes for an entire semester period of fourteen weeks, turned up an hour before the examination was to take place and tried to evoke the sympathy of the teacher by saying "teacher, I have got no hand-outs, no sample questions, could you help me?". The family of a certain student died in a car accident and so she requested that she be passed in the examinations on account of the death of her family. Many requested to be passed because they had children to look after and could not spare time for studies.

(iii)The Middle Eastern form of individualism

One aspect of life in primitive cultures was that socio-economic transactions took place more on a personal basis as there was little concept of an objective-impersonal way of conducting social and economic affairs on a community basis. This primitive cognitive culture survives in many materially modern societies. For example, the aforementioned students often took the student-teacher relationship as a one-to-one relationship portrayed in the context of their own personal needs, and not as a teacher-to-group relationship with concepts of uniformity, equity, and standardization: this was shown in that; (i)many students would ask a question which many had asked before in the same session; this happened so often that I wondered if they were listening when I had answered the first inquiry; (ii)many would come and ask for a specific date of a test to be set for them individually; when told that the examination time-table was the same for all "as a group", they would say, "but I cannot prepare for the given date", and offer an excuse. Some would come after having taken their test and say, "I was tired and couldn't do well. Why don't you give me another test-date". A student of some influence went as far as the *Diwan-al-Amiri* (the ruler's office) and brought instructions that a special test be arranged for him, when the other students had already taken the tests, and he could have appeared in the second round, but a special one-student-examination was arranged for him; (iii)many students would come to the teacher and want the lesson, already given in the class room, to be repeated to them individually; after the examinations, they would phone and ask for their marks. If told that the teacher could not remember the marks of a hundred or so students and that the marks lists would soon be placed on the notice board, they would express amazement, "don't you remember only my marks?". Similar individualism is shown in the aforementioned individualized distribution of public welfare sums for marriages, house building, travel abroad, family commitments, etc.

(iv)Misplaced controls in the Ministries of Education

The focus of control often strays away from where it should be. For example, the

main issue for the Ministries of Education, namely the very low standards of education, is never formally discussed. The level of motivation in students in the schools and universities is appallingly low, and foreign teachers from poorer countries are often reported to take bribes to pass the native rich students, but a formal discussion on motivation improvement never takes place in any department of the said Ministries; the matter is not even formally reported. Despite huge funds spent on spurious causes, there are insufficient instruments and equipment to raise the level of vocational skills among students. Most teachers and officials normally refuse to talk about academic and other real issues and yet, at times, show an almost paranoia about certain petty aspects of office procedures; for example, an English teacher who wanted to tell the names of computer parts in English to her students, went to take a photograph of an ordinary computer lying in the computer section, but faced incredible suspicion and resistance from the Tunisian teachers in the section.

Because the said Ministries of Education, and the universities, like most organizations in the Gulf, employ an authority and command structure where hierarchical channels cannot be bypassed for communication, the focus of control is on preserving the status quo, but in the frequent meetings between Heads of departments and organizations, nothing comes out in real terms of suggestions and tangible results. A student once made a 'mistake' of directly complaining to the President of the University about one of the teachers. The Head of department took it as a personal insult that the student had bypassed his authority (the proper channel), by going directly to the President. He wanted to punish the student and so he went on insisting every now and then and putting pressure on teachers to teach only in English, despite the knowledge that this was impossible because the students could not write a line in proper English. Finally, he went on a tour of the classes telling the students about the 'proper channels of communication'; "if you have any complaints, you first come to me".

The oral examination for the final undergraduate project used to be conducted by at least six teachers; grammatical errors, typing mistakes and petty omissions should have been corrected by the supervisors of the project before the printing of the report, but most 'questions' during the oral examination were of the type, "please open page -- of your report; why have you misspelled this word?"; there were frequent laughters and jokes at the expense of the student. It often became obvious that the aims of the teachers were as much the evaluation of the reports as self-expression among colleagues. Standing in front of six or more questioning teachers sometimes made the students nervous; a female student burst into

tears and a male student was caught in a frenzy of repeating the same thing again and again. However, despite many suggestions, the number of 'examiners' was not reduced from six.

For all the ease made for the students to pass, on many occasions, around half the male students brought miniature photocopies of hand-outs (not more than ten pages per course) to an examination. The teachers, if they saw such a miniature photocopy, usually took it and threw it in the dust bin. Making a case against a student was rare. Through tacit assumptions of a cultural nature, reported by many authors[see endnote 5], most avoided talking about such 'shameful' affairs as cheating: A European teacher, in his first year, took several cheating cases to the Dean. The Dean told him that the students had filed a counter claim that the said teacher encouraged them to cheat, and advised that the case be dropped. However, during four years, three cases were filed against students of weaker social backgrounds; the penalty for copying, as declared, was only that, "their papers should be marked with extra strictness", which, in practical terms, meant almost nothing.

Because one had to pass at least half the students, and none could pass if courses were taught and examinations were conducted in the Western way (or even in the way most colleges and universities in the Indian sub-continent pursue academic tasks), most question papers were little more than a formality that had to be fulfilled to keep a record to show some semblance to the procedures of an academic institution. However, hair splitting exactitude was demanded in the counts and 'ticks' in 'absent lists' that had already been tempered and changed several times because of students' pestering that they should be marked present. While the teachers would de facto ignore the low standards and cheating at various academic stages and in research, they spent hours discussing cases such as if a student with 30% absence record should be allowed to sit in the tests. In the design of examination papers and in the marking of answer sheets, certain formats were to be strictly observed. During the tests, the teachers were instructed to remain present to guide the students who 'could not understand the questions'; and this despite that the question most often asked by students during the two hour test period, was, "I have answered this question like this, is it correct?". Many Arab teachers in the examination hall, went to great lengths to very politely explain to the students how they were supposed to answer the questions.

Each time I prepared the 'present/absent' records for the students, question papers, marked the papers, made lists of marks, or went through the lengthy file-work for the courses, knowing that the end result was an output of students who were not, even by the

lowest reasonable standards, qualified for their jobs, I couldn't help recalling Dostoyevsky in his 'Memories from the House of the Dead'; "one of the worst penalties inflicted upon an inmate was to make him carry a load somewhere and then bring it back time and again".

Summary and contributions of chapter 8 towards the Grounded Theory to be proposed

(1)Pseudo organizations are those which keep appearance of work that, in fact, lacks purpose and rationale tied to their stated or supposed objectives. Most obvious examples of ineffective organizations are the armed forces of many countries and scores of Ministerial Departments, government bodies, universities and almost entire education systems in many Middle Eastern states. To a lesser extent, pseudo organizations are also found in the sub-continent.

(2)In the sub-continent private sector, some pseudo organizations have been created to expropriate government developmental loans and funds granted by international aid agencies.

(3)Pseudo organizations are usually found in imitative cultures which borrow organizational concepts from the West but apply them in conditions where people are not ready, and are not prepared, to benefit from them positively and constructively. Often, the imitated institutions and ideas are not helpful in the native conditions but are applied by native bureaucrats who either know little about their countries or seek a personal gain in promoting Western interests or in seeking international developmental funds.

(4)Where a needed organization turns into a pseudo one, the reasons were found in,

(a)misplaced controls, non-work control but little or no work-related control;

(b)a line hierarchical vertical command organization where the seniors cannot be challenged even when the personnel know that the organization is not working as it should;

(c)subordinates come from a culture in which, (i)emphasis is placed on form with little or no content, on obedience, loyalty and conformism, (ii)conflict is seen as an antithesis of order and hence repressed, (iii)rewards are related to patriarchal generosity/anger rather than work, (iv)rituals are a key social focus so that it becomes easy for personnel to see organizations as another ritualistic addition. Hence they perform unnecessary tasks unquestioningly with ritualistic diligence.

(5)Autocratic control and 'subtle coercion' are means of conflict repression and imposition of the seniors' plans in most Middle Eastern organizations. Such attitudes are shaped by the procrustean methods of familial control on child, and 'thought control' in traditional schools.

(6)Control on personal beliefs and values is exercised in all Muslim organizations in varying degree and in one or the other form.

(7)Whereever high personal non-work control and penalistic authoritarianism was found in organizations, it was found along with fatalistic creeds, very low motivation, lack of initiative and creativity, intra-level conflict, and 'personality clashes' among equi-status employees.

(8)Despite very low motivation and the least efforts, the high reward expectation is culturally conditioned among most for reasons mentioned in point 4-b-iii. Hence, despite incompetence, people may aspire to take high posts through the use of *wasta* (nepotism).

Pseudo organizations are in fact the extreme manifestation of extrinsic motivation that makes organization an instrumental facade in achieving socio-cultural goals of participants. The findings shall be taken towards our Grounded Theory to suggest that, (a)motivation is a learned phenomenon in which socio-cultural factors are often a greater force than intrinsic motivation so that the absence of basic livelihood security forces even intellectuals to accept meaningless work; (b)high personal control is related to low internal motivation for genuine work, intra-level conflict, repressed inter-level conflict, and fatalist creeds; (c)organizational control methods have parallels in methods of familial, social, political, and religious control.

We shall suggest that because of the above mentioned links established in this chapter, control and cultural learning dimensions be added to the expectancy theory of motivation.

Notes and Explanations

1. In a Pakistani university, we had various government orders coming in, instructing us to follow religious practices. Once there was an order saying that all teachers and employees should wear shalwar-kameez, believed to be an 'Islamic dress'. A certain teacher came to a meeting, with the Governor of the province, wearing a suit and tie, and was ordered to go home and reappear in shalwar-kameez. Another order stated that on Thursdays, the lecturers at the university should compulsorily attend a '*daras*' (sermon by a mullah).

In a certain school, a conflict arose between a teacher and the head master who wanted the former to pray during the time he was in the school. Upon the head master's recommendation, the teacher was suspended from his duties.

In a Middle Eastern university, a remark on the annual confidential report by a senior, saying 'he argues frequently', kept the subject teacher worried for weeks.

A production manager in a high-tech state company reported that a lot of control was exercised over personal beliefs and personal activities. If one does not fast during the month of Ramadan, he must pretend that he does. During the said month, eating in public is a criminal offense punishable by incarceration.

A lecturer at a certain college held a position in the College Teachers Union. During the Martial Law regime of General Zia, the said lecturer issued a press release saying that the dismissal of a number of teachers, without proper dismissal procedures (i.e., charging them with allegations, and consulting the Efficiency and Discipline Rules), was gross injustice. He was suspended for five years, and when reinstated, not given his wage arrears.

Another lecturer at the University of the Punjab took a group of students to a trip to Karachi where, on a beach, he sat on a camel with a female colleague and some students took pictures of them. The fundamentalist students used the picture to launch a campaign against him claiming that being on one camel with a female was not Islamic. The said lecturer was forced to resign; afterwards, he used to laugh at the incident by saying, "neither my wife nor the husband of my colleague had any objection on us two being on one camel but the fundamentalist became a third party to be jealous".

At a certain Arab university, a brilliant lecturer, who had a doctorate in political science from Edinburgh University, was expelled just for talking about democratic ideas.

2. A serious obstacle toward economic independence is the specific Arab form of the general Mediterranean inclination of "taking it easy", the Arabic "*buqra*" (tomorrow). The combination of these traits creates a mental climate which is not favorable for industrialization. Among other things, industrialization requires conscientious attention to maintenance, from small, incidental repairs to major overhauls; the traits referred to, militate against regular maintenance and cause many problems in trying to operate industrial plants and machines efficiently. The Swiss Arabist Hans E. Tutsch observed that the Arabs are conscious of the fact that the technology which dominates their life to an almost unlimited degree is the technology of alien nations. In the entire Arab world there is practically no mechanical production which is not dependent on the great production centers of the Western [or Asian] world. This technological retardation, Tutsch finds, is related to the static world view of Islam to which Western thirst for knowledge and theories of cognition are alien. The Arab world, and the Middle East as a whole, holds that it already has the answers to all the questions of a simple life. This is why in the Arab countries there are no "men who ponder the mysteries of their visible and invisible surroundings," no "do it yourself" fans, "no laboratories, and no philosophical schools which are not hedged in by the barriers of dogma" (Hans E. Tutsch, 'Arab Unity and Arab Dissensions', in Walter Z. Laqueur (ed.), *The Middle East in Transition*, N.Y.: Praeger, 1958, abridged from Patai, 1973: 276-77).

3. See the following statements by two prominent academicians abridged from Patai, R., 1973: 108-111:

The Fahlawi student is interested only in formal success in connection with his studies, in the external impression, and will often resort to illicit means to achieve it. He will flatter his teacher or try to bribe him, will cheat in his exams, will try to find out in advance what the questions will be, and his great dream is to be able to lay his hands on a copy of the test material. When such a student becomes a high official he will continue to use his Fahlawi methods in his new responsibilities. Because of these traditional traits, the Arab people are unable to accept facts with the speed and flexibility required by serious situations, but are forced to hide shortcomings and failures in order to preserve appearances and save their self-respect. The Fahlawi personality is inflated, always ready to demonstrate his superior knowledge and mastery accompanied by a contempt for those who really make an effort to work hard and to produce a well-finished job. (Dr. Sadiq Jalal al-Azm, lecturer in Philosophy at the American University of Beirut and the University of Amman).

What motivates the Fahlawi is not dedication to duty, nor a wish for self-realization, but rather the desire for reward or the fear of punishments. Search for quick and easy achievement is characteristic of many Egyptian students: instead of seriously studying for their examinations, they try to succeed without the necessary toil.

(Dr. Ammar, *Fi Bina al-Bashar* [On the Building of Man]).

4. Toynbee recognized the rigidity of the Muslim mind in many aspects of life, including the prohibition of using Arabic language in forms other than the established manner of the *madressah* [school] as he states: 'there is a catholic indifference to anything that is not directly of moment for his life in this world or the next which is enjoined upon every pious Muslim by the precepts of orthodox Islamic theology... this is not simply theological; it is in the very texture of the Muslim mind... Even curiosity, in the highest and finest sense, we cannot render [in Arabic]... The free, self-determining, self developing soul may not walk its own path, however innocently, but must fit itself to the scheme and pattern of schools'. However, Toynbee seems to contradict himself later by stating; 'the thinking faculty played a more responsible part in Islam than in Christianity'. (Toynbee, in Patai, R., 1973: 322).

Spengler notes the determinism of Islamic cultures that curb creativity as: 'The first thing that the man of this culture, from the poorest slave and porter to prophet and Caliph, feels over him as *kismet* [fate] is... a beginning and an end of "these days" which are immutably fixed and ordained and between which human existence takes its place foreordained ever since the beginning... and from this follows an inner, truly magian certainty: everything has "a time", from the Saviour's advent whose hour was stated in ancient texts, to the smallest everyday activities, in which the Faustian haste becomes senseless and unintelligible...' (Spengler, in Patai, R., 1973: 316-317).

5. "Shame" has been defined as a matter between a person and his society, while "guilt" is primarily a matter between a person and his conscience. A hermit in a desert can feel guilt; he cannot feel shame. One of the important differences between the Arab and the Western personality is that in the Arab culture, shame is more pronounced than guilt... (Ausubel, 1955: 379-389). 'Self-respect depends entirely on the respect from others. Their systems of virtues are predominantly other-determined which means that motives, intentions, feelings, attitudes, and so on are of no importance as long as one's outward behaviour conforms to expectations. Because of this overriding motivation, the Arabs are largely conforming: they accept the ethics of their society to a high degree. The Arabic noun *wajh*, while it means face, outer side, outward appearance, surface, and the like, has also the further meanings of first place, place of honor, advantage, pre-eminence, personal satisfaction, outstanding personality, prince, nobleman, person of honor, intention, purpose... while this long list of meaning maybe somewhat confusing, it certainly indicates, even to the non-Arabist, that for an Arab to "save one's face" is a much weightier matter than for an English-speaking person. "Face" is one example of the other determined, outward-oriented character of the Arab personality. "What would people say" is the main criterion for his choice' (abridged from Patai, R., 1973: 101-4-6).

Chapter Nine: Significant Factors in Managerial Motivation in the Sub-continent

(a) Variations in motivational patterns between government and private organizations

In the sub-continent a lot of debate takes place, among job seeking managers, about whether they should work for the government or the private sector. There is a remarkable similarity in the findings from Indian and Pakistani managers and there is little doubt in that the motivation patterns offered by state and private companies are dissimilar: Young and ambitious graduates, who want quick promotions and to make more money, normally want to work in the private sector where it is believed that higher rewards for higher performance are offered though often at the cost of job security. If the company has not enough work generated by demand, job security depends upon the generosity of owners.

There is a consensus among respondents that jobs in government or state owned companies are secure and, therefore, a man for whom job security is more important than the amount of salary, would like to work in a state company where even the jobs of below average employees are usually safe. It is commonly said that if you work for the government, people would be willing to let you marry their daughters, but if you are in a private company, they would be worried about your job security. However, the said objection is not raised against those in higher positions in the private sector because, people in higher level jobs would normally come from upper/middle classes and are thus expected to have enough means to support their families in the event of a dismissal. Another advantage in government organizations is their well-established employment legislation, rules, regulations and procedures which provide a stable environment in which the "rules of the game" are obvious to the participants so that those who cannot live without a certain amount of predictability and control over their fates would prefer government jobs. The risk-averse want to know that when they retire, they will get a pension in old age or some provident fund benefits. Moreover, because of the regulations, it is not easy to sack employees; the state companies have to form a committee, put a charge sheet, conduct interviews and inquiries, all of which takes a lot of time and after which probably little would happen. However, very large private companies with a considerable number of employees have to make policies, rules, and regulations in order to evaluate performance with enough objectivity.

There is a general impression among the educated that private companies pay more than do government companies, but, a lot of qualifications need to be stipulated to this

impression. First, there is a much greater gap between the salaries of high ranks and low ranks in private companies than is the case in government companies. Top managers get a lot more in private companies than in state organizations, both in terms of salaries, and allowances and fringe benefits, but workers in state companies generally get higher wages than workers in private companies. However, multinationals do pay lower ranks well too. Some state companies (e.g. Hindustan Antibiotics Limited), pay much more to workers than do many native private companies in the same business. For some kind of jobs in government or semi-government organizations, many interviewees stated, the salaries paid are greater compared to the efforts people put in there.

In fact, in the private sector, there is simply a shift of money from the lower ranks to the higher ranks and hence private companies seem more attractive to the ambitious who want to join the higher ranks in the shortest possible time. It was often reported that people are made to work too hard in the private sector and that even those who get high salaries think that they work more than they are paid for.

A culture based paradox in the public/private situation

There is a well established myth that a state company cannot be as good as a comparable private company in the same kind of operative tasks. There is little doubt that productivity [out-put per person] is greater in private companies because they would not hire more than the absolute minimum staff, but the Western observation that private organizations are normally better than public in socio-economic development, does not hold true in the sub-continent in many ways. First, government organizations are subject to public scrutiny and pressure and to union pressures which, in the conditions of a general totalitarian psychology of private entrepreneurs in the sub-continent, is a very important and much needed democratic necessity that could lead to a rise in wages to a level whereby jobs in the West would not be threatened by the cheap slave labor of many underdeveloped countries. In fact, by forcing the underdeveloped countries to privatize, institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and USAID have created not only greater misery for the underdeveloped labor but also placed an increasingly larger workforce in the West out of jobs as many Western capitalists shift investment from the West to the East. The said world institutions are managed primarily by professionals who have observed that in the West, private enterprise is more efficient, and hence they stress that the underdeveloped countries follow suit but, unfortunately, they ignore a lot many variables of the development matrix that are taken for granted in the West but do

not exist in most underdeveloped countries. Hence, the privatization of industry in the sub-continent has led to the substitution of proper management by autocratic private management.

Despite over-staffing, low productivity, inefficiency, and the so-claimed waste of many state enterprises in under-developed countries, their costs still remain a fraction of many efficient Western private enterprises: Because there is no general social security system in the sub-continent, sacking an employee is not as free from moral considerations as it maybe in the West. Moreover, most salaries in the sub-continent, including those of doctors, engineers, lecturers and middle managers, are often less than the social security payments in Europe and therefore, over-staffing, in real terms, means just paying dole money to employees by keeping them on job. The reasons for massive resistance to privatization in the sub-continent lie in that in the public sector, union pressures and government emphasis on proper managerial training and fairer rules of doing business have led to the establishment of a style of running organizations with appropriate management guidelines that are taken for granted in the Western organizations whether private or public. The efforts which many state sector managers put in to be seen fair and objective in workers' promotions, because of either union pressures or state management guides for justice, are hard to find in the private sector. Proper management of industries came, first of all, in state organizations because when the private sector was busy in driving labor to squeeze maximum profits that went mostly into the princely life styles of the sub-continent entrepreneurs, it was mostly the sub-continent governments that were sending managers for training to Western management institutions. Hence, despite all the typical mismanagement charges, many native state companies compete successfully even against Western private companies.

(b) The effects of nepotism on motivation[1]

The question of nepotism and similar considerations is of vital importance to the motivation of talented and able people discouraged when denied the opportunity to serve when someone else gets the job because of relations, contacts, or wealth. It would be of some consequence to note the kind of organizations where nepotism and similar considerations override merit-based considerations in hiring and promotion: There is a general impression that MNCs hire and promote people strictly on merit considerations but,

[1]For interviewee description of cases of nepotism in detail, see pages 308 to 312.

increasingly, multinationals in the sub-continent are replacing their top management with native managers and directors so that in many of these multi-nationals, I was told, instances of nepotism, regionalism and other considerations, more typical of the native companies, have already become apparent. Because of different social and familial obligations in their respective cultures, there is little doubt in that most native managers and directors would not resort to merit based considerations to the extent that Western or Japanese managers would.

Another general impression among the public is that nepotism and similar considerations are more likely to take place in state organizations than in the private sector but the distinction between state and the private sector is rapidly becoming irrelevant because of the increasingly stronger hold of private entrepreneurs on state institutions, because of the transfer of many of the state powers to the private sector, and because of the influence which modern capitalists have on those who run state institutions. In many cases, the state functionaries cannot stay in their jobs if they do not serve the due or undue wishes of the rich and influential private entrepreneurs who have been able to exercise their influence in getting their relatives placed on higher posts in state organizations. However, in the federal and provincial civil services, there is a strong chance for brilliant people to be selected because of the strict recruitment and selection procedures followed by the Public Service Commission, and it is a common observation that talented persons of humble backgrounds have been able to get civil service posts through competitive examinations, but, whether they rise in the hierarchy, solely on merit basis, is another story; it is rare to find one of humble origins, in a higher post.

There are many examples of nepotism in the local projects of such prestigious organizations as the UNDP, UNICEF and the World Bank. This happens when these organizations undertake projects which must be manned by the bureaucracy or the private sector in the developing countries. The effects of nepotism, in terms of organizational effectiveness, were reported to be that when people are hired without following the required and recommended criteria, and proper selection procedures, the required results cannot be produced, the objectives are achieved only on paper. In Pakistan International Airlines, the following was reported;

"when we take in employees, probably only 30 to 35 percent are hired on merit basis. The rest are hired on the basis of nepotism. There are some who have to be carried along, and once they are taken in, there is no tradition of one being fired."

However, it is obvious that organizations cannot run successfully without, at least,

some members having the required merits. Therefore, where we find personnel hired on the basis of nepotism, there are many other employees who work hard to make the organizations work. Those hired on merit, and those who work hard, have little to fear about their job security because they are always needed to make the organization survive, and also to carry the burden of the incompetent.

(c) The effects of various forms of corruption on motivation[2]

Various kinds of corruption at middle and upper levels of social and organizational life are such an integral part of everyday life in the sub-continent that most people have to decide what role they should play when faced, in one or the other capacity, with a situation of corruption; only the 'very naive, young and immature' would resign from their jobs because of the corruption therein, and even then only if they have alternative means of income. In this work we are not concerned with the legal or moral aspects of corruption of various kinds but only with its effects upon the motivation level of managers and employees who want to serve in a conscientious manner. Many such managers contemplate opening their own businesses but know that they cannot run a private business successfully if they stick to a reasonable form of morality and ethics. A section officer in the Ministry of Social Welfare reported that the Members of the Provincial Assembly, authorized to distribute charity money, used to send recommendations where it was difficult to find if the nominee deserved the money. He feared that the money was going to affluent people and that proper accounts were not being kept.

Common examples of illegal behaviour come from public limited companies. Although the share holders can scrutinize the accounts, and hence these companies have to be strictly correct in book-keeping, many try their best to wriggle out of payments that have to be made to the Social Security and Old Age Benefit Department, Tax Department etc. On the said evasions, the share holders would not object because the said corruption leads to increase in profits. For example, social security payments for the regular employees of a public limited company are compulsory, but to evade this, because the law is valid only if the number of regular workers in a company is more than 25, most native companies show a large part of their permanent employees as temporary workers hired on daily wages. Where

[2]For interviewee narrations see pages 314 to 316.

the number of workers is too large to hide, the company may show half or less as regular employees on the books.

In the state departments, corruption and embezzlement is often over-looked partly because many motivational techniques to fight corruption cannot be implemented for lack of funds. For example, the salaries of policemen, clerks and junior officers in state departments are so low that it is generally agreed that they cannot survive without regular bribes which, in any case, consist of petty amounts compared to the embezzlements of top officials and private entrepreneurs who evade taxes and form cartels to hoard and raise the prices of their products with no proper economic justification. In the private sector, the embezzlement of employees is strictly punished, and hence, is almost non-existent. Although the private sector is in a better position, compared to the state sector, to deter employee corruption, embezzlement and excessive profiteering by the owner's themselves is the real issue, nevertheless, an issue that may never be dealt with because of the sub-continent de facto cultural values whereby the rich are always right.

(d) Unhealthy competition and higher positions despite incompetence[3]

In organizations where the measurement of performance is not usually objective, where numerous non-work factors intervene, and where status and privilege has little association with better and hard work, unhealthy competition and intrigue for promotions is widespread. A familiar term in native organizations is 'leg-pulling', denoting unfair means to bring others down in order to promote oneself. Numerous examples of this kind of behaviour were quoted by the interviewees. In a research organization, for example, many scientists, doing research work in which sharing data is essential, were trying to hide their data from each other in order to promote themselves. In a large leather tanning industry, an attempt was made to put a manager's job at risk while he was attending a seminar in Germany. In a very large marketing company, the sales force was divided into groups which competed to show higher performance and each tried to undermine the other's efforts by fair means or foul.

The desire to be in a higher position is often culturally conditioned as far as the nature

[3]For interviewee narrations regarding unhealthy competition and the effects of incompetence, see pages 308, 312, 314, 318, 319 and 321.

and extent of such desire and the aims behind getting a higher rank are concerned: One's aims behind the desire to get a higher rank could be functional, that is, one may seek a higher position in order to be able to serve the organization and society better (when one has the abilities and skills required to do so at a higher position). However, a person who in reality can do little for the organization and for society in a higher rank may be culturally conditioned to seek high positions only for the sake of raising his public-esteem, boosting his ego or getting the respect and adoration of family, friends and others. In the sub-continent, parents and elders often bombard children with comments and criticisms pushing them to 'be something' so much so that 'being something' in itself becomes a very important goal in many people's lives. Ambitious people may lose touch with the fact that 'being something' is inextricably linked with real and genuine potential and abilities. Hence, we find ministers, let alone managers, in the Middle East and the sub-continent who understand neither the significance of their portfolios nor the functions of their departments, and have to be propped up by their lower level staff. The rise of incompetent people up in the organizational ladder leads not only to problems at work, but is also de-motivating for competent individuals.

(e) Motivation related to promotions

Managerial motivation in the sub-continent was found to be strongly related to promotions, monetary gains and the acquisition of culturally significant status symbols[4] but dissimilarities between most sub-continent companies and most Western companies appear in the way rewards and penalties are not solely performance related. In many organizations

[4] Herzberg's (1959) study separated needs and wants into 'Hygiene Factors' and 'Motivators'. Considering that the subjects of the study were two hundred engineers and accountants in Pittsburgh industry, the findings that achievement, recognition for any accomplishment, work itself, responsibility and advancement were associated with job satisfaction are hardly surprising. That the same people named dissatisfiers as company policy and administration, salary, supervision, interpersonal relations and working conditions is also expected in their particular situation where factors related to their job descriptions, being technical and specialized concerns, are within their powers and so they would want to have greater control over their working environment. A similar study with professionals in third world countries where higher education is obtained primarily to get more salary, is likely to lead to little distinction (if at all) between 'hygiene' factors and 'motivators': As shown in chapter 2, 4, and 8, in the sub-continent and the Middle East, salary and social status are so often the main motivators for the vast majority that one motivated by advancement or recognition in professional achievements, but without higher hygiene factors, is regarded an anomaly.

many high performers were reported to lose motivation because of the policy of relating incentives not with high performance but with culturally engendered non-work considerations.

There are several methods of performance evaluation in vogue in various kinds of organizations. Each method presents its advantages and disadvantages and none may be seen as safe from the intervention of cultural factors, prejudices and favoritism on one or the other grounds. Whether the performance appraisal is done objectively and fairly or not, finally, boils down to the judgmental abilities of the evaluators, their training, sense of fairness and justice, and ability to free oneself from personal and culturally instilled prejudices. In many government departments, the traditional system of promotions on the basis of annual confidential reports is in vogue so that the annual increments and promotions of employees are affected by what their seniors write about them in the ACRs. As reported, the process is not free from politics, intrigue and culturally instilled considerations. In some other government and semi-government departments, promotion is period-related. Normally, top management promote officers to the next grade approximately every five years. But in many departments, it was reported that many have been stuck in their initial ranks for too long because the higher rank vacancies were filled in by people from outside, appointed either through 'sifarish' (contacts with influential persons) or on political considerations. However, it was also commonly reported in government departments that those who were not working hard, were below average and about whom it was generally assessed that they had worked less than due, all were promoted in the same way: Many high officials claim that if they follow the statistical logic of only two, in a batch of 10, being above average, then only two could possibly be promoted and this would cause enormous resentment and potential for conflict. A General Manager in PIA who tried to relate promotions to performance, was not supported by the General Managers of the other departments. The traditional top Managers equate the average evaluation with above average and rank none as below average, the disadvantage of which is that those who are genuinely above average get no extra rewards. Those who think they work more than others, want the pay to be related to performance.

In the initial stages of service, one might be willing to accept time-related incentives and promotions because there are many senior posts available, but as one moves ahead in the organizational hierarchy, senior posts go on diminishing, and all cannot be promoted. Therefore, it becomes essential that only those who have put in extra effort, should be promoted. If the above average is treated the same as the others, his motivation would go

on diminishing. Many are reported to have got frustrated at slow promotions, resigned and left. Thus, there is a need to reward high performers if they are to be retained but, as found, where the policy of promoting all is replaced by promoting some, it does not necessarily follow that only high performers will be promoted; For example, the Oil and Gas Development Corporation employs a batch of geophysicists, all doing similar kind of work and putting in virtually equal amount of efforts so that if one could be promoted to a senior position, so could the rest, and yet there were reportedly some cultural factors that played a role in one being promoted over the others.

Where the jobs are similar in nature and lead to roughly equal results, but only some may be promoted because of fewer higher posts available, perhaps the best way would be to promote by tests and interviews so that all participants have a fair chance of showing their abilities. Many companies follow this method but this too is not free from abuse. However, the method gives the employees an opportunity to put on record what their abilities are.

Note that each of the above mentioned methods may only be used in certain types of organizations, and therefore, we suggest a contingent use of the said methods depending upon the skills/abilities of the employees, and the possibility of bias arising in certain situations[5].

(f) Variations in motivational patterns between the native companies and MNCs

In Britain, I found that most Asian businesses, however large, were run and controlled by the owning families and it was rare to see them hiring professional managers. In the sub-continent however, medium and large companies, though predominantly owned by families, often employ managers, first, because it is many times cheaper to employ managers in the sub-continent than it is in Britain; a manager who would be paid £25,000 per annum in Britain, would normally get between Rs. 120,000 and 300,000 (£2,500 to 5,000) per annum, depending upon the type of owners, hence ten to five times cheaper, while

[5]In terms of motivation, McGregor (1960-a: Ch. 7) stresses considerations for equity and equitable treatment, merit increases and group rewards in the administering of salaries and promotions. He notes that, "*the principle of integration requires active and responsible participation of the individual in decisions affecting his career*" (p. 103). McGregor notes three practical purposes of performance appraisal; administrative, informative and motivational. However, As found, the focus of appraisal in the traditional-authoritative sub-continent and Middle East is on the administrative side with little attention paid to its informative and motivational aspects.

the profitability of a comparable business would be much greater in the sub-continent because of lower salaries, the common practice of false accounting to evade taxes, the formation of cartels, price fixing, and the deliberate enhancement of prices by businesses on one pretext or another. Moreover, in the sub-continent, where business owners possess enormous social and legal clout, it is easy for them to control their managers when the latter know about the owner's secrets, while in Britain it would be hard to check the actions of a whistle blower.

Where there are several enterprises run by one family, control over major organizational affairs is done by close relative-directors in-charge of one or more enterprises, or by a few very trusted faithful managers who have been with the family for long and whose social background is well known to the owners; the faithful managers may be trusted with cash control involving bank accounts, cheques, identifying signatories, at times with certain decisions such as hiring and firing and making smaller business deals. Obsequiousness is always expected but a manager with high qualifications and high social and economic status may win some trust and less domination from private owners. In the state sector, however, qualified managers are supposed to be the major decision makers, though considerable centralization is vested in the top levels.

However, most non-relative managers in private organizations are not trusted with much responsibility compared to those in the West: Most business planning and tasks, particularly activities involving cash transactions, must be done under the owners' strict control[6]. Most managers reported that the main differences in the work environment between Euroamerican and native companies were that in local organizations, the managers do not have much authority when compared to that they hold in foreign companies. Native owners retain the decision-making powers and seldom transfer them to their managers. Native owners do not allow their managers to make many decisions independently, particularly crucial decisions. For example, during recruitment, the owners either send their men to be hired or set criteria for the type of man they want to be hired. In the multinationals, managers are not under owners' pressure when making decisions in their task-

[6]As an exports manager in one of Pakistan's largest textile industry, and later, as a finance manager in a large shoe manufacturing firm, I was not supposed to deal even with petty cash transactions. The owner directors (five brothers in the textile industry and a father and two sons in the shoe manufacturing firm), did all the cash related work while I was there to keep accounting tracks of their transactions. All decisions were made by the owners.

related issues; they are given authority, independence, and make their own decisions. Multinationals encourage their managers to have their own ideas and to present them to the higher management where discussions are freely conducted. Almost all managers reported that working with a multi-national made them feel important, learn more, and that there was greater prestige and status attached. Most managers stated that non-work problems and non-work control and conflict was much greater in native companies than in MNEs. A marketing manager in a German multinational, who was previously employed in a native industry, described the main difference between foreign and native companies as being that in foreign companies, one's professional potential is used but in native organizations, not only professional expertise but one's personal behaviour matters a lot; if one is successful as a professional but not very polite and pleasing to the '*saith*' (the sub-continent term meaning 'the owner'; the word is also used to allude to arrogance, such as, "he thinks he is a *saith*", or, "he has become a *saith*", meaning that, "he has become arrogant") he is not likely to succeed in that industry. Interviews with managers often reveal lack of trust and recognition by native private owners. The owners observe a strict status quo. With the managers, they mostly have a formal interaction typically reported to be a '*saith* type' attitude, that is, they do not talk more than about assignments, and expect loyalty[7] as much to tasks as to the employers in person. Most native private managers reported that the "*saiths*" consider the staff their personal employees, and that even when the latter get good salaries, the manner in which the *saiths* treat them was authoritative, and, at times, insulting.

Managers in multinationals frequently mention that a large part of their motivation to work comes from learning new things, getting more responsibility and authority, and having a variety of work. MNEs spend more on offices, salaries, and on entertaining clients than do native companies. MNEs pay far better than local companies, and therefore, the financial needs having been fulfilled, higher needs such as responsibility and job satisfaction begin to play a role in motivation. Compared to the local organizations, MNE workers are lavishly provided for; they are given several bonuses a year, conveyance allowance, clean uniforms, and good meals at work. As regards the unions in MNEs, it was reported that because they are better-off than the unions and workers in native companies, they are not the usual aggressive or violent kind. Strikes in MNEs almost never happen. Although MNEs

[7]See cases in pages 321 to 324.

incur greater expenditure[8] on workers, employees and clients than do comparable native companies, they still make greater profits and are more efficient than the latter. As regards organizational differences, most interviewees reported that MNCs were more results-oriented ("interested more in what you do than in what you say") than were the local[9].

For all the reasons mentioned above, it is a common observation that people are much more strongly motivated to work for MNEs than for native companies.

Recent changes in the organizational cultures of the MNEs in the sub-continent[10]

It was found in the case studies of German and British MNEs, conducted for this work, that, increasingly, the MNEs are replacing their expensive foreign top managers with relatively cheaper native managers, which has brought about risks of changing the MNE culture towards: (a)increasing short-term profitability at the cost of long-term company interests; (b)non-work control and conflict, and nepotism; (c)increasing rewards for top managers or directors while reducing salaries of the middle and lower ranks, thus reflecting and moving towards the typical sub-continent wider income-difference culture, and, (d)unnecessarily frustrating workers, and junior and middle management.

Though point (c) has now become a norm in many Western companies, it is not visible to such an extent in MNEs in Europe as in those in the sub-continent. There is strong

[8]A personnel manager in the Honda Civic plant in Pakistan reported that the company decided to give its newly recruited engineers much more salary than the latter had asked for. This would be unthinkable in native companies where the salary negotiations almost always mean offering less than asked for.

[9]More differences were found in the influence of technology on human behaviour: In Germany, for example, the MNEs use sophisticated production methods and office equipment; the efficiency and productivity of people working with the latest and most sophisticated equipment could not be compared with the efficiency or productivity of those working with comparatively obsolete machinery. However, while MNE productivity is higher in Europe, their profitability is higher in the sub-continent because operating costs are lesser. Operating costs are less because fewer environmental controls are imposed by the sub-continent governments; in Europe, tremendous sums are spent on the treatment of industrial waste, the tax rate too is much higher, labor rules are tougher and the MNEs incur heavy expenses on safety and security at workplace, on national insurance, and on body insurance, and then, because high accident risk means high insurance costs, MNEs have to reduce the risk of accidents, as per insurance companies requirements, which means expenditure on good safety and security systems.

[10]For excerpts from interviewee statements see pages 325 to 327.

evidence to suggest that when foreign companies are handed over to local managers, the local culture seeps into their organizational practice. For example, many MNE native managers have been hiring relatives of influential persons[11]. In the near past, the CITI Bank in Pakistan had a policy to employ the top performing MBA students from good local universities. However, now that there is a large number of MBAs in Pakistan, it was found that some of them, employed by some MNEs, had begun a new kind of nepotism; the affiliations which many students had with some friends and class fellows have resulted in giving jobs to friends through pre-arranged settlements. For example, in some instances, applicants were told what questions the interviewer was going to ask.

Summary and contributions of chapter 9 towards the Grounded Theory to be proposed

(1)Government and private companies in the sub-continent appeal to differentiated motivation; the former to the risk averse's long-term job security needs, the latter to the high performer's need for quicker and higher rewards.

(2)Managers unequivocally prefer to work for MNCs than for native companies because MNCs, (a)grant greater decision making powers to managers; (b)place greater trust in them; (c)give greater facilities; (d)exploit one's professional potential without seeking obedience; (e)accept challenges and encourage independence and creative thinking; and, (f)keep up employees'self-esteem. The mentioned factors are not usually present in native companies.

(3)The desire to be in a higher position for other than functional/organizational reasons, is culturally conditioned in so far as the extent of status seeking in a higher rank are concerned.

(4)As MNCs in the sub-continent replace their Western management with native, many native organizational cultural elements (such as non-work control and conflict, nepotism, regionalism, corruption, unhealthy competition, higher positions despite incompetence, tax and social security evasion, increasing short-term profitability at the cost of long-term company interests, and higher salary differentials between ranks) have begun to appear in the

[11]A well known British chemical giant took the son of the Governor of a province on a high post at a salary far above the going rate for the MBAs, despite the fact that the son had obtained admission on the basis of nepotism and scored comparatively very low marks in his MBA course: In the university from where the said son had graduated, one admission seat had been reserved for the nominee of the Governor of the province, and another for the nominee of the Mayor of the city. The Mayor and the Governor had nominated each other's son in order to disguise the nepotism therein.

MNCs which are hitherto seen as much better management examples than the native companies. Examples of nepotism and embezzlement have been found in the native projects of UNDP, UNICEF and the World Bank. Many projects have failed because the hired people did not have the required qualifications.

(5)The Western observation that private organizations are better than public ones in socio-economic development does not hold true for most underdeveloped countries for the following reasons; (a)government organizations are subject to public scrutiny and union pressures which, in authoritarian cultures, is a much needed democratic necessity to raise wages to a level where jobs in the West will not be threatened by the cheap labor of the third world; (b)better management practice came from the West first in public enterprises because when the Eastern entrepreneurs were busy in driving labor to squeeze maximum profits that mostly went into the princely life styles of the former, it was mostly Eastern governments that were sending managers to the West for training; (c)dispite charges of over-staffing, low productivity, inefficiency and waste, the costs of many state enterprises still remain a fraction of those in the Western private sectors; (d)although private sector is better placed to deduct employee embezzlement than is the public, the embezzlement of the private owners is much higher than that in the public sector; (e)most salaries in the sub-continent, including those of doctors, engineers, lecturers and middle managers, are less than the social security payments in Europe and therefore, over-staffing, in real terms, means just paying dole money to keep people on jobs. Such low cost employment is a main strategy of many underdeveloped governments for socio-economic development which has been seriously threatened by privatization done under ill-advice from foreign experts.

Managerial motivation is much higher in MNCs than in native companies but as MNCs transfer top managerial jobs to natives, many undesirable local cultural elements seep in.

The Western observation that private enterprise is always better for development does not hold true in underdeveloped countries where a lot many variables of the development matrix, taken for granted in the West, do not exist. The findings shall be taken to our Grounded Theory to show differentiated patterns of motivation, which suggest that cultural factors should be considered by MNCs and international developmental agencies (IMF, World Bank, USAID etc.) whilst planning/ advising on, (i)personnel mix (foreign-native), and, (ii)structural mix (public-private) ratios, for their projects in underdeveloped countries.

Chapter Ten: Significant Factors in Workers Motivation in the Sub-continent/ Middle East

Sources for this chapter

From 1981 to 1989, I have personally observed working conditions in more than thirty factories in six cities of Pakistan, and obtained information about several others indirectly through conversations with employees and employers. For six years, as a bank officer, I was supposed to visit client's factories where I would spend days, sometimes weeks, for the sake of analyzing their operational and marketing strategies. This we had to do before money could be lent to them. Because financial statements of businesses could not be trusted, often we had to prepare financial statements from our own estimates of the client's business factors such as the stocks in stores and the worth of the raw material used each month. Later, I worked as a finance manager with a large shoe manufacturing factory, and then, for two years, I taught at a local university during which period factory visits under a teacher's supervision were part of education and training of our students. Information about Indian, Bengali, and Middle Eastern[1] factories has been obtained from interviewees and workers in the Arabian Gulf states. Observation in the Gulf states were made for five years.

Findings and Analysis

In my informal discussions with several employers, managers and employees on the possible causes of industrial conflict, I found that while most industrialists attribute the causes to worker unrest, laziness and insolence, a vast majority of workers could be found barely surviving in abject poverty. Most workers found the reasons for conflict in the greed and embezzlement of the bureaucrats and capitalists. One could see that the supervisors, managers, and the owners rule with almost unconstrained power that may not be restricted even by courts due to acute class barriers and the general support for the authority of the upper classes by the social system. Most organizations are little more than a family affair in a totally unregulated labour market. The vast majority of workers have very few de facto rights and protection. The distinction between workers and bosses is very sharp and clear; there is a less stratified but, ironically, the least class-conscious workforce.

[1]Detailed information about workers' situation in the Middle East has been provided in chapter 15. More information about workers' unions and rights at workplace has also been given in chapter 15.

The vast majority of sub-continent and Middle Eastern workers lives in the conditions of 18th/19th century Britain that have been described by various authors such as Frederick Engels and Peter Lane. These conditions are similar enough throughout the country to allow a construction of typologies based on objective socio-economic circumstances of different classes. But there are various cultural, social, religious, and historic reasons for the non-homogeneous subjective nature of the workers, and for their mutually belligerent attitudes.

During conversations, the workers and trade union leaders brought in serious issues regarding the unethical behavior of native employers at all levels of trade and industry. Most workers considered it utopian to have a sense of belonging to the workplace. A typical day at the workplace, extracted from workers' narrations, could be described as follows:

"I get up at five in the morning and travel to the factory five to seven miles from my home on a bicycle or in an over-crowded rickety bus which I cannot always afford (despite significant recommendations in the labour laws for factories having workers' accommodation, such provisions are rare). I reach the factory at six. The first sight of the factory causes unpleasant sensations. The notice at the factory gate says, 'leave your personal belongings at the security post', and a thorough physical search takes place before entering and on leaving the factory compound. The security people check for harmful items while we enter, and for possible stolen factory items when we leave. The working conditions are appalling. The steel industry workers work in extreme heat and noise. The chemicals workers face hazards from out-dated boilers and unfamiliar chemicals. We bring our own food because the contractor at the factory canteen either charges very high, or if the meal is subsidized, the quality and quantity of the food is very low. Time for lunch break is half an hour but they start calling us back to work before it is due. The supervisors and foremen frequently resort to invective and abuse. Physical clashes are not uncommon. Even the fellow workers are hateful of each other for we have lost mutual respect. Expulsion of a fellow worker seldom evokes sympathy; the fewer the better. At the day end at six in the afternoon, we wait in queues for an hour to be paid. The cashier often tries to deduct as much as he can".

It maybe noted here that similarities do exist in the working conditions in the sub-continent/Middle East at present to those in 19th century British factories described as:

"The first 'immigrants' into the new industrial towns were, in one sense, 'slaves' to the machines. From a very early age they worked very long hours and for low wages. Many of the first factories were overcrowded, badly-lit and poorly ventilated. Accidents were common, and the crippled or maimed child or adult was dismissed by his employer to become a beggar or an inmate of a workhouse... Oastler argued that the conditions in which children and adults had to work in a British factory were worse than conditions in which slaves lived and worked on plantations in the West Indies" (Peter Lane) [See endnote 2].

Peter Lane has quoted Edward Hodder's writing in his book, 'George Smith of Coalville':

"When I was nine years old (in 1840) my work consisted of continually carrying about 40 pounds of clay upon my head from the clay heap to the table where the bricks were made. This I had to do without stopping for thirteen hours a day. Sometimes I had to work all

through the night, carrying 1200 bricks from the makers to the floors where they were placed to harden. During such a night I would walk about 14 miles".

But still there is a difference of culture and attitude between the people of the two societies under consideration. In the above mentioned reports, while the description matches that in present day sub-continent/Middle East workshops, farms, factories, restaurants or any other workplace, there are no enquiries that would be listened to or supported by the upper classes or the bureaucrats, there are no 'Poor Laws', as were operative even in pre-industrial Britain, and there is no alternative to the parish system. The history of the parish system and the Poor Law authorities in Britain dates back as far as before 16th century (admitting the corruption of some parish authorities) because of the concern of many for the poor.

A notice of rule and regulations in a 19th century British factory, quoted by Peter Lane, shows many Theory X type assumptions behind the management's attitude towards the workers. Although the document reveals many similarities in the 19th century British working conditions to that which presently exist in Middle Eastern/sub-continent factories, there are still some differences that show, surprisingly, that even in the 19th century, control attitudes in British factories were better than those in most Middle Eastern/sub-continent factories at present: Some rules/regulations in 19th century British factories were as follows:

"For Working Hours, the bell will ring at 6 o'clock in the Morning, and 6 o'clock in the Evening, for a day's work... The Hour of Dinner to be from 12 to 1... the half hour for breakfast from half past 8 to 9... Over-Time to be reckoned at the rate of 8 hours for a day's work both in and out of the Works... Each man to be accountable for his Tools, when leaving employment; and in case of loss, the amount to be deducted from his wages....".

In these rules it is mentioned that a fine of 1s be deducted from wages and deposited to the sick fund for the following misconduct:

"Any man, either giving or taking out any board but his own [attendance]; neglecting to leave the key of his drawer in the office, on leaving work; leaving his candle burning, or neglecting to shut his gas-cock; opening the drawer of another, or taking his tools without leave; not returning tools to the person who has charge of them; making preparations for leaving work before the bell rings; smoking during working hours; taking strangers into the works without leave or talking to such as may go in".

For using oil to clean hands and for giving in more time than worked, one was to be fined 2s. 6d. If one interfered or damaged any machinery or tools, he was to pay the cost of repairs and to be fined 1s.

The dissimilarities in many present day Middle Eastern/sub-continent factories from the conditions mentioned above are that the lunch break is only half an hour as against the one hour mentioned above; there is usually no break for breakfast: Most workers work for

twelve hours but no overtime rate is allowed because most wages are paid on a fixed monthly basis. While this system of low wages at the end of month encourages workers to waste time if they can, the level of production is sought to be kept high through coercive control by foremen and supervisors who frequently resort to invective and abuse, at times physical force. Most managers and owners do not aim at changing the coercive control system because, at the end of the day, after all the abuse, hassle, and coercion, they seem to obtain higher production at lower wages; performance related rewards, many believe, unlike the current trend in British personnel management, would result in higher wages.

While the above mentioned document shows that fines were to go towards the sick fund, in Pakistani factories, the fines are added towards the profits because most often there are no sickness or welfare funds. In the case of negligence and damage to property, workers are either beaten or handed over to the police depending upon the extent of the damage done.

Some work rights and conditions in the sub-continent[2] domestic private sector

1-The present wage legislation is meant for companies employing 50 or more workers, and it is only for such companies that the labour department may inspect for irregularities. Bribes are a common substitute to inspections. For unskilled workers in establishments employing 50 or more, minimum wages plus cost of living allowance, as determined by the central government are too low even to buy basic necessities;

"actual wages are... low even by Asian standards" [see endnote I].

2-Statutory benefits such as profit sharing, one month's bonus, social security contributions, annual vacations, educational allowances for workers' children and pensions are very rare in domestic companies.

3-The legislation requires employers to provide housing facilities for 25% of their employees and land is available for this purpose at nominal prices. Employers are expected to contribute 5% of total payroll for housing but this rule has not been enforced.

4-The concept of retirement and pension for workers and junior staff does not exist

[2]Although there are minor variations in the Labour Legislation of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh (all three have origins in the British legislation that was the same for the three countries prior to independence), the net effect is the same as summed up in this chapter which relies heavily on the Labour Legislation (Industrial Relations Ordinance and Labour Policy) in Pakistan, obtainable from Government Printing Press, Islamabad.

For details regarding Labour Legislation in the Middle East, see chapter 15.

in the domestic private sector though some companies may hand over a lump sum retirement provident fund or gratuity to very long serving officers and employees. For a manual worker, such a provision would be rare except in government organizations.

5-A profit sharing plan applies to all industrial companies that employ 100 or more workers and whose paid-up capital is more than Rs. 2.0 million or whose fixed assets are worth 4.0 million or more. Payment of an annual bonus is compulsory. Employers must also provide free education for one child of each worker up to high school. All industrial enterprises are expected to furnish company canteens serving subsidized meals and provide medical treatment facilities for in-house accidents or routine medical problems but such facilities are seldom provided in domestic companies.

Some work rights and conditions in foreign owned companies

Better industrial relations exist at the multinationals in Pakistan where strikes, go-slow tactics, lock outs etc. are virtually never experienced:

"Multinational corporations, with their relatively high pay scales and comprehensive benefits, remain the favoured employers among local workers. Strikes and agitation against foreign owned firms are rare" [see endnote 1].

The reasons for rare strikes and agitation are simply that foreign company managers not only try to abide by the labour legislation but even exceed the legal requirements in order to create better work relations:

1-Although the Factories Act limits adults to a 9 hour day and a 48 hour week, many foreign companies observe a five day, 42-45 hour week. Even then, productivity and quality is higher than that at most domestic companies observing a 54-60 hour week.

2-Foreign companies fulfil all mandated requirements such as the statutory benefits; profit sharing, one month bonus, social security contributions, annual vacations, educational allowances for workers' children and pensions: *"Foreign owned companies provide more generous fringe benefits than locally owned firms" [see endnote 1].*

3-Regarding dismissal of employees, the law demands that salaried employees must be given one month notice or one month salary. For workers the period is 15 days. Siemens (Pak) has a voluntary leave scheme with the following incentives;

(i)one month notice with pay rather than two weeks notice;

(ii)separation pay of one and a half month wages for every completed year of service with the company;

- (iii) payment in cash of any balance of annual vacation;
- (iv) refund of the resigning workers' contribution to the provident fund and accumulated employer's contribution;
- (v) family medical allowance for the balance of the year, and
- (vi) payment of all dues in the workers' participation fund.

4-The mandated retirement age is 58 or after 30 years of service. But at EXXON Chemicals (Pakistan) workers may retire at 48 or after 15 years of service. At Phillips Pakistan, retirement is at 55 or 24 years of service [see endnote 1].

Because productivity, quality and profitability are higher in the MNCs, there are all the reasons for domestic companies to follow better management practice exemplified by MNCs. The native employers can certainly do better but it must be noted that the sub-continent/Middle Eastern worker is often his own worst enemy for he, under the spell of superstition, produces many more children than do the middle and upper classes. Hence creating an oversupply of labour which drives the wages further down.

Summary and contributions of chapter 10 towards the Grounded Theory to be proposed

(1) The vast majority of sub-continent/Middle Eastern workers lives in conditions of poverty similar to that of 18th/19th century Britain. The material-physical conditions of different economic classes throughout the said regions are similar enough to allow for a construction of typologies based on objective socio-economic circumstances. However, there are various cultural, social, religious, historic, and nationalistic reasons for the non-homogeneous subjective nature of the workers' mutually belligerent attitudes. In other words, there is, objectively, a less stratified but, subjectively, the least class-conscious workforce. Hence, in most sub-continent/Middle Eastern factories, the managers and the owners enjoy a power not restricted even by courts, due to acute class barriers, the general support for upper-class authority by the social system, and a de facto unregulated labour market where the vast majority of workers have few, if any, rights and protection.

(2) The domestic private enterprises practically exercise the right to hire and fire and are not usually subject to any de facto regulatory controls. The present labour legislation is applicable for companies employing 50 or more workers, and it is only for such companies that the Labour Department may inspect for irregularities but bribes usually invalidate the

inspections. Statutory benefits such as profit sharing, one month's bonus, social security contributions, annual vacations, educational allowances for workers' children, and pensions are rarely if ever given.

(3) There is a difference of culture and attitude between the people of the Middle East/sub-continent and the British towards poverty: In the present day Middle East/sub-continent workshops, farms, factories, restaurants or any other workplace, there are no poverty enquiries that would be listened to or supported by the upper classes or the bureaucrats as against the pre-industrial Britain where there were 'Poor Laws'; the history of the parish system and the Poor Law authorities in Britain dates back as far as before 16th century.

(4) Finding (3) is remarkably matched by the fact that better industrial relations exist in the multinationals (working in the Middle East/sub-continent) where strikes, go-slow tactics, lock outs etc. are virtually never experienced. The reasons are simply that foreign company managers not only abide by the labour legislation but even exceed the legal requirements in order to create better work relations. Foreign companies fulfil all mandated requirements such as the statutory benefits, profit sharing, one month's bonus, social security contributions, annual vacations, educational allowances for worker's children and pensions.

The findings reveal our recurring theme in this work that poverty, coercion, intra-level conflict and over-supply of labour are linked to each other in the sub-continent/Middle East.

Findings in this chapter shall be taken to our Grounded Theory to show that cultural factors determine not only people's attitudes towards poverty, conflict, and coercion but also the possibility of their eradication. The said thesis is strongly supported by evidence showing,

(i) that the British were sensitive about poverty and coercion even in 16th century and worked bit by bit to eradicate it, against the native attitude where issues of poverty and coercion are normally obscured and dismissed by the upper classes;

(ii) when MNCs come to work in the Middle East/sub-continent, they not only abide by the native governmental labour legislation but in many cases exceed mandatory requirements, as against the native companies which ignore the labour legislation while the government does not have enough means and will to enforce it.

Despite better treatment of employees, MNCs in the sub-continent/Middle East still make more money than do the native companies and hence there are strong grounds for our suggestion that native companies follow the better management practices of MNCs.

Notes and Explanations

[1]Business International Corporation, U.S.A., Sept. 1981, Investing, Licensing & Trading Conditions Abroad.

[2]Clegg and Dunkerley (1980: 71) quote Benedix that the early capitalists based their activities on authoritarian 'ideology': Weber (1948: 261) stated, '*...no special proof is necessary to show that military discipline is the ideal model for the modern capitalist factory*'.

Weber developed his theory of bureaucracy from the Prussian military forces; British railway companies used British Army kind of ranks. But in the West, methods of influence have shifted gradually from coercion because the "Catholic church" and "military" models suffered from the limitations of authority in view of new pressures, mobility, and legislation brought by collective bargaining:

"We can improve our ability to control only if we recognize that control consists in selective adaptation to human nature rather than in attempting to make human nature conform to our wishes" (McGregor, 1960a: 11).

McGregor's observation that a shift in the nature of control from coercive to adaptive has followed the reducing dependence of subordinates on the controlling authority, supports our thesis, explained in chapter 16 that coercion in many countries will stay as long as the subordinates remain vulnerable.

Chapter Eleven: A Comparison of Control Attitudes in Asian and English Businesses

There is a significant presence of Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi businesses in Britain, which predominantly employ Asians. As these businesses operate in the British socio-cultural and legal environment, I was interested in seeing to what extent the British culture and social environment has influenced patterns of control, conflict and motivation therein, or if the said patterns in Asian organizations were similar to those found back home.

In British Asian organizations, many instances of negative assumptions and Theory X type of beliefs are commonly reported to exist in the attitudes of owners, managers, supervisors, and among employees themselves. Numerous events quoted in this respect by nearly all respondents showed that employees are often not considered trustworthy, and much personal control is exercised by the owners, managers or supervisors. In fact the word 'control' is often understood by employees as meaning 'keeping an eye on the employees' and so that when asked about control system in their organizations, most only tell about the owner family members, partners or managers/supervisors 'personally watching' the workers.

While it is understandable that personal observation is at times necessary and is required, particularly during on-the-job training, this kind of instruction-based training requires skills, patience, tolerance, and understanding on the part of the instructor, especially when the trainee makes mistakes. The difference between training by watching, and personal control, seemed very clear to the respondents when they narrated events which show criticism made by seniors for the sake of criticism alone, and undue snubbing to fulfil one's desire to exercise power over others. The interviewees often expressed feelings of bitterness engendered by personal control. Although the speed of work and the amount produced in a given time should be dealt with in a properly designed control system, it was frequently reported that the employers wanted too much work to be done very fast, though the work maybe too hard. Task-oriented supervisors and managers are found in all organizations, Asian or English, but the difference lies in the extent of pressure and subjectivity with which they exhibit their task-orientation, and the extent to which control is either task-related, or a means to exhibit culturally engendered authoritarianism.

Control issues related to conflict

The relationship of conflict with the nature of control is shown in that while

answering to questions about conflict, the respondents often talked about those control methods which lead to conflict situations, and then it became hard to differentiate, during qualitative coding, if the situation being described was related to control or conflict[1]. For example, keeping informers (those entrusted with keeping an eye on workers) on payroll is a standard procedure in many Asian factories. Many times, the favoured workers or informers abuse their power over others, which may lead to conflict. In a certain Manchester Asian factory, there were two so-called supervisors but they were not considered as supervisors by the workers because they did many private services for the owners; for example one of them was their driver but during factory hours he was supposed to watch the machinists. Similar situations were reported by many interviewees. Because the owners or the managers have to rely on the word of the watchman for information about what happens on the shop floor, many, in their efforts to be in the employer's good books, struggle against each other, so that a whole network of rival informers, and a kind of Machiavellian politics emerges, at times leading to inter-personal conflict which can be violent.

Control not related to work

Examples of adequate systems designs whereby authority, responsibility, and accountability are clearly delineated and designated, are not common in Asian businesses. Control should be done through impersonal systems based on management or scientific/statistical principles. In properly designed control systems, the focus of control is on factors that ensure that the right quantity and quality of a product is made. But the focus of attention was found to be on non-work control and personal inspection directed more at the worker than at the product; this could be because of a lack of proper education and training for the managers or supervisors, and was reported by respondents in many forms such as;

"the quality is checked only when the customer returns the goods. There is no designated quality control man" (Manchester).

I have had several formal and informal conversations with Asian employers in the U.K. and counting on my own experience of dealing with industrialists in Pakistan, I feel that the answers I recorded are typical of Asian industrialists (excluding examples of rare large companies where the complicated nature of operations and the presence of well educated

[1]For excerpts from interviews regarding control and related conflict attitudes in Asian firms, see pages 328 to 331.

management may lead to well designed systems of control): There was little explanation in answers to the questions, and, as in the workers' view, the term control was considered synonymous to personal observation. Only one worker interviewee thought there could be some justification for the owners' negative attitude in so far as he had observed at a factory that workers were not well motivated to work and tried to avoid working in the absence of the manager. It maybe argued that negative attitudes exist on both sides and that employers' negative assumptions engender negative behaviour in the workers, or vice versa. But the point is that when personal inspection is the only means of determining worker's efficiency, then in the absence of an inspector, the workers may not work hard, especially when they are not well motivated, and not accountable for the amount of work in some better way, such as some impersonal means of control used in most English firms.

A major distinguishing feature of Asian organizational control when compared to the Western one, was found to be the control over personal activities that are neither related to work nor a hinderance to one's performance at work. Such control was often reported as commonly exercised both from the top and among the workers themselves. A detailed description of non-work control in Muslim organizations has been given earlier (pages 113 to 115, and 304 to 308). About the religious rights of Muslims being observed in English businesses, see the later sections in this chapter. However, similar respect for religious rights of the non-Muslims was not found in most Muslim organizations[2].

Coercive-utilitarian control on new and illegal immigrants[3]

While in the sub-continent, the majority of workers, particularly the unskilled, are treated as an under-class with the least bargaining powers owing to a high supply of labour and a lack of support from the establishment in terms of employment rights, the equivalent of these in Britain are illegal workers, that is, those working without work-permits. As

[2]Ahmadees, for example, if they are hired at all, cannot have prayer facilities in Muslim organizations, and Christians in many Muslim countries are not allowed Christmas holidays unless these coincide with some other holidays. One interview said, "you cannot even have a can of coke at work. If I listen to Ghazals [poems] they criticize; for example, during the month of Ramadan, we cannot listen to poems in which wine is mentioned; they think that listening to poems and drinking are similar" (Oldham).

[3]For detailed case studies and excerpts from interviews, see pages 331 to 335, section titled: 'Typical cases of British Asian coercive control on new immigrants'.

mentioned in the later sections on illegal workers, there are many kinds of illegal employments in Asian industry, so that hiring people without work permits is only one of these. The illegal employees are paid off-books cash-in-hand, and the wages are very low. In many instance, the wages were reported to be just 50p an hour though some of these jobs were in large and very profitable factories; the owners of two of such factories are among the Asian millionaires in Britain.

Working conditions for illegal workers in Britain show that their social status is equivalent to that of an average worker in the sub-continent in that both lend themselves to coercive control as a result of their basic poverty. Instances of new immigrant exploitation in Asian industry show that Asian culture contains some elements that lead to a relationship of control behaviour with the social status of the persons involved. This has a cultural background whereby weaknesses in people are often exploited to derive certain advantages. For example, a house owned by a man of high social position would fetch a far greater price than if the same house was owned by one in lower social position, particularly if the seller was in some kind of difficulty. Another example is the common observation that Asian girls whose parents have a higher social position are more likely to be treated better in the husband's family than those whose parents come from comparatively lower social background. Even within a family or clan, less rich relatives may receive less favourable treatment than that extended to richer relatives; the base of salutary attitude is often not honesty or hard work but one's possessions, with little regard to how these are acquired.

Control related to perceptions of status, and the consequent alienation from the workplace

We have already noted that in the sub-continent, manual/physical trades are culturally perceived as inferior, and this is reflected in the humiliating attitude of business owners and non-manual employees towards manual workers. The treatment of peasants by landowners also reflects the feudal values whereby the peasants are treated so low that they are not allowed to sit on chairs in front of the land lords but must sit on the dusty ground[4]. The

[4]An interviewee asked his peasants to sit on *charpoys* rather than on the dusty ground but his relatives complained that he was pampering them, which would turn them proud, and they would not work hard on the lands. Asians who have lived long enough in Britain to get accustomed to comparatively high social equality among people, often criticize expressions of inherent inequality in the sub-continent, but most seldom bother to reform their own inherent attitudes.

relationship of attitude with the perception of the power of the subject, his social class or group, is one cause of many tensions, inferiorities, conflicts and divisions. In most Asian organizations, several tacit classifications (based on possession of property and means of production, caste and occupation in one's home country) exist and consequently, the tone of address and attitudes differ when the addressee belongs to lower/upper category. People in weaker positions maybe sensitive about their status while those in stronger positions could be aware of the power they have over others and may ignore the weaker's self-esteem. However, a paradox is that it is usually among equi-status persons that friction and coercive control is more observable, probably because they cannot afford antagonism with a higher status person, though this too is not an impossibility (in a Gulf university, I found a female teacher at loggerheads with the head of department but discovered later that her being on very close terms with the dean, was a source of her perception of power over her boss).

The principle of equality in treatment, as described by Fayol in his General and Industrial Management (by doing justice and sympathy to subordinates, we may raise their morale), is not applied in most Asian firms, and this was found to cause much resentment and demoralization among the employees. Inequitable treatment is related to conflict and motivation in that those treated as somehow inferior, may resent the power of those treated better, and may lose motivation to work honestly and diligently. In non-monetary ways of inequitable treatment, there are observable class distinctions maintained which are claimed to be essential to keep 'control over workers'. The extent of worker alienation (a Marxist term) from the workplace was very obvious in that most often, the interviewees in this study could not remember the names of the firms where they had worked for months and years; I see the reasons for not remembering the name of the workplace in the alienation of employees from the workplace and the unpleasant memories associated with it (Freud stated that people tend to repress the memories of unpleasant events). Most Asian employers too, do not see the workers as a part of the organization; when I asked a director of a firm to tell me about their organization structure, he mentioned none other than the three owner brothers.

Control attitudes in English firms

The aforementioned description of the personal and subjective means of control found in Asian organizations, emphasizes the need for work control in manners other than by personal observation, such as by setting reasonable targets for each employee's production,

self-filling in of forms for the quantity produced at the end of the day, raising motivation enough to lead to self-control, etc. Such impersonal means of control are often found in English owned firms: These reportedly include having quality control departments, trained inspectors, a discipline whereby workers are answerable to one foreman and not to many, and clearly defined, easy-to-follow job and duty lists. At times, personal checking is indispensable and is done in English firms as well, but in most English owned businesses, the comparative clarity of procedures and instructions, the general feeling of being trusted and milder control in person (where personal watching is essential) were greatly appreciated by those who have also worked in comparable Asian businesses. The significance of a polite and trusting management attitude in enhancing motivation was a recurring theme in the interviews[5]. One major reason for the interviewees' preference for English managed factories was the unoppressive environment and polite attitude they had found there. Control issues in English firms were not linked by the respondents to conflict situations or potential conflict. In most cases, the English organizations have been successful in avoiding conflict situations related to control issues, by designing impersonal means of control. Even where White and Asian workers work side by side and there is some kind of resentment between the races, conflict does not arise when impersonal means of control are in effect.

Events where one finds a hard attitude in a manager have been reported but these, as the reports show, are either inconclusive on the part of respondent or they clearly mention that they see these as minor problems and not as a cause for conflict[6]. In most Western companies, some channels of protest are open to unhappy workers. For example, they can go to the personnel department, or to a senior manager, something which is not likely to

[5]For excerpts from interviews, see pages 349 to 353, section titled: 'Control attitudes in English firms...'.

[6]One respondent (p. 352, statement 5) found himself and his brother, on occasions, pressed to work quicker in an English large departmental store. But the experiences of the two brothers must be viewed in the context that, being from a prosperous middle class family, one of them studying to become a solicitor, they were not as hard pressed to work as most interviewees in this study, and consequently a bit quick to quit; the events described do not reflect a significant conflict situation, for during Christmas, it is not surprising that the manager of wines and spirits department would be hard pressing his staff. In a small English business, an interviewee (p. 353, statement 6) found the speed of work very fast but then she said she was a new worker, and speed comes with experience. Another interviewee (p. 353, statement 7) reported that in an English firm slow workers could be fired.

happen in most Asian businesses due to the de facto strictly maintained class barriers. About excessive speed of work and the amount of work required of workers in Western businesses, the interviewees expressed mixed feelings. Generally, the speed and amount of work was reported to be reasonable, but occasionally there could be excessively task-oriented managers.

Non-work control has not been reported to exist in English owned businesses. Personal authority was not exercised. Many organizations went to great lengths to provide prayer facilities and time changes to accommodate their Muslim employees. This may have its origins in the culture-bred tolerance of the English compared to many other societies where minorities are not tolerated particularly when they are successful in making wealth or getting higher jobs (e.g. the persecution of Ahmadees in Pakistan).

Summary and contributions of chapter 11 towards the Grounded Theory to be proposed

(1) In most British-Asian organizations, instances of negative assumptions and Theory X type of beliefs are commonly reported to be found in the attitudes of owners, managers, supervisors and among employees themselves. Numerous events were quoted in this respect by nearly all respondents complaining that they are not considered trustworthy and thus too much personal control is exercised by the owners, managers or supervisors. In fact the word 'control' is often understood by employees as meaning 'keeping an eye on the employees' and 'personal watching' so that when asked about control system in their organization, most only tell about the owning family members, partners or managers/supervisors personally watching the workers. Unlike the European way, little attention is paid to the worker's self esteem. There are patterns of personal control existing in Asian business and industry when impersonal means of control could be used. The use of supervisors and selected workers as informers on other's work and non-work related activities breeds tension and resentments; rivals strive to be in the employers' good books and a net work of intrigue and politics may lead to various kind of conflict. Religious and cultural rights of non-Muslims are hardly respected in Muslim-owned and dominated organizations.

(2) Task-oriented attitudes exist in native-British businesses but the nature of task-orientation is not reported as somehow painful by the respondents because, most often, goals and procedures are made clear to the employees. The speed of work is reasonably set compared to Asian businesses. The feeling of trust exists in most cases and self-control is

facilitated by fewer inspections aimed at the work quality and quantity rather than the worker's personal arrangements of time spending. Flexi-time, if available, and better management attitude have been appreciated by many interviewees. The impersonal nature of work organization and control has been reported to ease tensions and resentments and thus avoid potential control-related conflict even among different races. There could be occasional strict management attitudes but the respondents do not see these as major problems or reasons for conflict. Unlike in Asian firms, non-work control and undue exercise of authority is not reported. Religious/cultural rights of people are observed and facilities provided even though it costs time and money to the firm.

A study of Asian and native-British companies working in Britain provides ideal experimental conditions for comparison, because the broader cultural, social, and legal-governmental climate is the same for both. The findings strongly support our thesis that authoritarianism (as indicated by unnecessarily domineering attitude, and direction of control more at the weaker social status people) is learned first in one's family and immediate culture. This supports our general 'culture and personality' approach taken in this work.

The findings shall be taken to our Grounded Theory to show that the structures and de facto functions of the institutions of a culture shape patterns of behaviour shown in that:

- (i) Asian view of control and motivation is more oriented towards Theory X while the native-British view is more oriented towards Theory Y;*

- (ii) the greater incidence of control-related conflict in Asian companies shows that inter-personal conflict is linked to non-work, personal, and authoritarian control;*

- (iii) Asians show less tolerance for one's personal views/needs, life style, ideology and religion than do the native British;*

- (iv) The native British are very particular about equity in treatment of employees while the Asians show differentiated treatment on account of one's socio-economic status;*

- (v) Asian control is related to perceptions of status and power and is consequently alienating while the British control is impersonal, related to task and functions and imparts greater motivation; consequently we again find our recurring theme that,*

- (vi) cultural factors strongly influence, if not determine, people's attitudes towards control, conflict, and motivation.*

Chapter Twelve: A Comparison of Conflict Attitudes in Asian and English Businesses

Many interviewees reported incidents of physical conflict in the Asian organizations where they worked or had worked earlier[1]. Major causes of conflict in Asian factories were reported to be abuse of power and authority over those in weaker positions and over female workers, and religious or cultural divisions. A few instances of physical conflict between owners and workers were reported, and the causes were often found in the use of coercive control by the owners or intrigues by the supervisors who wanted 'to show their worth'. However, direct conflict between employers and workers was not observed as much as conflict among employees of more or less same status. This is in conformity with the findings in the sub-continent where managers were treated with greater deference than that shown for fellow workers/supervisors. Instances of worker's filling the ears of owner's against fellow workers, support the thesis that there are more divisions among workers than are among the higher income groups. In the sub-continent, this may have its origins in the workers' insecurity about their future. This, presumably, is one reason that keeps them tense and may make them turn their frustration against each other. In Britain, however, where basic survival is guaranteed by the welfare system, acrimonious attitudes in the workplace show that class distinctions and oppressive control can frustrate the subject regardless of the presence of basic economic security. If conflict was only between employers and employees, the causes could be more safely related to objective conditions of employment (low wages, no paid holidays, job-insecurity etc.) but, it was found in the interviews that there was more incidence of conflict among workers than between workers and seniors. In search of possible causes of such intra-class conflict, we might refer to the culturally bred dominance-seeking attitudes that are often observable in Asian organizations, particularly in the sub-continent and often in Middle Eastern countries. Dominance seeking attitudes (I have borrowed this term from an interviewee as I found it quite appropriate in describing authoritarian behaviour) were usually described by the interviewees as follows;

"when the boss scolds one, the latter takes it out on others. Its not a respectable environment. Each wants to put his foot on the other; we call it 'dominance seeking' attitudes." (Oldham).

Dominance seeking for the sake of itself is distinguished from functional authority

[1]For statements about inter-personal conflict, see pages 328 to 330 and 340 to 342.

(task required dominance such as for example, in the military) in that first, while the latter is top-down, the former is often as much horizontal as vertical and second, the former is not a task-related necessity but a cultural phenomenon. Thus not only those who are in position of power, but almost everyone may seek dominance if the desire to do so is culturally instilled. Moreover, the subjective, culturally instilled authoritative attitude is often reciprocated and hence dysfunctional in achieving compliance.

Conflict among employees of the same status is shown in Asian organizations, in its most subtle form, in people trying to discourage each other in order to what is known as 'increase one's score' and to show that one is better at knowing and doing one's work than are the others. We noted this kind of competition among managers as well, in the sub-continent. Such competition often takes the shape of discouraging one from showing his abilities and skills in order to keep him from taking higher and more responsible jobs or because one's dexterity may make the others feel insecure of their positions in the organization. Unhealthy competition is shown with more intensity among lower ranks than among senior ranks and hence maybe directly proportional to the sense of job security among rival contenders, or to the ambitious nature of competing personnel. Many illiterate workers particularly deride those among them who have ambitions to get an education and to rise in social status. Illiterate relatives may snub those in the family who want to get an education. In one such case, a number of relatives of an interviewee long settled in Britain, who were making good money through factory work and considered education a waste of time, used to taunt that he had "delusions of grandeur".

Workers may also fight with each other if the control system is not properly designed so that in the event of poor work performance, the person responsible and accountable for the wrongly done work could not be traced. Religious[2], cultural and political differences between workers, supervisors and employers were one reason behind many conflicts. In the sub-continent, such differences coupled with caste, language, clan and regional differences are known well to have lead to many violent clashes and riots (see chapter 5). The same culturally engendered conflicts exist among the immigrants in the U.K. but their intensity is watered down to some extent by certain common interests of the immigrants.

[2]For detailed interviewee narrations see page 340 section titled: "Conflict related to religious divisions..."

In Britain I had interviews and conversations with many Asian employers and there are some common narrations which can safely be pointed at. Asian employers generally view conflict, in keeping with the traditions back home, as trouble-making which needs to be dealt with authoritatively. Conflict is often seen as "workers complaining against each other" (which is not far from reality in view of greater intra-class conflict observed in this study) and the task of conflict-resolution is usually entrusted to supervisors. We may note that the employers' description of conflict-resolution is not different from employees' descriptions:

"if the workers quarrelled amongst themselves the owners would not be interested until it was beyond limits" (Oldham), and ,

"sometimes the bosses call them (those in conflict) into the office but often they try to resolve the conflict at the work station" (Manchester).

Frustrated new immigrants and conflict

Coercive control by the owners/supervisors over illegal workers is one source of conflict. It was reported about many Asian small and medium factories that the largest problem they had was that they had a lot of men who had come to Britain as spouses to Asians holding British nationality; many interviewees reported the frustrations of the new entrants, at being mistreated in the homes of their in-laws and in the workplace, as one cause of conflict[3]. The new immigrants typically, have regular quarrels with their wives because the wives speak English which they cannot understand. They are not entitled to income support for a year, cannot speak English, and know nothing about the society, the offices and other things. If they stay at home, they are bullied by their in-laws where they must live because of total dependency on the latter. They keep searching for jobs but when they get one, they are not even allowed to talk at their workplace and have to work nearly double the hours of an average worker, at wages of just 50p an hour if the usual rate is around £2 per hour, because they are new and, it is said, that, "they know nothing". The owners take advantage of their weaker immigration status in that they call them whenever they need them - even on Sundays. These new-comers know that if they do not obey, they would rot as jobless people with absolutely no source of income. Quite often, the older immigrants tell the new immigrants, who do not know much about Britain, discouraging stories about the White people, in order to enjoy the consequent demoralization in the latter, to make them

[3]For interviewee statements, see pages 331 to 335 section titled: 'Typical cases of British Asian coercive control... Frustrated new immigrants and inter-personal conflict'.

dependent and tied to the former, and hence more vulnerable to exploitation. For example, a new immigrant, a young man who refused to sweep the factory floor, but later realized his mistake and tried to sweep, was made fun of for his volta face (not standing by one's beliefs is seen as a sign of weakness, and the one who changes himself is often derided as 'not a real man'). He was derided by fellow Asian workers and made to feel so embarrassed that he felt he could not stay on his job. A White supervisor who said to him, "I will cut your throat", was certainly not serious because, as narrated by the interviewee, when he went outside, the said supervisor came after him and gave him another task, but the older Asian workers instilled fear in him by telling him, "he has stabbed someone before" (had he done so, he would not be in the job). One can see here the typical enjoyment which many draw by frightening those new comers who think rather high of themselves. Because the interviewee had recently come to Britain and knew nothing about the White people, when fear was instilled in him by the senior Asian workers, he took it seriously.

Lesser challenge from traditional female workers in Asian factories

Asian employers in the U.K. usually prefer female workers to male workers, where the nature of the tasks will allow, (there were many times more female workers than male, in all Asian textile-related organizations reported about in these interviews) perhaps because female workers are less likely to question and develop a state of confrontation with the employers or amongst themselves, and are therefore comparatively easy to deal with. A female worker explained:

'because the employer was a man, the female workers couldn't exactly go up and say, "look, I am fed up, you don't pay me enough, and I am having to work harder"; so they would go to the wife and complain to her, but she would just say, "yes, yes, yes", or if she wasn't in a very good mood, she would say, "well, that's it, go and get job at another place". The women never thought of taking a collective action like going to some government office - or finding a government regulation about work conditions because, I suspect that, first, they didn't know, and, second, it was beyond their imagination that they could do such a thing - collect together and demand. It was out of the world' (Leicester).

Most Asian women are brought up in a social environment where it is difficult for them to question a male. As they expect a male to have a greater say and authority in matters, they tend to take and accept much more controlling behavior from a man than a man would take. In the above mentioned example of the female workers complaining to the wife because they couldn't complain to the man, the wife too, being a female, couldn't possibly

talk about this to her husband, for this could be considered as moving beyond her station. Perhaps she too wanted her husband to make more profits for the family, and so, while she avoided the complaining women at times, she felt piqued at why the said women did not realize her incapacity in influencing her husband.

Conflict related to sexual harassment

Four out of ten respondents whose interviews were recorded in 1991-92 reported instances of sexual harassment leading to conflict situation in some Asian organizations[4]. In the interviews recorded in 1994, the respondents were all male, and the questions about sexual harassment were not asked but one interviewee mentioned such an incidence of his own accord. It must be pointed out that sexual harassment is a Western term and the meanings it conveys are not a true measure of the gravity of discrimination and exploitation on sexual basis that is rampant in the sub-continent and in the Middle East, not particularly in the workplace. The difference lies in that while women in the West live with the assurance that in case of harassment or discrimination, the social and legal system (media, courts, police etc.) would help them, women in most Muslim countries must bear with the fact that the social system would protect them only if they stay within the pales of the rigid family system and within the instructions of their male kin. In particular, women from the lower classes, who are forced by the necessity of circumstances (death of husband, abandonment, or poverty etc.) to step outside the boundaries of the household, and go to work, often live under threats of rape and abuse because the common view about women held in most Muslim societies, is that they should not step outside their domestic duties and child rearing, and that a woman who does step out is perceived by many as of a promiscuous predisposition; thus many keep an eye on such hard pressed women to take advantage of their situational weaknesses. Numerous events of sexual black-mail are reported by working women's associations in the sub-continent, who demand change of attitudes.

A deeper analysis here is beyond the scope of this work, but it maybe mentioned that segregation in most Muslim countries begins at the age of six or seven. Thus, boys and girls grow in an environment where elders keep a vigil on them to ensure separation between the

[4]For detailed interviewee statements, see page 340, section titled: 'Inter-personal conflict related to sexual harassment'.

two sexes. Because of the preemptive enforcement of segregation, and the penalties imposed upon violation, especially upon girls, most boys grow up with an image of girls primarily as sex objects while most girls grow with an image of men as fearsome and commanding. Because no relationship other than familial is allowed, the negative assumption that when non-related men and women meet, it would always lead to them having sex, sinks in the minds (this is shown in the Islamic aphorism, '*when a non-related man and woman meet, the third present at the occasion is the devil*'): The whole practice is dysfunctional in that the consciousness in this respect develops all in sexist terms with such an intensity that a relationship between man and woman is perceived either in familial or in libidinal context; there is no third ground; a woman cannot be a colleague, a class-fellow, or a friend.

The cultural nature of sexual harassment is shown in that the source of sexual harassment in Asian owned factories could be from any social class, not particularly from the owners though their positions enable them to have greater power over female workers. Having a lowly view of women and seeing them as objects of sex, pervades the lower classes as much as the upper though there is more opportunity in the upper classes to grow out of it. But the social power of upper class males over lower class females is known to be a major cause of sexual exploitation in the sub-continent and in most Muslim countries. One would expect a marked change of behaviour among Asians in Britain but, as the interviewees report, there is little difference from the behaviour back home, except for some of the younger generation who are conscious of the need for social progress.

The important thing to note here is that when men in senior positions try to take advantage of subordinate women from a lower social background, the owners or others in authority, unlike what is expected in an English or Western environment, do not usually take action against the men; this was seen in many reported events: In one incident, the husband of a harassed girl was handed over to the police because he came to the factory and fought with the supervisor who had harassed his wife. No action however was taken against the supervisor. In yet another factory, it was alleged by many girls that a collusion existed between the owner and the supervisor who both sought vulnerable female workers. One old woman did not let me record her statement except for the following: "I have cut my tongue, there is so much corruption, any talk of honesty gets you nowhere" ('cutting one's tongue' is an idiom in Punjabi, which means, "I am no longer talking because I am too afraid"; another idiom which refers to outside pressure leading to silence is, "his tongue has been

cut"). Apparently, the said interviewee got afraid at my questions and refused to carry on. I then turned the tape recorder off and then, in passing, she told me about the incidence of sexual harassment of a certain female worker, and then left in a hurry. A more detailed account in this respect was provided by another interviewee who, having been brought up in Britain, was not shy and fearful.

Marriage in countries where the rights of women are culturally limited, and where economic and other power-bestowing means are concentrated in men's hands, has not succeeded in limiting many men, who come across opportunities, to their spouses. In many cases, marriage can be the best cover for a sexually exploitative man because his wife, for fear of divorce and the consequent social stigmatization inflicted upon a divorced women, may find it wiser to ignore her husband's flirtations as many examples show. What in the West is known as infidelity is often sanctioned for men under one or the other pretext in Muslims countries and in the sub-continent. Instances of abuse of female workers and children in the sub-continent, Gulf, and Middle East are widely reported on.

Asian workers and conflict in English-owned firms

Non-work conflict was not reported to occur in Western businesses. With the English managers, many said, minor disputes about work arrangement, design and targets of production, machine lay-out arrangements, etc. do arise but such disputes are not serious and almost always end up in a compromise. In most Western medium/large businesses there are formal procedures and channels available if there is a conflict situation, and complaints are not left without enquiry, but such a practice is largely absent in comparable Asian businesses. However, there have been conflicts related to union activities and strikes by Asian workers against the management, always reported to be for wage increases. Many White managers, realizing the difficulties in communicating with Asians, hand-over charge of Asian affairs to Asian supervisors, but this often leads to an Asian sub-organization within a White one, and many commonplace elements of the Asian culture (mischief for competition, intolerance, nepotism, authoritarianism and ethnic/cultural conflict) spring up[5].

Many interviewees noted the differences between the behaviour of English and Asian

[5]Note the similarity here to the events, quoted in chapter 9, in the German and British multinationals, where top management tasks were handed over to Pakistani managers and this lead to the creeping of some local cultural elements in the said multinationals.

workers, as being that Asian workers do not collectively stand up to authority but try to show, individually and secretly, to the authorities, that they are better than the rest. It was often reported that Asians individually betray their collectively taken decisions[6].

In an American factory in Britain, it was found that there were strong cultural elements in why the team-leader method of work organization caused a lot of resentment, and yet could not even be abandoned. The case study reveals that Asians build certain bonds and divisions among people that often render them unable to solve problems as would be solved relatively simply and easily among Europeans. In the said factory, the creation of a seemingly unnecessary level of 'team-leaders'[7] in between the levels of machine operators and setters/supervisors led to resentment and tensions among the Asian operators. The White operators did not express any such resentment: The elevation of some operators to team leaders, and giving the latter 50p an hour more than the others, was taken by the White operators in a different spirit. Besides, the attitude of the White team leaders among White operators was different, but, as the descriptions reveal, the attitude of the Asian team leaders, after having acquired their newly 'elevated status', became authoritarian and rather indifferent to the state of their fellow Asian operators. We may recall the cases from sub-continent factories where authoritarianism was a major issue in control and conflict: The behaviour of Asian team leaders in the said American factory was not different but limited only to the extent that the authority to hire and fire, determination of wages, and granting promotions, was not in their hands. A newly recruited operator was persuaded by the other operators to take the issue to the White production manager, who called a meeting of all Asian workers. The said workers, to the amazement of the one whom they themselves had persuaded to take up the issue, "took a U-turn", and said that they had absolutely no

[6]For events of Asian workers in conflict in British firms, see pages 354 to 362, sections titled: 'Tensions among...'; and 'Asian workers attitudes towards unions in native British firms'. Also see chapter 15.

[7]The method of work organization in teams and team leaders has been reported to work well in high-tech manufacturing and research organizations where the team members have a chance to learn from the expertise of the team leader, and where the team leader can allocate work in accordance with the varying skills and aptitudes of the members, and coordinate their activities. However, the said method does not suit organization where the nature of tasks is simple, repetitive, and uniform, where the workers feel better off by having equal ranks and levels, and a work distribution that is equal and fair among all, so that the need for team leaders does not arise.

problem: It was later discovered that the operators and the team leaders were either relatives or friends, and therefore, while the new-comer was secretly persuaded to take up the issue, the operators did not expect that the production manager would call them to a meeting. Once in a meeting, the Asian operators could not offend their relative or friend team leaders.

Summary and contributions of chapter 12 towards the Grounded Theory to be proposed

(1) Inter-personal physical conflict is not common but reported more in Asian-British businesses than in the native-British. The reasons were found in personal control, abuse of powers, personality clash among rivals seeking employers' favours, organizational politics and intrigue, lower motivation resulting in greater tension, religious/regional differences and class-based attitudes. There is greater occurrence of intra-level than inter-level conflict.

(2) Sexual harassment is a greater problem in Asian organizations than in the Western because the assumptions behind segregation make many men see women in sexist terms while many women grow fearful of men and thus more vulnerable to control and harassment. Conflict due to sexual harassment may sometimes lead to violence between the relatives of the harassed women and the perpetrator of such harassment.

(3) There are seldom any formal conflict resolution procedures in Asian organizations and most issues are dealt with on ad-hoc and individual basis. Persons of greater value to the owners may not be investigated against when events of injustice occur and hence circumstances may lead to oppression of the weaker by those in higher hierarchical positions. The cultural element of ignoring the conflict or repressing it with authority plays a key role in the Asian way of conflict resolution. Examples of dismissal of workers on spot have been reported and the word of a favored supervisor is normally considered weightier than that of a worker. Even when the charges against a favoured man were as grave as sexual exploitation, little action was taken. Female workers are less likely to enter into conflict.

(4) In most native-British medium/large companies, there are formal procedures and channels available for conflict resolution and issues are not let go without proper inquiry.

(5) Non-work conflict was not reported in native-British businesses. With the 'White' managers, minor disputes about work arrangement, machine lay-out and design, and targets of production do arise but these are not serious and often result in a compromise.

(6) However, greater collective action was taken by Asian workers in native-British companies

than in British Asian, almost always on demand of wage increases though wages (as reported in the following chapter) in native-British companies are many times higher than in Asian. (7) Strikes and collective protest action by Asian workers in native-British companies have almost always been ineffective because of the following reasons; (i) individual betrayal (to seek self-advantage from the management) of collectively taken decisions; (ii) a social bonding and division pattern that makes it difficult for Asians to solve problems as would be relatively easily solved among the Europeans; (iii) individualist status and money orientation that renders equi-status Asians unable to generate cohesiveness in group.

Finding (6) suggests that greater expectations are a greater stimulant to protest action than are bad working conditions. The findings such as that conflict is generally repressed in Asian firms but sought resolution in the native-British, shall be taken to our Grounded Theory to show that,

(i) culturally engendered propensity to conflict does exist and therefore, British-Asians show many divisions found in home countries (mentioned in chapter 5);

(ii) the greater incidence of control-related conflict in Asian companies shows that inter-personal conflict is linked to non-work, personal, and authoritarian control;

(iii) segregation of sexes often produces sexism which leads to greater control and harassment of women in workplace; and,

(iv) greater individualism and a particular social bonding/divisions pattern renders collective action by Asian's ineffective.

The findings shall be used in chapter 16 to suggest ways of transforming a conflict prone cognitive culture and to suggest that the structure and functions of the institutions of a culture determine patterns of control and conflict.

Chapter Thirteen: A Comparison of Motivation and Working Conditions in British-Asian and Native British Businesses

(a) The reasons for higher turnover in Asian firms

In businesses which do not require skilled or highly trained workers, where training new workers does not take long, and where new workers are relatively easily available, high turnover is profitable to the employer in many ways. First, he does not have to bother about designing an elaborate system of recruitment, selection, evaluation, remuneration, increments and promotions etc. which is essential when long term employees are to be kept. Second, he can save on wages by hiring trainees at apprentice wages who, by the time they might expect to get a reasonable salary, may already be preparing to leave. It was commonly reported that leaving a job after a few months if not weeks is a common experience for most workers in Asian businesses, and more rarely in English businesses[see endnote 1].

Schedule of Comparison

Average Duration in the 12 small Asian firms in the study: 5.67 months

Average Duration in the 9 medium/large Asian firms: 17 months

Net average for the 21 Asian firms in this study: 10.52 months

Average Duration in the 7 small English firms in this study: 20.14 months

Average Duration in the 31 medium/large English firms: 46.06 months

Net Average for the 38 English firms in this study: 41.29 months

Difference in Turnover between English and Asian firms: 30.77 months

To do justice in determining causes of high turnover there is a need to take into account reasons other than bad working conditions. There could be reasons such as one's personal propensity to keep changing one's workplace. However, because the subjects in this study were selected at random, if the reasons for quitting or dismissal were employee-related and not organization-related, the bias arising out of this, in all probability, would be equal for Asian and English firms, and hence, would not bear negatively on the validity of the conclusions drawn. Though the data is limited and the analysis does not take into account all considerations such as factory closure and factory translocation, these factors were there mostly in the case of English businesses and so the bias, if any, only favours the Asian firms figures and therefore has no bearing on the conclusion drawn that turnover is higher in Asian

firms. Therefore, the data does serve well in imparting a fair idea that Asian organizations in particular, and some English organizations as well, are not keen on long-term employees. Unskilled workers quitting jobs mainly because of an employer's rough attitude is also common. Although numerous instances were reported to this effect, such resignations do not seem to bother the employers because of the easy availability of unskilled workers. While most Asian workers blamed exploitation by Asian owners as reasons for quitting jobs too soon, many employers attributed the causes of high turnover to workers' higher ideals. While many employers reported that a shortage of skilled workers makes them keep in touch with the job centers, the career offices, and the YTS, many new workers reported that they had to leave a certain job after a few days because the employers were not willing to train them, or because the experienced workers there made fun of their inexperience. Although, in many factories, it was reported, there was room for extra workers and there were facilities for training (the government departments were cooperative and sent school leavers on YTS schemes), most employers said that the YTS scheme is not very effective because the majority of young apprentices leave without completing their training. Most employers deny that the apprentices face any particular problems, but, they say, the school leavers have high ideals and do not want to be operators or machinists; most go back to the YTS to get jobs where they could be better adjusted.

Most Asian employers state that they have no long-term agreements with any employees, and that even their regular employees do not stay longer than an average of two years. This is also supported by the data quoted above. In quoting reasons for not keeping long-term employees, the Asian employers often state that the government and the labour laws do not require them to keep long-term employees. And furthermore, particularly in the textile industry, they usually employ Asian girls many of whom want to leave after they get married, want to go to their home countries after about two years, or become pregnant and want to give up work. Very few resume work after their maternity leave. Regarding the implementation of some motivation techniques to make people stay longer, almost all employers were pessimistic, and claimed that it was the will of the workers that they got fed up after working for a while, looked for other jobs, and that even an increase in wages would not help. However, contrary to the pessimism expressed by Asian employers, most workers do stay when wages and working conditions are good, particularly in English businesses. Where workers do stay longer, the reasons most often reported were, increments in wages,

job enlargement or enrichment, good relations with fellow workers, and polite behaviour. Flexi-time also was appreciated by many workers as a motivating factor. In many jobs where even though most work rights (paid holidays and overtime extra rate) were not available, flexi-time and polite employer behaviour kept the interviewees in their jobs. Even where the money earned was low, a kinder attitude, some freedom, especially that to talk to fellow workers, was widely appreciated as enhancing motivation.

Most Asian companies, even large businesses, do not show enthusiasm for training workers. Many Asian organizations are reported to either ignore or provide little training, most often, on-the-job very short-period training. In most job advertisements, a minimum experience of two years is mentioned as required, hence of little encouragement to the beginner. However, in many large English firms, government schemes such as Industrial Training Boards and YTS, have been a major stimulant in providing training to workers, despite many managers being reportedly not keen to release men to go for training, because of having to hire a replacement, or pay overtime, which increases the costs of operations. Where the companies can reclaim the cost of training from the government, some 'fiddling with figures' was reported in the case of a few companies.

(b) Inequity in remuneration

In most Asian firms, wage and overtime payment is done on an ad-hoc basis in so far as each worker is assessed, subjectively, for what he/she is worth and what would be the least he/she would be willing to work for. Negotiations, carried out at an individual level, result in uneven wages for people on similar jobs, and, in much under-payment compared to what the law suggests, or what English firms would pay in a similar situation. The incidence of considerable inequity in wages, among Asian firms, was often reported by the interviewees[1]. Many Asian employees express resentment at unequal wages and spend considerable time in finding out how much the others get. In many factories, the curiosity to find how much the others get leads to squabbles, which is not different from the situation in the sub-continent/Middle East. Annual increments at a certain Arab-Asian bank were the preoccupation of nearly all employees for weeks after the increments had been granted.

[1]For interviewee statements, see pages 335 -336, section titled: 'Low wages in Asian businesses....'.

Although the relationship of rewards to one's socio-economic status is also observable in the Western societies, such a situation is not as pervasive as to include persons on similar jobs within one organization. Among the several prerogatives of a properly designed organizational structure are equitable treatment for all participants, at least comparable pay scales between slightly different levels of hierarchy, and the same pay for persons on similar jobs in terms of the amount of work done, the level of qualification and skills required, and the level of difficulty of the task. Determining how much one should get is, in theory, related to the amount of effort put in and the level of education and skills required. There is a basic Western business principle that those on the same jobs, at least in one firm, should get the same pay for an equal amount of work done. When Asian immigrants came to Britain in the fifties and sixties, British employers could have hired them at a fraction of what they were paying to White workers (as is customary in the Middle East for immigrant workers, and in the sub-continent for workers from poorer regions) but they paid them as much as they paid to their White workers. However, the same justice is not seen in most other societies where remuneration is related to one's social and economic status. In the Arabian Gulf countries, on average, around 25% extra payment is made to the natives who have the same official capacity and tasks as foreigners have. Further divisions exist in that Egyptians, Filipinos, and South East Asians are paid much less than Europeans/Americans on equi-level or same jobs.

(c) Lower wages in Asian firms

In cases where there is a regular and uniform system of wage payment, it often does not take into account the remuneration legislation which is probably not in force. Out of 18 Asian firms[see endnote 2] about which information was obtained, none was found to comply with minimum wage legislation, and only 3 paid as high wages as £2.5 an hour. Only 3 out of 23 firms paid overtime rate for more than 40 hours work. None paid double rate for Sundays, and only 2 allowed paid vacations. The sick pay was generally left to the DSS. For legally employed workers, the average wages come to only £1.69/hour. Out of 23 Asian businesses, 17 were reported to employ a certain number of illegal and off-books workers at wage rates between 50p to £1/hour.

(d) Wages in comparable English firms

Contrary to the above mentioned conditions in Asian firms, the regular practice in

most English businesses is much closer to legal prescription[2]. Out of 27 English businesses about which information was obtained, only 4 paid wages less than £2.50/hour. Only in 3 English firms was the wage rate as low as in the Asian firms, and in only two firms wages were given off-books. 28 out of 32 firms paid overtime (1.5% and above) for more than 40 hours a week work, and even among the least paying firms, over-time was paid. Most firms allow 15 days paid leave at Christmas, plus one month paid leave a year, one and a quarter rate for overtime on working days, one and a half rate for Saturdays, and double rate for Sundays. The average wage for English firms in this study came to £3.69/hour, which is £2/hour higher than that for the Asian firms.

Schedule of Comparison

	<u>Asian</u>	<u>English</u>
Average wage per hour	£1.69/hour	£3.69/hour
Overtime above 40 hour week	3 out of 23	28 out of 32
Sunday double rate	none	28 out of 32
Paid vacation (1 month)	2 out of 23	32 out of 34
Off-books employment	17 out of 23	2 out of 42
Off-books wages	50p-£1/hour	£1.75/hour

With such working conditions as mentioned, it is little wonder that many Asian entrepreneurs are now among the millionaires in Britain, while amongst the workers, there is low motivation and high turnover.

Socio-cultural reasons for lower wages and poorer working conditions in Asian businesses

All interviewees said that, typically, wages in Asian firms were very low compared to those in English firms. One way to keep the wages very low is to employ more women and illegal workers, because Asian women have been reported as less likely to question, and illegal workers, by the very nature of their legal status, cannot complain about whatever they get. Sometimes even children are employed, as was confirmed about at least one factory in Bradford. Most respondents reported greater employment of women than of men because of

[2]For interviewee statements, see pages 353-354 section titled 'Better wages and working conditions in English firms'.

lower wages being more acceptable to Asian women.

Contrary to the feelings of workers in Asian firms, those in English firms seem relatively satisfied with regular wages; most often, there is a rate-system for overtime, Saturday and Sunday work. Unfair deductions were not reported about English owned businesses. In non-monetary terms, friendly gestures such as a polite and welcoming attitude, Christmas hampers, and many small things (for example, payment of taxi fare if your car breaks down), mark a difference between the Asian and the Western attitude.

There are many common observations related to the socio-cultural learning of the people of the sub-continent, and several other countries, that explain quibbles over pennies in markets, in the workplace, and wherever a transaction takes place between people, not only among the lower classes. If haggling was done only by the poor, the reasons could be attributed to their economic insecurity, but often, rich people quarrel over pennies with the poor and adopt a demeaning attitude which I had thought would dissipate in the comparatively secure environment of the British welfare state, but it seems that cultural patterns, learned in early life, do not disappear for at least one or two generations, even with a change in social environment.

In Pakistan, as a bank's credit officer, I was once inspecting the imported stocks of a steel rerolling mills pledged against a working capital loan. It was six o' clock in the evening and the workers had just finished a twelve hour long shift of hard work in the moulding shop. The owner of the factory, a very rich man, said to his cashier, "where are those bundles of notes we were going to change at the bank? Bring them here and pay the wages from them". When the cashier brought the notes, I could see that the notes were badly worn and would not be acceptable to any but the State Bank to be exchanged for new ones. The owner began paying the wages from those notes. The first worker refused to take them, the second refused, and soon there was a regular brawl brewing up. I said to the owner that he could easily get the notes changed at the State Bank, but the illiterate workers would have to spend a whole day walking on foot, in the scorching heat, to find where the State Bank was. The owner gave a smile of amazement because it was unexpected of a middle class bank officer to 'take sides with the workers against a rich factory owner'; such issues are not usually discussed in objective, problem-solving terms, but viewed in subjective, status-related terms. After a hot brawl that lasted an hour, he managed to force the rotten notes on the workers.

Other than the enjoyment which many high status people in the sub-continent receive from such power realizing games as mentioned above, the culture of the sub-continent conditions people in such a way that they indulge in a frustrating scrutiny, even where petty amounts of money are involved, depending again, on the lower social status of the person being paid, and many defend such an attitude on the basis of the 'principle of exactitude'. A friend of mine who had done his L.L.M, and MBA in investment banking at Harvard and is serving in a reputable law firm in New York, came on a short visit to see me. We went home by taxi, and when I had paid the fare and was about to enter the house, he asked me to stop and began haggling over the fare for an amount equal to ten U.S. cents. His haggling exasperated me so much that I left him and went inside. I couldn't understand why such a busy affluent man would haggle for ten cents. But then I realized that he had spent his childhood working in his father's retail store and had acquired this habit of petty haggling which he couldn't rid himself of, despite his education at Harvard. He came inside with the two rupees that he had managed to extract from the poor taxi driver, waved them proudly in front of my nose, and said, "you know why you could never become rich? you are not exact in principles!". In many such observable cases, the stress is laid on the 'principle of exactitude', but the effects are usually on gathering pennies from the poor to make a pound for oneself. The brutalization which such demeaning attitude causes, is seldom taken into account. Generosity is frequently directed towards those, however undeserving, from whom a future benefit is expected.

In short, there are no Christmas hampers for workers in Asian firms, and despite there being no fair wage rate system, to add pennies to their profits, many Asian employers go to the extent of deducting, from already low wages, for such things as a piece of cloth which gets unwittingly damaged during work. In some factories, there is even a 'rate system for deductions from wages'. We may note here that in cost accounting procedures, the cost of waste is usually added on to the cost of the product, and therefore the customers pay for the waste, if any. And, because the price of a certain product in Britain would be the same whether it was made in an Asian firm or in an English firm, the Asian employers seem to be getting doubly paid for the wastage; on the one hand the customers pay for it, and on the other hand, deductions are made from workers' wages as well. Note that proper accounting is rare in Asian businesses; many interviewees reported that they were not paid for completed work, or their sick pay or other dues.

For a typical situation of working conditions in Asian restaurants, see pages 331-332, section titled: 'Typical cases of British-Asian coercive control on new immigrants' (12 to 14 hours a day work, six days a week, with no holidays). A comparison may be made with working conditions in the Western equivalent of Asian restaurants, that is, fast food outlets: First, employment in fast food outlets is a legal employment. The wages at around £4 an hour are almost three times those in Asian restaurants. The minimum working hours are eight a day for five days a week, but one may work more in order to get more money. The fast food workers can take paid holidays for at least two weeks in an year, and the jobs are permanent and pensionable.

While one reason for the comparatively better attitude of Western employers may be seen in the possible effects of a better upbringing and ethics, we may also note that better wages and treatment make economic sense in that they raise the purchasing ability and confidence of the working class majority which is one major prerequisite for industrial development. But this spiral of prosperity is impaired in the sub-continent by the miserly behaviour of most employers despite their capacity to treat better. The sub-continent attitude has, demonstrably, been preserved until now in most British Asian organizations. The concept of charity is either vague in the religions of the sub-continent or not paid much attention to. It is insignificant in the face of the more dominant cultural symbols of power and authority obtained through money hoarding. Such money is not however often invested for the benefit of the nation and is, commonly, wasted on ostentatious, jealousy generating occasions, over-eating and ultra-luxurious living for oneself or one's close family. Even life-time servants and relatives are often ignored.

Though we could gather mass of data about differences in wages and working conditions in Asian and British firms, most Asian employers said that there was no difference in wages or in working conditions between Asian and English factories. Where it was agreed that wages were low, the employers reasoned that it was because of their low profit margins. The issue of 'how much wages?' is a widespread source of conflict among employers and employees in the sub-continent, but in the Asian owned businesses in Britain it seems subdued. However, I found many traces of traditional cultural attitudes brought by Asians from their home countries. I shall try to summarize here not only my discussions with the employers and employees on the issue of determination of wages, both in Pakistan and Britain, but also reflect upon the possible causes of why and how the issue is kept from

expression except for frequent grudging remarks made by the two groups, usually behind each other's back, and occasionally in front of each other, particularly when the employee is certain that he has little to lose. The common argument in favour of low wages (employees' term) or 'just the right wages' (employers' term) by the employers is the common theme of market based wages, add to it the usual cultural pretensions of getting low profits, and divine providence being the final decision maker as to what each should get. It is not uncommon in the sub-continent, and among Muslims in general, to evade an unpleasant argument by attributing the causes of their actions to divine wisdom that makes all people but pawns working under a divine plan. Thus, any discussion which could result in some kind of compromise, is forbidden. The use of 'divinity' is not usually challenged by the aggrieved unless he himself possesses enough wit to mould the 'divinity' in his favour. Similarly, it is traditional among Muslims that the man of means has always been regarded as a better interpreter and defender of divinity than the one who is economically dependent on the former. Many sayings attributed to prophet Mohammed, for example, "*the hand that gives is worthier than the hand that takes*" (see Imam Bukhari's collection of the sayings of the prophet), as well as other learned habits form the basis of this traditional attitude. Other cultural attitudes of relevance here include the concept of 'exactitude' which is not always strictly followed. For example, if it serves the transient perceived purposes of a contender, he may seek to justify his arguments by exaggerating or undermining the figures involved, and derive a degree of self-satisfaction from having 'won the argument'. To be defeated in an argument is too hard to bear and the long term consequences of cheating are too intangible to be of much value. Thus many employers would not hesitate from pretending that their profits are too low to raise wages, and many employees would pretend that 'they are being paid well' to in fact hide their financial problems where 'it is a matter of honour to save face' and 'poverty is a curse' which must be hidden. Apart from cultural complexities, there are other material reasons for many Asian employees in Britain keeping their concern over wages from surfacing as an out-right conflict. As described in the following sections, many employees receive social security benefits (to which they are unentitled) as well as wages. It was found in the interviews that these employees were willing to work for a pound an hour because, in return, their employers had agreed not to inform the DSS and the Inland Revenue offices of their being in employment.

Other than the violation of ethical/legal aspects that oils the business machine in a

large number of cases, many employees argue that the market rate argument is not always valid. For example, faced with the employers' argument that if wages are low in one factory or industry, and high in another, then workers would move from one to the other and thus force the low payer to raise wages, many employees conferred that this is not possible for many reasons one of which is that the market rate cannot remain the same even within an industry because the high payer soon gets the number of workers he needs and the rest have to work at lower wages. The animosity caused by some getting more than others in similar work and hours, keeps them from joint action.

(e)Low wages and corruption: Let the state foot the bill[3]

In circumstances where the vast majority of citizens is law abider and honest, a social security system may help in raising wage rates above the basic minimum income support level which the DSS determines for the unemployed; it also enables the workers to demand better treatment at work, or to develop their social and economic situation further, as workers who consider themselves exploited can give up their jobs without facing starvation, and put pressure on exploitative employers. In the Asian countries discussed in this work, there is no welfare safety net for workers, and they are thus bound to work even if the reward be only a meal in return for a day's work. In Britain, workers have the option to fall back on the safety net, and withdraw from exploitative work. However it was found that the social security system is open to gross abuse. Among various illegal employment practice in the U.K. apart from the employment of illegal immigrants, there exists an even more horrendous situation whereby workers of British nationality and many political asylum seekers, work off-books and, at the same time, claim welfare benefits from the state. This situation is relevant to this study because it shows how low wages become acceptable to employees when both employers and employees collude to take part of their incomes from the state. Employees who work off-books at low wages, take a large part of their income (mortgage payments included) from the state, by claiming that they are unemployed or underemployed, and the employers benefit from the arrangement by saving on wages, NI contributions and tax deductions which would have to be paid if all workers' records were

[3]For interviewee statements regarding off-the-books work, see pages 336 to 340, section titled: 'Off-the-books employment...'.

kept properly. Many interviewees reasoned that they were working off-books, and claiming social security at the same time, because their wages were too low, that they had mortgages to pay, and that living expenses were high. Off-books work was reported by nine out of ten interviewees who work, or have worked, for Asian businesses in London, Slough, Oldham, Bradford, Leicester, Manchester, Coventry, and Huddersfield. Considering that the interviewees were selected at random, one may estimate the extent of this kind of corruption. It was reported that many small business owners, let alone large business owners, were able to live in luxury and run expensive cars because their business was conducted largely off-books. As regards some small businesses it may however in fact be true that they cannot break-even if they work honestly. The widespread use of off-books employment may be guessed at from the statement of an interviewee who spent seven years looking for legal employment but found none among British Asians - until he got a job in an American factory in the U.K. Note also that the said interviewee had worked as a manager in three large Asian businesses, which shows that even managers may be hired to work off-books.

An illiterate worker was told that her tax and NI contributions were duly deducted, but it turned out later that no proper records had been kept. Being illiterate, she didn't understand employment legislation. The reasons for her employers not giving a P45, and filling in the wrong dates in the sick pay form, could be that her records as an employee were not properly kept, and when she kept pressing hard for the P45, her employers did somehow manage to give it to her. Regarding the question of her sick note, efforts were made to dissuade her; she was intimidated to drop claims to sick pay and not to ask for a P45, because giving these would mean that her employers would have to regularize her employment record and this could mean a back-dated payment of NI contributions and taxes for the period she had worked. But there is another side to this situation: I came to know later that some Asian doctors in various areas colluded with some in giving sick and disability notes, thus bringing about the misappropriation of various disability allowances: For example, during my two months of voluntary advisory service at High Fields Community Centre in Leicester, I found three healthy persons who had managed to be on permanent disability allowance of £400 a month.

When interviewees told me about ex-VAT, unregistered and off-the-record businesses and several other forms of rampant illegalities, I was not surprised because, during my said voluntary advisory service, I came across many men who had been in full-time jobs for years

and yet managed to live in council houses and keep their wives and children on welfare benefits, at times by having fake divorce certificates issued from the local mosques. In Islam, a man can divorce his wife simply by going to the local mullah and giving a statement that he has divorced his wife; all he is supposed to do is utter the statement three times and sign an affidavit to the same effect.

Some interviewees reported that off-books employment status wields considerable powers to the employers, including the power to 'dock' due wages. If wages are not paid, the worker has no recourse to law because no records of his being in employment exist. According to the DSS means-tested benefits rules, working for more than 15 hours a week terminates the entitlement to single parent allowance. Many women were reported to work off-books for more than 15 hours a week and this had enabled one factory owner to make them work at £5 a day. Otherwise, he said, he would divulge their off-books status to the DSS. The working women were afraid of him and continued to work at £5 a day believing that should they report the employer to the authorities, they would be the bigger losers because they had themselves told the DSS that they were not working, or working for less than 15 hours a week. The cultural perception of working class people from the sub-continent, that the law and the police always support the employer, the powerful, had been projected on the British social situation through ignorance.

Even grants for religious causes have been misappropriated in many British towns. Although there is much religious activity among the Asians, the emphasis of religion is on rituals, checks on sexual behaviour, fasting etc., whilst embezzlement is tacitly encouraged. Hence, many who want to misappropriate state funds, strive hard to become members of mosque committees. Such struggles have often led to conflict between rival groups each seeking to take control of the mosque committee for personal gain. For example, see the oft-reported events of clashes between rival mosque committee control seekers in Luton. The manifest reasons for such conflict are attributed to sectarian differences, but there are often latent economic interests behind the religious facade.

A General Review of the Asian Wage Management Practice

In order to describe what has lead Asian workers to work at very low wages, we shall look at the historical trends in wage management practice which Asian entrepreneurs have established where they could, in Britain, and in the Middle East.

In early sixties, when Asian workers came to work in Britain, they were paid as much as an Englishman in the same position would get, but because of currency exchange rates, Asian workers could purchase significantly more in their home countries for whatever they saved in Britain (or in the Middle East). Thus they lived extremely frugal in the country of work (for example, 15 men living in one house and sleeping in shifts) to get their millions in their home countries after having worked for between a decade or two. As regards the Arabs, most had acquired their wealth suddenly, directly or indirectly from oil, in a relatively short period of time and didn't know the 'going rate' for workers and staff in the sub-continent and other developing labour-source countries. Consequently, in the early years of their riches, the Arabs hired workers and other personnel at salaries even higher than those in the West.

When entrepreneurs from the sub-continent turned their investment attentions to Britain, America, Gulf, and the Middle East (despite the mass poverty of the sub-continent, those who are very rich have all the required capital to be able to invest in Europe, the USA or the Gulf), they did not like the way the Europeans, the Americans, and the Arabs were 'wasting their resources' in paying 'ridiculously high wages'[4] to manual workers from the sub-continent because they had seen many workers returning to their home countries as millionaires (in native currency terms) after having worked in Britain and the Middle East for fifteen or twenty years. The entrepreneurs from the sub-continent were altogether different from their Western and nouveau-riche Arab counterparts; the former were accustomed to hiring their men often at close to bread and clothing only. They were interested in investing in Europe and America because these offered ideal living conditions for the upper classes and were safe, comparatively, from the violence and bureaucratic inefficiency of the sub-continent. Some were interested in investing in the Gulf and the Middle East because near zero taxation and nouveau-riche markets offered ideal opportunities to double or triple their wealth in a few years. Accustomed to becoming millionaires and multi-millionaires in a minimal number of years, they couldn't reconcile themselves to the Western idea of giving a fair share to the worker. Thus, before they could invest in the Middle East and the Gulf, they began their efforts in 'bringing some monetary sense to the

[4]The words in inverted comas in this section are those used by some top managers and entrepreneurs during interviews.

Arabs', and, before investing in Europe, most waited for the 'right circumstances', that is, they waited for a time when enough Asian workers were available in Europe to be hired at 'the right wages'.

In the Arabian Gulf states, the Pakistani and Indian general managers of many Arab banks and businesses, hired by the Arabs because management from the sub-continent came cheaper than that from America and Europe, gave their first lessons to the *Sheikhs*, and a process of massive reductions in worker and staff salaries was launched. One major reason for the newly rich Arabs to prefer Indian, Pakistani and Egyptian managers for their banks and businesses (where Western high technology and sophistication was dispensable) was the cultural proximity whereby the Eastern managers knew how to flatter, entertain, and express utmost loyalty to the patriarchal and proud Arab *Sheikhs*. Under the guidance of the Eastern managers, salaries for most Asian staff and workers in the Gulf and the Middle East, according to several estimates by regional experts, during the past two decades, have gone down to as low as one sixth in real terms of what they used to be twenty years ago. For example, Pakistani doctors in Saudi Arabia in the sixties were paid a minimum of 15,000 Riyals a month. They are now employed at only 2,500 Riyals.

In the West, the Asian management could not succeed in wage reduction as such because, first, they could not reach the key decision making positions in Western businesses, and second, wage determination was not entirely left to market forces; the unions and the government institutions had a big role to play. Besides, the Western abidance by the principle of equity of treatment could not lead to a situation like that in the Middle East where locals are hired at higher wages than foreigners in similar positions. Moreover, wage determination for foreigners in the Middle East is also linked to the regional and social bargaining power which means that Americans and Europeans receive much higher pay than do Asians in similar jobs; this is justified by the governments and entrepreneurs on grounds that the Westerners need more money for their expensive way of living, while Indians, Pakistanis, Bengalis, Egyptians etc. can make do with less than half of what a Westerner in similar job would require. The said practice is in stark contrast to the Western practice of hiring Blacks and Whites, natives and foreigners, at same salaries for same positions within an organization. Most Middle Eastern organizations are suffering from inter-group political intrigues (Egyptians versus Tunisians, Pakistanis versus Indians, South Indians against North Indians, Bengalis against other Indians etc.), a major factor for which is the said inequitable

treatment even for similar positions in the organizational hierarchy. Seething resentments deviate the attention of employees from organizational objectives towards petty squabbling.

The above paragraph throws light on the culture-bound limitations of the principle of equity of treatment, and on the way in which the 'market forces' concept is used or abused. Europe was safe from such culture-based perceptions of inequities in organizational practice and procedures, but the rather recent import of a sufficient number of Asian entrepreneurs and workers into Europe has now led to a situation in which a 'minority culture' has been able to take roots and flourish insulated, it seems, from the context of the broader host culture. There is a large number of Asian entrepreneurs carrying on Asian organizational practices, and there is a large population of Asian workers who are willing to accept low wages, inequitable treatment, and harsh working conditions for the aforementioned reasons.

We can ignore the issue of Asian low wages on the pretext that low wages would reduce commodity prices and help Britain compete in export markets, but this is not the whole story: Low wages are made acceptable by means that themselves often lead to asocial and illegal practices. Low wages do not necessarily mean low prices because the business owners are there to intermediate between prices and wages (United Nations surveys show that the gap between the rich and the poor has widened many times since the eighties): Low wages also mean low spending power, low bargaining position and hence placing oneself in a position where greater control maybe exercised over one, and this leads to a whole lot of socio-economic issues. It also involves moral issues which too play a strong role in the determination of the political and economic strength of a country. A large population living close to the poverty line is not likely to help a country, because deterioration in living standards is known to have a direct relationship with moral, social and economic chaos, as evident in most third world countries.

"Low ceilings crush the souls... " (Dostoyevsky).

Summary and contributions of chapter 13 towards the Grounded Theory to be proposed

(1)When entrepreneurs from the sub-continent turned their investment attention to the West and the Middle East, they couldn't reconcile to the Western idea of giving a fair share to the worker, because, in the sub-continent, they were accustomed to greater profits and shorter pay-back periods. In the Gulf, one major reason for the newly rich Arabs to prefer sub-continent/Egyptian managers for their businesses (where Western technological sophistication

was dispensable) was the cultural proximity whereby the 'Eastern' managers knew how to flatter, entertain, and express loyalty to the patriarchal *Sheikhs*. Hence, under the guidance of the Eastern managers, salaries for Asian staff and workers in the Gulf, during the past two decades, have gone down to as low as one sixth in real terms. Wage determination for expatriates in the Middle East is now linked to regional-social bargaining power which means that, for example, Americans and Europeans receive much higher pay than do Asians in similar jobs within one organization. As a consequence, seething resentments between various nationalities have rendered many organizations ineffective. The said practice is in stark contrast to the Western practice of hiring Blacks/Whites, natives and foreigners, at same salaries for same positions. Britain was safe from such culture-based inequities in organizations but the import of a sufficient number of Asian entrepreneurs and workers has now led to a 'minority culture' which is flourishing, insulated from the context of the broader host culture. Consequently, in Britain:

(2) Out of 18 Asian firms about which information was obtained only 3 paid as high wages as £2.50 an hour. Only 3 out of 25 companies paid overtime for more than 40 hours week work and only 2 gave paid vacations. The sick pay was generally left to the DSS. The average wage comes to only £1.69/hour. Our comparative study shows that out of 27 native-British businesses only in 3 firms the wage rate was as low as in Asian firms and 28 out of 32 firms paid overtime (1.5% and above) for more than 40 hours a week work. Most English firms allow 15 days paid leave at Christmas, plus one month paid leave in a year. The average wage for comparable English firms comes to £3.69/hour which is £2/hour higher than that in the Asian firms.

(3) In addition to very low pay, no overtime, and no paid holidays, many Asian employers adopt a demeaning attitude in deducting for waste and minor late arrivals. Thus workers in English firms report greater satisfaction but those in Asian firms feel demoralized. Hence:

(4) There is remarkably high personnel turnover in British-Asian companies compared to the native-British. The average duration of stay in the former being only 11 months compared to 41 months in the latter. But high turnover is profitable for such businesses as do not require skilled and trained workers and where new workers are relatively easily available and trainable; the employers can save on wages by hiring trainees at apprentice wages and by the time they should expect to get a reasonable salary, they are already preparing to leave.

(5) Low wages become acceptable to employees when both employers and employees collude

to take part of their incomes from the state: Out of 23 Asian businesses, 17 were reported to employ a certain number of off-books workers at wages between 50p to £1 an hour, but out of 27 native-British businesses, in only two firms wages were given off-books. Among various illegal business practice in the U.K. are:

- (i) employing illegal immigrants and political asylum seekers;
- (ii) employing workers with British nationalities who work off-books and take a large part of their income (mortgage payments included) from the state by claiming that they are unemployed or underemployed; the employers benefit from the arrangement by saving on wages, NI contributions and tax deductions which would have to be paid if workers' records were kept properly;
- (iii) ex-VAT, unregistered and off-the-record businesses;
- (iv) being in jobs but keeping wives and children on welfare benefits by having fake divorce certificates issued from the local mosques;
- (v) misappropriation of government grants for religious causes, by members of mosque committees; hence the oft-reported conflicts between rival groups seeking financial control of the mosques on the facade of sectarian differences, and the entailing police lock-up of mosques.

(6) Illegal arrangements between employees and employers wield greater powers to the owners to exercise personal control over employees and suppress potential conflict. Various kind of corruption described here is neither condemned nor publicly admitted by employers and leaders in the Asian community, as is the case in home countries as well.

(7) The common argument in favour of low wages is the populist theme of market based wages, add to it the usual cultural pretensions of getting low profits, and divine providence being the final decision maker as to what each should get. Some argue that British-Asian low wages would reduce commodity prices and help Britain compete in export markets, but low wages are made acceptable by robbing the DSS; low wages do not necessarily mean low prices because the business owners are there to intermediate between prices and wages (several United Nations surveys show that the gap between the rich and the poor has widened many times since the eighties). Low wages mean low spending power, low bargaining position, and hence placing workers in coercive control which is not likely to help a country, because deterioration in living standards is known to have a direct relationship with moral, social and economic chaos, as evident in the underdeveloped countries described earlier.

These findings show the culture-bound nature of the 'market forces' rule, for in the 'Eastern' culture, each person can be hired at a different wage on a same job in one organization. The findings relate inequity in treatment to inter-group intrigues and conflict, corruption, and organizational ineffectiveness. Findings in British-Asian businesses show strong links between low wages, inequitable treatment, money motivation (indicated by embezzlement of state money), inter-group rivalries, low motivation (indicated by high turn-over etc.), mystification of material issues in obscurantism and religious haze, all of which have been thriving in Britain in a minority culture insulated from the host cultural influence.

Although better wages and equitable treatment make economic sense in that they reduce conflict and raise purchasing ability and confidence which is one major prerequisite for industrial development, the 'sub-continent attitude' has, demonstrably, been preserved until now in most British Asian companies. Hence, as before, many Asians organizations in Britain, are little more than instruments in achieving non-organizational socio-cultural goals.

The observations narrated in this chapter support our thesis that patterns of behaviour are determined by one's immediate culture which can change if it opens itself to external cognitive influences. We shall suggest some methods of improvement in chapter 16.

A significant contribution of our studies of British Asians is the refutation of Marxist optimism for working class, in general and all across the world, as 'the vanguard of revolution' because, as found, after arriving in Britain, most of the poor exploited sub-continent workers did not hail the liberating opportunities in Britain, did not even join the White workers unions (chapter 15), but sought to collude with their compatriot employers (the upper classes) to enrich themselves often at the cost of the state. The Marxist class consciousness did not show itself despite the proselytisation of many socialist parties. Hence the dominance of cultural influence over class membership in determining behaviour patterns. This is further supported by observations in the sub-continent where most workers in practice, do not seek to join hands to end exploitation but compete to under-cut wages.

However, there are some cultures where the working classes have behaved as Marx expected. My proposition is therefore, that although Marxist analysis is very valid for the sub-continent (class divisions are objectively and materially very sharp), it showed predictive validity not in superstitious, subjectivist, segregated and strongly familial cultures but only in some objectivist cultures in conditions of 'necessity and compulsion' as Marx had said.

Notes and Explanations

1. Figures regarding average duration of stay in British firms are as follows:

Asian Small Firms (months worked): 24, 1, 6, 1, 1, 3, 4, 1, 2, 17, 3, 5.

Asian Medium/Large Firms: 2, 48, 24, 4, 1, 1, 1, 12, 60.

English Small Firms: 48, 60, 18, 3, 3, 3, 6.

English Medium/Large Firms: 3, 84, 48, 120, 16, 24, 1, 30, 12, 24, 72, 48, 84, 12, 36, 36, 36, 6, 210, 1, 1, 12, 108, 36, 24, 12, 60, 120, 132, 2, 18.

2. Wages and other working conditions for workers in Britain were found to be as follows:

WAGES PER HOUR

Asian Small 8 Firms	Asian Medium/ Large 10	English Small 6 Firms	English Medium/ Large 21 Firms	
£2.50	1.30	1.69	2.50	2.63
£1.50	1.75	4.00	2.50	4.50
£2.00	1.75	2.85	3.25	6.00
£1.35	1.75	3.25	3.25	4.25
£1.50	1.50	3.65	3.25	2.17
£1.50	2.50	3.65	3.53	3.25
£2.88	1.25		5.00	5.00
£1.07	1.25		5.00	4.25
	1.25		1.50	3.50
	1.74		6.00	7.69
			1.50	

Average wage in small Asian firms (8 in this study): £1.79/hour

Average wage in medium/large Asian firms (10 in this study): £1.60/hour

Net average for the 18 Asian firms in this study: £1.69/hour

Abidance by overtime legislation: 3 (partial abidance) out of 23 firms

Sunday double rate: None

Paid holidays allowed: 2 out of 23 firms

Employment of off-books/illegal workers: 17 out of 23 firms

Off-books/illegal workers wages: from 50p to £1 per hour

Average wage in small English firms (6 in this study): £3.18/hour

Average wage in medium/large English firms (21 firms): £3.83/hour

Net average for the 27 firms in this study: £3.69/hour

Abidance by overtime legislation: 28 out of 32 firms (standard)

Sunday double rate: 28 out of 32 firms (if work is available)

Paid holiday allowed: 32 out of 34 firms

Employment of off-books/illegal workers: 2 out of 42 firms

Off-books/illegal workers wages: £1.75/hour

Chapter Fourteen: Issues of Racism in a Multi-Cultural Workforce

Racial situation in Asian companies

People from one particular race quite often hold positive or negative views about other races. It is almost impossible to make generalizations from the expression of such views but a fair knowledge of what different groups think about each other could be of importance to managers in multi-racial organizations. Even in an organization comprising people of one single culture or race, there could be different images construed about other races and cultures. Such views do contain parts of some realities. It is easy to classify people with respect to race, and some incidents have been reported where a certain race has been considered as possessing certain characteristics, more social power or less of it, and thus treated with inequity. For example, an Asian employee reported that his Asian employers gave better treatment to the White workers and were polite with them but not with the Asian workers. Similar observations were narrated by other interviewees in some detail[1] showing perturbing consequences of inequitable treatment that could, if widespread, lead to inter-racial conflict of some kind. Many interviewees stated that in Asian factories, because of inequitable salaries and working hours between Whites and Asians, there was resentment projected on racial grounds: The Whites worked standard hours, i.e. 40 hours a week (they socialized in the evenings) at standard wages but the Asians worked more overtime often at lower and off-books wages (many could make up for the less wages through DSS income support and other benefits, see chapter 13). Some resentment among the two groups arose from the fact that the Asian management told the White workers not to disclose their wages to the Asians. The reasons for such inequity were found to be mainly in off-books work. I have discussed earlier that the typical Asian workers' obsession with money (large families supported mainly by adult males; traditional women not allowed to work for socio-cultural reasons) makes them work twelve hours a day and, at times, seven days a week (thus pushing many out of employment) a situation which would not be acceptable to their White co-workers who want to socialize in the evenings. Some interviewees said that while Asians are prepared to work unsocial hours, in Asian factories, they are not as constant and reliable at work as the Whites are; many Asian workers compensate for low wages and longer hours

[1]For excerpts from interviewee statements, see pages 342, 343, section titled: 'Racial situation in Asian factories; differences in work patterns and life styles'.

by wasting some of the time, but quite often, Asian employers preferred Asian workers because they could get them to work off-books. To add to this, in most unskilled/semiskilled jobs which Asians are deemed fit to do, many White companies prefer Asians over Whites, one reason for such preference being the inaptitude of Asians to form effective workers unions (see chapter 15). Thus there exists a genuine cause for resentment by the Whites who see their whole lifestyle being challenged by Asian workers especially when the latter are preferred by many White employers as well, and because of the diminishing number of "White businesses" and the growing number of Asian businesses, factories, take-always, restaurants, etc. There is reportedly a growing feeling among the Whites that they are being discriminated against in many instances but there is visibly and demonstrably more street and media protest from the Asians to the contrary. While in many cases, the causes of resentment could be found in the aforementioned lack of uniformity in employment practice in Asian firms (similar resentment is found in the sub-continent and Middle Eastern organizations among regional groups; see chapter 13, p. 185-186), there are other incidents of prejudice showing that the said reasons also have to do with 'in-group/out-group psychology'.

Though there is resentment among races, and some signs of this resentment turning into conflict, no strong evidence exists that such conflict has already started to become openly manifest and it is certainly not evident in English-owned businesses where equitable treatment for Whites, blacks and Asians keeps such conflict from arising. Besides, such conflict may be avoided if uniformity in working patterns is guaranteed by the enforcement of the equal opportunities legislation in Asian businesses as well.

Racial situation in English organizations

Most interviewees reported that there was hardly any resentment or inequity on racial grounds in White-owned firms. There was no racial conflict except some verbal skirmishes about minor affairs, and friendly jokes exchanged about inter-race perceptions[2].

In most Western companies with a multi-cultural Workforce, great care is taken to provide equitable treatment to all employees and hence where discrimination on racial grounds was felt, as narrated by the interviewees, they also made it clear that proper action

[2]For excerpts from interviewee statements, see pages 343 to 348 section titled: 'Racial situation in English/Western businesses'.

was taken by the management. In one English organization, an Asian employee resigned from his job and then filed a complaint that he was racially harassed. The interviewee said that although the charges of racial harassment were not justified, the process of investigation went through. It was often discovered during the interviews for this work that typical charges of racism, levied against the White authorities or management, by some Asians, did not appear valid upon detailed analysis. One interviewee thought that the speed of machines for Asian workers in an American company was adjusted a bit faster than that for the White workers but the increase was not noted by his fellow Asian workers, and there were many in other factories who said that the Asians were supposed to produce only as much as the Whites had in the morning shifts. A supervisor mentioned that he was once sacked from his job because he left the job as he was feeling sick, and couldn't inform his manager. He believed that his sacking was undue because he had made sure that work went as usual in his absence. But then, later, he was offered a higher post at the same organization. Though he said that he should have been promoted further up, he mentioned many times during the interview that race or culture was not a barrier. Similarly, another interviewee claimed that he was not promoted because the management wanted to promote the son of a senior employee, but then, after an year, the interviewee did get his promotion and hence any claims of prejudice may not hold. In another case, a White worker was dismissed on the grounds of a statement made by an Asian worker. In almost all such cases, the complaints of Asian employees were taken seriously and rectified.

There were several cases which revealed that Asian allegations of racism most often are not tenable[3]. We shall therefore discuss some reasons why such charges are brought about by many British Asians.

(i)Partisan description of events and in-group/out-group psychology

One common reason for racial conflict is the partisan rather than judicious attitude towards events of conflict or potential conflict. Partisan claims are made for several culturally-learned reasons such as that, for the sake of group-solidarity, one's group expects negative claims against other groups; in the sub-continent, people often learn to speak, often unfairly, in support of their community or the group they belong to, for fear lest the group

[3]For two such cases among many see p. 346, statement 10, & p. 348, statement 11.

may disown them. They also learn, quite prejudicially, to charge rival, or assumed rival groups, of doing injustice, of being unfair, of having malicious aims, often as a preemptive defence or as a tactical manoeuvre in order to gain more privileges and facilities (I have personal knowledge of various fake claims by British Asians, of White racism, made in order to gain some benefits from state or private institutions), or under the influence of a belief in a religion, an ideology or a prejudicial theory[4]. Such a behaviour is very common in the sub-continent, in most Muslim countries, and is also manifested among British Muslims. During my stay in Britain from Sept. 1989 to August 1992, I interviewed more than thirty well informed members of the Asian community in several cities and towns. I also attended several mosque committee meetings, local Pakistani welfare associations meetings, Asian literature and poetry seminars, workshops and festivals, and had conversations with dozens of Asian immigrants and English participants. I observed that while there are enlightened Asians who do not think in racist terms, among the fundamentalist British Muslims, typical perceptions about Whites are quite lopsided: Negative stereotypes[5] of Whites include traits such as, "swine-eaters, drinkers, having no sexual control, and hence not compatible for co-existence with Muslims". The pig is considered a "shameless" animal and, it is believed among Muslims, that the one who eats pork will get the "disgrace" of the said animal. Many old and middle-aged Muslims whip up a hysteria to "save their culture" and many younger

[4]Gadlin (1994) has argued that racial and ethnic conflicts must be understood within the context of the "culture of racism", that is, in terms of intra-race and inter-race social relations, attitudes, beliefs and meanings through which conflict and antagonism are existentially structured. Likewise, Avruch and Black (1991) stress the local, indigenous, common sense understandings of conflict (ethnoconflict theory), alongside techniques or processes of conflict resolution (ethnopraxis), because, they argue, at the heart of ethnoconflict theories and ethnopraxis are the local and indigenous ideas about human nature, personhood and self which must be studied through ethnographic case studies. Waters (1992) identified antecedent conditions and specific behaviors of social actors that can contribute to race-related interpersonal conflict.

[5]Bodenhausen (1990) conducted experiments relating circadian variations in arousal levels to the subject's propensity to stereotype others. He showed that as a person's ability to systematically process information is diminished, the person increasingly relies on the use of stereotypes and simplifications. The findings can be extended to show that the less educated and unprepared earlier generations of immigrants, when overwhelmed by frequent culture-contrasting information in a new society, resorted to stereotypical explanations of new observations (such as White women moving about freely alongside men in non-segregated public and workplaces) in order to simplify the task of understanding a new society.

Asians follow the elders' line to maintain a tense stance towards the host community. Education is a continual battle ground for this group of Asians. In January 1996, the Muslim community in Bradford boycotted local schools for having a syllabus of religious education which allegedly placed greater emphasis on Christianity. In conversations with seven Bradford Muslim children below the age of eight, I was disappointed to see that they were told in the local mosques, by the mullahs, to abstain from the company of White children because "most of them are illegitimate", not to pay attention to school education because "education at school is not directed towards what Allah wants us to do"[6]. One child was beaten by the mullah for attending the History Club at school because the mullah believed that the history written by the Whites was biased against Muslims. The said children showed hatred for the British police, and their ideals were characters of the type of Malcolm X. On the other hand, most White people with whom I had the opportunity to ask about what they thought of the Asians, generally had the perceptions that Asians were, "hard-working, family-oriented, keep their shops open until mid-night, we can get things when we want, we wish we had as much love and respect for family and elders as the Asians have".

The use of the words 'haram' and 'kaffir' among the Arabs and Muslims provides a preconditioning for categorizing non-Muslims as unjust and unfair[7]. Examples of partisan preemptive strikes from world politics maybe seen in the claims of Iranian mullahs and the various fundamentalist movements against the West. In fact in many societies, the psychology of divisions is so much institutionally ingrained that people normally think in dividing terminology. One such dividing institution is the Asian 'partisan closed family' whereby the interests of an Asian family are de facto exclusive of the interests of society (see chapter 3).

Conflict-prone cultures[8] lend supportive beliefs which enable people to be aggressive

[6]Erickson (1987) has explained his findings regarding low school achievement of minority students in terms of 'critical social theory' and 'resistance theory'.

[7]It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss a whole major part of the Islamic ideology whereby the non-believers are not to be trusted; a whole lot of negative traits are attributed to the non-believers as parts of the Islamic doctrine of dividing the world into three kinds, namely, the believers, the non-believers and the hypocrites: Ironically and very interestingly, when suspicion and preemptive mistrust against the non-Muslims is commanded upon Muslims by 'divine providence', many fall victims to mistrust among themselves, such as the inter-sectarian massacres in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bahrain etc.

[8]Ballard (1991) has noted that cultural background affects the learning of hatred.

and less willing to compromise. The importance of certain cultural norms, values, and religion in breeding conflict-proneness has been well documented in history and literature[9]. A common example is that most Muslim children are taught to hate Jews (and Hindus in Pakistan) in particular (the common phrase joining the two together in Pakistani Urdu newspapers and magazines is "*yahood-o-hanood*") and other non-Muslims in general, at a very early age until it becomes part of their psyche. Furthermore, various Muslim sects (Shias, Sunnies, Whabbis) inculcate sectarian hatred in children at very young age; hence the mutual massacres in Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, Bahrain, and those of Ahmadees in Pakistan, Bais in Iran, of liberals in Algeria etc. In 1992, I wrote about a potential one-sided conflict being brewed by certain British Muslims in my pilot study. I was not surprised when this conflict showed up in the Bradford riots in June 1995. The riots showed how distorted inter-race perceptions could trigger conflict. There was no interaction in that the White community did not counteract (other than that the police tried to contain it) and the causes were primarily cognitive in nature[10].

(ii)The projection of learning of divisions in home countries

We noted several reasons, in chapter 5, for much higher ethnicism in the sub-continent compared to that in Europe. Except for those who really try to understand European psychology, many Asians simply project their home-based perceptions on the host culture. During conversations with those British Asians who were brought up in Britain and had never been to their home countries, I found that they often retain the conflict and control-related beliefs and the in-group/out-group psychology engendered by parental and community socialization. Only a few[11] think about the relevance of the ancient cultural

[9]See Raphael Patai's (1973) detailed account of the conflict-proneness generated by the Arab Bedouin culture: Tua Hussain's "Dua-al-Karawan" (describing the relationship between violence and Arab honour related to sexual conduct), "Al-Fitna-tul-Kubra" and "Ali-wa-Banua" (on the intermittent conflicts and bloodshed in the Islamic history).

[10]Waters (1992) has offered a cognitive processual model to help managers understand race-based interpersonal conflicts in the workplace.

[11]In a study of intercultural learning that transcends the experience of culture conflict, Hoffman (1990) has found two possible levels of such learning : (1)behavioral level change that does not penetrate to the depth of subjective self-concept; (2)a deeper transformation of behavior along with changes in values, meaning and inner-self identity.

traditions, beliefs, values, enmities and attitudes to their lives in Britain. This has much to do with the greater control Asian parents have over children (see chapter 3) of which one example may be quoted here: One interviewee, despite the fact that she had never been to Pakistan and that she had many Indian friends, retained the enmity of her Pakistani parents against India (internalization of beliefs). However, an apparent contradiction was found in that she was fairly liberal and English in many aspects of her behaviour and could not "even think of living in Pakistan". She had left her oppressive parents on the pretext of studying medicine at a university but was in fact living on odd jobs. She was afraid that if her parents found out the truth, they won't be very sparing. They had been trying to force her to marry a cousin back home but she had thwarted all attempts of the boy's coming to Britain by writing (unknown to her parents) to the Home Office asking them not to grant him a visa. Despite all this, she felt so guilty at deceiving her parents, that she occasionally sent them money, telling them that it was out of her student grant. Such a behaviour is not uncommon among young British Asians who find it very difficult to get rid of their parents' beliefs however irrelevant in the modern world and in their own lives.

(iii) High Subjectivity

I have invented the term 'high subjectivity' to denote a certain attitude towards life; it is an attitude of substituting profound objective observation and teleological behaviour with certain reactions[12] to a frustration resulting from not being able to achieve some high aims. As a consequence, some routine matters could be taken too seriously by a person who has developed a feeling of being victimized due to certain events in his personal life or in his work-related activities. High subjectivity may show itself in generalized opinions as a substitute for the exact narration of actual incidents, in short and curt replies as a substitute for detail, in obscure description of events, in over-vehement denials, and in too robust affirmations of one's opinions, showing the respondent's refusal to think, review or reconsider what he/she takes as an essential belief. I have seen such paranoia in a number of Asians; for example, at DPC, a whole group of workers refused to be interviewed on the

[12]The reactions to frustration are given in many books on psychology, such as the following by Costello and Zalkind (1963); compensation; conversion; displacement; fantasy; identification; negativism; projection; rationalization; reaction-formation; regression; repression; fixation; resignation, apathy and boredom; flight or withdrawal.

presumption that I had some ulterior motive in interviewing them, that I had some interests and benefit to gain. One interviewee, in particular, showed that even when a person has been satisfied with a certain situation, he might try to dig up elements of dissatisfaction for several of the reasons quoted above; the said interviewee talked about discrimination against Asian workers and favoritism for White workers when he had earlier stated that there were hardly any White workers in his workplace. When he was asked to narrate events to show discrimination and injustice on the part of the management, he said there were two events: In fact, these two events could not reasonably justify the claims of unfair treatment and both occurred in a three year period[13]. In most instances of a similar nature, I was compelled to think that any barrier faced in an English firm leads many Asians to jump quickly to making accusations of racism even though they cannot prove it. It was reported (see chapters 12 and 15) that Asian workers took collective action for wage increase only in English factories though they had much better wages there, but despite gross injustice, no collective action against Asian employers was reported. The reasons for this paradoxical behaviour of protest against White organizations but not against the Asian, show that a minority may adopt an aggressive stance against the majority and yet ignore the injustice within itself, so as to maintain ethnic solidarity. Many show generalized grudges and suspicions for which there is much less than sufficient ground. A presumptive and aggressive outlook towards others is often self-reinforcing and self-fulfilling. It has been shown to lead to no-win situations in the sub-continent, Middle East, and among British-Asians. If prejudicial claims are rewarded by the other groups giving-in to the demands of the 'victimized', such 'grudge bearers' may carry on with their prejudices (as shown in many 'successes' of people posing to be victimized) in order to continue their forward march towards further material gains. On the other hand, if the 'grudge bearers' are denied acceptance of their claims, there can be inter-group conflict, a routine event and an integral part of life in the said societies.

[13]See statement II on page 348. I found later from the interviewee's friends and relatives, known to me, that since he gave up work, he was living on a fake medical disability allowance and had a long record of securing council and insurance money through fraudulent claims. I asked him why he was doing so when he was a healthy person and could work, at which he answered that he had two daughters and four brothers in Pakistan to look after. However, his daughters and wife were living on welfare benefits in Britain and, had he continued his job, he could have had more than enough money to meet his obligations. I discarded another whole interview of four hours on similar grounds.

Summary and contributions of chapter 14 towards the Grounded Theory to be proposed

(1) British-Asian factories predominantly employ Asians but where they do have native British workers, some resentment between races was reported. The interviewees saw the reasons in unequal salaries and working hours between Whites and Asians; the Whites worked standard hours at standard wages and socialized in the evenings but the Asians worked overtime (chapter 4) often at lower and off-books wages (see chapter 13). Some resentment arose when the Asian management told the White workers not to disclose their wages to the Asians (similar resentment is found in the sub-continent and Middle Eastern organizations for reasons of inequitable treatment; see chapters 13 & 15). Typically, Asian workers' have large families supported mainly by adult males who want to work twelve hours a day and, at times, seven days a week (chapter 4), thus pushing many out of employment. Hence, many White workers see their whole lifestyle being threatened by Asian workers especially when the latter are preferred by many White employers as well (one reason for such preference being the inaptitude of Asians to form effective workers unions; see chapters 12 & 15), and because of the diminishing number of 'White businesses' and the growing number of Asian businesses in certain areas.

(2) There is reportedly a growing feeling among the Whites that they are being discriminated against in many instances but there is visibly and demonstrably more street and media protest from the Asians to the contrary. However, charges of racism, levied against the White authorities or management by some Asians most often are not tenable; the reasons for false allegations were found to be the following:

- (i) Partisan description of events and injudicious claims made to create or maintain group-solidarity, or as a tactical manoeuvre in order to gain more privileges;
- (ii) the influence of a belief, a religion or an ideology that propagates negative stereotypes of other groups;
- (iii) the insecurity feelings of older Asians that the younger Asians will not follow the elders' line unless a tense stance is upheld against host community;
- (iv) the interests of an Asian family are de facto exclusive of the interests of society (see chapter 3) and so children are controlled by certain divisive themes;
- (v) adopting a general aggressive stance against the majority and ignoring the injustice within so as to maintain ethnic solidarity;

- (vi) the projection of learning of institutionalized divisions in home countries engendered by parental/community socialization (see chapter 5 for ethnicism in the sub-continent, and chapter 15 for institutionalized racism in the Middle East);
- (vii) lack of awareness of the irrelevance of the ancient traditions, enmities and attitudes to modern life;
- (viii) high subjectivity; an attitude of substituting profound objective observation and teleological behaviour with certain reactions to a frustration resulting from not being able to achieve some higher than justified aims.

Findings in this chapter elaborate how a strong subjectivist familial culture can generate proclivity to conflict by substituting learning for objective observation with institutionalized divisions, stereotypes, prohibition of exposure to other cognitive cultures, and aggressive closed-familial goal-seeking at the cost of other groups: The subjectivist cultures do so by strict ideological socialization of children, thus imposing,

- (i) a large family life style which cannot be sustained in a world of scarce resources albeit at the cost of social harmony;*
- (ii) personal-familial centredness that seeks refuge in its immediate community exclusive of wider human concerns.*

These findings support our theory that conflict-proneness is engendered by the particular structure and de facto functions of the social institutions of a culture and then imported into the organization.

In native-British businesses in general, equitable treatment for employees keeps racial conflict from showing. Such conflict can be avoided in British-Asian organizations if uniformity in employment patterns is guaranteed by the enforcement of the equal opportunities legislation in Asian organizations as well, most of which hitherto employ only from particular groups of British-Asians. Conflict-proneness can also be reduced by British-Asian and sub-continent families reducing their family size, so that scarce resources and jobs are available to all at reasonable salaries. This in turn will diminish the material basis of conflict and have positive effect on people's perceptions of other races and cultures. We shall discuss some solutions in chapter 16.

Chapter Fifteen: A Comparison of Attitude towards Unionism and Rights at Work in the Sub-continent, Middle East and among British Asians

Where there is a need for unions: The Sub-continent

In the sub-continent, the exploitation of workers, and even white collar workers is too obvious to be emphasized. In addition to exploitation and unfair treatment, there are all kinds of other issues that make it essential for the employees to form organized unions but while many unions exist, their activities are far from teleological. Workers and employees associations have not been as successful in bringing about prosperity, to those they claim to serve, as similar organizations in the West have been. Trade union movements and several other institutions in the sub-continent often have pseudo-leaders who are not really capable of leading but became leaders due to the possession of property or clout or what is known as a 'nuisance value'[1]. Even the attempts of genuine union leaders are thwarted by the too frequent presence of pseudo-leaders. The excessive desire to be a leader (referred to in some work of literature as 'Napoleonomania') is so commonly observable in the sub-continent that it maybe seen as related to the early childhood teachings about great national heros, and to the exhortations of elders to the young to "be someone great"[2].

There are several cultural factors behind the general failure of unions in raising the living standards and job conditions of the majority of workers in the sub-continent: Among the major reasons for the said general failure are first, an obvious replacement of, in Marxist terms, class consciousness and class solidarity among workers by ethnic, religious, linguistic, and tribal groupings, second, an authoritarian-patriarchal respect for the rich whatever his moral character and his sources of wealth might be, and third, superstition, over-production of children, keeping women in virtual captivity and the consequent greater economic burden on the bread-winner's shoulders, makes most live in a neurotic-arrogant and irrational state of mind. This situation persists in the sub-continent. Many narrated that the lower and middle

[1]In PIA, it was reported, that the union officials did not work in their jobs, abused their positions and powers and, compared to other people, worked about a quarter of what they should.

[2]I was once giving tuition to the son of the Minister of Education of my home state in Pakistan when the child's uncle came in and asked the child, "son, what do you want to be in life?", the child said, "I want to be a doctor". At this, the uncle reprimanded him, "I am disappointed in you for you have such low aims; your father is a Minister and you want to be just a doctor?"

classes are exploited openly. But, because there is an electoral democracy, the grudge of the exploited is not against the system but against the individual exploiter, and therefore, a few industrialists, on occasions, get beaten up by laborers. Many union leaders have been murdered over the years. Aggression also gets diverted towards communal wars such as those between Bengalis, Marwaris, Assamese, or in religious riots described earlier.

Blau (1955) noted that group pressures, whereby conflict-prone members were punished helped in conflict avoidance. Blake and Mouton (1964) noted that systematic playing down of differences between organizational units helped in conflict avoidance. The opposite of above quoted suggestions, however, can be seen in the sub-continent where usually conflict-prone persons are chosen to represent groups in conflict in business, commerce, industry, government, politics and women's groups, under the belief that the conflict-prone representative is more likely to grab more benefits and privileges during negotiations, bargaining, and haggling. As narrated, the whole exercise is dysfunctional in achieving long-term social harmony and collective prosperity.

Where unions are banned: The Middle East

In most countries of the Middle East, there are hard pressing reasons for the workers to protest, but there is no protest because of its horrendous potential consequences. The institutional and personal bondage of migrant workers in the Gulf countries is notable, especially the legal impositions upon the workers and even on higher ranking employees. The said legal impositions, described below, will be unthinkable in the West.

Legislation in the Arabian Gulf states is most often a chronological or subject-wise record of the decisions and decrees issued by the *Amir*, the *Sultan*, or the *Malik* (whatever the title of the ruler), or by the *Shura* (an advisory body of tribal *sheikhs* or commercial/ industrial elite), or by Ministerial Committees. Countries which were colonized by one of the European powers, do have some kind of a legislative framework derived from their European heritage; Egypt has some laws that are either a derivative of the Napoleonic Code or the British Legal Codes. The Gulf states often borrow parts of their legislative systems, for which nothing could be found in the Islamic *Sharia*, from Egypt. The Egyptians are often employed in legislation interpretation and advisory bodies for they are considered more scholarly among the Arabs. However, a review of several Egyptian legislative frameworks shows that Egyptian legislation, where Islamic *Sharia* can be ignored by the legislators in

safety from the fundamentalist reaction, is an imitation or modification of the traditional British or French legal systems. Despite such heritage, the Egyptians could do almost nothing to bring modern European employment or other legislation to the Gulf countries.

In the traditional Middle Eastern patriarchal ethics, an employer is the patron of the employee. He is the middle-man between God and the 'dependent'. The word still used for an employer of foreign employees in the Middle East is *kafeel* which means 'the provider' so that the whole nature of employment is culturally seen much as a case of 'providing for the dependent' and, in return, the dependent must forsake some of his rights, including the right to change employment against the employer's wishes. The employment practice is replete with traces of the traditional values of the Arabian slave society reflected in Quranic and *Hadeeth* verses about; (i) how to buy and sell a slave and a concubine; (ii) when and how a slave may be allowed to marry and have children; (iii) the rights of the slave owner to have sex with his concubines (among the words used for slaves and concubines in *Sura Al-Noor*, is the term, *malakat imanokum* meaning, "your rightful possessions"); (iv) the conditions on which one may free a slave or a concubine; and, (v) how to free a slave or a concubine; the contract of the freedom of a slave or a concubine is called the *mukatibat* whereby the conditions under which a slave is freed must be written down. Nowhere in the Quran it is mentioned that freeing a slave is a compulsory religious requirement. In the Arabic-Islamic ethics whereby, "the hand that gives is worthier than the hand that takes", the employer is the patron and, despite the mistreatment and abuse of employees by many, the former still want to feel the pride of being the patrons. Hence, it is often an insult to an Arab employer if his employee submits his resignation, or does part-time work at another place, and this is consequently reflected in the employment legislation whereby:

(1) A foreign employee (*kharji*) cannot change his *kafeel* without the written consent of the *kafeel* and the acceptance of such consent by the offices of immigration; this involves a very complicated official procedure made even difficult by the customary protraction and procrastination of the said offices. Foreign workers are not allowed even part-time work at a place other than that of their *kafeel*. I have come across many cases whereby the employees were treated very badly and had the opportunity to work elsewhere with much better prospects but their *kafeels* did not release them. A pharmacist, for example, was offered a better job but his *kafeel* refused to allow him a change in sponsorship. Another science graduate, brought to work in a chemistry laboratory, was forced to work among laborers and

made to live in a tent in the desert but not allowed a change of *kafeel* when offered a job befitting his qualifications. Foreign workers, by certain provisions of law, are almost bonded servants of the *kafeel* because once they enter the country, they cannot leave without the written consent of the *kafeel*, counter-confirmed by the Passport and Immigration Office. All foreigners entering the country for work and residence have to give finger prints to be kept with the local Crimes Investigation Agencies. The 'exit permit' must be shown at the airport before departure, without which a person cannot leave the country. Many employees reported that they could not attend the funerals of their parents or other relatives because it took them around a week to get the 'exit permit'. On the other hand, the *kafeel* has also the right to get his foreigner employee expelled from the country for whatever reasons he may have; the excuse may simply be that he did not like the employee. With the legal powers to stop an employee from leaving the country, and keep him/her at whatever wages and job conditions, and the powers to get him expelled without even paying his dues, whatever happens to the employee finally boils down to the moral character of the employer especially because there is scant recourse to justice and courts. And because the courts function in as arbitrary and unpredictable a manner as most native employers do (be they prestigious state or private organizations), the lower class workers in particular are at the mercy of their employers. I have seen Indian and Filipino women enslaved for decades, and prosperous and prestigious organizations playing with job contracts to squeeze even professionals into wages, housing, and allowances considerably lower than those promised at the time of interview in the employee's home country or in a third country.

(2) A foreign employee may bring his family to the country of work only if his salary is more than a certain amount and if the *kafeel* agrees to become the *kafeel* of the employee's family as well. Because most workers earn almost a fourth of the fixed amount, they are not allowed to bring their families, and hence have to live for years without seeing their families.

(3) A foreigner cannot have rights of permanent residence, let alone local nationality, however long he stays in the country, or even if he/she was born and brought up there, and hence cannot have any rights equivalent to those of the host nationals (there are rare exceptions where citizenship has been granted by the rulers at their discretion to their favorites). Foreigners have no rights to welfare measures (we are referring here to legislative measures but one may find rare exceptions where a generous patriarch may, for example, pay the medical expenses of his employee).

(4) Non-Arab men are not allowed to marry Arab women but an Arab man can marry a woman of any nationality. Foreigners cannot own any businesses of any size or kind, and are not allowed to buy any property (a few exceptions exist where the rulers have bestowed certain privileges to their favorites). However, a foreigner may run a business if a native is the *kafeel* or the owner of that business. Because most natives are not keen at running businesses, the said law allows them to take advantage of the entrepreneurial aptitude of a foreigner whereby a native becomes a business *kafeel* and takes a regular payment from the foreigner business keeper in return just for being his legal *kafeel*.

(5) In the eye of the law, Indians, Srilankans and Filipinos are not treated the way Arab women and men are. Arabs can get away with what could lead a lower income Indian straight to prison and deportation. Even the 'blood money rates' (*Qasas* is the money paid to the relatives of a victim of homicide or, of one who died in an accident) are different for different nationalities and are normally linked not only to the earning capacity of the victim but to his/her nationality as well: Relatives of Indians, Bengalis, Srilankans and Filipinos are normally awarded the lowest 'blood money'. But again, the law relies heavily upon the arbitrary judgements of the police and the *qazis* (Islamic judges).

(6) In a *Sharia* court, the testimony of two women equals that of one man. Likewise, the blood-money prescribed for a woman is half that for a man of comparable socio-economic status. A woman cannot travel out of country without her husband's written consent. An Egyptian female university teacher was working in a Gulf state. She went to Egypt on vacations and had some argument with her husband who then went to the authorities and barred her from travelling abroad. When she could not reach her university four months after the vacations, her job was terminated.

Employers of higher-ranking employees cannot always restrict their employees from changing jobs and therefore when a high-ranking employee resigns against the wishes of his employer, the two may not part as friends. To a large extent, the Arabic-Islamic employer psychology prevails among most Muslims; the following was reported in Britain:

'At my two weeks notice to resign, the owners (British Muslims) got so offended and angry that they said, "don't wait for two weeks, you better pick up your things and leave right now; you are sacked - just go"'.

Resignation is usually considered an affront to the owners, and so, Arab employers in particular, and Muslim employers in general, usually try to sack an employee if they find out that he is going to resign at some future date. At an Arab bank, an officer was fired only

because he had appeared in an interview for a better paying job with another bank. There is a cultural aspect of this situation whereby the one who makes "the first move" (a resignation is often seen as a 'move' or an insult to the patron-employer, while sacking is an exercise of the employer's privilege however insulting to the employee), is perceived the 'cleverer', which perception is a derivative of Islamic ethics whereby preemptive strike has been, historically, not only allowed but considered 'wise' as well.

A study of employment legislation in the Gulf states not only shows blatant racism and sexism in its clauses, it also shows that a legislation reflects the historical nature of a culture unless made by scholars who are well-informed, well-read in the history of legislative systems and laws, pay due attention to human psychology, ambitions, and motives, conduct thorough debates and analyses, and are willing to depart from historically transmitted primitive attitudes where necessary. Debates on jurisprudence and legislation in Europe were one factor in social and cultural transformation, but in the Middle East, open debate on legislation is not allowed, and those few who are responsible for the formation of legislation, do so with a view to perpetuate and preserve the oppressive culture and not transform it sufficiently to make it, at the least, comparable to modern democracies. Hence, there are aspects in the said legislation which will be considered sub-human by the one who looks at them in an objective, unbiased manner, and whose primary concern is not to preserve the traditions but to see them in the light of basic human rights.

A fundamental aspect of jurisprudence, namely equity, does not reflect in the Middle Eastern laws. Not only is the interpretation and implementation of various laws inconsistent, but the contents too vary in their effect according to the nationality, race, and socio-economic status of the persons involved, thus showing the primitive-tribal cognitive nature of the said society despite its having taken on a modern material cultural facade. The interpretation of the law for a man of higher status would be different from that for a man of lower status. Workers are at the lowest end of the social hierarchy and because almost all manual workers are foreigners, the racist essence of the employment legislation becomes obvious.

Despite all that has been mentioned above, and much more, protest comes only from those who can afford to quit and have the necessary resources and contacts to be able to leave the country at a short notice. Among the native public, not even a concept of unions and associations exists.

An explanation for the absence of organized group or collective protest is as follows:

The relationship between autocratic values, fatalism, mysticism, and 'divine providence'

While in Western cultures, the symbols of authority would not be confused, the legal norms would be clear, and the syntax of laws would not allow variety of interpretation, a glaring example of confusion can be seen in the Islamic judicial system, the *Fiqah*, based upon the Quranic verses with such a variety of interpretation[3] that dozens of *Fiqah* battle against each other; it must be mentioned that a confusing judicial system which cannot even be challenged because of its claimed divine origins, can only lead to an arbitrary social control and hence compound subjectivity in the society. It could be estimated that a majority of the world cultures still hold punishment, the negative reinforcement through penalties, as means of social control, at times also as means of organizational control. The negative affect generated by punishment[4] can spread to objects and behaviors different from the intended target (Katz and Kahn, 1978: 310). In many cultures, for example in Saudi Arabia, ego-defensiveness results because penalties are tied not only to the consequences of situations and proscribed actions, but also to the personalities of the accused and those of persons in power. 'Authoritarianism' in the Western sense, fails to convey the true meaning and extent and nature of control in many societies. While the European jurisprudence takes account of the circumstances, situation, and frustrations, motives and intentions of the offender, the Islamic *Fiqah* is based upon the doctrine of penalties to avenge, not to reform, and the control it imposes is total and unchallenged; hence its survival for centuries despite its obvious weaknesses and atrocities[5].

[3]"...if there are many varying interpretations, then the law is not seen as having a character of its own but a means for obtaining individual advantage" (Katz & Kahn, 1978: 308).

[4]Experiments have demonstrated that positive reinforcement is a more reliable and easier technique to administer and is also less subject to side effects (Maier, 1949).

[5]We note in the following lines, the effects of coercive control as constraint, avoidance, and alienation of people from socio-organizational processes; the said effects are obvious in most Muslim countries, particularly in the Middle East: "When even minor dissidence incurs great penalties, dissidents are few. Most revolts in social structures are easily quelled by invoking the symbols of authority. Nevertheless, to escape the shortcomings of negative motivation, modern [Western] tendency is to gear the desired behavior to the internalized motives. Constraint and avoidance [as results of intimidation] are not the psychological conditions for new and constructive activity. Etzioni has correctly emphasized the alienative character of coercive measures" (summarized from Katz & Kahn: 311-12).

In the below quoted[6] words of Milgram echoes one of our recurring themes, namely the significance of cognitive culture in shaping patterns of control and conflict. Milgram's findings show that common ethics and mores (to hurt someone is bad) could be easily overridden by the instructions of an institution of the establishment. In many societies, hurting someone for one's interests is not considered too bad and many cultures in fact approve of such behavior; in such cultures, social control in fact works the opposite to that in civilized countries, so that in aggression-prone cultures, the non-aggressive is more likely to suffer from neurosis: During my visits to Lahore Mental Hospital, I found two men, classified schizoid, who felt the 'guilt of being weak' for they belonged to a culture where non-aggressive/non-violent men were scoffed at.

Autocratic cultural values determine the way in which legitimate power could be turned into personal power, or whether legitimacy of some sort is sought or not. In the Western organizations, power is considered at its best if it remains invisible but in most Muslim countries, most parts of the sub-continent and the Middle East, the tendency is towards an exhibition, even flaunting of power. It maybe argued that the greatest power is the one which keeps issues from being spoken about[7].

A consequence of the sheer weight of religious tyranny is that the under-privileged classes in the said countries commonly believe in fatalism. When they see their misery and poverty against the equally obvious riches and waste of the vainglorious landlords and capitalists, fear of repression generally keeps them from thinking about building a more just and fair society through group social action such as a long-term rational thinking would imply. The most common reaction, under the spell of a common belief in machismo and religion is to improve the individual lot at the expense of other individuals within their own class; they go on under-cutting each other's wage demands. After suffering from misery and

[6]Milgram's (1963) experiments, in which 26 out of 40 subjects obeyed the instructions to deliver shocks to the end, are commonly known as studies of obedience per se; in fact they are more revealing of socio-cultural control because his subjects, as elaborated by Milgram, were voluntary participants and had all the options to quit: "Obedience occurs as an instrumental element in a situation that the subject construes as significant and meaningful. He may not be able to see its full significance, but he may assume that the experimenter [or the higher authorities] does" (summarized from Milgram, 1963: 377).

[7]"There are unspoken issues from the trivial to the revolutionary, the 'un-spokenness' of which is itself evidence of power. Not only are decisions the outcome of power processes, so are 'non-decisions'" (abridged from Hickson et al. 1980: 53).

inter-class or state violence for years, to add to their misfortune, they produce too many children under the spell of mystic beliefs (see chapter 16) that children would bring luck or favour in old age, thus driving the market rate of wages further down. By the time they have realized some of their mistakes, they have had so many quarrels amongst themselves that any faith in group activity is lost.

Asian workers in British organizations: Some cultural factors in the reasons for union formation and in the perception of union powers

Compared to the aforementioned situation in the sub-continent and the Middle East, there is hardly any racism in Britain nor are there laws which could be described as 'racist'. Wages and working conditions are incomparably better. Governmental action for ethnic minorities (council housing, welfare measures, basic human rights, familial rights) helped the immigrants bring over their families and become permanent citizens. Many took advantage of the humanistic attitudes of European governments and societies to make themselves comfortable in Europe. Citizenship enables one to be legally at par with the ethnic majority and the jurisprudence is one of the most humane and scrupulous that man has ever designed. However, perhaps it is in the nature of man that, while in depravation he may think he would be happy if food, clothing, and shelter were guaranteed, he quickly takes his newly won rights and privileges for granted and moves on to the next level of demands.

Many Asian workers in several British factories have tried at various times to form unions but generally they stay aloof from White workers and their unions. At a certain British-American factory, some Asian workers secretly tried to make a union when, reportedly, there was no need for it because their demands were likely to be met by the management and they were already getting good wages. However, the said workers wanted to make a union because they believed that union leaders were dignitaries and being one would mean an elevation of status[8]. In many examples we find that Asian employees show a fear of management whereby they find it difficult to enter into open communication and this fear could be a primary cause for assuming that the management would not listen to them and hence, in the said case, they engaged in unnecessary union forming. In the said British-American factory, the White workers had no such fear of management and because of

[8]For detailed narration, see page 360 statement 3.

cultural understanding, they found it easy to communicate with the management and get their demands accepted relatively easily which gave the impression to some Asian workers, that the White workers were on better relations with the management. Although the Asian workers in the said case kept it secret from the management that they were forming a union, one of them informed his supervisor who in turn let the cat out of the bag. Subsequently, fourteen workers who were found involved in union formation, were made redundant.

Asian workers have often been reported to behave more as competing individuals rather than as cooperating colleagues. This is one reason why Asian workers are not good at forming unions and taking organized collective decisions. When they take a collective action, many make phone calls to the managers telling them that they are not the ones creating problems but others are doing so[9]. If they decide collectively that they will not work on a certain day, on a bank holiday or some other holiday, they often go individually to the manager and say that it is the others who don't want to work. An interviewee said that it was similar to what happens between children and parents whereby each child tries to get more favorable treatment from the parents. Among reported reasons for not taking a collective stand, is the observation that Asian workers usually feel ignored, and, if they are qualified or skilled, they do not get treated better than an average worker. They therefore try to make themselves important in the eyes of the management. This also happens because even though one may be good at his job, competing fellow workers would discourage him so that barriers arise which keep people from taking group decisions.

We saw in chapters 2 and 9 that status symbols are so important in the sub-continent that people go to great lengths to acquire higher status and move away from manual work. We saw that people 'promoted to office jobs' refused to do manual-technical work though they were not trained for office jobs. We saw similar motivation in people trying to get higher posts perceived as prestigious, and we saw in chapter 12 that the Asians who became 'team leaders' in a factory in Britain, tried their best not to operate machines and to retain their 'elevated status'. Indeed, the concept of 'high status' explains a large part of behaviour

[9]An interesting similarity exists here in that the records at the India Office Library show several examples of similar behaviour shown by many rulers of the Indian states and many Indian political leaders who used to approach the Viceroy and, in privacy, claim that they were more loyal than the other natives were, to the English, and wanted to serve them better. But in their public statements, along with the other Indians, they used to denounce the British (see Wali Khan, "Facts Are Sacred", Vanguard Publishers, Lahore).

in the sub-continent where being a political leader is almost an acme of social status so that there is a strong motivation among many manual workers to form unions primarily because by being a union leader, they can jump up from a lowest social status to one significantly higher. Once accepted as union leaders, many refuse to do the jobs for which they were employed in the first place, and because of their pressure-group support, they cannot be compelled to work, particularly in state enterprises where it is difficult to sack an employee.

More over, there are certain concepts of masculinity and strength prevalent in the sub-continent and the Middle East whereby resistance and aggression are considered worthier than compromise and tolerance. The concepts are often applied and practiced in situations which do not require resistance and aggression; hence a major subjective cause of social conflict and violence. Many Asians came to Britain with the psychology of 'resistance and aggression' deeply instilled and ingrained and hence they saw the British environment too in their culturally conditioned context. Having been brought up in an environment of divisions and suspicions, and displays of strength and aggression, many see conspiracy and racism in British situations where there is none. At the workplace, many workers find it incredible to see that workers unions in Britain may cooperate and work together with the management: In their home countries, they had learned that workers union are formed primarily to resist and 'counter-attack' the 'evil schemes' of managers and owners. An interviewee who was in a very good job with a work environment where there was no need for the union to call for strikes, said, showing his cultural conditioning, that the union 'colluded' with the management because the former was not a 'strong union'. His statements reveal a view of 'strength' as necessarily incorporating a manifestation of resistance if not aggression even if there is little need for conflict. This is obvious in that the said interviewee first appreciated the firm for its high pay and good facilities, and yet believed that the union was "not strong because there was never a strike and because it colluded with the management".

Many incidents of seemingly irrational behaviour that I have seen myself or have been narrated to me by others, reveal deeper cultural perceptions and conditioning. In the case of a strike at Courtauld[10], Mr. K, a training officer and a comparatively higher status man in the factory, was seen by his compatriot workers as an agent of the English management and thus not trusted (the supervisor's typical role-conflict). The reasons for a walk-out by a

[10]For details of Asian workers' strikes in Courtauld, see page 358 statement 1.

group of representative Asian workers, without proper discussion with the management and without properly sharing information among all workers, could be traced to the cultural conception that saying "no" means power. "They need us", the leaders typically tell the workers, "just walk out and show them our strength and unity, and they will come behind us with concessions and increments in wages". Then, as may happen in authoritarian cultures, when the manifestation of strength does not lead to the desired consequence but to the opposite, the backlash and the increasing realization of weakness may force the rebel to succumb to authority and even worse conditions than those he had had before. In the aforementioned strike at Courtauld, the workers on strike were all dismissed and some were later taken back on new contracts with conditions that were stricter than before[11]. Through interviews, I was able to gather enough evidence to see the following pattern of attitudes of Asian workers[12] on strike in White owned factories: In almost all reported events of strike, I found that most Asian workers, (i)did not consult the 'White' unions, (ii)took action in a haphazard and abrupt manner (wild cat strikes), (iii)mostly, individually, betrayed the decisions that were taken collectively, and, (iv)after getting sacked, regretted their action and wanted to be taken back.

Remarkably similar to that in the sub-continent, the collective action of Asian workers in conflict situations is often non-unionized, chaotic, and egotistical rather than organized and reasonable. In many situations of conflict, as said earlier, phoney leaders emerge due to a cultural glorification of leadership behaviour though they may not have the required abilities, skills, knowledge and potential to lead the workers and help the organization.

The above reported description of conflict behaviour is different from that reported about the behaviour of White workers. The White workers take their issues, about pay scales or other matters, to their unions and the unions pick up their fights with the management. Once a decision is made collectively, all involved accept it and do not individually betray it.

In sub-continent industry and politics, those involved in disputes often become ill-

[11]Lawrence and Lorsch (1967-b) show that forms of conflict could be limited by a requirement that issues be presented by special representatives, but the use of representatives was not accepted by Asian workers at Courtauld in Manchester and in some other factories; the said workers had a culturally engendered belief that the presence of "all workers" and a "great show of force" would intimidate the management to accept wage increase demands.

[12]Typical interviewee statements have been given in pages 358 to 362 section titled: 'Asian worker's attitude towards unions in native British/English Firms...'

tempered quickly, less tolerant when they should be more so, and do not deal with the conflict situation in a cold, calm and sensible way. Most Asians in Britain often show similar attitude when in conflict. It may be said that they had hardly any experience of democratic methods of conflict resolution in the sub-continent. Hence, as is often reported and frequently observed, where Asians are in control of offices or organizations, as a senior manager said,

"all they heard about democracy was here, and now, if you go around in the community, the processes are misused in the name of democracy."

We may conclude that there is a direct relationship between protest behaviour and expectation. Democratic societies, with their safe official channels of protest registration, raise the expectations of people. Motivation and morale are linked to expectations and although there is greater motivation among Asian workers to work for White firms, it is in these that official protest is lodged more than in the Asian firms. Some reasons for Asians demanding greater facilities in British firms, but not in Asian firms where working conditions are much worse (see chapter 13 for details), were found to be the following:

- (i) Awareness of more rights in Western firms than in Asian;
- (ii) a more skilled and experienced labor force is employed in Western firms than in Asian firms. English factories prefer experienced employees over new entrants while Asian factories tend to take on the cheapest labor, YTS trainees, women, illegal immigrants etc., except for key tasks where experience is essential (see chapter 13 for details);
- (iii) cultural factors such as in-group/out-group psychology reflected in the proverb, "one of your kind, even if he kills you, would give a decent burial" (see chapter 14 for details);
- (iv) greater expectations of Asians from Western ownership than that from Asian. Hence British Asians make many demands which would be unthinkable in their home countries and which would not be granted by autocratic Asian employers.

It may safely be stated that because of the expectation dimension, the frequency of protest action is not necessarily a valid indicator of bad working and living conditions.

Summary and contributions of chapter 15 towards the Grounded Theory to be proposed

- (1) Despite obvious exploitation of workers and white collar staff, in the sub-continent, trade unions have not been as successful as those in the West. The reasons were found to be;
 - (a) pseudo-leaders elevated due to the possession of property or clout or 'nuisance value', motivated by an excessive culture-instilled desire to be a leader despite incompetence;

(b)abuse of positions and powers by union officials; (c)replacement of 'class consciousness' among workers by ethnic, religious, linguistic, and tribal groupings; (d)an patriarchal respect for the rich whatever his moral character and sources of wealth; (e)violence on both sides, also diverted towards communal wars (see chapter 5 for details). (f)repression, superstition, over-procreation, and the consequent greater economic burdens make most stay neurotic-arrogant and irrational.

(2)In most Middle Eastern countries, employees unions at all levels are totally banned and protest often brings horrendous consequences. Although countries once colonized by one of the European powers, do have some legislative aspects derived from their European heritage, employment legislation in the Gulf states is derived from the following sources: (a)The decisions and decrees issued by the autocrats; (b)advisory bodies of tribal *sheikhs* or commercial/industrial elite; (c)ministerial committees; (d)traditional tribal-patriarchal ethics whereby an employer is the patron of the employee, a dependent who must forsake some of his rights, including the right to change employment against the employer's wishes; (e)remnants of the traditional values of the Arabian slave society preserved in religious verses and consequently reflected in the employment legislation whereby an expatriate, (i)cannot change his *kafeel* and cannot leave the country without the written consent of the *kafeel*, counter-confirmed by the Passport and Immigration Office; (ii)must give his finger prints to be kept with the local crime investigation agencies; (iii)must show an 'exit permit' at the airport before departure; (iv)can bring his family to the country of work only if his salary is more than a certain amount and if the *kafeel* agrees to it; (v)cannot have rights of permanent residence or citizenship, however long he stays in the country, or even if was born and brought up there, and hence cannot have any rights equivalent to those of the nationals; (vi)has no rights to welfare measures; (vii)cannot own any businesses or property, but may run a business for a native owner; the said law allows the natives to take advantage of the entrepreneurial aptitude of a foreigner or take regular fee from the foreigner business keeper in return just for being his legal *kafeel*.

Because the *kafeel* has the legal powers to stop an employee from leaving the country or keep him/her at whatever wages and job conditions, whatever happens to the employee finally boils down to the moral character of the employer especially because there is scant recourse to justice and the law relies heavily upon the arbitrary judgements of the police and the *qazis* (Islamic judges). Despite all mentioned above, and much more, among the public,

not even a concept of unions and associations exists.

(3) Compared to the aforementioned, the British situation is incomparably humane and scrupulous but many Asians in British organizations have tried at various times to form unions and protest groups primarily to seek an elevation in social status. However, the general behaviour of Asian unions has been explained as: (a) competition where cooperation is required; (b) discouraging each other from taking initiative; (c) a view of unions as necessarily incorporating resistance, if not aggression, even if there is little need for conflict; (d) certain concepts of masculinity/ strength whereby resistance and aggression are considered worthier than compromise and tolerance, an attitude which is a major subjective cause of social conflict: Having been brought up in an environment of divisions and suspicions, and displays of strength and aggression, many see conspiracy and racism in British situations where there is little or none; (e) the cultural conception that saying "no" means power.

Evidence suggests the following typical pattern of attitudes of Asian workers on strike: In almost all reported events, the Asian workers, (i) did not consult the 'White' unions, (ii) took action in a haphazard and abrupt manner (wild cat strikes), (iii) mostly, individually, betrayed the decisions that were taken collectively, and, (iv) after getting sacked, regretted their action and wanted to be taken back.

Remarkably similar to that in the sub-continent, the collective action of Asian workers in conflict situations is often non-unionized, chaotic, and egotistical rather than organized and reasonable. In many situations of conflict, as said earlier, phoney leaders emerge due to a cultural glorification of leadership behaviour though they may not have the required abilities, skills, knowledge and potential to lead the workers and help the organization.

The above description of conflict behaviour is different from that reported about the typical behaviour of White workers: The White workers take their issues, about pay scales or other matters, to their unions which then pick up the issues with the management. Once a decision is made collectively, all involved accept it and do not individually betray it.

Reasons for Asians demanding greater facilities in British firms, but not in Asian where working conditions are much worse (see chapters 11, 12, 13), were found as follows; (i) awareness of more rights in Western firms; (ii) a more skilled and experienced labor force is employed in Western firms; (iii) cultural factors such as in-group/out-group psychology (see chapter 14 for details); (iv) greater expectations in Western firms than that in Asian or Arab.

Findings in the Middle East show that legislation should be made by scholars well-informed in human psychology, ambitions and motives, conduct thorough analyses, and are willing to depart from historically transmitted traditions where necessary for the sake of human rights. The inequity in the contents and the inconsistency, in the interpretation and implementation of various employment laws, according to the nationality, race, and socio-economic status of the subject, show how a subjectivist cognitive culture can lag so far behind (to its own long-term detriment), in the sophistication of social control, conflict resolution and motivation techniques despite having taken on a modern material-culture facade.

The chapter sums up many comparative and recurring themes of this work;

(i) similarities in Asian union behaviour in the sub-continent and in Britain, despite great differences in the two societies, demonstrate the high significance of immediate cultural learning in the social institutions of a culture; (ii) lack of protest and union formation in the Middle East despite a high degree of injustice shows clearly that actual or potential conflict cannot be properly understood without registering the control dimension; (iii) more protest registration by Asians in 'White owned' organizations than in Asian (or Arab) clearly links conflict to the extent of control and expectation as much as to injustice, if any, so that it may safely be stated that because of the expectation dimension, the frequency and extent of protest action is not necessarily a valid indicator of relatively bad working and living conditions. Protest behaviour is directly linked to expectations. Democratic societies, with their open official channels of protest registration, raise the expectations of people. Hence, British Asians make many demands which would be unthinkable in home countries and would not be granted by authoritative/autocratic employers.

Motivation and morale are linked to expectations, and although there is greater motivation among people to live in democratic societies and work for democratic or participative organizations, it is in these that official protest is lodged more than in the authoritarian/ autocratic societies and organizations where the consequences of high control show in loss of motivation and intermittent violence.

The links between control, conflict and motivation become very explicit in this comparison of union behaviour in three cultures. The findings shall be used to deduce our Grounded Theory that patterns of organizational behavioral factors are shaped by the structures and functions of the broader socio-cultural institutions.

Chapter Sixteen: The Key Issues Raised in this Work and their Solutions

In the empirical investigations narrated so far, the following key issues were found:

The relationship between socio-cultural structure and organizational structural imperatives

It was found that the structural features of society (social stratification), affect organizational imperatives (through corresponding hierarchical stratification) in the sub-continent and the Middle East in a much more obvious manner than they do in the West. For example, in chapter 2, we saw that in the sub-continent and Middle Eastern organizations, there is an explicit classification of persons with respect to class and cultural background, perceived socio-economic power and status, the way they are dressed and addressed, and their possessions. On the other hand, classification of persons in Western companies is more impersonal, related to the official designation and task-oriented. The relationship of power and promotion in Western organizations is related more to the performance of the person than to his socio-economic status. Likewise, in the West, there are less acute socio-economic differences, and manual work is not seen as a curse but something which ennobles man.

There are implications of status concepts (cultural, social and economic) and perceptions of people, for the way they categorize jobs, ranks and departments in terms of their 'worthiness'. Such a classification has implications for people's motivation, the way they control, and for potential for conflict. It is because of the acute social stratification, lack of social integration, and the consequent class-segregated organizational hierarchical levels that entrepreneurs from the two said cultures mostly follow theory X type of assumptions in their views of control, conflict and motivation but this is no longer the case in the West. The findings that in Britain[1], worker wages are much lower in Asian businesses than in English (chapter 13), and likewise, in the sub-continent and the Middle East, worker wages are much lower in native companies than in the MNCs (chapters 9, 10 and 13), reveals, as one indicator, that the sub-continent and Arab entrepreneurs determine the monetary worth of

[1]Most respondents in Britain mention dissimilarities in terms of class and culture based attitudes revealed by indicators such as the nature of supervision, feed-back and personal control, treatment given to new entrants, religious/life style tolerance, levels of wages, promotion opportunities, rest periods, extent of employer's trust, and fellow-workers' behaviour (chapters 11, 12, and 13).

their employees in accordance with sharp class, culture, nationality, and race distinctions.

The class and culture oriented dissimilarities between British and Asian businesses show in the ways in which hierarchy in the organizational structure is determined, authority, responsibility and accountability is defined and assigned to specific persons, jobs are defined, described and allotted, and procedures for the flow of work implemented: While in most British businesses, much of the above mentioned systems are established with scrupulous consideration for the task and human related factors in an impersonal and functional manner, in most Asian businesses much is left to be done on an ad-hoc and social status basis. Hence most Asian businesses try to get the cheapest form of workforce and deal in such products (textile, knit-wear, food products etc.), services (retailing, whole-sale, simple finance) and technology as can be comparatively easily made, used, or provided by unskilled or semi-skilled workers and semi-qualified staff, all of which reflects the relevance of a 'wide gap' income structure to the Asian way of organization. In other words, high-tech and creative organizations require low social stratification and narrower income gaps than the Asian and Arab culture allows for. A solution has to be found which could enable the said organizations to reduce the class barriers within organization and in society.

The relationship of aforesaid socio-cultural structure specifically with motivation and control

Because in the sub-continent and the Middle East, class memberships correlate with organizational hierarchical levels, concepts of social mobility, status and prestige shape the motivation and control patterns of most native people (chapter 2). Regarding control, we saw in chapter 2, that a decision made by a supervisor is not accepted by workers as easily as when it is made by higher managers because the workers feel that the supervisor is from their own "lower" class and thus have less deference for him than that for managers who come from a "higher" social class. Likewise, in the Middle East, a senior official from a perceived "inferior tribe" may not be obeyed (chapter 5) by juniors from a "superior tribe", even in organizations as performance-oriented as the armed forces. Regarding motivation, acute class distinctions often breed excessive motivation to rise above one's socio-economic class. As discovered, people are generally motivated to avoid manual-physical-centered jobs, and seek jobs that could grant them more money, higher status, public contacts, and more powers (chapters 2 and 4). Because academic qualifications help in obtaining higher status and a better paying job, many strive to get academic qualifications despite lack of real

interest in the subjects they study. Work, education, and organizations become instruments in seeking goals that lie elsewhere in society (chapter 4). Hence there is a need to offer solutions to channel control and motivation to work-related imperatives.

Major problems regarding motivation

The relationship of motivation to innovation, found in many Western organizations[2], is very hard to see in sub-continent/Middle Eastern companies. Because in the Western culture, intrinsic motivation and the need for achievement are more common observations than in the other two said cultures, it is safe to conclude that intrinsic motivation is a culture-bound need both in its existence and in its form. We have seen in chapter 8 that need for achievement (in the Western sense) is not strong among the Arabs. We have related the need for achievement to culture, personality-formation, and child-rearing practices. The oil-based affluent regions of Middle East are a testimony to the fact that, at a mass level, an almost complete satisfaction of lower level needs (physiological and safety) has not lead to a shift forwards to the fulfillment of higher-level needs as understood and expected in the theories of Maslow and McGregor. Likewise, Pakistanis in Britain, who found the satisfaction of basic needs guaranteed by the British welfare state (chapters 4 and 13), show only faint signs of a shift to higher level needs as understood and expected in the said theories. We therefore conclude that the development of higher level needs in man does not take place spontaneously but is strongly related to one's learning in a certain socio-cultural and ethical environment under moderate economic pressures; that the kind of motivation one has is primarily determined by the kind of messages that prevail in a certain society, by the type of socio-familial structure one lives in, by the prevailing norms, values, dogmas and beliefs that people are programmed with, and that despite the pretence of individual independence, the masses of people, with all their idiosyncrasies (that are often of a less significant nature) are motivated by the common prevalent values and limitations of the society they are brought up in. Even the idea that intrinsic motivation is desirable, is a learned idea which, in many cultures, at least at mass level, does not exist.

[2]Gregory (1983: 373) notes about Silicon Valley computer companies that innovation in general and new products in particular are highly valued. The opportunity to work on "the newest, whizziest product" is sought while "maintaining" last year's product is assigned to junior, low status employees.

The purely instrumental/extrinsic nature of work in the sub-continent is obvious from the fact that the vast majority of job seekers think about the organization and job description only when they have choices, in which case it is not the nature of the work that determines their selection but the social status (chapter 2) attached to the job, the level of income[3], and the opportunities of promotion etc.[4]. We shall discuss how extrinsic motivation could be reduced in a society.

Major problems regarding control

Some major cultural differences in the exercise of authority between Western and other two organizations are that while in the former, influence transactions are relevant to organizational roles, in the latter, they are also related to one's social and personal roles (chapters 2 and 15); while in Western organizations, power is vested in the position, it may also be personalized in the latter (chapters 6, 8 and 15); while in the West, the pyramidal hierarchical organizational model is not the only choice (matrix and democratic/participative models are also in vogue), in the sub-continent and the Middle East, the hierarchical organization (chapter 8) with status, prestige, rewards and power following the pyramid of ranks, is still prevalent. In the Middle East, even universities and research institutions are formed and run on a softer form of the military model; the legislative powers, the prerogative to hire and fire, to form policies and procedures, are vested in the top ranking few; orders flow from top down; lecturers, teachers or researchers are supposed to follow orders to implement the programs with minimal participation in decision making (chapter 8).

[3]While there is little doubt that money is the key motivation in the sub-continent, Middle East, and among British-Asians (chapter 4), because of the complex nature of different societies, it would be safe to conclude that the nature of such motivation is formed by more than a few factors: These are the factors of reason, religion, caste, social class, economic class, socio-cultural and familial structure and the consequent obligations, sub-culture, and the general level of development of a society (chapter 4). The above mentioned factors form a particular matrix of motivation patterns for a group of people.

[4]Dubin and Goldthrope et al. (Burrell & Morgan, p. 175, p. 195) also have demonstrated that people may seek to minimize their commitment to work and obtain satisfaction (in terms of psychological needs, goals, and personal values) elsewhere; Burrell & Morgan state: "*The psychological analysis in terms of needs is thus modified in terms of the sociological factors which influence attitudes to work*". Goldthrope et al., in their study of industrial workers found a markedly instrumental orientation.

While control attitudes in the sub-continent and the Middle East are more based on perceptions of the subject's social power (chapters 2, 6 and 15), control attitudes in Western firms are more task-related and based on organizational imperatives. Means of control in the former organizations are more towards the coercive-utilitarian (chapters 6, 11, 8 and 15) end of the spectrum, but in Western firms, means of control are more towards the utilitarian-normative end of the spectrum. Non-work/personal control in the two former cultures is seen in undue exercise of commanding behaviour extended to what in the West is regarded as personal choices (chapters 8 and 11).

Major problems regarding conflict

Compared to that in the West, industrial relations situation in the sub-continent is far from harmonious. The population of Pakistan is more than twice that of Britain while the population of India is twenty times the same and, although most industrial produce finds its way highly profitably into their very large internal markets, potential and actual conflict at various levels, in conjunction with other cultural factors (chapter 5), hampers efficiency, effectiveness, and creativity in the sub-continent. However, contrary to that in the West[5],

[5]The traditional Western approach to conflict, as in modern Middle East and sub-continent, equated conflict with trouble-making, and sought avoidance by authoritative/legalistic repression of conflictive expression, and finding scapegoats (Kelly, 1974). But conflict in the West is now seen primarily as an integral and manageable part of the social and organizational process. Although many researches show a negative relationship between interunit conflict and performance of the organization (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967-a; Blau and Scott, 1963-b) in certain conditions, others find conflict of opinions, discussions and disagreements productive. Katz and Kahn (1978: 641) give a long list of researchers who see the positive effects of limited or controlled conflict; as leading to the discovery of better organizational arrangements (Follet, 1941), as necessary for progress (Van Doorn, 1966); as directing managerial attention to needed changes (Litterer, 1966); as bringing a dynamic situation into a better state of congruence with the facts of power (Coser, 1956); as effecting a search for better means of conflict reduction (March and Simon, 1958; Litterer, 1966); as a stimulus to interest and curiosity, to the full use of individual capacities, and as a welcomed means for testing one's abilities (Deutsch, 1971); Katz and Kahn quote that Hall (1971) has summed up such research to conclude that, "*conflict, effectively managed, is a necessary condition for creativity*", and also that Allport (1953), Hunt (1963) and Driver and Streufert (1964) propose many speculative benefits at the individual level, with the assumption that people require certain levels of stimulation and continuing experience of tension generation and reduction, within limits, to function well and with satisfaction. Ashforth (1995) has argued that even emotions are an integral and inseparable part of organizational life and often functional for the organization when applied to motivation, leadership and group dynamics.

conflict in the sub-continent and the Middle East, is most often viewed as the antithesis of social order. The main problem regarding conflict is that, while in the West a positive relationship between creativity of various kinds and controlled conflict has been established, in the sub-continent and the Middle East, conflict even if controlled, has associated negative connotations so that the popular attitude in general, and in management and administration in particular, tends to prohibit and oppress conflict at most levels (chapters 8 and 9). Such an approach is often dysfunctional for it channels conflict to non-work intra-level conflict (chapter 5) and results in the lack of creativity for the sake of conformity (chapters 8 and 9).

Segregation among sexes and the consequent sexist psychology not only leads to greater incidence of female sexual harassment (chapter 12), it also compounds community segregation by prohibiting inter-community marriages. Hence we observe group formation and conflict in the sub-continent on the basis of caste, region, language, religion, tribe and ethnic background brought into organizations (chapter 5)[6]. In the Middle East, we observe tribal conflict, along with other conflict, playing a prominent role in organizations including those as sensitive as the armed forces (chapter 5). Non-work conflict is seen in response to inequitable treatment, and about each other's values, beliefs and life-styles (chapter 13).

In Western companies, conflict is either related to the distribution of rewards or to the multi-occupational cultures and occupational ethnocentrism[7]. But in sub-continent and Middle Eastern organizations, intraorganizational conflict is more related to the contextual culture (chapters 5, 12 and 14). Therefore, we deduce that whilst Western companies primarily evolve a work-based culture, and even conflict is work-related[8], the other said

[6]Dubin and Goldthrope (Burrell and Morgan p. 206) have demonstrated that conflict based on plurality of group interests may be brought into the organization from outside.

[7]Examples of work-based soft-conflicts in Western companies are supplied in Gregory's (1983: 371-372) study of several professionals in Silicon Valley computer companies; Employees sometimes alluded to different occupation based or suborganization based cultures. "Hardware", "Software", "Engineering", "Marketing", or "Scientist" orientations were often mentioned. Just as more widely held cultures produce ethnocentricity, each occupational culture justifies its own centrality and emphasizes local priorities.

[8]The voluminous evidence for conflict behavior between organizational units shows the work-related nature of conflict in Western organizations: Walton and McKersie (1966), loci of conflict on resource allocation; White (1961) and Seiler (1963), loci on matters of jurisdiction between departments; Argyris (1964b), loci on autonomy and control between supervisors and those supervised and on questions of status and reward.

organizations are open to social divisions (chapter 5) which largely over-shadow their work-based cultures and may result in pseudo organizations (chapter 8).

Problems regarding control, conflict and motivation in conjunction

The findings that while workers in British-Asian organizations express little protest against authoritative owners (i.e. obedience to oppressive control) despite unfair working conditions and bad treatment, inter-personal conflict, turn-over, and wastage of time (i.e. low motivation) is much higher in Asian firms than in native-British (chapters 12, 13 and 15) lead us to believe that although high personal control may breed obedience to authority, it serves as a negative motivation[9] (chapters 8, 10 & 15). High control curbs work-related conflict and results in a loss of creativity. This is supported by overwhelming evidence from the Middle East where a repression of work-related conflict by autocratic, utilitarian and coercive control has led to an utter loss of intrinsic motivation and creativity. Repression of work-related conflict by high control has also channelled such conflict in the direction of non-work conflict, even violence, based on caste, region, language, religion, tribal and ethnic background (chapter 5)[10]. When we find people seeking jobs that grant influence, contacts, and domination over others (chapter 2) unprecedented in the West, it is not difficult to link

[9]Katz & Kahn (1978: 294) point to three major motivation patterns, namely compliance with rules, responsiveness to external rewards, and internalized motivation; in the first two of these patterns, the relationship of motivation to control is obvious as in the statement, "*Machine theory assumes that rule enforcement, or coercive compliance, is the fundamental pattern. Dahrendorf holds that rule enforcement creates its own antithesis. Marx also holds that differential rewards and hierarchical control are inimical to internalized motivation*". Handy (1981: 37-39) talks about a tacit psychological contract between the individual and the organization and mentions three types of organizations with coercive contracts, calculative contracts, and cooperative contracts thus reminding one of Etzioni's three kinds of power and compliance, which relates motivation to control.

[10]Hofstede's (1980) observations which provide support to a relationship between obsequiousness (personal control) and conflict are that more violence is found in the middle and in the upper third of PDI countries (Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Columbia, India, Italy, Pakistan, Peru, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela). On the other hand low PDI is more likely to be associated with a certain consensus among the population which reduces disruptive conflicts. Those lower in PDI (Austria, New Zealand, Israel, Denmark, Ireland and Sweden) are relatively stable pluralist systems.

Argyris (1964-b) relating loci of conflict to autonomy and control between supervisors and those supervised, shows the relationship of conflict to control.

such motivation to the security needs triggered by coercive control (chapters 6 and 15).

The consequence of misplaced controls, instrumental motivation (organizations used to seek strong familial goals), and suppression of conflict is that many native organizations are in fact, what I have termed, 'pseudo organizations' in that they consume huge resources but do not really achieve their stated objectives except in appearance so that the functions and procedures in the said organizations were found to be concerned with activities without real tangible results, that is, concerned with appearance rather than soul (chapter 8). I see pseudo organizations as a characteristic of 'imitation cultures' in which people borrow aspects or organizations from a 'genuine culture' perhaps because they need them or are impressed either by their functionalism or by their glamour, but because the said aspects or organizations have few roots in the 'imitation culture', they gradually reduce to what maybe symbolized as 'actions without much meaning', or 'forms without much content'. This, unfortunately, has happened to many developmental projects designed by foreign experts who perhaps did not have the capacity to explore the native culture in sufficient depth and hence primarily used 'self reference criteria' when planning for the sub-continent and Middle Eastern situations. However, while many local capitalists and bureaucrats offer cultural and religious excuses for the aforementioned problems at the workplace, better human resource practices of multinationals in the sub-continent and the Middle East create an optimism about these few companies.

Problems in the Eastern familialism

As a result of a major cultural focus on an exclusive familialism, there is a greater and exclusive involvement of the sub-continent-Middle Eastern family and the British-Asian family in businesses than is the case in Western businesses (chapter 3). There is evidence showing that the former families run businesses in the sole interest of the family prosperity often at the cost of social, legal, governmental, and moral concerns. More over, organizational patterns of control, conflict generation and resolution, and motivation, are strongly related to the same patterns observable in the families from which organizational participants come[see endnote 1]. In chapters 3 and 4, we saw that money motivation may be instilled into children at home by parents and elders, and materialized in the workplace: In-group/out-group psychology and racism as well as lack of inter-religious tolerance (chapter 14) (Sikhs, Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Whites, Asians) may also be imparted to children at

home and then expressed in the workplace; similar observations were made regarding the induction of patriarchal authoritarianism (chapter 7), personal control, non-work and religious control, and segregation of sexes, practiced in the workplace analogous to the way they are practiced in homes. For example, high personal control at family level has parallels in high personal control in the workplace.

Problems in the broader cultural context

I have provided ample evidence to show that control, conflict and motivation are as much interrelated as they are shaped by the contextual culture. Patterns of control are shaped by the religion and beliefs of employees as much as by work-related imperatives; patterns of conflict too are engendered as much by cognitive cultures as by work-related factors.

The empirical studies conducted for this work support our thesis that the influence of a social-familial culture reigns supreme over the organizational culture, and that many aspects of the latter are often an extension of the former. Hence, although native MNE personnel work with almost as much result-orientation as MNE personnel in Europe, this does not mean that MNEs in the sub-continent have the same organizational culture as they have in the West: Because of the nature of social relationships that exist in the sub-continent and the Middle East, cultural factors constantly interfere with the imperatives of organizational functioning as developed and understood in the West. A major difference between the former organizations and the Western, in terms of cultural focus, is the greater relevance of the contextual culture (religious, social, familial, national, ethnic) in the former than in the latter. For the reasons as mentioned, when offering solutions to the above mentioned problems, we shall offer possible solutions not only at the organizational level, but at cultural level as well.

What are the solutions to the problems pointed at in this work?

My twenty years of engagement with several socio-political groups/organizations working for socio-organizational reformation have made me rather pessimistic about certain cultures though I console myself by looking at other cultures that are continuously progressing. In offering solutions to the issues raised in this work, I am therefore standing at cross roads: I can hide behind the data to argue that the culture decides on its own whether it is going to prosper or not, or survive in one or the other way. The slave society also survived for centuries and even authoritarian and violent cultures survive for long. I can say

that democracy can work only when the culture has prepared people to listen to the voice of reason. When the culture does not do so, democracy and capitalism will not succeed to a reasonable level but neither will communism for it needs an even higher level of mass consciousness and humanism to function adequately. However, I am aware that such an attitude will be criticized as 'arm chair theorizing' and besides, a sense of duty forces one to think that there must be solutions.

The aims of science were once noted by some scholar as 'understanding, prediction and control of the phenomena under study'. In so far as understanding and prediction are concerned, it would appear to many, particularly the European readers of this work, that I have offered a gloomy picture (the tragedy of experience is that it can often not be transferred to those who live in a different socio-cultural context) of the majority in the sub-continent and the Middle East. This is mainly because, unlike many studies which focus at the tiny elite-business classes for their deductions and consequently, reflect the class-centered and 'politically correct' typical optimism of the elite, I have looked at the behaviour patterns of a sample that represents the vast majority of the people in question, and, used all methods that I could, to grasp the true essence of the two cultures in question. However, I am very well aware that the said people can improve their collective lot in a few generations by taking the 'right decisions' now. The purpose of my expositions is not to predict impending doom. Exposition is a first step to realizing what is wrong and perceiving its true depth if any remedies are to be sought. I have tried to understand, expose, and predict what will happen if history is allowed to take its own course as it has been so far in the said cultures.

In understanding the said cultures, I have arrived at two 'structural over-determinants' which I see as the main barriers to a desirable movement of these cultures, and the main causes of social stagnation; this needs some explanation: In 'Althusserian structuralism', at times one or more structural elements overdetermine [see endnote 2] the course of history: The configuration of particular over-determinations create in different societies quite different social forms. People's actions and historical events are determined fundamentally by the social formations in which they are located (Burrell & Morgan: 343-5; Marx see page 7).

The two structural over-determinants that I see as the main barriers to social progress are a particular type of familialism and a particular type of attitude towards religion in the contemporary sub-continent and Middle East. But before I prejudice my reader against the solutions to be proposed, let me emphasize that I am neither against the family system as a

mode of social life nor against religion per se. On the contrary, I am very well aware of the immediate risks to mankind and civilization if any of the two systems in question is blemished. However, the significance of both systems to the continuity of civilization, ipso facto, makes them the prime vehicles for the progress or stagnation of a society. In seeking certain changes, I am only criticizing the 'over-determinant' way in which the two systems in question have taken hold of the contemporary sub-continent and Middle Eastern cultures while in the West, a remarkable refinement in religious social control and the inclusiveness of individual and moral concerns within the family means that the two are no longer barriers to human progress in the sense explained in this chapter. Religions cannot be abolished but transformation must be allowed, as many Christian sects have done in the West, to adapt religions to modern circumstances and give people at least the freedom to use logical and basic solutions to their seething problems.

I shall now come to the third aforementioned aim of science and try to suggest ways to control and alter the future to a desirable direction of social harmony and prosperity which only then will be reflected in organizations in the form of work-related control, productive conflict, and a motivation to create in a work-related context. Because of limited space in this work, I shall discuss only two main solutions in some detail: One offers a materialistic, objective, and scientific approach (the experiments on the social behaviour of rats[11] in circumstances of over-population quoted in chapter 5 p. 79) and deals with the ill effects of the particular kind of familialism found in the two said cultures, albeit in varying forms, but is not specific to the said cultures; the Philippines, for example, suffers from similar problems and needs similar solutions as shall be offered.

The second solution looks at the subjective side of the human mind in offering possible methods of transformation of a cognitive culture and deals with the inappropriate view of 'immutable religion' in the said societies. However, in offering these two main solutions, I am also aware of the barriers, that will probably arise, to the implementation of the solutions to be proposed. I shall try to deal with all these issues in this chapter.

[11]Some readers might object to my reference to rats' behaviour in solving human problems, considering such an analogy a debasement of mankind. To such readers I recommend a stay in Bombay, Delhi, Karachi, Lahore, Cairo or in many other cities with similar problems, for profound observations over of a period of no less than one year and in the social position of an average-income person, divorced from the city upper classes. I am certain that a sensitive observer will then look at my 'rats analogy' quite sympathetically..

It is not difficult to find and implement solutions for organizational problems unless the solutions come in conflict with certain sensitive cultural symbols. In such a case, organizational change in the said two cultures gets inextricably linked to politics. This is because organizational development to a significant extent is not possible without significant socio-cultural changes of the type which require efforts of hundreds of intellectuals and a mass participation over longer periods of history (Burtrend Russell once said that if a hundred great thinkers of Europe had been killed in infancy, modern world would not have come into existence). In the West, the work of thousands of intellectuals, bit by bit, accepted gradually by the masses, has resulted in a reasonable level of cognition (and even then a lot is left to be desired) which most in the West now take for granted. In the other two cultures in question, the process has probably just begun and faces many threats. There are factors, inherent in these cultures, that inhibit the refinement of cognition, so that many argue that the cultures need radical transformation in several areas of social life. Hence, we shall look at solutions and barriers both at the organizational and social level.

Solutions at the organizational level

In chapters 9 and 10, we compared the working conditions between MNCs in the sub-continent and native companies and found that foreign companies have shown by example that a functional organizational environment with a primarily work-related control, conflict and motivation can be created. If the MNCs can do it in the sub-continent, so can the native organizations. For example, the native companies can adopt the same incentive structure that is being followed in the MNCs. This would lead to greater motivation and reduced conflict, as was found in the MNCs and described in chapters 9 and 10. In this respect, Sheriff's (1958) experiment showing that conflict could be generated or resolved by changing the incentive structure provides a vital clue to understanding the relationship of conflict with motivation in organizations that have immense gaps between employee salaries. In Sheriff's experiment, mere social interaction did not show conflict reduction but the introduction of superordinate goals which induced joint activity for common purpose did.

Many authors on organizational change have mentioned several kinds of reactions to change and reasons for resistance to change (Lippitt, 1982) and hence 'change management' is their theme. But these have been written in the context of Western culture which, unlike the other two, is not a barrier to many required changes. A change and development even

at the organizational level requires a long-term view of the situation: French and Bell (1970) suggest a period between three and five years. Lippitt (1982) gives some reasons, very valid in the sub-continent and the Middle East, for resistance to change and suggests the following to reduce such resistance; (i)make the employees participate in change; (ii)continuously provide information regarding the need and goals of change; (iii)take employee habits into consideration; (iv)stimulate the ambitious among the employees, and, (iv)use problem solving methods. Facilitating learning of new skills required in change helps adjustment to change.

Regarding the creation of work-related motivation in the two said cultures, managers can find many objective ways to relate rewards to performance and ensure that the personnel know that only work and performance can lead to higher rewards. Such methods can be found in numerous books on personnel management.

Regarding eliminating personal control, managers can design objective and impersonal systems of control, make it easy for the staff to understand the procedures, targets and goals, simplify them, and ensure knowledge by publishing them for reference.

Intra-level conflict can be reduced by institutionalizing equity in treatment (uniform pay scales within one rank, hiring, selection and promotion on the basis of merit) at least within a rank. Equity in treatment will also reduce conflict on the basis of nationality, race and region etc. by mitigating people's suspicions about each other: Many problems occur because people are not given the right information about their place and status in the organization so that they keep guessing and have no alternative but to form grape vines and listen to rumours. Regular and trustworthy publications from the seniors, imparting clarity about things such as the incentives and promotion systems for the staff, can allay their fears and diminish the bickering which is a consequence of abandoning the employees in the haze of half-information or ignorance.

Solutions to reducing coercive control in the organization, mitigating non-work conflict, and linking motivation to work and performance are often possible[see endnote 3] if the owners and managers show commitment to these. Examples where managers have successfully tried to shift management style from authoritative to democratic, along with suggestions in the light of such experiments, were summarized in chapter 6. In authoritarian societies, an advantage, that may be exploited by owners/managers, is the reverence that subordinates have for seniors; such a reverence can be positively used by the seniors to show by example and instruct their middle management to be more participative, democratic, and

supportive of the good work of the middle/junior staff[12]. In authoritarian societies, whatever comes from the top will be followed by those below in the hierarchy. In ancient times, if the king changed his religion, so did his subjects. Likewise, during Bhutto's government (1972-1976), most officers donned the *awami* dress and during the Zia regime in Pakistan (1977-1988), most bureaucrats had placed Islamic books on their shelves. Therefore, the prime responsibility for organizational change and development, in authoritarian cultures, rests with the top managers and the owners who can get their decisions (of decentralization, participation, and raising the cognitive levels of the lower ranks so that they could be made fit to share responsibility) implemented with much greater ease than their counter-parts in the West can. There is a need therefore, for the authoritarian senior to realize that by giving up some of his powers, he can share his burdens, reduce his responsibilities and while, in the short term, he might feel uneasy at not being the 'master', in the long run he can only have less stress and strain, feel the pleasure of being appreciated by those who benefit from participation, and enjoy the contentment of not being 'all in all'. While the authoritarian feudal lords, capitalists, bureaucrats, and religious leaders pay attention to the benefits of power-centralization, they ignore its self-destructive aspects. If they could see the advantages of power sharing (shared responsibility and accountability, less burden on one's shoulders, less stress) they would be willing to move towards democratic control where possible. There is evidence suggesting that such a movement towards greater participation and less coercive control has begun to show in the urban regions of India, remarkably paralleled at the social level by growing freedom that middle classes now allow to their children, and the growing acceptance of female employment and independence.

Regarding the Middle East, there are solutions at the organizational level such as, for example, in the immigration departments, the control procedures could be shortened or simplified. But these solutions will not be brought about primarily by the personnel who man these organizations because of reasons mentioned in chapter 8. Hence the solution lies in a social transformation which could enable the growth of people who are not, for example,

[12]Likert and Likert (1976) see conflict management as one derivative advantage of participative organizational structure (System 4), proposing supportive interpersonal style with emphasis on integrative goals, a de-emphasis of status, the use of consensus rather than majority rule, overlapping vertical and lateral membership, and, measurement and feedback with appropriate third party coaching, as means of bringing about such structural and interpersonal changes.

status-power-seekers for its own sake, who are creative and capable of designing everyday commonplace solutions to immediate routine organizational problems.

I shall not dwell much on organizational level solutions because of, that I shall be committing a logical fallacy, an inconsistency in my theory, by claiming that organizations can be radically transformed without a radical change in the culture on which they are predicated[13]. Organizational solutions can be offered by managers if they are 'made of the right stuff' which comes from the society. In the radical structuralist organization theory, the notion of 'totality' implies that it is crucial to study total social formations as a means of understanding the elements of a social system; organizations can be understood and radically changed only in terms of their place in the wider social formations within which they exist and which they reflect[14].

A solution to transforming subjectivist cultures: Objectivity generating education system

Social transformation in the Middle East can primarily be brought about by a radical transformation in the focus of education, starting from the primary schools, which requires the rulers, for example, to enact laws requiring that every five year old be sent to 'good' schools. It will be easy to do so in most Gulf states which have a relatively smaller population and enough resources to pay for. In future, the receding oil money and the burgeoning population will close this option too. In the schools, many cultural structural elements of the Middle East, if they are not to be a barrier to any desirable change, will need

[13]Burke and Litwin (1992), using a case study of British Airways, have shown that transformation in organizational mission, strategy, leadership and culture are a response to external environment. The former changes, in turn, affect organizational structure, systems and management practices leading on to influencing motivation and finally, performance.

[14]V. L. Allen's 'dynamic sociology' as an alternative to 'static sociology' implies that organizations are causally connected to their past states as well to the hidden and observable features of their environments, with which there is a perpetual process of interaction and absorption. We should be concerned with what properties organizations have in common with, as well as distinguished from, the environment; what is the meaning of organizational autonomy and what is the source of movement in organizations? Many writers such as Goldthorpe, Hyman, Fryer, and Brough have directed attention the possibilities for sweeping social change. Radical Weberianism also points towards the development of macro-theorizing of organizational process against the middle range theorizing (organizations interacting with environment) reflected in the work of the majority of organization theorists (summarized from Burrell & Morgan chapters on the radical structuralist theory).

transformation. One example of such cultural elements is the way the Arabic language is used to instill irrevocable fatalism and fear/reverence for traditional authority, such as the rebuff one receives for not using the fatalistic word *insha Allah* each time one refers to a future plan, or for not using the reverential titles with the names of office seniors, let alone political and religious dignitaries, or the vague notions of time and period in history inherent in the language (see Patai's chapter, "under the spell of language", details suggesting reformation in Arabic; such reformation has already been done in Hebrew to the benefit of the Israelis).

However, if modifying sensitive cultural symbols is too much for the Arabs to accept [see endnote 4], then there are other ways of reducing subjectivity in cognition: At the least, a good education with a strong focus on natural sciences must be made compulsory, starting from young children, in order to reduce the high subjectivism ingrained in the forms of social life in question. Compulsory education, for all the young, in natural sciences is a primary solution to the seething social stagnation for it will make the child think about the real, material, and vast world at an early age, thus, as if, 'vaccinating' him against the subsequent prevalent socialization to being egocentric, inward looking, subjectivist, and too proud to pay attention to others and to the realities of life.

That such a solution will succeed, became obvious to me when I noted, during giving private lessons, that children who were sent to Western schools at an early age, even within their home countries, were much more capable of looking at problems in an objective manner, and hence solving them with much greater ease, than those who had attended traditional schools, described in chapter 8, in their early formative years.

Education in natural sciences, without maiming the essence of scientific knowledge with belief systems, is essential at a very young age because once the fatalistic attitude has been instilled, the child will not understand the real difference between a scientific knowledge and other knowledge: It will come as a great surprise to many to know that the word *Ilm* and *uluum* (the plural of *Ilm*) is used in all Arab scientific research centers to denote both 'science' and 'knowledge', so that, I was shocked to find, even many Arab 'professors' saw no distinction between 'scientific' and other knowledge.

Many Arabs are aware that such a solution as proposed in this section, is badly needed. Hence the emphasis on education in Arabic has begun to recede so that in many Gulf states, teachers who were brought in to teach in Arabic, are being sent back and extensive programs in English as a medium of teaching are being designed. The native upper classes

have for long sent their children to Western schools, and even in their own countries, prefer American and British schools over the traditional ones. But the need is to provide objectivist education, in an objectivity-oriented language, for all, not just for the minority elite.

The Family Planning Solution: Understanding the relationship between over-population, coercive control, obsessive money motivation, nepotism, communal conflict, and mysticism

The population situation in the sub-continent and many Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt and Iraq, is as described by Maurice Dobb:

"In addition to abysmal poverty, a fairly common feature of underdeveloped countries is the existence both of a high population density in relation to area of cultivated land and a large surplus of manpower, unemployed or underemployed. ... In the towns there is similarly a pool of unemployed or irregularly employed, composed of landless persons or members of peasant families forced by debt or hunger to migrate to the towns in search of employment".

Population in Pakistan is growing at 6% while the maximum GNP growth in the last decade has been 3%. This reminds one of the numeric versus geometric progression of Reverend Malthus; "when food grains grow by 1, 2, 3..., numbers grow by 1, 2, 4,..."

It is obvious that so long as there are people vulnerable to coercion and allow themselves to be coerced and used in harsh working conditions at a pittance, there will always be coercive control in organizations, for such is the only way the poor can have their daily bread. To add to it, poverty is exacerbated and compounded by massive procreation, ironically, by the very poor in the sub-continent, leading to an over-supply of labour. Hence over-populations gets linked to coercive control. Because the poor over-procreate under the spell of superstition, religion and culturally engendered beliefs, these beliefs get linked to coercive control. Religion is linked also from another side; Hinduism and Islam both preach submission to the patriarchs and female submission to the male (*sati*). Hence there is 'divine' support for submission to high personal control. Carrying the analysis forward, we arrive at our thesis of socio-cultural determination of individual behavior.

When the over-populating poor cannot feed his kith and kin properly, let alone the issues of shelter, clothing, health, education, jobs, and old age destitution in a society without any state social security system, he gets neurotic, which further compounds his superstitions for he was never educated in the traditions of objective problem-solving. He is fatalistic by compulsion of the only mystic socialization he ever received. Therefore, he sees the only solution to his grinding problems either in rituals to please the divine or, obviously,

in money. The Hindus even have a goddess of wealth known as the '*Lakshmi Devi*' to which many of them address their prayers. Money becomes an obsession for reasons of poverty, and also, of an extravagant life style described in chapters 2 and 4.

The majority cannot get enough money for it is scarce. Many cannot even get jobs, and those who do have jobs find it hard to meet the ends for, unlike that in the West, they have to provide for their old parents, younger brothers and sisters (and there are many of them), wives and children (not a few). Many vent out their extreme frustration in the form of communal conflict: The Muslim blames the Hindu in the sub-continent and the Jew in the Middle East. The over-populating Asian in Britain talks about 'White racism'. The details of ethnic conflicts have been provided in chapters 5 and 14. The aggressive instinct is triggered by frustration and the person finds excuses in projecting blame to the other communities. The psychological evidence linking aggression to over-population in scarce resources has been provided by the aforementioned experiments about the effects of over-population on rats who become increasingly violent and aggressive as their population outgrows available resources in a controlled residential environment.

What are the solutions to the aforementioned problems? It is obvious that the Indian capitalist, out of the goodness of his heart, is not going to give four meals worth of money a day to a worker when he can get another at two meals a day, or a child worker who eats less than an adult[15]. Hence the relationship of the state providing 'basic social security' in order to reduce 'coercive control and communal conflict'. But universal social security cannot be provided, because the sub-continent states have no funds for it, and besides, the system will be open to gross abuse in conformity with the general inclination to corruption (as explained in chapter 13). What then is the solution?

In the poverty-stricken over-populated countries, the adoption of family planning has for long been advocated by the enlightened, as the primary solution to reducing the massive over-supply of labour and the consequent coercion, repression, and the inclination of the family-centric man to corruption self-justified on a figurative account of "a need to feed my children". Through family planning the supply of labour can be reduced to a level where the workers will be able to demand fair wages, as happens in Europe where almost half the non-

[15]Galbraith (1979) as the American ambassador to India, noted, "...*India, which, while it employs socialist rhetoric, remains a property owning republic with capitalist entrepreneurs who, for studied rapacity, can probably claim to be the equal of any...*"

Muslim population either do not marry or do not have children, and so the population growth rate is almost zero, if the 'Muslim effect' is ignored. Such reasoning is further supported by observations about the plight of Indian Muslims against the relative prosperity of Indian Parsees and Anglo-Indians (see chapter 5).

Nepotism also is primarily caused by the large net-work family where it becomes important for the head of the family to get his sons, brothers, nephews etc. placed into jobs. A small family, as an institutional base, will diminish the need for nepotism. More over, because of a smaller population, when the scarce resources will be available to most, there will be less cause for communal conflict. In smaller families, working members will have less economic pressures to support the non-working members of the family. Hence, they will have more economic freedom to think about intrinsic motivation and, rather than seek more money and do unwanted jobs to support the large family, they will be able to do things towards which they are naturally inclined[16]. Money motivation caused by insecurity will reduce when people will have smaller families. A shift of cultural focus from familialism to work-related attitudes will be more likely to take place. Consequently, when the people will be relatively prosperous, they will be less likely to succumb to coercive control. Hence family planning appears to be the primary solution to many evils. As a side effect, it will also decrease the pressure on the depletion of natural resources and degradation of the environment. Many large cities are already suffocating under the enormous smoke, traffic, noise, and concretisation of the few green belts left, all that serve as stimulants to neurosis and aggression (see the links here of a large family life-style to conflict).

Barriers to the proposed solution of family planning

It is not in the short-sighted self-interest of the upper and middle classes to uplift the

[16]Herzberg's (1966: 347) thesis that man can be happy only by seeking to satisfy both his animal need to avoid pain and his human need to grow psychologically, with psychological growth defined by Herzberg as, "creativity and individual initiative, artistic and scholarly interests, receptive openness to new insights, true relaxation and regrouping of growth potentials as contrasted with plain laziness, realistic attitude against vague aspirations, to fulfil himself as a creative, unique individual according to his own innate potentialities and within the limits of reality" (pp.343-44), could be validated in the sub-continent and the Middle East when most will learn not to equate growth and achievement only with having a family. At the moment, the majority may safely be placed as money seeker deriving the motivation to work from the claimed pleasures of having enough to enjoy closed family life.

cognition level of the lower classes, for the existing life-style of the latter provides the former with domestic servants, gardeners, cooks, drivers, child servants and workers at ridiculously low wages. Regarding the power-seeking and control-seeking culture-bred desires of people in the said two cultures, capitalism has made a lethal conjugation with the native culture so that the European sensible and humane capitalism stands in stark contrast to the Indian and Middle Eastern exploitative capitalism. On the other hand, the working class itself is prejudiced against small family life style and the modes of social conjugation other than the over-procreative family though, hypocritically, almost all men avail the opportunities they may find of extra-marital sex.

Serving as if the mouth-piece of the employers, the Islamic Ideological Council's Committee on Family Planning condemned family planning as unIslamic[17]. The reasons often given to justify a ban on family planning are that,

"Allah states in the Quran that it is He who creates life and He alone is the provider of all: Man's attempts to stop lives from coming into being show weakness of faith: Family planning is the conspiracy of the West to reduce the number of Muslim populace, a conspiracy that must be fought against: The Quran commands Muslims to be vigilant in their defence against non-Muslims; any reduction in numbers will mean less young men to defend our country and therefore all attempts at family planning must be abrogated".

However, the report did not lead the government to the closure of the Family Planning Association of Pakistan. It was renamed as 'Department for Population Welfare' and instructed to work discretely. Even the Islamist General Zia could not afford to lose funds donated by international aid agencies.

In most underdeveloped countries, the result of such fatalistic creeds means that it is most often the child's father who leaves the child at the workplace as soon as he is eight or nine with strict instructions to obey the master and bring some money home in the evening. In fact the most common argument in favour of large families given by the poor are the naive over-optimistic adages such as, "the more the hands, the more they will bring home; God has given man one mouth to eat but two hands to earn". Many continue procreation only to seek, or add to the number of, male children.

How can the vast majority of poor in Pakistan or Egypt, for example, be made to adhere to family planning and proper brought-up of their children rather than letting them

[17] Report of the Federal Islamic Ideological Council's Committee on Family Planning, headed by Maulana Zafar Ahmad Ansari, Government Press, Islamabad, 1985.

grow on streets as they do now? Suppose the government announces a reward money for each vasectomy. Pretty soon, fake certificates of vasectomy, because of rampant bribery, will appear for which some antidote will have to be found. The sufferings of the female family planning workers in segregated societies where sex is a taboo subject, are another problem. For more than a decade, as a voluntary worker for the Family Planning Association of Pakistan, I saw that resistance to family planning was embedded in the Pakistani cognitive culture[18] and therefore, I shall suggest some methods of transformation of a traditionalist cognitive culture (defined on page 246).

In the Middle East, an artificial prosperity based on oil sales has so far hidden the aforementioned consequences of overpopulation. The Middle Eastern rulers channel some oil wealth to grant basic social security to all and hence we do not see, at the workplace, coercive control on the prosperous natives, but only on expatriate workers who come to the Middle East because of grinding poverty back home. The Gulf states social security has further supported the overpopulating behaviour commanded by the tribal ethics. The oil is expected to run out in not too distant future and the Gulf states will find themselves with a burgeoning population but without significant skills to compensate for the receding oil revenues. The conflict-prone cognitive culture is then strongly likely to show with a ferocity matched by recent events in Zaire, Yemen, and Bahrain.

Some optimism for India

In India however, many required social changes are tacitly being brought about by the growth of capitalism in the urban areas. For example, the increasing financial problems of modern life and the consequent emphasis on calculation of one's income and expenditure have pressed the urban middle classes to happily accept family planning. Also, to some extent, people engaged in non-familial modes of sexual gratification are ignored if not tolerated, but then, the middle classes have never been as subject to coercion as have been the working classes. The government of Indira Gandhi tried its best to bring about family

[18]Tominaga (1991), drawing on the works of Max Weber to understand delayed modernization in Japanese kinship and family systems, concludes that in non-Western societies, economic modernization, first directed towards societal and cultural modernization, is the most difficult to achieve. In order to achieve societal and cultural modernization, three essential conditions must exist; (1)diffusibility of modernizing values; (2)motivation in accepting these values; and (3)possibility of accepting these values without causing conflict.

planning by incentives and rewards but at that time the cognitive culture of India was not as ready for transformation as it seems now. In the state of Kerala, mass education among women has reportedly led to a common acceptance of family planning and a major role of women in cultural transformation. More female employment is also another dimension of the solution. Where female employment is growing, family planning comes naturally because working women cannot raise as many children as house wives possibly can.

The need to abandon mystification of materialistic problems if poverty is to be reduced

The obscurantist and mystic interpretation of objective/material problems is a main barrier to social and organizational development in almost all high subjectivist cultures[19]. One frequently meets the dead end of the kind of opportunistic dogmatism that can best be explained perhaps only by examples, though a very large number of such examples can be used, through thematic qualitative coding, to find a pattern, or a 'meaning structure'. For example, in my conversations, during the empirical investigations for this work, I found that most Muslim employers seek justification of their behaviour in Islamic ethics which is neither homogeneous nor logically consistent. For example, the common justification for paying ridiculously low wages (lower than the social security payments in the West), is that it is not man but Allah Who determines how much a man should receive for his livelihood. A verse commonly used to justify such an excuse is,

"And He is the One to elevate to honour and He is the One to throw into abysmal humiliation" [the Quran].

When questioned that the employer himself determines what wages should be given to the workers, the typical reply is that the employers are only the middle men between Allah and the worker[20]. Divine providence is the final decision maker so that people are but

[19]Several authors, for example V.S. Naipal, Among the Believers, and Christina Lamb, Waiting for Allah, have written directly or indirectly on the theme prefixed as the heading of this section.

[20]The use of religion to justify one's own actions is rampant in Islamic countries. At an Arab bank, a fired officer went to see one of the owners and requested for an explanation. The owner, an Arab *Sheikh*, retorted by questioning the faith of the fired employee, "if you were a true Muslim", the *Sheikh* admonished, "you should have known that it is not me who decides but Allah. In this case, Allah has simply shifted your account of livelihood somewhere else. All you need now is find where your account has been shifted".

pawns in its hands[21]. But there are many other verses that most employers overlook in order to choose those that serve them well. For example, the following verses, taken together, contradict the above mentioned justification:

"All Muslims are brothers amongst themselves", and, "the one who does not choose for his brother what he chooses for himself is not amongst us" [Hadeeth].

Likewise in Pakistan, the Industrial Relations Ordinances frequently come into conflict with Islamic traditions which provide ample holy verses to replace action: Most employers hold that social responsibilities must be left to the personal conscience of the entrepreneurs and that Islamic ethics was sovereign over state legislation[see endnote 5]. Laws have been effective only where individuals choose to abide by them. Although many industrialists look down upon the Industrial Relations Ordinance as artifact of Western civilization, they are eager to exploit, for their own purpose, such laws from the arsenal of state legislation as could serve their personal ambitions. The choice is thus determined by extreme selfishness: Islam holds sovereign where it goes to their advantage, and state legislation are pursued vigorously where these bring advantage. For example, most Pakistani industrialists demanded strictest implementation of the notorious Martial Law Regulation 51 because it gave them unlimited freedom to hire and fire (K. D., one of the top most industrialists of Pakistan, once recalled, not without regret, that his father fired a red haired worker on spot because he considered red hair a bad omen). The result of such manipulation both of Islam and state legislation is the excessive concentration of wealth and the consequent wastage of capital as mentioned in a United Nations report:

"There is excessive wastage of private capital, partly because of concentration of huge amounts of capital in fewer families, on non-developmental outlets such as extravagant import of luxuries, speculative land purchase, show-off marriages or luxury residence building"[22].

Many Muslim businessmen go to great lengths in preserving segregation of sexes and performing Islamic rituals but brush off the real moral and legal issues of excessive corruption. Some relevant observations might help explain such an attitude: I once worked as exports manager for Din Limited, a large textile and carpets manufacturing and export

[21]The European reader can relate to the said attitude, by reading about King Henry VIII. The use of religion to justify one's own actions has been brilliantly depicted in the film, "Ann of a Thousand Days", in phrases such as, *"when I pray, God answers..."*

[22]Processes and Problems of Industrialization in Underdeveloped Countries, United Nations Publication, p. 34.

company. At Din Limited, we were once preparing an advertising campaign for our women's fabrics. The owners of Din Limited, three brothers, were all bearded *mullahs* one of whom later became the President of the local Chamber of Commerce and Industry. When an advertising agency was asked to prepare television commercials, the owners told them that no woman should be shown in the advertisement. The advertising agency argued, only for a short while, that an advertisement for women's fabrics must have women in it but the owners refused to allow it and consequently, the commercial had to be made showing a number of designs and flowers but no women. On the one hand the owners of Din Limited were so particular about religious values that they fired an accountant for not praying after the lunch break, on the other hand, they used to prepare fake export orders to get cheap loans from the State Bank of Pakistan: The owners had counterfeit letter pads of German, Belgian and French firms on which they used to get orders typed of the values they required now and then to finance their new textile mill, one of the largest in Asia. The loans were granted by State Bank at 3% interest to promote exports but these loans were being used, illegally, in the construction of a textile mill. If Din Limited had borrowed these sums from commercial banks, or government development banks, they would have had to pay 16% in interest. When our finance manager returned from his pilgrimage to Mecca, he requested to be spared from making counterfeit papers, at which the managing director replied, "you should leave your pilgrimage at home when you come to work". There were several incidents of similar nature which made me resign after having worked only for a month.

A Pakistani marketing manager of a German multinational narrated the following:

"There is a place near Islamabad, where D. S., one of the big industrialists of Pakistan, has got a large polyester plant erected. The Pir of D. Sharif (a holy man considered sacred by his followers who go to great lengths in solemn obsequiousness and fellowship) was invited to inaugurate the plant. After the celebrations, when they began their prayers, the Pir Sahib raised his hands and asked everyone to be silent. He then listened to something in silence for a while, pretending that some divine source was telling him something and then said, in a solemn tone, that he had been told by a divine voice that the plant would prosper and flourish, and there will be a lot of demand for its produce. The owner of the project was so pleased at this that he gave an extra fifty thousand rupees to the Pir Sahib. Now, when you see these things happening here, you just wonder about the psychology of these people".

Many Muslim owners think that by observing religious practices, they will please Allah Who in turn, will be kind to them and bestow them with greater material gains, as they say, "there will be more barkat (blessings) and Allah will give us more". This kind of psychology showed itself in its extreme form in our neighbor who was the managing director

of a cooperative bank. He used to arrange for religious gatherings every Thursday, offer expensive meals to more than a hundred guests after which loud-speakers were turned on and all present did the *zikr* (singing praises of the Prophet) until mid-night. This was their week-end ritual. The loud speakers blared and disturbed the entire neighborhood. He believed that as long as he would keep pleasing Allah by feeding the mullahs who sang His praises and did the '*khatm*' (recite the Quran), his bank will keep prospering. But the bank money was not being invested properly and loans were given to influential political people. After three years, the bank went bankrupt and its depositors sued the managing director who was then sent to prison though the influential political men who had taken the major share of the bank deposits in the form of loans, were all spared. The property of the scape-goat managing director was confiscated. His son, once used to luxury living, was seen selling products of other companies on foot. The son worked very hard and has now been able to open a small retail store but, ironically, spends his spare time preaching for the same beliefs that, as a factor if not primarily, led to his father's ruin.

The above mentioned case was one of mystic beliefs leading to bankruptcy but, in most cases, Muslim businessmen show great skill in using religious doctrines to their personal gain. The injunction of *halal* which enabled Muslim meat producers in Britain to carve an exclusive market for them has now been extended to *halal* banking and even to *halal* super markets which, though they sell the same products as 'non-Muslim super-markets' do, use the word *halal* as an exhortation to influence Muslims to buy only from *halal* super markets. While Islam is often used as a 'marketing gimmick', the massive tax evasion, VAT evasion, and other malpractice are never talked about. An interviewee explained such behaviour as follows:

'Religion here is an integral part of business which takes ethics out of business dealings. When it comes to ethical questions, they argue that they cannot afford to be ethical because it often goes against profit making of the kind they are accustomed to. Like, for example, those who evade taxes, say that because they have spend money in the name of Allah, they should not be asked to pay government taxes, that any taxation beyond 2.5% of one's net savings is not an Islamic prescription. There are instances where one's due tax comes to a million but the man is happy with spending a small fraction of his due tax on religious causes and then expropriating the rest without feeling guilty about it. They justify, "look, we have spend a hundred thousand in the name of Allah"'.

Many say that *zakat* (2.5% for charity) has been commanded by Allah, but taxes are the artifacts of Western civilization to which they need not subscribe. We need not emphasize

the destructive social and government-related consequences of such an attitude. One only has to look at the near bankruptcy state of many governments where tax evasion is rampant.

Learning from Britain: The need to discuss issues of poverty in objective, materialistic and problem- solving terminology

In the sub-continent, one observes poverty of the kind that existed in Britain until the mid of this century reported as:

"By 1851 over half the population lived in factory towns which with their factories, businesses, ports and warehouses were the source of the great wealth which flowed into the pockets of the new industrial middle classes. But the majority of the working classes lived in appalling conditions, suffered from frequent unemployment and total loss of income unless their children went out to work. Low income was one reason for the poor quality of their food, health, education, furniture and entertainment. In 1845 there was a public outcry; the poor in the Andover workhouse had been driven by hunger to eat rotting bone marrow. In 1835, it was reported about the working classes in new industrial towns: A very great number are unable to provide for themselves and their families a sufficiency of food of the plainest and cheapest kind. They are clothed in rags and indisposed on this account to go to any place of worship or to send their children to the Sunday schools. They have scarcely anything like furniture in their houses. Their beds and bedding are of the most wretched description and many sleep upon straw" (summarized from Lane, Peter 1979).

However, there are many differences in the poverty situation that existed in Britain in the past and that which exists in the sub-continent at present. First, while some segments of the working class in Britain were suffering because of the new inventions of machinery or for other economic reasons, some other segments of the working class were prospering. In 1770, for example, the Staffordshire potteriers have been reported to have been living in prosperity. The state of poverty of the working class in Britain was not as general a state of affairs as it is in the sub-continent and among the Middle Eastern migrant workers. Second, where segments of working class suffered in Britain, it was not because of a deliberate and socially institutionalized disdain of the rich for the poor, as is the case in many undeveloped countries, but often because of economic factors (international trade or demand and supply factors) and technological inventions that replaced one kind of labour force for another. The third and most important difference is that in Britain, problems of poverty were materially and objectively defined and described (detailed enquiries and reports on cost of living, wages, living conditions, commissions on the state of health in towns, parliamentary debates etc.) and remedies (Poor Laws, work-houses, government intervention, taxation, councils etc.) sought by influential people, even by members of the aristocracy, upper classes, clergy, and

the Parliament, as an ongoing process of social improvement. Many of the reformers were themselves owners of factories or workshops; there is a long list of upper and middle class men and societies which sought to improve the lot of the common people:

- (1790-1820) William Cobbett (gave to the 'deserving poor').
- (1802) Sir Robert Peel and (1819) Robert Owen persuaded parliament to pass Factory Acts to improve the conditions of poor children workers.
- (1840s) Edwin Chadwick (for healthy environment and sanitary reforms).
- (1842) Richard Oastler and John Fielden (lead protest against inhuman conditions in Workhouses) and many others' efforts (*clergymen up and down the country preached about the new system's inhumanity to the poor*) resulted in a new Poor Law Board in 1847 and Local Government Boards, 1871.
- (1830s) Robert Owen (tried to get laws passed against employment of children in factories or mines, for education of workers' children, tried to form a Grand National Consolidated Trade Union).
- Several middle class reformers, doctors, clergymen, civil servants, journalists and teachers, such as Dr. John Simon (1858).
- (1860) Titus Salt (built a new town for his workers).
- (1860) Lord Leverhulme (built a town for his workers).
- (1860) George Peabody (built 50,000 flats for cheaper rent).
- (1864) Octavia Hill (bought and improved slums to house some London poor).
- (1870) W. E. Forster (Education Bill for state education).
- (1875) Disraeli government's Public Health Act (councils to appoint Medical and Health inspectors, build sewers, street drainage, new reservoirs, public parks, libraries, wash houses, swimming baths and public lavatories).
- (1879) George Cadbury (built Bournville for his workers).
- (1881) Henry Hyndman (Social Democratic Federation).
- (1883) Rev. Mearns (drew attention to the housing conditions for the poor).
- (1884) William Morris (Socialist League; wrote, *How I Became a Socialist*; 1896).
- (1884) The Fabian Society (H.G. Wells, Bernard Shaw, Sidney & Beatrice Webbs).
- (1885) Joseph Chamberlain (unofficial program of social reforms).
- (1890) William Booth (*In the Darkest England and Way Out*; found the Salvation Army).
- (1891) Charles Booth (investigations of the London Poor; wrote, *Life and Labour and the People of London*).
- (1898) Ebenezer Howard (his ideas were taken up by some politicians and civil servants leading to the 1909 Town Planning Act).
- (1902) Rowntree (*Poverty, a Study in Town Life*; showed that 40% of wage earners in York lived in poverty).
- (1906) Asquith, Lloyd George, Churchill (Parliamentary Acts of social reform).

(Abridged from Lane, 1979)

And then the process culminated in a welfare system that looked after those left behind in the economic race:

"The increased cost of social services in the UK, as elsewhere in capitalist Europe, is one of the most dramatic facts of state policy in the twentieth century. From about 4% of the GNP in 1910, social expenditures - from income security (pensions, unemployment, family

allowances, and national assistance); to medical care; education; and housing - increased by 1970 to some 24 percent of the GNP. In fact, during the rise of the postwar settlement welfare provision expanded to a point where it accounted for one-half of all state expenditures" (Joel, Kreiger, 1986).

The sub-continent and Middle Eastern upper classes can learn from Britain that in each power gaining class in Britain, there were many who rose beyond narrow class interests and presented the case of the lower classes, in just and equitable terms, to the Parliament. From the onset of the 17th century, each lower class that was left out from political power in the Parliament (first the bourgeoisie, then the skilled workers, then the unskilled workers, and finally, women) launched a struggle, at times violent, during which course they spelled out their demands, reasons for the demands, and suggested courses of action in details, justifying their causes logically, and, in materialistic and objective terms. There was little popular attempt to obscure the problems by directing the material issues towards mythological, supernatural, or metaphysical haze, as is done in almost all subjectivist cultures and has been explained in the last section. The *ullema* must note that the role of the Christian clergy was significantly different from that of the *mullahs* in that the former often supported the lower classes when their cause was just. Because religion plays a very strong role in shaping attitudes, the role of religious leaders cannot be ignored in directing people's behaviour towards either harmony and development or zeal and the perpetuation of misery.

Learning from Europe: The need for creativity by shunning nationalistic and cultural chauvinism on the one hand and thoughtless imitation on the other

In terms of originality and creativity, we may note that almost all modern social and economic philosophies were born during struggle between classes in European countries. During the political processes that were triggered on by the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution, the European intellectuals and concerned people tackled issues of social and economic development as first-hand, new experiences. They had little to follow as examples of a nature similar to the issues they faced. Thus they showed phenomenal creativity and originality in solving problems in almost all fields of knowledge and activity; political, social, economic, literary, scientific and technological.

On the other hand, most developing countries at present badly suffer from lack of originality and creativity. The upper and middle classes who have the time and resources to think about possible solutions to socio-economic problems and want to do so, mostly fall into

three sets of attitudes which in their extreme forms maybe described as follows: The first is that some find it easy to, literally, photocopy Western designs and solutions and try to implement them without much thought. For example, some Pakistani bureaucrats who were sent to Britain and USA for education and training in business administration, have now launched a Reagonite-Thatcherite cost cutting program in Pakistani governmental and public sector organizations. In doing so, they are using the 'performance indicators' method to reduce as much staff as they can but have paid no attention to the fact that the vast majority of public sector employees works at salaries below the social security payments in Britain. And to add to it, there is no social security net work in Pakistan on which the fired employees can rely. If the government is paying less than social security money to keep, as an extreme case, say, two persons on a job which one can do, then it makes little long-term socio-economic sense to fire one and thereby deprive him of any kind of livelihood. Productivity in this case should not have been measured as production per person but production per rupee paid in wages. A use of the latter criterion will show that the said government gets its jobs done much cheaper than that in the West.

The second attitude is that, in reaction to the West, many fanatically try to exert their 'national and cultural identity' by entirely excluding Western examples per se and sticking to their ancestral heritage which has little to offer in modern socio-economic problems. Fanaticism and zeal for the past pervades all social classes, and because all creativity must at times contradict old doctrines, radical creativity is strongly discouraged and penalized to an extent that little energy or desire is left in people to think logically.

The third attitude seeks to find a compromise between logic and traditionally ingrained irrationality, and, therefore, sensitive though to cultural dogmas and prevalent values, is as ineffective as the first two. In its essence, the third kind of attitude does involve hypocrisy which seldom pays except that it may save one's skin at times. This attitude is shown even by remarkably brilliant people (for example Bhutto and Habib Bourqiba) because it sometimes becomes absolutely essential to pretend if one wants to stay in power - or sometimes, just to stay alive, as a Persian poet in a zealous regime said:

*Pretending to be a believer,
I saved myself
From the Sheikh; though I know,
The arch unbeliever
Is the Sheikh himself* (My translation).

The problem lies with the way people understand and perceive the imperatives of living. Unless the traditionalist cognitive culture is modernized, people will stay, as if, 'brain washed' by myths that perpetuate misery and poverty and bar modernization.

Traditionalist cognitive cultures may be understood as being characterized by:

1-Fewer socially acceptable roles, ways of behavior, or life styles; for example, in the traditional majority of the subcontinent and the Middle East, by virtue of the prevalent norms and values supported by various assumptions and dogmas, people, despite economic or social constraints, must marry and have children; their primary loyalties must be to their kith and kin; all males must make money by hook or by crook; all must strive for prestige and status of various kinds; male and female roles are stereotyped. Those who do not subscribe to any of the "accepted truths" face taunts, isolation, suspicion and disapproval[23].

2-Mass subscription to simplistic ideologies[24].

Modernist cultures on the other hand are characterized by a multiplicity and variety in acceptable behavior; for example, in the West, marriage, and having children is not socially compulsory; the concept of loyalty to kith and kin does not override legal/ governmental/social/ personal concerns, making money is good but through fair means, and prestige and status have many more kinds and shapes than those found in the traditionalist cultures. The opportunities to have multifarious roles for most people do exist[25].

How then can a traditionalist cognitive culture be modernized? Some suggestions

(1) Training for presenting information in an objective, problem-solving manner:

From a thematic-content analysis of mass media reports, newspapers, journals, magazines, the way TV news are written, I have found that the way language is used in authoritarian-conflict-prone cultures needs radical change. I suggest that the media control

[23]Patai (1973: 279) notes that in a culture in which traditionalism is pronounced, change and innovation in every area of culture are inhibited. Triandis (1982: 89) states, "*Modernity is characterized by openness to new experiences, while traditionalism is not*".

[24]For example: "The world, in the traditional Arab view, is divided into two parts: an inner part constituting the 'House of Islam', and an outer one, constituting the 'House of War'. Under the Western influences, the concept of the 'House of War' has become obsolete but the distinction between Muslim and infidel remains sharp" (abridged from Patai: 13-14).

[25]"*In contemporary large-scale industrial societies with their great diversity of constituent sectors, there may be several modal personality structures*" (Patai, 1973: 19).

agencies and ministries of information and broadcasting should arrange for training of presenting information not in authoritarian and conflict-prone language but in an objective-problem solving manner. The details of such programs are easy to prepare, for the authoritarian and conflict-prone language in media is very self-evident.

(2)Raising public level of consciousness through debates about relevant issues:

Cultural transformation can be sought by debates and criticism of the 'over-determining' structural elements such as the abuse of the religious system, the over-stretching of familialism, hierarchical patterns of language that create undue obsequiousness, and the authoritarian personality etc. Such debates are not often prohibited if one takes care of not attacking the basic symbols of reverence. Literature, art and media have a major role to play in such transformation (see an example from Omar Khayyam given below). Likewise, freedom of speech, criticism and debate on the nature of social institutions and their functions, and their effects on organizations can lead to the generation of creative solutions to problems. Following are some guidelines from my experience of engaging in such debates:

(i)Provide correct information that breaks the existing structure of cognition:

A cognitive culture can be modified if not entirely altered by challenging the wrong or prejudicial information on which a belief system is predicated. One first has to understand the existing cognitive structural base of the subjectivist mind. Indoctrination can be countered by correct information. Kurt Lewin's (1958) approach to organizational change in three stages of, "*unfreezing, change, and refreezing*" can be used to seek transformation of a cognitive pattern. This may be explained by some examples given below.

(ii)Point at self-contradictions rather than criticize from an 'outsider's frame of mind':

Self-contradictions are the easiest to point at in attempts to make people think. For example, the question of 'divine determinism' versus 'free will' frequently brings contradictory premises. Taken logically, the belief implies that the sinners, being mere puppets in the hands of divine providence, must not be subjected to the tortures of hell. The Persian poet Omar Khayyam has subjected this kind of reasoning to satire which is but one example of how literature can make people think about their belief structures thereby bringing their beliefs closer to acceptable logic:

*I was, from dust, conjured
My sins, Lord, Thou adjured.
Thou determined my predicament
Why then, send me to torment? (My translation).*

During discussions with people in conflict prone cultures, I realized that a main recurring theme of their belief structure was that the assumed "enemy groups" cannot be friends and "will always intrigue against us so that we must be wary of them". They had been fed by news papers and journals with information to similar effect as mentioned. I understood that, in the beginning, the structure of their thought patterns could not be challenged from an 'alien' frame work of thought (such as by using unfamiliar thought patterns) but, by hitting one structural element of their beliefs against the other, I could perhaps make them think. I pointed at their self-contradictions and hoped that the basic logical faculties of the mind (whatever the nature of such faculties) will begin to work. In most cases, the strategy did work in softening hostile attitudes.

(iii)The initial challenges to a subjectivist thought pattern must come from within:

The nature of an idealistic subjectivist thought pattern is such that it generally refuses to accept objective and broad information. Hence, it is important that one should grasp the 'intrinsic' essence of the subjectivist notions and criticize them from within.

(iv)Do not forsake responsibility if the knowledge sought does not fall in your specialism:

The social reformer should be a kind of 'generalist' in information seeking and disseminating for he may face challenges from many disciplines of knowledge. He should therefore strive to obtain all necessary information to which ever field it may belong.

(v)Find out the exact reasons for which an incorrect belief is held:

The belief structures of the subjects could be absurdly simple and yet when we try to modify them, we find that the problem is one of the most intricate we ever had. The examples they quote and the 'reasoning' they give can be absurd but held with an enthusiasm and strength of conviction which makes up for the absurdity. In the first place, we may find that one is holding beliefs only because his parents and relatives have them, or that the media, particularly the news papers, propagate these and, as justified, "newspapers cannot be wrong, they are written by qualified intellectuals". The person may not know about the

marketing requirements of news papers and the aims behind writings and broadcasts. The young may have been bombarded during their formative and teenage years through the media, newspapers, books, magazines, teachers and so on.

(vi)In the beginning, stay close to the subject's level of understanding:

For most public debates in many cultures, one can argue in the beginning only by staying close to the level of common understanding. Logic and sophistication have to wait. For example, in the Middle East, one cannot usually talk about Freud or Russell. Even when I referred to scholars from Muslim background, such as the *Mautazilla*, Omar Khayyam, Tua Hussain, or Najeeb Mahfooz, most educated people had no knowledge of them. The writings of the *Mautazilla* and other early non-conformists have long been hidden though one may find many of their works in some corners of a few libraries that rarely if anyone visits[26]. The information offered should be commensurate with the subject's comprehension level.

(vii)Appeal to common sense and common observation:

An example is that, in altering the interpretation of the oft-quoted Quranic verse "*God is the provider of all, and the best provider*", presented against family planning, when one points at the famines and people dying of starvation, one can make many reform the interpretation of their beliefs, and make it commensurate with basic logic.

(viii)Do not expect transformation in cognition in the short-term:

Except for the very bright individuals, transformation of a cognitive pattern seldom takes place in a year or two. Most often, the intelligent will not require outside help, except perhaps, some guidance about from where to obtain the right books etc. With the majority, the social reformer must be patient and impart information bit by bit when the individuals are willing to listen [see endnote 6]. In almost every culture, there are intellectuals who publish works that are promising in raising public level of consciousness. Finding out about these intellectuals can help augment one's personal efforts.

[26]See the following published about Saudi Arabia: "*One cannot but feel sad to see many of our public libraries deserted and hundreds of thousands of books and reference works remaining dusted. A relative of mine.... was terribly shocked to find that he had to work in a library devoid of visitors...*" (Arab News, April 4, 1997, p. 3).

Notes and Explanations

1. Many studies have found some relationship between parent-child relations and the degree of the child's achievement need (Whiting and Child, 1953). The idea of variations in the need for achievement among individuals is well known in literature (McClelland et al. 1953). Closely related to McClelland's characteristics of those with high achievement need is the idea of Argyris (1964-a) that an individual seeks to increase his self-esteem and enhance his self-concept by searching for psychological success. McClelland (1961) maintained that the variability among human beings in the strength of need for achievement (defined as "*behaviour towards competition with a standard of excellence*") is a function of differing cultural backgrounds, childhood training, parental attitudes, education etc. He believed that economic development is strongly influenced by entrepreneurial activity and showed that such activity could be stimulated by education and training in strengthening the businessmen's need for achievement (Cowling et al., 1988: 77-78). Variations among achievement motivation in cultures is so common observation that Prothro (1961) linked economic development not only to available natural resources, investment capital, or technological skills alone, but also to the amount of achievement motive found in the inhabitants of a nation. He made a comprehensive study of differences in achievement motivation among three culturally heterogenous communities in Lebanon; the Sunni Muslim Arabs, Greek Orthodox Arabs, and Gregorian Orthodox Armenians. He found that the group whose five year old children scored highest in the "Goodenough Draw-a-Man test" ranked highest in adult achievement as well, thereby establishing the existence of inter-ethnic differences at the early age of five. He then related the achievement differences to differences in the three groups of rewarding the child for accomplishing approved tasks and found that the Sunni Arab mothers reward successful accomplishment relatively infrequently and use the threat of punishment frequently (often fail to carry out their threats), foster independence less frequently, and let the father predominate over the child. Related to the said finding is that the Sunni Muslims lag behind the two Christian groups 'with respect to achievement in the economic, and probably also the educational and cultural spheres': Patai states that since similar correlations between child-rearing practices and achievement have been found in America as well, it seems legitimate to conclude that there is a cause-effect relationship between the two. Patai relates the above mentioned "mother's threats without action" with the well known Arab proclivity for emphatically uttering intentions without following them up by actions, such as shown in Sadam's "mother of all battles"; a trait the knowledge of which helped me understand why most of my Arab students would strongly commit but neither work nor bring in their assignments until the very day the examinations started.

2. Similarly, Hoebel (1971: 217-218) states that the significance of a culture is less in its inventory of traits than in the manner of integration of traits, of all its parts, in accordance with some basic and dominant principles or value systems underlying the whole scheme. Herskovits (1948) and Patai (1973) use the word 'foci' for the said 'dominant principles': The characteristic differences between cultures can be seen by looking at their foci, i.e. those cultural features which constitute the prime preoccupation of the modal personality in that culture. Such a preoccupation may often be cognitive in its prime origins: "Among the focal concerns of the West are technology, scientific inquiry, the belief in and preoccupation with progress, which means that innovation and change are considered benefits in themselves. Other preoccupations are nationalism, democracy, individual freedoms, and

the like. As against them, the Arab world has had a complement of dominant concerns such as religion, familism, traditionalism, sexual modesty, and the like. These focal concerns are so pronounced that they can be used with advantage to characterize an entire culture, to draw its profile" (summarized from Patai, 1973: 279-280). "The modal personality not only puts high value on the focal aspects of his culture, but considers them ethnocentrically as superior to corresponding features in other cultures" (summarized from Patai, 1973: 358-359).

3. In their study, very relevant to the sub-continent and Middle Eastern organizational culture, Walton, Dutton and Fitch (1966) showed that rigid, formal and circumscribed structural arrangements (commonly found the two said cultures) between groups were associated with restriction and distortion of information between groups, conflict-resolution through bargaining rather than joint problem solving, and attitudes of suspicion and hostility. Supportive of the below given classification are observations that in the said countries, the enactment of inappropriate rules and placing focus of control on the exhibition of power rather than on problem solving (described in chapters 6, 11, 12 and 15), heightens tensions to an extent not paralleled in the West. That the exhibition of power is not limited to those in authority shows its cultural rather than objective origins.

Components and Characteristics of Contrasting Types of Lateral Relationships

Component of Relationship	Type of Lateral Relationship	
	Integrative	Distributive
Form of joint decision process between units	Problem solving: Free information exchange Conscientious accuracy of information transfer	Bargaining: Careful rationing of information Deliberate distortion of information
Structure of interaction and interunit decision framework	Flexible, informal, and open	Rigid, formal, and circumscribed
Attitudes toward other unit	Positive attitudes: trust friendliness, inclusion of other unit	Negative attitudes: suspicion hostility, disassociation from other unit

The said authors proposed a change in the formal structure to induce change toward more problem solving and less bargaining or open conflict.

4. While the most objective things would lend themselves easily to understanding and adoption by people from different cultures and languages (such things abound in material cultures; motor car and aeroplane for example), cognitive culture is hard to transfer even when the changes suggested are based on logic, scientific truths and objectivity, unless there is a willingness on the part of the recipients to believe in these three bases. Objectivity at mass level is a fairly recent phenomenon. Bertrand Russell (1975) once equated the amount of scientifically tested beliefs to a luggage in a boat rocking perilously in an ocean of subjectivity. Patai (1973) notes how the Arabs are happy to buy new artifacts and gadgets of technology that make life easy for them though there is stagnation in their social and political culture. Hence, it is in their cognitive cultures (values, norms, beliefs) that traditionalist people exhibit maximum resistance to change and therein lie the main sources of stagnation. Kroeber (1963: 73-74) has discussed this which maybe summarized as follows:

"As soon as people were opposed, pressed or cross-questioned on customs of this sort, they manifested resentment. When asked as to the reason for the observance, they either had none beyond the allegation that that was the way it had always been done, or they gave a mythological justification that was obvious fantasy. Comparative studies showed that moral codes were essentially mere group habits or customs, non-rational, though often falsely rationalized. Summer's Folkways states that folkways are ways of the unsophisticated, unanalytic mass of mankind, customs held to with much momentum but with incomplete rationality; and crossing them may cause a flare up of fear or anger, for, they are basic societal forces and include a belief that they are desirable for social welfare, and which people insist that their fellows conform to. Though the mores are not derived from politically constituted authority, they may produce laws just as they result in taboos. 'Folkways whose ethical sanctions have risen into consciousness', might be a fair definition of mores".

Kroeber, like Patai and other anthropologists, sees the reasons of "persistence" in habit adjustment, in spontaneous and deliberate exaltation of the ideals and values of instructing generations, assimilation and participation, voluntary adaptation, imitation, wanting to conform, learning from examples, some of which is conscious, and more of it is unconscious or foreconscious, and education.

On the other hand, Murdock (1971) gives a good description of "cultural diffusion" or "cultural borrowing" regarding the ease in the diffusion of material culture. The same is mentioned by Kroeber (1963: 65-68) and may be summarized as follows: As soon as a culture has accepted a new item, it tends to lose interest in the foreignness of origin of this item. In the sphere of practical, mechanical things, there are objective superiorities which start the process of its adoption by other cultures. Then, whatever comes from a society that is stronger, wealthier, cleverer or has greater prestige, comes with a favorable recommendation. Kroeber uses the terms organic diversity and cultural hybridity to explain that cultures can blend, thrive, perpetuate, diverge and syncretize.

5. The essence of the "Islamic management philosophy" is in fact reflected in the words which Enoch Powell has used to describe a socialist government; "...a socialist government knows best; that a nation cannot flourish and prosper unless people conduct their lives and use their energies in the manner laid down by the higher wisdom of a little group of men somewhere in the center... Anyone else's decisions or management, any other system but state control, is contemptuously dismissed in the jargon of socialism as 'chaos'". Muslim capitalists use similar phraseology to describe their view of control except that the 'socialist government', 'the center' and the 'state control' are substituted by an abstract version of 'the Islamic rule' which de facto means 'the capitalist-clergy rule'.

6. During discussions with my Arab students over a period of five years, I realized that a main recurring theme of their belief structure was that "Jews and Christians cannot be friends to Muslims". Another theme was that "Jews and Christians will always intrigue against Muslims and so the Muslims must be wary of them". They had been fed with propaganda such as that the "'West' was working in unison for Christian supremacy and the destruction of the Muslim world". I once told them that because Moses was an Egyptian and Jesus was a Palestinian, the Jews and the Christians were following Arab prophets. By a certain 'management of meaning', followers of Arab prophets could not be enemies to Arabs. To my own surprise, there were exclamations of amazement among the students. Many suddenly developed a likening for me and wanted me to talk more. I was amazed at why such 'information' had not been provided to them earlier in schools and colleges. I then went

on with whatever I could imagine to break the "thought structures" they had, simple things such as that Israelis and Arabs, as reported in the Quran, had a common ancestor, Abraham, and so by virtue of the Arab genealogical tribal ethics, the Jews and the Arabs were, sort of, cousins, and even constituted one tribe (an appeal to tribal ethics). The students had been told that Muslims constituted one nation. I had to point to them that this was an idealistic notion, for nations were not based around common aspects of a certain religion or otherwise the relatively small Gulf region, all comprising Muslims, would not be split into many nations.

Many European readers will wonder why I, a lecturer in management, got involved with changing the cognition of my students; it came naturally when in encouraging them to debate about 'systems of management' I found them most often turning to 'Islamic and non-Islamic' categorizations in almost every sphere of life. Their attention would often stray away from their work and study-related issues to issues of religion and infidelity. Discussions broke out in and outside the class room. The students faced enormous dilemmas; in the university they relied on Western text books for knowledge in any modern academic, professional or technical field. Outside the university, they were told that the main goals of a Muslim did not lay in worldly knowledge but in the 'true' Islamic knowledge. In motivating them to accept knowledge from wherever it came, I had to engage into extra-curricular discussions. For example, whilst taking classes in 'principles of management', some students would ask, "what does the Quran tell us about management?". I couldn't just tell them to go to the 'Center for Preaching and Guidance' run by the Saudi government at great financial expense in many countries.

Four students launched an year long campaign that male teachers should not be sent to teach in the women's building and female teachers should not come to teach male students. They refused to attend classes where female teachers taught. When explained that the number of female students was six times that of male students and, hence, segregated teaching would result in a six times greater burden on female teachers, they declared that Islamic segregation was supreme to any functional considerations.

One could argue in the beginning only by staying close to their level of understanding. For example, when my female students, all covered in *hijabs*, expressed dislike for, say, the Egyptian women because the latter "don't cover themselves up and live like the *promiscuous Europeans*", and that, "this is because a large percentage of them are Christians", I would say, "but before the advent of Islam, all Arabs were either Christians, Jews, or pagans". One of these students was, as if, stunned, "were Arabs Christians?", she asked twice. I told her that even in her own country which, she had been told by the *mullahs*, was "always Muslim", there was still an area called *Nasrania*, meaning, "the Christian region". I would tell them that promiscuity in Europe was not the norm and that while a European could legally have only one wife at a time, Arab men could have many.

Although the information I gave them in the beginning was very basic (such as that, the Westerners were not "all Christians"), it was commensurate with the level of their ideas and it helped as I found the attitudes of many towards other cultures softened.

In Pakistan, where the standard of education is much higher, many students often came to my home to debate about complicated issues and many thought I had benefitted them so that some, even after eight years, keep writing to me. Such examples have, at times, made me optimistic that changing a cognitive culture by dialogue and mass publication is not very difficult. Those who have the means must engage in such work.

Chapter Seventeen: Constructing the Theory

Before we offer our grounded theory, it is important that some clarifications and explanations are noted. The first explanation deals with the use of analogies between findings about the structures/functions of various socio-cultural and organizational systems. An analogy is a relationship but not necessarily a causal one [see footnotes 1 & 3]. By seeking such analogies as mentioned, I aim at showing that the structures and de facto functions of socio-cultural institutions play a main role not only in organizational behaviour, but also in helping or hindering solutions to socio-economic problems. The use of analogies may be demonstrated by an example of inducing links between the following four groups of findings:

1-(a)Regarding the organizational control systems, it was established through research methods mentioned in chapter one, that, typically, in Middle Eastern organizations, and to lesser extent, in sub-continent organizations, subordinates must not challenge their superiors. This factor, along with several others, necessitates formal compliance to higher level decisions even if their consequential invalidity and incorrect placement of functional contents is obvious to the subordinates. (b) Much greater intra-level conflict was found as compared to the amount of inter-level conflict. I see finding (b) partially an effect of finding (a).

2-Regarding the social/familial control system, it is commonly reported in literature and was observed as well as found in interviews, that in the traditional Middle Eastern family and to a lesser extent, in the traditional sub-continent family, the male head, and in the tribe, the tribal chiefs/elders, must not be challenged. Heavy sanctions against non-conformers necessitate apparent compliance with little concern for the true feelings of those patronized.

3-Regarding the political control system, it has been established in relevant literature, is common knowledge, and was observed as well as confirmed in intensive interviews, that in the Middle Eastern tribal-autocratic political system, the king, the *malik*, the *sultan* or the *amir* (whatever the title) has the final and absolute authority in all matters, including judicial affairs, that may be brought to him. The emphasis of compliance is again on appearance rather than soul (i.e., on form rather than on content).

4-(a)Regarding the religious control system, I was able to deduce from an exhaustive content-thematic analysis of Quranic verses, the *Ahadeeth* (sayings of prophet Mohammed reported by many in traditional Islamic books) and books on Islamic history, that there is an overwhelming support for autocracy in the Islamic religious-political system. This is

symbolized in many Quranic commands such as: "Oh those who believe, obey Allah, His prophet and the '*oli-al-amr*'"; the literal meaning of '*oli-al-amr*' is 'the one who is the first in giving orders'; the command is commonly understood as meaning, 'the one who has the authority'. Because the penalties for non-conformism can be horrendous, the result, often found in Muslim countries, is the sacrifice of creativity for the sake of conformity. (b) We see high sectarian conflict (e.g. violence in Pakistan, Bahrain and Afghanistan) among followers of various Islamic leaders, each claiming to be the genuine '*oli-al-amr*' in socio-religious matters. I see finding (b) partially an effect of finding (a), just as finding 1(b) was seen an effect of finding 1(a), showing a relationship of high control to intra-level conflict.

In the aforementioned four groups of findings, one can see analogies[see footnote 1], about control and conflict, between (1)organizational, (2)social/familial, (3)political, and (4)religious systems so that the structures and functions of the four systems appear to be mutually supportive in shaping (i)the prescribed incontestable control system, and (ii)the lack of tolerance for inter-level conflict despite significant tolerance for intra-level conflict.

Analysis, interpretation, and seeking relationships in the data for the three cultures

The three figures given in pages 257, 258 and 259, summarize the key cultural-organizational characteristics deduced from empirical studies and literature. It must be noted that the said characteristics have been described here in an 'abstract and quintessential' rather than 'absolutely real' manner; in other words, in arriving at these 'typical abstractions' (given below), we have ignored exceptional behaviour as well as economic class and regional-urban differences. However, the characteristics reflect the attitudes of the 'modal personality', though they have been simplified to facilitate understanding, and slightly magnified in the

[1]See a similar use of analogies in Hofstede's findings that high power distance is found in countries where, parents put high value on children's obedience, students subscribe to authoritarian attitudes as a social norm, employees show considerable mistrust of each other, there is less education for lower classes, concentration of wealth and political power in the elite, and less questioning of authority. Hofstede (1980) has linked his "power distance indicator" (a measure of the interpersonal influence between a boss and a subordinate as perceived by the least powerful of the two) with income inequality, education system, historical factors, religion and the political system: "*Political systems, unless imposed by foreign violence, reflect... the values and behavior of the population*" (Hofstede, 1980, ch. 3). His hypothesis that the power distance between the two is determined by their national cultures to a considerable extent, is supported by the findings in this work.

differential side to highlight the Western comparative dimension. The heuristic value of such models was explained by Bran and Sweezy (Burrell and Morgan, 1993: 391-392) as:

"Scientific understanding proceeds by way of constructing and analyzing 'models' of the segments or aspects of reality under study. The purpose of these models is not to give a mirror image of reality, nor to include all its elements in their exact sizes and proportions, but rather to single out and make available for intensive investigation those elements which are decisive. We abstract from non-essentials, blot out the unimportant, we magnify in order to improve the range and accuracy of our observation... "

Relating Factor Boxes in the Figures (p. 257-259) to Observations in the Empirical Studies

Box 1 The Over-determining Cultural Factors

The Sub-continent: Procreative familism and superstition (deduced from observations noted in pages 49 to 51, 226, 227, 233 to 236, 238, 246, 247, 251) leading to subjectivity shown in mystification of social issues (pp. 233 to 242).

The Middle East: Procreative familism (see pages 49, 50 to 52, 57, 85, 226, 227, 233 to 236, 238, 246, 247, 250, 251) and religion (mostly, Islam; see the pages quoted under the title, 'Islam/Islamic', in the Subject Index given at the end) leading to subjectivity shown in mystification of social issues (pp. 233 to 242).


Euroamerica: Several cultural factors (technology, scientific inquiry, belief in and occupation with progress, innovation and change, family values, democracy, individual freedoms etc.) determine behaviour in a counter-balancing manner (see p. 250 endnote 2, and 251) leading to objectivity shown in a problem-solving attitude towards social issues (pp. 242 to 244).

Box 2 Relationship of Socio-cultural Control to Organizational Control


The Sub-continent: At the socio-political level, an imposition of a unitary view of nation-state, strong familial culture and religion[see footnote 2], despite plurality in relatively insignificant aspects of life, (deduced from observations noted in pages 23, 75, 112 to 116,

[2]This observation is valid for Pakistan and Bangladesh. While India manifests political pluralism and decentralization among states, the tendency towards a forced unitary view of a nation-state remains strong which makes many Indians blame the British rule for splitting India into two parts. However, the various communities in India are so diverse and varied in their languages and religions that, in the words of Indira Gandhi, the two things that have kept India united are, ironically, the British left English language and bureaucracy.


Legend: Darker boxes show findings in the broader society while lighter boxes show those in the organizations. Inter-box joining lines refer to analogies while arrows point to likely causal relationships. Box numbers have no order but merely refer to respective reference to empirical studies in pages 256 to 268



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Legend: Darker boxes show findings in the broader society while lighter boxes show those in the organizations. Inter-box joining lines refer to analogies while arrows point to likely causal relationships. Box numbers have no order but merely refer to respective reference to empirical studies in pages 256 to 268



129, 130), and repression of criticism and non-conformism (pages 11, 98, 99, 101, 102, 221 to 223) is analogous[see footnote 3] to non-work organizational control on personal behaviour, values and beliefs (pp. 113 to 116, 129, 130, 156, 240).

The Middle East: Socio-political imposition of a unitary view of race, nation, strong tribal culture and religion, and even minor aspects of choices (see pages 23, 112 to 116, 120, 129, 130, 253; the GCC Arabs all wear a same dress in white), and repression of criticism and non-conformism (pp. 52, 83, 113 to 117, 123, 124, 129, 130) is analogous to non-work organizational control on behaviour, values and beliefs (pp. 113 to 116, 129, 130, 156, 240).

Euroamerica: Pluralist view of society is reflected in a pluralist view of organization[see footnote 4]. Emphasis of social control is not on personal and political behaviour but on control adaptive to human nature/self-control (153, 159) analogous to the use of impersonal means of control and task-related control in organizations (pp. 158, 159, 160, 217, 218, 221)

Box 3 Attitude towards Manual Work

The Sub-continent: Cultural and monetary degradation of manual work (pp. 7, 15, 33 to 38, 66, 157, 177 to 179, 210, 211); low wages (149, 236, 238; Asian; 157, 164, 175, 176, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 186) [see footnote 5].

The Middle East: Cultural and monetary degradation of manual work (pp. 38, 39, 119, 120), and exploitation of expatriate labor (pp. 202 to 206).

Euroamerica: Cultural and monetary regard for manual work approximates that for most other types of enterprise (pp. 39, 242).

[3]Arrows and Lines in the Figures: Note that relationships in the figures (p. 257-259) are based on analogies because causal connections in social sciences are hard to establish. However, because of the comparative nature of this work, causal connections can be shown between factors X and Y, if X appears along with Y in a culture while both are missing in the other. But deciding whether 'X caused Y' or 'Y caused X', is similar to the 'chicken and egg' situation. Hence, arrows in the figures point to the most likely causal relationships only.

[4]Where reference page numbers are not given for the Western cultural factors, see the Subject Index at the end of this work, categories, 'West/Western' & 'Western companies in the sub-continent'. Observations regarding the West are literature-based as well as those noted during empirical studies in Britain, and in some Multinationals in the sub-continent.

[5]Where, in explanation of a cultural factor for the sub-continent, the reader is referred to observations made among Asians in Britain, this is because of the similarity in behavior patterns among people in the sub-continent and those who migrated to Britain.

Box 4 Differences in Living Standards and Basic Rights

The Sub-continent: High differences shown in physical evidence of living standard gaps (pages 12, 17, 18, 30, 31), social status differences (pages 30 to 32, 39 to 41, 46, 54, 55, 56, 58, 64, 186, 217, 239), upper class privileges (pages 31, 32, 39 to 41, 46, 58, 65, 126, 135, 141, 158, 177 to 179, 183, 232, 233, 235, 236, 239) and upper class/socio-political powers (pp. 6, 42 to 44, 65, 70, 71, 102, 104, 105 to 107, 141, 183).

The Middle East: In addition to that for the sub-continent [see footnote 6], there are tribal inequalities (pp. 6, 46, 83, 125, 203 to 206), and racial inequalities (pp. 204, 205, 206).

Euroamerica: Egalitarian values enable people to transcend class differences. Citizens' rights in law and state institutions (written or tacit) are the same for all citizens.

Box 5 Differences in Living Standards Related to Incentive Structures in Organizations

The Sub-continent: Very high differences in living standards (mentioned in box 4) are related to similar differences in lowest and highest paid jobs in a typical organization; the average difference estimated as that between 1 and 50 (see pages 66, 67, 133, 140, 143, 186, 239).

The Middle East: Same as for the sub-continent[see footnote 6] in addition to wide gaps in incentives/treatment between races as well (see racism in remuneration, pp. 175, 185, 204).

Euroamerica: Equity in treatment (pages 104, 140, 175, 184, 185, 192, 209). Difference between lowest and highest paid job, on an average, estimated to be that between 1 and 5, i.e., ten times less than that for the other two cultures (176, 177, 179)

Box 6 Level of Egalitarianism

The Sub-continent: Inequality values and norms (pages 104, 125, 141, 157, 158, 164, 177,

[6]Where, in empirical referencing of a Middle Eastern cultural/organizational factor, the reader is referred to an observation from a sub-continent country, or vice versa, this is because of the following reasons:

(i)The observation explains a phenomenon whose cross-culturally commonality among the said regions was beyond doubt. Hence, addition of examples in the text, from the other regions, was considered repetitious and hence, superfluous.

(ii)Most Arabian Gulf middle and lower level employees come from the sub-continent countries; expatriates out-number natives in almost all Arabian Gulf countries.

(iii)Tape recording of interviews in the Middle Eastern countries was not possible due to interviewee reluctance and prohibition of certain types of research (see pp. 11, 25 endnote 2) by the state authorities. Hence, detailed empirical narrations, though provided in informal conversations, could not be reproduced verbatim from memory alone.

178, 217); high class-barriers and distinctions (pages 5, 7, 71, 146, 158, 162, 177, 178, 218); significance of class background (pages 41, 46, 127, 141, 157, 158, 177, 178, 217).

The Middle East: In addition to the similar found in the sub-continent (page numbers as given above; see footnote 6), there are tribal inequality values (pages 6, 46, 83, 125, 203 to 206) and racial inequality values (see pages 204, 205, 206).

Euroamerica: Egalitarian and democratic values (pp. 8, 95, 158, 230).

Box 7 Relationship of Social Differences to Organizational Hierarchical Levels

The Sub-continent: Positions in the organizational hierarchy correspond directly to one's membership of a certain socio-economic group [social stratification](pp. 39, 40, 41, 46, 217).

The Middle East: In addition to that for the sub-continent [see footnote 6], for certain jobs, positions in the organizational hierarchy correspond to tribal identities (6, 46, 85).

Euroamerica: Equity in treatment (pages 104, 140, 175, 184, 185, 192, 209) enables people to transcend class differences, if any, in promotions to higher offices.

Box 8 Family Values

The Sub-continent: Economic dependence of the young, the unemployed, women, and the property-less old, on family (pp. 53, 54) due to absence of state social security. Excessive control and indoctrination of children[see footnote 7] (pp. 49, 52 to 54, 56, 63, 64, 195 to 197, 201, 250); strong conditioning of children into set patterns of motivation (pp. 50, 63, 64, 138); high influence of relatives (pp. 53, 169, 170); exclusion of societal and broader (other than religious) concerns (pp. 57, 58, 59); patriarchal values (99, 201). Family values related to nepotism (p. 235), control of business (pp. 146, 154), concentration of wealth (pp. 58, 239), motivation for corruption (pp. 57 to 59, 63, 140, 141); instrumental use of work and organization for familial goals (pp. 53, 54, 63, 64, 234, 235). Extension of family feuds/relations to those at workplace (p. 55). Segregation of sexes, arranged endogamy (prohibition of inter-communal marriages), the consequent communal segregation (pp. 71, 79, 81, 82, 86, 222) plus closed-familial goal seeking at the cost of other similar groups amidst scarce resources perpetuates and intensifies communal conflict (pp. 58, 130, 222, 234, 235).

The Middle East: Procrustean control on children (p. 52, 250), and *wasta* (nepotism), in

[7]See the analogy to authoritarian control in organizations.

addition to that for the sub-continent [see footnote 6] mentioned above. Preservation of tribal family values, patrilineal descent and male authoritarianism (pp. 51, 57, 84, 85, 93, 250, 254), perpetuates tribal conflict which then shows in organizations.

Euroamerica: State social security frees individuals without means, from economic bondage to family (pp. 243, 244). Family values are generally inclusive of individual, social, legal, governmental and community concerns (pp. 58, 64, 246). Permission for celibacy, family planning, female employment, and non-procreative conjugation leads to controlled population size, lesser economic burdens, hence low vulnerability to coercion, nepotism and corruption. Normative control in family reflects in normative control in organizations. Inter-communal marriages have since long eliminated conflictive communal divisions.

Box 9 Control Attitudes in Organizations

The Sub-continent: Authoritative control, theory X (pp. 91, 94 to 96, 146, 154, 169); patriarchal control (pp. 98, 99, 101, 104, 201, 203); dislike for challenges (pp. 98, 101, 111, 116, 254); culturally engendered non-work considerations in performance appraisal (pp. 139, 140); control by personal observation (pp. 154, 155, 156); non-work control (pp. 142, 154, 155, 156, 221, 239, 240); dominance-seeking (pp. 162 to 164); Machiavellian control by the use of informers (p. 155); loyalty/ obsequiousness demanded (pp. 101, 116, 141, 142); lack of managerial independence in decision making (pp. 141, 142); control related conflict is not uncommon (pp. 154, 155, 162 to 164, 251); centralization of control (pp. 99, 119, 230).

The Middle East: In addition to that found in the sub-continent [see footnote 6], there is high centralization of control (pp. 119, 141); misplaced controls (pp. 111, 112, 126, 127); pseudo controls (pp. 109 to 111); control by subtle coercion (pp. 112, 113); excessive controls curb protest (pp. 202, 206 to 209) except for occasional outbursts of violence.

EuroAmerica: Impersonal rules (pp. 95, 104, 217, 218) and means of control/task-related control (pp. 158, 159, 160, 217, 218, 221); control related conflict not found (p. 159).

Box 10 Social Status and Control

The Sub-continent: Control related to social status (pp. 44 to 46, 141, 157, 158, 169, 218).

The Middle East: Control related to social status and tribal membership (p. 46, 218).

Euroamerica: Influence transactions related only to organizational roles (p. 220).

Box 11 Extent of Coercive Control

The Sub-continent: Coercive control: on and among workers (pp. 23, 91, 146, 147, 149, 157, 158, 162 to 164); related to the absence of social security system (pp. 23, 113, 117, 118, 181, 234, 237); over illegal workers/new immigrants (pp. 156, 157, 164, 179); as source of conflict (p. 164); demeaning attitudes (pp. 177 to 179); abuse of power/personalized power (pp. 154, 155, 158, 162, 163, 168, 177 to 179, 208, 220, 239, 240).

The Middle East: Coercive control on lower classes and expatriate workers (pp. 203 to 209, in addition to pages referred to for the sub-continent; see footnote 6).

Euroamerica: Coercion not found; means of control tend towards the utilitarian-normative end (p. 221).

Box 12 Relationship of Values/norms to Coercive Control

The Sub-continent: Authoritarian values/norms (pp. 91 to 93, 113 to 116, 129, 130, 162, 163, 166 to 168, 211, 254) show in organizations in the form of 'significance of loyalty and obsequiousness' (pp. 101, 116, 141, 142, 255), and coercive control mentioned in box 11.

The Middle East: Autocratic values/norms (pp. 91 to 93, 166 to 168, 203 to 209, 211, 254, 255) show in organizations in the form of coercion, loyalty/obsequiousness (pages as above) and high external conformism (pp. 115, 117, 127, 131, 245, 254, 255).

Euroamerica: Democratic values and norms, at times bordering to individualistic isolation[see endnote 1] and indifference. Coercive control found neither in society nor in organizations.

Box 13 Effects of Coercion and Repression on Creativity and Initiative

The Sub-continent: Lack of creativity and initiative (pp. 114, 116, 222, 223, 245), constraint, avoidance, and alienation from workplace (pp. 147, 158, 177, 178, 207).

The Middle East: Lack of creativity and initiative (pp. 114, 123, 124, 130, 131, 222, 223, 244, 245); constraint, avoidance, alienation (page numbers as above; see footnote 6) and even 'thought control' (pp. 123, 124, 130, 131, 223).

Euroamerica: Absence of repression; efforts at integration of employees (p. 140); innovation and creativity is found and encouraged (pp. 142, 219, 244)

Box 14 Key Motivation Patterns

The Sub-continent: Money/instrumental/extrinsic (pp. 15, 44, 61, 62 to 70, 184, 219, 220); for power/contacts (pp. 42 to 44, 65, 104, 111, 126, 138, 162, 163, 179, 223); for high

status (see pp. 30 to 32, 39 to 44, 63, 64, 119, 138, 169, 209 to 212, 218, 239); related to family needs (pp. 53, 54, 63, 64, 234, 235); related to beliefs (pp. 233, 234, 240, 241).

The Middle East: Similar to that found in the sub-continent [see footnote 6].

Euroamerica: Several forms of motivation along with intrinsic motivation (pp. 159, 207).

Box 15 Basis of Evaluation and Remuneration

The Sub-continent: Rewards/penalties not performance-related (pp. 138 to 140, 238, 239) but related to social status more than with work (pp. 31, 32, 64, 65, 156 to 158, 174, 175, 178, 217); relationship of rewards with 'divine providence' among Muslims and with 'fate' among Hindus (pp. 238, 239); inequitable treatment related to demoralization (pp. 80, 158, 164, 174, 181, 185, 186); favoritism & discrimination (pp. 78 to 81, 101, 104 to 106, 135, 136).

The Middle East: In addition to that found in the sub-continent [see footnote 6], there is a relationship of rewards/penalties with tribal membership (6, 125, 203 to 206), with 'divine providence' (pp. 238, 239), patriarchal generosity/anger more than with work (pp. 117, 124, 125, 203), and racism in remuneration and evaluation (pp. 175, 185, 204).

Euroamerica: Relationship of rewards with performance/merit based systems (pp. 57, 104, 140, 175, 217); equitable treatment (pp. 104, 140, 175, 184, 185, 192, 209).

Box 16 Reasons for Conflict

The Sub-continent: Unhealthy competition/intrigues in appointments, transfers, promotions (pp. 15, 77, 78, 101, 104 to 106, 137, 162, 163, 169, 170, 210); lobbying (p. 101); inequitable treatment in recruitment, selection, evaluation, remuneration etc. (pp. 80, 101, 104, 157, 158, 164, 165, 174, 175, 181, 186, 191, 222, 223); on promotions/ performance appraisal (pp. 139, 140); dominance-seeking (pp. 162, 163, 164, 211); related to control (pp. 154, 155, 162 to 164, 251); conflict-proneness (pp. 15, 94, 195, 196, 202, 211).

The Middle East: In addition to those mentioned for the sub-continent [see footnote 6], there is inequitable treatment on individual, tribal and racial grounds, in recruitment, selection, evaluation, remuneration etc. (pp. 125, 175, 185, 203 to 206, 217, 222, 223); conflict-proneness (pp. 83 to 85, 195, 196, 206, 211, 237, 248, 252, 253).

Euroamerica: Distribution of rewards; task-related status; 'occupational ethnocentrism'; resource allocation; jurisdiction between departments; autonomy and control (p. 222); awareness of rights (p. 213) etc.

Box 17 (a) & (b) Patterns of Conflict

The Sub-continent: (a)Socio-cultural conflict (political, religious, ethnic, regional, linguistic etc.) is reflected in similar (b)non-work conflict in the organizations (pp. 75 to 80, 82, 106, 107, 162, 163, 183, 195, 196, 211 to 213, 222, 223, 255). Intra-level (pp. 147, 158, 162, 163, 222, 223, 254, 255); personality clashes (pp. 42, 116); inter-personal physical (pp. 91, 155, 162, 163, 167); strikes (pp. 102 to 104); pressure groups/unions (pp. 99 to 107, 133, 168, 211 to 213); related to wages (pp. 62, 168, 179, 180); ethno-conflict (pp. 191 to 196, 211); hooliganism (pp. 99, 102, 103, 105, 211, 212, 213).

The Middle East: (a)Repressed conflict on grounds as those in the sub-continent [see footnote 6], analogous to (b)potential/manifest conflict in organizations (pp. 83 to 85, 237) in addition to tribal/nationalistic affiliations, attributes of worth or lack of it attached to tribes, races and nations (pp. 6, 46, 83, 85, 125, 203 to 206) and the consequential prejudices.

Euroamerica: (a)Socio-cultural conflict if any, does not significantly affect organizations. (b)Absence of non-work conflict (p. 168); conflict is task-related (p. 168, 222); group formation is function-based such as in the form of occupational groups (p. 222).

Box 18 Methods of Conflict Resolution

The Sub-continent: Conflict equated with trouble making (pp. 164, 221, 222); playing down (pp. 164, 167); hard bargaining (pp. 202); strikes (pp. 102 to 104); through pressure groups and unions (pp. 99 to 107, 133, 168, 211 to 213); lobbying (p. 101); and using "nuisance value" (pp. 102, 103, 201, 202); by creating pocket unions (pp. 99, 100).

The Middle East: Total repression for lower classes/tribes (pp. 202, 206 to 209); for conflict between natives of a comparable social status, tribal methods (use of intermediaries [*wasit*] or calling conferences) of conflict resolution are used (pp. 85, 90).

Euroamerica: Channels of protest registration/conflict resolution are available (pp. 159, 160, 168, 192, 193, 280); conflict seen as a positive, integral, productive, creative, stimulating and manageable part of social/organizational process (pp. 221, 222); integrative approach (p. 251) and collective bargaining (p. 153) in addition to various other methods[see endnote 2].

Box 19 Union Activities

The Sub-continent: Chaotic behavior (pp. 15, 94, 99, 102, 106, 107, 201, 202, 210 to 213); pressure groups (pp. 99 to 107, 133); associated with political parties (pp. 104 to 107);

influence on employment practice (pp. 104 to 106, 139); pseudo leaders (pp. 201, 209 to 212); ineffectiveness of unions (pp. 169, 192, 201, 202, 210 to 213); misconception of union functions (p. 211).

The Middle East: A general prohibition of unions and associations of employees (p. 202).

Euroamerica: Union activities are relatively organized (p. 212); variations in union behavior exist across countries (p. 8); unions in MNCs working in the sub-continent enjoy good industrial relations; strikes, go-slow tactics and lock-outs, virtually never experienced (pp. 142, 150) partly due to abidance by labor legislation (pp. 176, 177, 179). Asian groups/unions in Western firms show inter-ethnic difficulties in communication (pp. 168, 209, 210 to 212) and inaptitude for union formation (pp. 169, 192, 209, 210 to 213).

Box 20 Over-population in Absence of Social Security, a Cause of Poverty, Coercion, and Communal Conflict

The Sub-continent: Over-population (p. 233); material poverty (pp. 13, 17, 18, 100, 146 to 148, 233, 236, 242); cause of material poverty (pp. 9, 14, 151, 201, 233 to 237); caused by beliefs (pp. 13, 49, 50, 51, 209, 233 to 237); vulnerability to coercion (9, 151, 153, 165, 201, 233 to 237); related to coercive control and negative motivation in absence of social security (pp. 23, 113, 117, 118, 181, 234, 237); cause of aggression and communal conflict (pp. 14, 76, 79, 227, 234, 235, 237) over scarce resources.

The Middle East: The same as mentioned above is true for Middle Eastern countries that are without enough oil and also overpopulated [see footnote 6].

Euroamerica: Significant state provision of basic social security, controlled population size, little poverty, and the consequential low vulnerability to, and absence of, coercion.

Box 21 Motivation for Corruption and Nepotism

The Sub-continent: Widespread corruption: In the private sector (pp. 70, 71, 110, 111, 136, 137, 141, 146, 149, 239); in some educational institutions (p. 77); *sifarish* in promotions (p. 139); in government departments (pp. 103 to 106, 110, 136, 137, 149); cheating in arguments (pp. 179, 180, 238, 239); DSS, welfare services and Asian corruption in Britain (pp. 63, 65, 156, 157, 175, 176, 180 to 183, 186, 198, 234); nepotism (pp. 55, 56, 104 to 106, 134 to 136, 144); related to low motivation (pp. 15, 121, 122, 127, 130, 131, 137); related to Eastern family values (pp. 57 to 59, 63, 234, 235).

The Middle East: In addition to that mentioned for the sub-continent [see footnote 6], there is widespread corruption in educational institutions (118 to 127, 130, 131).

Euroamerica Not found to a significant extent.

Box 22 Pseudo-organizations

The Sub-continent: In private sector, created to embezzle state or international developmental funds, or to evade taxes etc. (pp. 70, 71, 110, 111, 135 to 137, 141, 149); government departments and institutions rendered ineffective due to corruption or political influence (pp. 104 to 106, 110, 136, 137, 149); imitative civil service (pp. 110, 245); many international developmental programs (pp. 110, 133, 135, 136, 224).

The Middle East: In addition to that mentioned for the sub-continent [see footnote 6], further high incidence of pseudo organizations (pp. 109, 111 to 117, 224); pseudo education (pp. 118 to 127, 130, 131); imitative civil service and other organizations (pp. 110, 118, 245) emphasizing form with little content. A remarkable parallel exists here with the heavy social emphasis on hollow religious rituals (pp. 9, 114, 121, 124, 183, 239, 240, 241) whose real contents are seldom discussed or allowed elaboration.

Euroamerica: No significant occurrence of pseudo organizations.

Implications of our findings for theories of motivation

In the light of our findings, we can now review some popular motivation theories. Handy (1981: 24-28) has categorized theories of motivation as; (a)satisfaction theories, (b)incentive theories, and (c)intrinsic theories. Followers of the last approach, McGregor, Argyris, Likert, and Herzberg, implicitly or explicitly, extend Maslow's ideas (hierarchy of human needs; physiological, safety, affiliation and love, esteem and self-actualization) into management (Cowling et al., 1988: 73). However, Schein (1972) points out that people are much more complex than the assumptions of motivation theories (social or psychological man, rational-economic man, and self-actualizing man) suggest. Handy (1981: 27-28) notes that these theories do not work well when the individual does not have strong needs for self-actualization, or when he likes authoritarian masters. In this work, the same was found in the Middle East where affluence and security do not seem to have led to a noticeable progress towards self-actualization (see pp. 114, 121 to 124, 130, 131, 222, 223, 244, 245).

McGregor suggested his version of the nature of "*average human being*" in his

Theory Y stating that the expenditure of physical and mental effort in work is as natural as play or rest, that man will exercise self-direction and self-control in the service of objectives to which he is committed, that the most significant rewards were the satisfaction of ego and self-actualization, that the average human being learns, under proper conditions, not only to accept but to seek responsibility, that the capacity to exercise a relatively high degree of imagination, ingenuity and creativity in the solution of organizational problems is widely, not narrowly, distributed in the population (McGregor, 1960-b: 324, 326-327).

However, as found in this work, there are cultures where the incidence of creativity is a fraction of that in the West. Second, exercising self-direction and self-control in the service of self-determined objectives is not common in most familial societies where the objectives of the individual are determined, directly or sub-consciously, by the larger family net-work (see pp. 51 to 59, 62, 63, 93, 234, 235). Third, one does not find satisfaction of ego and self-actualization (in the Western sense) as the most significant rewards either in the prosperous Middle East or in the poverty stricken sub-continent where the most significant rewards were found to be money (see pp. 15, 44, 61, 62, 184, 219, 220), power (see pp. 42 to 44, 65, 104, 111, 126, 138, 162, 163, 179, 223), and status (see pp. 30 to 32, 39 to 44, 63, 64, 119, 138, 169, 209 to 212, 218, 239). Fourth, in the Middle East and the sub-continent, it is hard to find people seeking "responsibility" though they do often strive for power and status and are happy to shift responsibility of unpleasant consequences to others. Fifth, the assertion that "ingenuity and creativity in the solution of organizational problems is widely distributed in population", is questionable for Islamic countries and the sub-continent where almost every aspect of organizational life in every sphere of modern activity (education, health care, administration, police, civil service, private business, technology, factory and workplace design, office procedures etc.) is little more than imitation (see pp. 110, 118, 224, 245) of the Western designs, manuals and manuscripts but lacking in objectivity and sensitivity to native circumstances. There are many cultures which do not socialize the child through a uniform pattern of objectivity generating education and the basic learning of mutual obligation. Such cultures, with their emphasis on primitive egotism, often produce whimsical people insensitive to others' needs, and ignorant of their responsibilities and obligations towards those with whom they deal in one or the other capacity, which behaviour has a direct relevance for motivation situation in organizations.

McGregor asserts that *"If employees are lazy, indifferent, unwilling to take*

responsibility, intransigent, uncreative, uncooperative, Theory Y implies that the causes lie in management's methods of organizational and control" (1960-b: 327). But it is seldom within management powers to change employer or employee culture-bred attitudes. Hence we suggest that the effects of the cultural 'suprasystem', and the learning of individuals in certain social conditions should be taken into account in building theories about motivation.

Proposed extensions in the Expectancy Theory

Cowling et al. (1988: 80) state that the expectancy-valence theory, one of the most popular motivation theories, owes to the work of Porter, Lawler, Campbell, Dunnette, and Weick. Vroom (1964)[see footnote 8] expressed this motivation theory in terms of strength or salience of the need, the expectancy that effort will lead to a particular result, and the instrumentality of that result in reducing the need. Vroom's model of the expectancy theory seems to have cross-cultural validity because it deals with the abstracted mechanism of the teleological process of reaching to desired goals through instrumental means and hence supersedes the culture-bound factors of needs and means determination. Although Vroom's model leaves room for taking account of people's such subjective calculations and expectations as are influenced by learning in a culture, it helped me understand the extremely low motivation in the Gulf Arabs to work or study: While investigating why our mature students would neither be particular about coming to classes nor working even to a least minimum level, I discovered a whole set of socio-cultural circumstances that inculcated expectations and beliefs in them that could be explained in a joint framework of cognitive understanding and the expectancy-valence theory: In a society, where almost everything from secondary school certificates to jobs, positions, status, privileges and monetary rewards could possibly be obtained by an appeal to the "patriarchal generosity" of first, the father, then the teachers, influential relatives, tribal chiefs, the *Sheikhs* etc. (see pp. 117, 124, 125, 203, for details) and where fatalistic beliefs created a relationship of rewards with 'divine providence' (see pp. 238, 239), the 'type II expectancy' (performance-reward relationship) was very low, because the aforementioned "other means" for securing the reward intervened. Hence a minimal effort to perform. However, the expectancy theory could not explain many culture

[8]Any explanation of the expectancy theory here has been made in the context of the proposed extensions in the said theory. For a detailed understanding of the expectancy theory, the interested reader may refer to the authors quoted here.

based findings; one example would suffice to show the point: The said theory, in its original form, implies (see the figure on page 273) that low effort would lead to low performance, low perceived equitable rewards, low actual rewards, and less satisfaction. But among more than a thousand Arab mature students, I found that despite extremely low efforts, their perceptions for equitable rewards were very high. More over, the way people seek 'satisfaction' (the last right hand box in the figure on page 273) is highly culture-bound; in the Western culture, it is important that the individual should feel that it is due to his efforts or energy that the goal was achieved: *"If the achievement was fortuitous, or the means were decided for him, then the feeling of success is reduced"* (Handy, 1981: 51). Thus students in Britain do not usually cheat or buy their degrees; the poor would not accept money from rich relatives unless in dire circumstances and employees would want to work hard to "earn their money". This perhaps has a lot to do with ethics and the concepts of "guilt culture" and "shame culture" (see pp. 117, 127, 131): Among the Arabs, as mentioned earlier, the idea of psychological success is quite different; money is normally sought from generous patriarchs without doing enough work; likewise, degrees and marks are sought by an appeal to the "generosity" of the teacher; hard work is often shunned and influential mediators are used to seek jobs, promotions and privileges of various sorts. The ease with which undeserved positions and goals are achieved does not bother the Arabs whose cultural foci is not on content but on form, concerned not with the soul but with the body (see external conformism, pp. 115, 117, 127, 131, 245, 255). Likewise, nepotism in the sub-continent (pp. 55, 56, 104 to 106, 134 to 136, 144) does not deprive the privilege-seeker from a feeling of "success" and, among the non-working classes, undeserved rewards are sought more often than hard earned rewards (see "higher than deserved expectations", pp. 123, 137, 138, 201, 209 to 212, and incompetence, pp. 105, 106, 117, 119, 135, 137, 138). The expectancy theory, based as it is upon the "fair play" assumptions of the West, cannot explain other cultural phenomenon whereby the manifestation of higher expectations is a bargaining trick used to confuse the distributor of rewards to give more than deserved, and undeserved rewards can be seen bringing not only satisfaction but celebration as well.


For the aforementioned reasons, and more to follow, I have added the darker boxes 1 and 2 to the expectancy theory figure on page 273, thus implying that "Self esteem" and "Role Perceptions" are "Culturally learned attitudes", and that "Characteristics of individuals" are strongly influenced by "Socio-cultural learning".

We have seen that motivation among Asians in Britain is more centered around money (see pages 15, 44, 61, 62, 184, 219, 220) than it is among the English, due to differences in familial and social commitments (see pages 53, 54, 61 to 66; the Asian compulsion to marry, emphasis on a larger than nuclear family, and to possess much more than required) and in the way people are brought up in the two cultures. This shows that money is a means of achieving non-work-related social and cultural goals such as enhancing family prestige, higher social status and political ambitions. Hence I have extended the said expectancy theory figure to include social imperatives and expectations. More reasons for adding the socio-cultural dimension (boxes 1 and 2) to the expectancy theory are that people process information regarding social variables, not only work-related factors, and then form their patterns of motivation[see footnote 9]. Often the said process takes place subconsciously. Apparently totally irrelevant social variables play their part in shaping patterns of motivation. For example, lack of equity in basic citizenship rights (see "social status differences", pages 30 to 32, 39 to 41, 46, 54, 55, 56, 58, 64, 186, 217, 239), the consequential differential police treatment, and utter absence of social security outside family in the sub-continent (pp. 53, 54) is a key factor in the excessive money, status and power-seeking, triggered by the frustration of the security motive.

Because the search for intrinsic (box 4) and extrinsic (box 5) rewards is determined, among other factors, by the nature of control, that is, high control reduces intrinsic motivation but the person may carry on working for the sake of extrinsic rewards i.e. negative motivation in the absence of social security (pp. 113, 117, 118, 181), I have also linked the control dimension in box 3, to boxes 4 and 5 in the figure on page 273.

Furthermore, because repression of work-related challenges to seniors (i.e. repression of work-related conflict by high control) curbs creativity among employees (see pp. 114, 123, 124, 130, 131, 222, 223, 244, 245) and reduces intrinsic motivation, I have linked the conflict dimension in box 3 to the extrinsic/intrinsic rewards (boxes 4 and 5) in the said figure. And because the nature and value of intrinsic rewards (box 4) depends on the 'characteristics of individual' (box 6) which are largely culturally conditioned (explained in page 271), I have linked the boxes 1, 6 and 4, in the said figure accordingly.

[9] Similar was reported in the Hawthorne studies: "*The ultimate significance of an individual's work is not defined so much by his relation to the company as by his relation to the wider social reality*" (Roethlisberger & Dickson in Burrell & Morgan, p. 138).



The Expectancy-Valence theoretical model showing determinants of effort, performance and satisfaction, adopted from Cowling et al. (1988: 81), simplified and modified to take account of cultural factors. Darker boxes with phrases in italics are my additions

The Grounded Theory arising out of the findings of this work

Stated most succinctly and simply, the theory that arises out of the various findings in this work is that organizational behaviour is strongly influenced, if not determined, by the peculiar structures and de facto functions of the socio-cultural institutions (such as religion, family, values) of a society. A corollary of the said theory is that patterns of control, conflict and motivation in organizations are derived from the same found in the broader socio-cultural institutions. The various analogies between socio-cultural behaviour and organizational behaviour (for example, between religious autocracy and non-work control in organizations), found in this work and mentioned earlier, provide ample evidence for the said theory. The theory finds strong empirical support particularly from the comparisons made between three cultures which clearly show that behaviour patterns in Western organizations are analogous to that in other Western cultural institutions. The same is true for the other two cultures.

Further evidence for the said theory comes from that the key issues (major problems) in the sub-continent and the Middle East, turned out to be also the key differences between the Western and the other two cultures (see the Subject Index categories, "Key issues", and "Key organizational-cultural differences"). In other words, the reasons for the long-term effectiveness of Western organizations in bringing about socio-economic development could be attributed to the dissimilar functions of Western cultural institutions. Likewise, the reasons for the long-term ineffectiveness of most organizations in the other two cultures, in bringing about socio-economic development, became attributable to the inappropriate functions of the broader cultural institutions.

The placement of the proposed theory in Social Sciences Paradigms

When various theoretical formulations began to take shape from the patterns and relationships in my data, I found that many of my theses supported the structural functionalist view, of the fundamental nature of sociological reality, which regards society as ontologically prior to man, and seeks to place man and his activities within a wider social context (Burrell and Morgan, 1993: 106-7). From the various empirical observations narrated in this work, it becomes evident that organizations can neither be fully understood nor significantly transformed without understanding and transformation of the culture at large. The said propositions become self-evident when we see all the earlier mentioned strong similarities between socio-cultural characteristics and organizational characteristics. However, my

findings do not support the assumptions of 'purposive rationality' in the functionalist paradigm but suggest that the presence of long-term rationality depends upon the de facto functions of the institutions of a particular culture. The said suggestion derives from the findings that creativity emerges in certain cultural conditions which give rise to certain relationships between the nature of control, conflict and motivation. This needs explanation.

First, structural functionalism does not advocate that a social system, whether arisen spontaneously or designed, necessarily functions to its best for long-term rationality and survival of a society: The exposition of a structure and its de facto functions is not the same as the advocacy of a particular tradition. The latent and the manifest functions of socio-cultural structures should be discovered through empirical investigations, and their long-term consequences for the social system should be noted. The notion of 'purposive rationality', commonly associated with the functionalist approach to the study of social systems, should not be a postulate but a topic of research, for while organizations can be rational in the pursuit of their goals, this does not necessarily lead to long term survival of a culture; the 'value rationality' of many social structures, such as religious prohibition of family planning (described in our pages 233 to 237), may in fact reduce the possibility of long-term survival of a society[see footnote 10].

The second explanation deals with methodological issues. Burrell and Morgan (1993) characterize structural-functionalism with a realistic ontology and a positivistic epistemology [see endnote 3] and differentiate it from the 'interpretive paradigm' which is unified by its 'subjectivist, nominalist, voluntarist, anti-positivist, and ideographic methods' stance:

"The ontological assumptions of a truly interpretive theory do not permit a functionalist perspective; the two types of theories are based upon fundamentally different assumptions with regard to the ontological status of the social world" (Burrell: 253-254)

However, in view of the eclectic and integrative use of methodologies that we have followed in this work, and which (as we shall show later) is also recommended by Burrell

[10]Malinowski advocated a functionalist explanation of social phenomenon, that the special characteristics of social systems, such as social organization, religion, language, economy, political organization etc. might be understood in terms of the functions which they perform. He suggested a holistic approach to studying a culture because the consistency, the law and order which we obtain within each aspect in the whole area of a culture, makes also for joining them into one coherent whole. Thus, Malinowski established the importance of field work in socio-anthropological studies of small scale societies in order to form their holistic views in manageable empirical contexts (Burrell and Morgan, 1993: 50-51).

and Morgan, the above quoted statement can be addressed on account that the structures and functions of cultural institutions can shape subjectivity which can then be understood by interpretive sociological methods and hence there is no inherent contradiction between the functionalist and interpretive paradigms. More over, research using interpretive methods may lead to functionalist explanations, such as Schutz's concern with understanding the meaning structure of the world of everyday life (Burrell and Morgan: 246) and the linguistic theorists' (interpretive sociology) attempts to find the structure and functions of language and subjective meanings reveal. Likewise, a functionalist research may find a structure in subjective patterns of behaviour, for example Durkheim's functionalist determinism of subjectivity, as Burrell and Morgan themselves acknowledge:

"The response... to the problem of the 'subjective' has indeed been diverse. Durkheim... found a solution consistent with a functionalist orientation, Sorel veered in the direction of Marxism (dialectical materialism) and Freud into the realm of psychoanalysis (objective social influence in subjectivity)" (Burrell and Morgan: 256).

Likewise, the said authors see too strong a dichotomy between 'organization theorists' and the 'interpretive paradigm' (though they later recommend integration):

"From the standpoint of the interpretive paradigm, organizations simply do not exist" (Burrell and Morgan: 260)... the ontological assumptions of the interpretive paradigm are completely destructive as far as contemporary organization theory is concerned... The contemporary organization theorist cannot build his theories within the context of the interpretive paradigm" (Burrell and Morgan: 274).

One is pleased however, at the said authors, later, talking in detail about the attempts of many social theorists to integrate idealism and positivism and seeing the social action theory and certain varieties of interactionism as the direct product of such concern (Burrell and Morgan: 275). In addition, they see the conflict functionalism of Merton, Coser and Gouldner as integrating two paradigms, functionalism and radical structuralism.

A detailed study shows that Burrell and Morgan's paradigms are in fact ideal type constructs, and as such of great heuristic value, but paradigm boundaries can be crossed without sacrificing logical consistency. When a certain author works in more than one paradigms, Burrell and Morgan call it 'a change in basic paradigm':

"Wittgenstein, like a number of other social philosophers... (for example, Mead, Husserl, Marx), embarked during his lifetime upon an intellectual journey which involved a change in basic paradigm" (Burrell and Morgan: 259).

Such a change in basic paradigm as mentioned, the said authors call 'ontological oscillation' and, because several authors continually shift their attention from the subjective

to the objective, from the nominal to the real, and from the determinist aspects of human nature to the voluntarist, Burrell and Morgan find it difficult to classify them in accordance with their four paradigm schema [see endnote 3]. Hence, after referring to Silverman's 'ontological oscillation' and 'paradigm shift' (described in the fourth explanation below), they quote his *"The Theory of Organizations"* (Silverman, 1970) as one example of an integrative attempt, and state:

"There is scope for adopting an epistemology, a view of human nature and a methodology consonant with this revised view of the ontological status of the social world... contemporary organization theory can usefully assess and reappraise its basic orientation with regard to its assumptions on each of the four strands of the subjective-objective dimension of our analytical scheme" (Burrell and Morgan: 275).

For such reasons as given above, and more to follow, I have made an eclectic use of methodologies and paradigms and one can see that this has not been done at the cost of logic.

My third explanation deals with the 'regulation versus radical change' dimension. Burrell and Morgan differentiate between the *sociology of regulation* and that of *radical change*. However, many theorists recognize the need for regulation in certain social aspects and yet suggest radical change in other social aspects, which makes it difficult for Burrell and Morgan to locate them in the *sociology of regulation* or that of *radical change*. Hence, after suggesting that, *"...the paradigms reflect four alternative realities. They stand as four mutually exclusive ways of seeing the world"*, Burrell and Morgan (p. 398) find it necessary to split Weber's works into four parts in order to suggest that,

"Weber's influence has been felt in all of the four paradigms... his discussion of scientific rationality pervades much of radical humanism... verstehen in the interpretive paradigm... bureaucracy... dominates functionalist organization theory... Within radical structuralism, certain strands of his work consistent with the... sociology of radical change... [warrant the use of] the term 'radical Weberianism'" (Burrell and Morgan: 331).

I have adopted an eclectic approach to the use of the regulation versus radical change dimension suggesting, in chapter sixteen, radical change only in some crucial social aspects.

My fourth explanation is about views of human nature. Again, the 'four paradigm' schema, followed strictly, necessitates that authors subscribe either to high voluntarism or high determinism depending upon the paradigm in which they may be located. But many authors hold that behaviour is at times voluntarist and at other times determined:

"Silverman recognizes that reality is socially constructed, socially sustained and socially changed, yet he interprets this essentially as indicating the need for social theories to adopt a more voluntaristic theory of action and to avoid the reification of social

phenomena. In other words,... Silverman adheres to a highly voluntaristic view of human nature but to an ontology, an epistemology and a methodology characteristic of the subjectivist region of the functionalist paradigm" (Burrell and Morgan: 266).

The above quoted statement can be addressed as follows: In the quoted statement, the proposition before the word *yet* is concerned with short/medium-term individual behaviour which, as said, is most often socially determined. However, social changes can be brought about in the long term if a sufficient number of people choose to wash off the social deterministic effects. Hence, in the very long term human behaviour can be seen as voluntarist (as shown in historical changes). To add to it, we have cultures that foster greater determinism (Saudi Arabia) or greater voluntarism (United States and Europe). The simple duality of human nature, both determined and voluntary ("we shape our dwellings and then our dwellings shape us") and its cultural determination in the short-medium term, until the culture is transformed in the long term, implies that an author can be logically consistent without subscribing to either one camp of a set of positions or the other. Silverman's approach is eclectic and thus reflects the social reality which is both subjective and objective as much as human nature is both determined and voluntarist.

It is safe to conclude then, that, regarding voluntarism versus determinism, these should not be the basic postulates but topics of research to determine where behaviour is determined and where it is voluntarist. Our findings show that man's behaviour is culturally determined but there are always exceptional individuals, capable of understanding the imperatives of society and life other than those transmitted to them by their immediate culture. Such exceptional individuals may become voluntarists in shrugging off cultural prejudices and guiding others to follow suit. If a sufficiently large number of people choose to transform culture and society, voluntarism in the long-term may be achieved. Hence, our grounded theory, implying 'cultural determinism plus some voluntarism' in the development of a society, comes close to Althusserian structuralism as explained on page 226.

A Last Word

For the European reader, this work, in the words of Barry Turner, is a window through which they can look at other dissimilar cultures. At the least, it has shed light on predicting what will happen if, say, Europe was to abolish basic social security, reduce wages below a reasonable basic level, and had religions that stopped family planning. Such an exercise may lead to a growth in mass neurosis, corruption, conflict of many sorts,

irritability among people, greed and selfishness; it may lead to coercive control and the workplace will show many non-work problems. The message that people will get from such a reversion in history, if it ever took place, will be that it is not necessary to value human beings per se. Europeans can see in this work that the sub-continent or Middle Eastern form of capitalism can only lead to a Hobbesian instrumental individualist society which does not bring even economic good, because the European style of capitalism can survive only with the support of the often concealed bed rock of European socialism.

For the sub-continent and the Middle Eastern reader, the message is very clear. If the people in the said cultures will continue to allow their superstitious beliefs to generate intolerance of non-conformism and the type of familism and socialization which is the basis for poverty, coercive control, communal conflict, and power-status-money motivation, then their fate will indeed be determined by, in terms of Althusser's structuralism, the configuration of particular 'over-determinations' in social forms. On the contrary, if they choose to look at their lives in depth with a view to prediction and change, they can take decisions now to alter their future.


Notes and Explanations

1. One manifestation of the Western type of individualism is that even researchers in social sciences often use their own peculiar definitions of well established concepts. There is no harm in defining concepts differently to suit the context of a particular work, but research findings cannot be shared evenly, let alone on scientific grounds, if even the very basic, well-established and fundamental concepts of social sciences are defined differently by different researchers. For example, Gregory (1983) in her study of technical professionals in Silicon Valley, individualizes the commonly accepted supra-individual definition of a paradigm ("*conceptual orientation or perspective from which research questions, methods, and styles of explanation flow*") by adding: "*A paradigm is a researcher's 'native' view regarding appropriate research behavior*" (p. 360), and, sees "*multiple native views*" (probably confused with "personal views"), that is, as many 'paradigms' as the number of researchers. She also defines culture as "*learned ways of coping with experience*" (p. 364), and hence questions the robustness of any group as a culture in large complex societies, and "*probably in apparently simple ones as well*" (p. 365). Her approach is in stark contrast to the established one, of macro comparisons between "culture continents, cultural foci, national cultures, and modal personalities" explained in this work (see pp. 1, 2, 3) but an adequate reflection of her chosen Western organizations where multi-cultural sub-groups compete, as also described by March and Simon (1958; clash of values/ traditions in multiplex bureaucracies), Likert (1961), and Strauss (1978). Nevertheless, Gregory's approach is but one example of individualism growing towards isolationism so much so that modern Western social science research is facing the threat of what has been termed, 'fragmentation'.

2. Comparative studies of conflict resolution by Walton and Dutton (1966), Blake et al. (1964-b), and Litwin and Stringer (1968) show, substantial variance in mode of conflict management, from collaborative to persistently conflictful.

Feldman and Arnold (1983) classify strategies of resolving conflict into four types; avoidance (keep conflict from surfacing); diffusion (cool off, play down the importance or establish superordinate goals); containment (allow some conflict to surface, negotiate and bargain within the established structure); confrontation (open discussion of issues to arrive at a mutually satisfactory solution). Pondy (1967-b) identifies conflict management approaches as; the bargaining approach (increase resources or reduce demands of competing groups); the bureaucratic approach (conflict occurs when subordinates resist superior's control; hence replace personal control by impersonal bureaucratic rules) and the systems approach (reduce functional conflict and interdependence, e.g. between marketing and production functions, by reducing goal differentiation and dependence upon common resources, by training, making loose schedules, creating buffers etc.). Kilmann and Thomas (1978-b) suggest steps for effective conflict management as perceiving unacceptable conflict, diagnosing causes, and intervening. Blake et al. (1964-c) report some effects of intensive group training in reducing behavioral propensities to conflict: *"Participants were instructed in specific approaches to conflict management, for example, being sure that one understands the opposition point of view well enough to state it to the satisfaction of one's opponents, acquiring skills in building on areas of agreement, and re-examining disagreements jointly so that a consensus statement of the issues at conflict can be made"*. The said authors also show that rapid disposition of conflict by problem solving teams of union and management could save going to formal and written grievance handling procedures. Walton and Mckersie (1965-a), in line with Blake et al. quoted above, suggest the use of "integrative" rather than "distributive" presentation of issues at conflict so that both parties are satisfied with the statement of the issue. Recommendations in the quoted studies can be useful in the sub-continent and the Middle East.

3. Burrell and Morgan (1993) classify social science research into four paradigms based on two dimensions. The first dimension is the "subjective versus objective" dimension. Subjectivism is characterized by the use of a nominalist ontology, an anti-positivist epistemology, a voluntarist view of human nature, and an idiographic research methodology. On the other hand, objectivism is characterized by the use of a realist ontology, a positivistic epistemology, a deterministic view of human nature, and a nomothetic research methodology. Their second dimension is the "regulation versus radical change" dimension. Researchers are classified under the 'sociology of regulation' or the 'sociology of radical change' depending upon whether they support the existing status quo or suggest radical social change. The four paradigms that arise on the basis of these two dimension are as follows:



Appendices of Raw Data
Cases and Excerpts from
Interviewee Statements

Asian Family Business; Exclusion of Social/Legal Concerns; Control Attitudes; Patriarchy; Money Motivation; Status-Power-Seeking; Exploitation; Corruption; Intrigues; Inter-personal Conflict

A Typical Manner in which Asian Family Businesses in Britain are Managed

In the following detailed study of one of the richest Asian families in Britain, the owner family exhibits many known characteristics of the sub-continent patriarchs[1]. The details of the way business is run by one of the Asian multi-millionaires in Britain, were narrated to me by a sales manager[2] who has seen both the patriarchal generosity and the indifference of the family which is running several industries and ware houses in Britain and in some other European countries.

When I left my first job, I talked with a friend to get me a job as I was desperate for a job. He told me that there was a firm called 'Krishna Sons[3]'. They had multi-million pounds worth of businesses, four or five ware houses, a net work of import and export, a chain of ten or twelve retail shops, factories and some businesses in Portugal. They were very big. I began working at one of their ware houses from where they used to despatch goods to all their shops and retail units. I worked on trucks and vans loading and unloading and realized that despite being so big, they too were keen at exploitation of workers. We worked from ten in the morning until twelve at night and sometimes, when they had to ship large orders, we worked even until two in the next morning. They made us do this work but no one counted the hours that we worked. For six days a week work, they paid us only £55. This was a fixed rate for six days a week, twelve hours a day extending sometimes to fourteen and sixteen hours a day. There were times when we began at ten in the morning and finished work at three in the next morning. And all this at a fixed weekly wages of £55. It was a family business. The work at the factory and the ware house was supervised by a mother, her three sons, and two daughters-in-law who were members of the owning family. One of the daughters-in-law was Dutch and the other was an English woman, that is, the sons had married European women. These people supervised and ran the entire business at that site. There was neither a regular organizational structure nor a discipline or job descriptions. The stocks were not regularly accounted for and even cash was handled without the strict recording system that is normally associated with cash transactions. I wondered at how such a large business could be run without proper accounting procedures and still, at the end of the year, they used to sit, make books, satisfy the Inland Revenue people, and get on with it very successfully. The goods turn-over of all of their projects collectively must be, at least, in millions and still the business was run in a haphazard manner.

When I had spent around two or three weeks at Krishna Sons, the year end came up. The owners and some staff were hectic in preparing final accounts, books, fake invoices of transactions, because there were no regular invoices when goods were despatched. They made the invoices for the entire year at the end of the year, fake invoices leading to a certain amount of sales that would show

[1]In claiming that the case of Krishna sons depicts a typical situation of the Asian family way of running business, I have least qualms because, first, during the last decade, I have not been able to find enough examples that could suggest otherwise, though I admit that there must be a few Asian private businesses run as professionally and scrupulously, and with as due regard for the employee efforts, as most Western businesses are. Secondly, the more interviews I gather, the more information of similar nature keeps pouring in. For reasons of brevity, I have quoted here only one case in detail but it is possible to obtain dozens of descriptions to the same conclusion as mentioned.

[2]I have no doubts in the veracity of the narration about Krishna Sons. I have known the interviewee for the last thirty years.

[3]Some Asian names, and the names of some British cities in this narration, have been disguised. The English names stay as narrated.

a nominal profit and a token amount of tax to be paid to the Inland Revenue. Now because it was the end of the year, and they were busy in making invoices, they needed extra hands. Those who were working in the office had many other things to do and so they began searching for some literate worker who could sit and make those invoices. I presented my services to them and told them that I could do that work. They said, "are you literate?", I told them that I had a graduation, at which they asked me to leave all other work, sit down, and then they gave me a list of goods for which I had to make back-dated invoices. By the time it was mid-night, I had filled in ten books of invoices, some worth £100, some £500, some £1000 and so on, different prices. When they checked the books that I had made, they were impressed by my work and said to me, "you deserve an office job, you should not be a handy man. So from tomorrow don't do the loading/unloading. Your job title from now onwards will be a sales manager and we shall assign you sales duties. You will look after the sales supplies to our ten local retail outlets, you will keep the despatch records, you will supervise the shipment from the ware house, you will keep liaison with the ten branch managers of the retail outlets, and also keep records for the intake of goods for each retail outlet. You will be doing all this accounting and will have control over all staff and things that this work involves". I said that it was a lot of work but I would be happy to do it. When I asked what financial improvement would it bring to me, they said, "we give £55 to other workers, your salary would be £70 (off the books and hence illegal) a week". I accepted that and I thought it did not matter if I got less for a lot of work but at least I had gained respect from the owners and a decent job compared to loading/unloading for all my education, and then I had gained some authority and an office job and so on. After all I had gained something in a short period of time and secondly, I thought, whenever I would apply for a regular and legal job, I would quote this job as a valuable experience, that I have worked as a sales manager. So these were my priorities because of which I accepted their offer though at less salary: It was a jump in status and it was an experience that could open further opportunities for me especially because they were a well known manufacturers who supplied to such prestigious stores as C&A, Top Shop, British Home Stores, Burton's etc. We used to fix labels of these prestigious stores as mentioned above on the T Shirts and other clothing which they either imported or manufactured and then supplied them to the highly respected outlets.

I accepted the job also because the mother, one of the owners, had expressed sympathy for me and respected me because of my education and my polite tone. She thus granted me some privileges such as that I was allowed to take clothes for myself either without payment or on big discounts. The family benefited from me in that they didn't have to deal with the branch managers directly by themselves. In each retail outlet, there used to be six or seven sales staff, an assistant manager and a manager. On top of this, each retail shop had week-end extra staff. Because there were more customers on the week-ends, the retail shops used to hire six or seven more girls and boys as sales staff. Before I was hired, the owners had to go to these retail shops and argue with the branch managers about one or the other things. Now it was me who took over the responsibility for dealing with the branch managers and was supposed to resolve the conflicts that arose between the branch managers and the ware-house or the factory when, things such as shipments were not exactly made as the branch managers wanted them to be. I was now the middle man between the owner family and the branch managers and I was dealing with the problems of the sales and shipment staff at the ware-house and at the retail outlets.

Among the four hundred workers and staff there, I hardly found fifty people there who were legally employed. We also had White people working there. The White staff were paid regular wages at an hourly rate though they too were paid low and some of the Whites too were working off-the-books, that is, they were on social security benefits and they worked without informing the DSS. However, there was a difference of treatment extended to the White staff and to the Asian staff. One difference was that the Asians had to work without specified fixed hours but the Whites worked on fixed hours. If the family decided that they had to ship goods to say, C&A, to meet an order deadline, the Asian staff had to stay and work even if it came to working until four in the morning. The family used to stay there as well and the order had to be shipped at all costs. We had to stay

though we were paid not a penny in overtime. The White employees were treated with more politeness and fairness. At least the Whites had a certain fixed rate of wages, they used to get paid on hourly basis which meant more money for more work, and if they were supposed to finish at six in the evening, they did leave at six, that's it, but with the Asian workers, it was weekly rate without any limit to working hours. At the ware house we had only four White men and the rest were Asians. At the retail shops, about 25% staff was White, but most Whites worked on a legal basis on the national insurance card. There were far fewer Whites compared to Asians in the whole net work of businesses, and this despite that they had two White daughters-in-law. Among the White staff, very few worked on illegal basis. On the retail shops, they were perhaps compelled to take White staff because they couldn't run clothing shops in up market and fine areas without any White staff. The shops were in fine areas frequented by White customers and because they were in city centers, they had to hire a certain number of people on legal basis, on regularized payroll so that if concerned government departments decided to inspect their records, they should be able to show that they had a regular staff. They had some managers who were working on legal basis, on NI cards, but even those managers were exploited in many ways.

Conflicts used to arise often. I have personal knowledge of the fact that many among the staff used to steal things and they used to steal because they believed that they had a right to do so, because the owners exploited them, they had a right to steal. There were often quarrels of the kind that we despatched a certain amount of goods but the amount that reached the shops was less than that shipped. I know that there were some who would steal whole cartons full of clothes. For example, we once despatched fourteen cartons to a certain store but when the truck reached there, it contained only thirteen cartons. Sometimes the staff would open up cartons and steal clothes from several cartons. What amazed me was that the family often turned a blind eye to thefts even when it was very obvious that goods had been stolen. They won't go deeply into such things and seldom investigated what really happened. Perhaps because there was no way to stop it with an exploited workforce and, perhaps, if police was involved, they had no regular systems of records in which case a police investigation could lead to the disclosure of the corruption, for example, that the employees were employed illegally. Predominantly this was the reason, but they could use advanced technology for record and stock keeping which they never wanted to do. They didn't want to keep precise records. Least records on paper were kept. Such a big business and no proper book keeping! They were one of the biggest clothing manufacturing and wholesale supplying company in Britain, a company that supplied to such big stores as I have told you earlier. They used to be the patrons of Bradford football team. The Bradford club was their's. And still no proper accounts, and I used to wonder how the whole system worked. I think that their bigger ware house in London was better organized, and I know this because I used to go to the London ware house frequently in the course of my work. At London ware house, they paid better wages to workers and perhaps the reason for better organization at London was that Rajiv, another member of the owner family, who looked after the London ware house, and his wife who was White, were better organizers. At London they had better systems and not as much exploitation of staff as they did in Leicester. There could be another reason for this better organization: The London office was perhaps a show piece of the company especially for international foreign clients. It could be a reason that because they were there at main Oxford Street, they had to keep up a certain standard. But in that company, all personnel were working for their own personal interests. No one worked for the deeper interests of the organization because all knew that the company badly exploited them and so there were often clashes and conflicts. There were conflicts of the kind that, for example, a retail shop manager, frustrated at not being delivered the right goods at the right time, would say that a certain manager of another retail outlet has taken more than necessary goods and therefore there was a shortage. But it was not really a conflict because the branch managers usually tried to water down each other's miscalculations or hide each other's mistakes because they had there, relationships that were more like the 'Mafia' relationships. They did quarrel with each other outside the factory and the ware house over issues, "why you took so much of those skirts and left nothing for us, why did you take two hundred blouses when you can sell only a

hundred and there was little left for my shop". This happened because most retail managers had links with non-company retailers and businessmen and they had commitments to supply them the most popular clothes in return for a certain percentage commission, so that if a certain manager could sell say, ten shirts at his shop, he would take twenty instead and sell ten to his non-company business contacts. I could have made a lot of money had I joined this 'Mafia' - I don't claim to be an angel - but I wanted to be fair, or perhaps the truth is that I was in direct contact with the owners all the time and it was easy for them to keep an eye on my activities, and so I didn't dare get involved in making money. The only advantage that I took from my job was that I would take the clothes that I liked for myself but I used to let the owners know that I was taking something. I was on good terms with the mother and I used to say to her, "mummy, I am taking this and this", and she never stopped me from taking home some nice clothes.

There were often conflicts about money, about the hours of work, and about exploitation. Employees would say, "you make us work so and so many hours but you pay so little". The only way the owners had found to resolve such conflicts was that if someone raised a lot of hue and cry and protested a lot, they would call him aside, give him some ten or twenty pounds in privacy and say, "you have worked hard, we know that, here, don't be angry, take this money and go to a fine restaurant and have a nice meal". These were temporary solutions for conflict and if someone really did protest a lot, too much, they would kick him out of his job saying "we don't need your services, you quit". It was all whimsical and the organization was being run so haphazardly that I cannot figure out for you what control methods or conflict resolution methods were used there. It would be more true to say that there was no organization at all, that is, if you mean by organization, a stable pattern of relationships.

Many people were fired in my presence. For example, one of my colleagues filled up a bin liner with clothes and put it in his car boot. Whether he was stealing those clothes for personal use or sale outside, I don't know. After a while, Benir jee, one of the sons of the owning family, came out in rush to go somewhere but found that none of the company cars was present at site. Benir asked this colleague to lend him his car for a while, and the latter gave it to him. He either forgot that he had put a bin liner full of clothes in his car boot or perhaps he thought that Benir would not open the car boot. When Benir went somewhere, he opened the car boot to put something in and found the bin liner full of clothes. When he came back, he called the said employee in and said, "you have stolen those clothes that are lying in your car". The employee tried to make an excuse, "no Babu Jee, I had gone to deliver some clothes to a retail outlet and perhaps we forgot one bag in the car". The excuse obviously appeared a lame one and Benir said, "I am calling the police". They called in a police officer and made him sit without telling him anything. While the police officer was made to wait, Benir Jee kept putting pressure on the employee and negotiated with him, "if you do not admit that you have stolen, I would hand over the case to the police". Eventually the employee admitted that he had stolen, and asked to be forgiven because he could not afford to be investigated by the police; he used to work but claim social security as well. Had he been investigated, he could lose all benefits. Benir Jee then asked the police officer to go back because, as Benir Jee told him, "sorry, we have sorted out the matter, it was a misunderstanding". The employee was fired but, another strange aspect of the owners, after two months the employee came back, applied for a job, and they gave him the job despite the knowledge that he had stolen in the past[4].

I shall give you an excellent example in this regard: This example shows the extent to which

[4]The above described 'generosity' shows the traditional patriarchal values whereby a rich man may be generous and exploitative at the same time and would like to be the police and the court all by himself within the boundary walls of his property where he functions some what like a mini-king. In the subcontinent, the village *chaudharies*, for example, consider it a disgrace and gross affront should police enter their village to investigate matters which the *chaudharies* think they should sort out themselves. Many battles between the 'intruding' police and the villagers have been fought about whether, in the village, the *chaudharies* or the government institutions are the supreme authority.

corruption had sunk into their psyche. A certain shipment came from abroad for us at the airport. When such shipments would come at the airport, some employee was told to go and get the goods released and cleared from the Airport Customs. He used to take the airway bills and invoices pertaining to the letters of credit, and bring the goods from the airport to the factory. On this occasion, Jamil, the same employee who had been fired earlier for stealing and then taken back on job, was sent to collect the goods. When he reached the airport, he found that there were two lots of goods there but he had papers for only one lot. Jamil went inside to collect the goods. Now the officer at the airport, who was dealing with this shipment, made a mistake and delivered him the second lot as well, thinking that it had been cleared. The mistake was made by the person on deliveries. Jamil had gone there with papers pertaining to one lot but the officer there thought that the papers were for the entire shipment that had come in the name of Krishna Sons. He gave him all that bore the name of Krishna Sons. Our man knew that the second lot had not been cleared but he received it. Had he wanted to dispose off the second lot by himself, he could have made money and, perhaps, there was no way the owners could find out this embezzlement. Any way, he brought both the lots to the factory. They were about six thousand T shirts. The owners not only kept the second lot, they praised Jamil for his cleverness, "Jamil, what a wonderful thing you have done - excellent". Now the T shirts, had they been through the Customs, would have been sold at £4 each, but they very quickly sold them off at £2 per shirt because they didn't want them to be kept in the warehouse for long, fearing that the Airport Authorities might find out that they had made a mistake and come for an investigation. The interesting thing is that Jamil, this employee who had brought in the lots from the airport and was the source of this profit, wanted to take one shirt for himself but the Krishnas made him pay £2 for the shirt he took: They had praised him for his clever manoeuvre but were not in a mood, at that time, to give him one shirt free. On top of that, the Krishnas, after having sold the second lot for twelve thousand pounds, found the papers and invoices for the second lot, filed a complaint that they had not received the second lot and therefore got their money back from the exporters who perhaps got refunded for it by the Cargo Insurance Company believing that the consignment was lost by the Airline. It was a mistake by the Airport Cargo Authorities that they got this lot, made twelve thousand pounds by selling the second lot, got more money from the exporters, which was easy because they had a full set of invoices and airway bill telling that they had not received the goods. The exporter might have got his money from the insurance company[5]. But just look at this, from the same lot that gave them twelve thousand pounds extra, they were not willing to give one shirt worth £2 to Jamil who had been the source of all this profit. Perhaps they thought that this was Jamil's way of repaying for the thefts he had been doing earlier and for which he was fired. But they set this example of embezzlement for their employees, and perhaps that is why they ignored the comparatively smaller thefts of their employees.

There were other events as well of this kind: A certain person who owed the Krishnas about six or seven thousand pounds, refused to pay his debts, and the matter was sent to court. The Krishnas had no evidence that the man owed them the money because, as usual, no proper record for the transaction were kept. When the matter was sent to the court, they instructed me to go to the court as a witness that the man owed them money. I said how could I be a witness, because when the goods were delivered to that man, I did not work for the Krishnas. The Krishnas said that it was part of my duty to go as a witness or else I would be putting my job at risk. Interestingly, when they had made the transaction with that man, I had not even arrived in Britain. When they forced me to go, I said, "in the court room, I shall have to testify on oath on the Quran that he owed you money and I cannot do that because I have no knowledge of the dealings between you and him". They said, "we tell you a way out, you tell the court that you have no faith, that you are an atheist, or say you are a Hindu and testify on the Gita". Now because Gita is the holy book of the Hindus, an oath on Gita, according

[5] I know many Asian businessmen and others who have made a lot of money by insurance frauds and though these events have implications for motivation of people to work, going into details would be beyond the scope of this work.

to their logic, was not binding on me not to tell more than what I knew. I was terribly desperate those days as I had no legal rights to work in Britain and I knew that without the job I won't survive, and so I went to the court and testified. They won the case, and the decision was based solely upon my testimony. I later found that the man owed them only £2000, but they had claimed that he owed much more than that. Such events of gross dishonesty were quite common in that company. There was no discipline, no rules, and a lot of conflict between managers over petty issues. If I tried to mediate in conflicts between staff and managers, the managers resisted my authority. If I tried to tell the owners they would laugh it off, "leave matters where they are". I am still surprised how such a large organization thrived and made enormous profits. And to add to my surprise, I found that the old Krishnas, the founding husband and wife, had began work in Britain as door to door sales people. Perhaps this is just a legend, as legends are often made about successful people. But I think that in this case it was true that they began from scratch, because the mother was very frank with me and would often tell me stories of how they began, what hardships they faced and so on. But there was a help in this case in that when the father died, he was insured for a large sum, and that insurance money really helped them in crossing the barrier of lack of capital. They opened a shop in Liverpool, which was successful, and from there they went on and on to their present fortunes.

I worked for Krishna Sons for four years. I don't know how they dealt with the government departments and how they managed investigations if any. They often took me to their home because the mother grew fond of me. I think that the house was worth more than a million pounds. It was situated in W., a posh locality in Leicester. I used to go to their birthday parties where they used to spend a lot of money on entertaining the guests. Many White people used to come. Champagne was served. They had contacts with several influential White people. They had contacts with the Inland Revenue and VAT officers. I saw them many times giving bottles of special wines and whisky, and gifts to some White people but I don't know who they were. But I personally believe that they did use to bribe some people. For example, I saw them giving gifts to some White people who would come to the factory, "this is for your wife, this is for the kids", and so on. They were very generous with their bank manager as well. But the prime reason for their success was the strong cohesion within a relatively small family. They were so united they never allowed a non-family partner to join in or even take a senior managerial post. I was the only man there who was allowed to touch the cash registers and make invoices without their supervision. Perhaps by going to the court and testifying for them, I had proved my loyalty for them, or perhaps they liked me somehow, I have no idea why they began trusting me a bit more than the others.

However, they soon changed their attitude towards me. The only reason for this change was that their factory manager began filling their ears against me, and they began ignoring me. Perhaps he thought that in my presence, he won't be very close to the owners. I had to take goods from the factory and hence I had to check their quality and keep in touch with the production people and the said factory manager. I had to tell the factory manager what the shops required, what orders we had, what the production people should make and what not. I had to tell the factory manager about the quantity and quality of clothes we required, and what clothes could be sold in the ware house and hence should be made available all the time at the ware house for outside whole-sale customers to come, see, inspect and order. I even had to check the quality of the clothes. So I had a lot of work relationship with the factory manager. I had to deal with him all the time, and because I was keen on keeping up the quality, I sometimes used to snub him particularly because, being so much in their good books and having shown so much loyalty towards them, I thought my job was safe with the owners. I would say to the factory manager, "those jumpers were not of the right quality, I cannot accept them, I cannot sell them either to outside customers or to our own units". I used to do that only because I was quality conscious but he thought that I was pulling his leg, and so in revenge, he began filling the ears of the owners. He messed up the work relationship with his personal problems and because he was a Hindu and so were the owners, and because he had a degree in textile engineering and he thought high of himself, he began creating troubles for me in his presumed revenge. He began saying rotten things about me to the owners who then showed their mistrust in

such things as that they took away facilities from me: I used to have a company car and free petrol, but they took away this car from me and gave it to the factory manager. Gradually it became unbearable and I realized that it was not possible to stay there and work in a respectful way: I had sold my conscience for the owners but at least I had their trust and respect to count on - there was little money but there were some favours. Now this too was lost and so there was no point in carrying on. One day I said to the mother, "mother, I have been working for you for the last four years. I don't need to elaborate how fair and sincere I have been with you and with the company. But now things have become hard for me here and I find it difficult to continue". She appreciated all that I had done for them and she asked me to take a leave for four weeks, relax and think it over. I asked if it would be a leave with pay because if I stopped getting the £70 a week they used to give me, how would I pay my rent and survive without money? During all those four years we had never been given a holiday. Staff holidays were not on their agenda. The mother turned cool and said, "it is not our principle to allow holidays and, just to remind you, you are not a legal employee of this company". We never had a holiday, no national holidays, bank holidays, week-ends, none. We worked even during Christmas holidays. However, I went on a leave without pay and didn't tell them that I was leaving. After two weeks, I found work at another place and then I went to them and told them that I had got a job and that I was leaving. They said nothing.

Asian Family Businesses; Theory X Control Attitudes; Authoritative Control by Personal Observation

1-The work was mainly supervised by the family who owned. Two sons and a daughter-in-law, the owner, his wife, and a sister used to take turns in walking around us. So five of the owners, and two supervisors would come in for a round after every hour or two. They would stand by our side and check if the stitching was done properly, then they would check the bins that are kept by the side of each machinist to see if we had thrown any damaged piece in there. If they found one, they would pick it and put it back on our tables and record it in front of us so that its cost be deducted from our wages. (Manchester).

2-There should be a discipline. There should be a foreman because all the bosses behave as foremen. Two brothers and their father own the factory. They do not understand each other well. One may instruct us to do one thing and the other may come and want us to do something else. Its like being in a home where a child has many fathers and each wants him to do things in different manners. We have three bosses who do not agree amongst themselves. Then the Pakistani employers have a habit of criticizing you in front of all others at the work station. I think this is very bad. Instead they should call you in the office if they have to tell you about any wrong doings. They should not humiliate one in front of others but warn in private, in the office. Pakistani employers don't treat workers as human beings. They think that workers are animals who need a stick and should be kept under strict control if they have to be made understood. They do not consider that we have a self-respect and an ego. One has to give up self-respect if one wants to work - one has to work like a slave with them. After forty hours one doesn't find the energy to work more. It is very tough work. At first I would fix hooks in hangers. Plastic hangers would fall at the rate of four in eight seconds. Two men have to fix hooks in them at the same speed as they fall. You have to be very quick. I couldn't work so fast and so I left it. Now I am working on the press, and because it is piece work, I have the advantage to work on my own. There's no one to keep an eye on me. (Oldham).

3-The pressure was too much to take. If one was a little late, the boss would scold. If one took a bit more time while taking tea break they would scold. They pressured the workers too much and I couldn't bear it. The owner and his wife checked the quality and speed of work. They would frown if the thread broke because it meant wastage of some time. All the time the workers were watched by one breathing on their shoulders. They would criticize and find faults and if someone

would damage a piece of cloth, the cost was deducted from his wages. They would not even give half an hour for lunch; it was fifteen minutes. If anyone was late, they would deduct money from his wages. I left and then never worked again. (Manchester).

4-The three boys, the owner's sons were supposed to be three supervisors to me. They didn't trust me because the sooner they turned their back they thought I wasn't doing any work and as soon as they supervised me, I was doing all the work, and when they went I won't do any. So, they had a system like one boy went off to watch the other workers and one watched me and then, it was a sort of rota system. All the time they were watching me and they were watching the other workers as well. They thought I was a kid of fifteen that needed supervising: They gave me one job and they imagined I made mistakes, I mean, like cutting strings where [the nature of job was such that] no body could [possibly] say to me "maybe you were making mistakes", but it was just they would tell me that. The string was about 3 centimeters [long] and if I was to cut it in the middle they would say, "oh you cut it too short", and things like that, and there was another fact, while they were watching me, since I was taller than them and little people have something against taller ones, I don't know perhaps they always wanted to be tall because if they wanted to go for dancing and all that, you get pushed around by others, and that was another factor [personal dislike]. In addition to the work on machine for which I was employed, I had to do packing, sweep the floor and some times the toilets, if one of the boys who were there, it was there job but I couldn't complain to their father because they could have told their father I wasn't doing well he could have kicked me out so I agreed to clean the toilets.... In an Asian factory, they pay you less, if you want a tea break, they put on a sour face on like, "oh you haven't done enough work, go and do some more". (Huddersfield).

5-I used to do a packing job, and, sometimes, it was cheap plastic bags, and you had to open them, you had to fold the clothes in a certain way and put them in the bags, and put the cello-tape on - and because I didn't want to do over-locking, because that makes your - you know those fibers that are left - they go into your nose and down your throat, they are very bad for your health - I wanted to do packing. And they, one of the brothers, he was the general dogs body - he used to do everything, he wanted me to work so fast, you know, I mean, I couldn't believe - I mean - so fast - sometimes I would say to him, "why don't you try it?", but very nicely - I mean I didn't say, "look - you try and see, I'll see how faster you can do it", but he wanted me to work so fast. All the women were pushed to their limits. They couldn't talk to each other, they couldn't have a rest-break, you know, they couldn't say, "well, I'm having a cup of tea now, I am tired". They were really forced to work. We had half an hour lunch break - and tea was brought around - but you didn't stop to have a tea break, because he wanted to, out of that £1.50 or £2.00 [per hour] he may have paid them, he wanted double the amount, he wanted more than he was giving.

The wives of the owners worked there. These wives were working as supervisors while they were sewing as well. There was no conflict between the worker and the owners' wives - it was just the same old one - work faster - do this like this - do you understand? and you really wanted to say, "well you did it like this before but why are you telling me this". They always wanted you to work slightly better than they had, and you didn't understand, "look, I am doing as good as you are". If one of the other workers didn't do a job good, you know, like didn't sew properly, they were kind of, start quibbling, you know, saying, "that seam is not straight, you should do it properly", and I was very - oh God, there was one terrible time, when one women, I think was at some pressure at home, and she was sewing, and she couldn't sew properly, it was over-locking and you have to be very good at it to do it properly - and she kept missing parts out and we had to return them back, and they started quibbling, "why can't you do it properly, you have missed this little seam", or this and that, and she used to cry, and, Oh God!, I feel awful.

They checked the amount of waste. At first, when you are over-locking, the design of the cloth - right - it has been cut - its like a size 12 - now the over-locking has to be done very careful, that they put so much into the machine and sew; if you - like some of the girls used to put 2 inches,

3 inches into the machine - by the time you have cut that off, it is of size 10 - they used to tell her very gently - they were very nice in that - "oh! do this properly, do it like this", but if she didn't, then they would get angry. They would say, "well, sister", that was the word they kind of used, "would you leave because we don't think you are doing the job properly". She was fired - but not in a very nice way; "you can't do it and we don't want to waste our things". (Leicester).

6-I and my colleagues had a conflict once with the owners. They used to get their goods from France and they were very conscious that no one should know the names and addresses of their suppliers (an exports manager in Pakistan faced a similar fear on the part of the owners who were keen to conceal the particulars of the importers of their products in Germany, France and Britain) or otherwise, their competitor ware houses would import the same stuff from France. They wanted the addresses of their suppliers to be kept secret. But once they saw, at the show room of one of their competitors, a few lines of dresses which they had believed had been exclusively displayed at their ware house. Now anyone can find the names and addresses of the makers of any dresses in the French trade directories and then import them but the owner's wife was distrustful and she wanted to see if anyone from the ware house had leaked the addresses and so she began suspecting us. We knew that the owners didn't want to lose us because we worked very hard, and so when she questioned us in strict tones, we took a stand, and we told her that if we were treated with mistrust, we might think about quitting the job. After some time, the same problem arose again and they suspected us and questioned us in a rude manner, and insisted upon their charges against us, that we had given their secret addresses to their competitors, at which we resigned. (Manchester).

7-The employers always looked for excuses to humiliate and would scold at petty things such as putting a chair here or there as if they enjoy exercise of authority. Quarrels were common. For example, often, when one would take a bit longer tea-time, because all were Pakistanis, the others would fill the boss's ears against him. That X was wasting time or Y had gone there or done this or that. Even if the boss was away from the factory, he found out all that happened in his absence. The selected workers would see to it that he was told of all that happened in his absence. (Manchester).

Typical Statements about Money Motivation: Differences between Asian and English Workers' Motivation: Greater Familial Commitments; More Hours; Least Incentive for Cultural Uplift

1-Pakistanis, or the Asians came here to this country predominantly for money - not for the love of anything else. They came for money and the night shifts offered more money because there was a bonus attached with the night shifts, what they called 'night shift bonus'. There, the salary scales were more than those on the day shifts. So practically everybody went for the night shifts. If any overtime was offered, then Pakistanis were the only people who were prepared to work overtime.... their main purpose to come here was to make money, as much as possible. (Oldham).

2-The next rank from what I was doing was the supervisor which was one more of a headache because you have more responsibility, and he just did the same work as I do, pay is slightly different but slightly. It wasn't worth the trouble. I didn't want to be the supervisor. Extra work. Wish I could have been positive. Because if you get into trouble, you are responsible for it because you have authority. But if you are just a worker, it doesn't matter; you just get a smack once in a while.

And your motivation to work was?

Money. There are lot of chances of promotion if you want to. Good thing about TESCO is that you get cash in hand; probably its the only place that gives you cash... (Leicester).

3-There was no incentive for cultural uplift - to learn more than what was necessary to make money apart from that when you learn more and understand the language, you get more responsibility

for less pay. I will tell you one thing, they used to mess up things deliberately so that they should not get extra jobs. One operator... was asked to do the extra job when he had spare time. But he... messed up, his intention was that the supervisor should not give him extra jobs though that could enrich his job learning. For betterment, or learning language there was no incentive of promotion or furthering career for the pay high up was not equal to the effort they had to put. Their main motivation to work was to get money. That was that main thing and remained always as the top priority. The majority of workers didn't go for self-development. It was enough development for them to come from a remote village and start wearing trousers and suits, tie, hat, and money in the pocket, house of their own and a car... Another thing is that people who had the qualifications could not get good jobs. (Manchester).

4-I was working to be away from domestic problems, to keep myself busy. I didn't like working with the machines but one has to when there is no alternative... Then the wages were reduced further and I quit. (Oldham).

5-A private company offered me a job; I didn't go because the salary was less. But when I came to the Gulf, the salary difference was too big to resist; I thought I'd be getting 25000 and if I work for ten years, I'd have a much better life than I'd have after putting 30 years in India. (Qatar).

6-Conflict arose mostly when they would want a change in the pay scales... A number of times they did go on strikes. Mostly they would complain about the wages. (Manchester)

7-The workers wanted a pay rise. The union called a strike but the management sacked all involved and moved the factory elsewhere. (Slough).

8-From sixties onwards, predominantly, Asians were employed. The English employers employed the Asians because jobs were rough. English people don't want to do any dirty job. They don't want to work night shifts. An Englishman, when he has finished his shift at four or five o' clock in the evening, would not stay on overtime till ten o' clock in the night because he has social hours in front of him. He socializes - completely different. (Manchester).

9-The Asian workers work twelve hours a day and six/seven days a week. The basic reason is financial; the more you work, the more money you make. There is so much greed among our people that they keenly watch how much they are going to make each week. They have high income targets on weekly basis. They keep thinking, whether they are at home or in a shop or wherever, how many more hours of work they can get. We have a worker who virtually falls sick if he is told that this week there would be work for only five or six days and he keeps wondering what he would do on the weekend, and he worries a lot at a day's loss of work; this man has been working for seven days a week for the last five years. When there is not enough work to give seven day work to all workers, we have a rota system whereby the work on the sixth and seventh day is divided among workers turn by turn and none is willing to give up his turn and take some rest or spend time with family. Normally all work seven days a week. (Brentford).

10-There is no wage rate difference between that of the English workers, who work eight hours a day and five days a week, and that of the Asian workers, and therefore, because the White workers work eight hours a day and five days a week, they get nearly half the weekly wages which an Asian worker gets. The major difference in earnings between Asians and Whites comes from the work on the weekends which makes the earnings of our Asian workers almost twice that of an English worker. A weekend work makes your earnings as if you have worked for two weeks, so that an Asian worker gets for a week what an English worker gets for two weeks, but the latter seem to be happy with what they get for lesser hours and lesser days. (Brentford).

11-I think our Asians are more sort of money conscious when it comes to, you know, Asian people would do more for money but the White people would do more for promotion; but at the end of the day, money comes with the responsibility and with promotion. I mean, if you are in charge of fifty people, the fifty won't get more than you obviously. When it comes to overtime our people would work twenty-four hours (if it was possible) a day seven days a week because they think about money. But if you ask an English person, he would say, eight hours, that's it mate, I am going... Well, first of all, their [the Whites] out-going is different; for example, they quite often go out for a weekend or during a week to a pub, drinking, while it is strictly forbidden in our religion. Eating habits, you know, you can be good friends but on the other hand you got to respect each other's way of living. We are more motivated towards the interests of our children, our forefathers, our parents and so on. But the English people are there for themselves. I am aware of one White person in our firm, he is doing at the moment shift work, he is doing three nights from 10 in the evening to 7 o'clock in the morning, three afternoons, 2 to 10, and three mornings from 7 to 2, and then he gets three days off. He is getting more for this kind of work but he applied to be transferred to load planning;; he volunteered to do load planning where he would be working from 9 to 5 and he was prepared to take a pay cut. The advantage he would have is that he would be working Monday to Friday, 9 to 5 but at a lesser pay. (Slough).

12-Now there is another inspector who is going to be retired next year, August, they know that he is retiring and they are asking me to take his job because, normally, it would be very difficult for them to get a White man because Whites don't want to work in the night shifts. They are expecting me to take the night shift because it would be easy for them to hire one for the day shift.... We don't have a lot of social life like the English people; they have to go out in the evening, we have our own way of life, and so we are prepared to work virtually any hours, day or night. (Slough).

13-I had some complaints that I thought that we worked more than what we were paid for. I thought the hours were too long and I didn't feel like working there. If I had said that I wanted to work eight or nine hours, the other workers would not agree. I could be sacked because if all [Asian] workers work twelve hours, then one in the shift cannot work for lesser hours. I asked twice for reduction in working hours but none among the workers agreed. I would say that they have serious family obligations; there is perhaps greed as well, but they have commitments to keep and no other work is available. I would say that even if they could get 16 hours a day work, they would do it. Compared to the English people, our people have much greater family obligations. An average English man usually has to, financially, look after himself only but an average Asian man has to pay for his parents, brothers and sisters, wife and kids as well. Then there are many social problems as well such as payments for the marriages of relatives etc. It is because of the large family and kinship structures that while one is earning, there are ten to eat out of his earnings. (Slough).

14-Asian workers want money at the cost of their physical fitness - I mean many who have worked 12 hours - seven days for several years, are not very fit now. Many have a regular back-bone problem. They have too many family commitments and problems. About the Whites, their style of life and family responsibilities are different from ours; their family responsibilities are lesser than ours. Our people want to keep relatives happy, to own property, spend on marriages etc. The Whites mostly have to look after themselves only, in financial terms, and they can afford to work forty hours only. And then their wives too work in many cases, then there are many who do not marry at all which is very rare among Asians, and then they don't have to spend heavily on their daughter's or son's wedding. When husband and wife both work, they share their financial burden. Our wives do not work outside home. Indians too work twelve hours though the entire family works; mothers, daughters, sons - and they are financially much better off than Pakistanis. If there are four in an Indian family, they all work hard. Either the needs are more, or the greed is more... (Brentford).

15-I didn't want to work that much. It was really hot and since I couldn't claim income support because my mum was claiming child benefit for me, I had to go and work because my dad told me to... I didn't really want to work and what happened was that I used to earn around £100 every week and my dad was not that happy about it, he said, "look you don't need O levels so why don't you get a better job"; he expected me to get at least a better job somewhere in a chemist's or anything like that. (Huddersfield).

16-Family finances needed sorting out. I left my studies at the university to support my parents and six younger sisters. There was no expectation, no motivation, they were just interested in running the place and pay us our wages and that was all we could expect there. (Oldham).

17-You can get more work out of the Asians easily because they want more money - like if they want to work overtime they [the employers] won't give them one and a half times more; they would say we will give you about half or same when they should have given one and half. (Huddersfield).

18-I was working after the women had gone just to get a bit more, because when you are working, you know, when it was 6 o' clock and everybody used to go, you are dead, but just to get that little bit more money, you would kill yourself - just a little bit more to get those £2; even those £2 you might spend it when you are going down the street, but you would stay there, an extra hour, to get that £2. Psychologically it's very funny ... Also the women considered themselves very lucky if the factory opened on a Saturday or Sunday, oh they would love to come. (Leicester).

19-Asian women started to ask for more work and I was forced to come in to pack what they had sewn. (Coventry).

20-The money they got (£30 a week) was close to the level they could get on income support but they worked because most of their husbands were working and so they were not entitled to income support - so they were working there - that was their pin money. It was their money - pocket money like. As you give to a child 50p or £1 a day. They worked for their own private use of money; the husband might not give them enough for clothes and for gold. (Leicester).

Typical Income Differences in Sub-continent Organizations and the Consequent Psychology

1-Operator-three used to get around IRs. 1600, operator-two used to get IRs. 1800 and operator-one used to get IRs. 2000. An executive started from IRs. 2700 basic and the total used to come around 3000. The salary of an assistant manager started from nearly 5500. So there was a big jump in salary from executive to an assistant manager. A very big jump; and then the difference between the salary of an assistant manager and that of a deputy manager was again 2000, and so on; each time you were promoted, you got a jump of IRs. 2000. A joint-manager used to get about 10,000; the Deputy General Manager about 12,000, and the Managing Director used to get about 15,000..

2-... before Smith Kline and Beecham had a merger, the sales team of Smith Kline was getting more money than the sales team of Beecham and therefore felt superior. Hence, after the merger of the two companies, the 'upper brass' of Smith Kline began undermining the sales team of the previously Beecham. Such patronizing was not acceptable to the Beecham team but the conflict went so far that they all resigned, remained unemployed for some time and were then taken by our company. (Narrated by a sales manager in Pakistan).

Communal (Non-Work) Conflict and Intrigues Leaving Little Room for Improving Effectiveness: Corruption; Hooliganism; Rewards not Related to Performance; Pseudo Organizations

The following are excerpts from interview with a former lecturer at Sindh University in Pakistan:

The majority of students at Sindh University were predominantly Sindhis. No Punjabis were there but there were some Urdu-speaking students. There were around twenty to twenty-five lecturers only two of whom were Urdu-speaking, namely the Chairman and me. The rest were all Sindhis.

In the beginning, when I went from Punjab to work in Sindh, because I had been told by many people that the Sindhis do not accept Urdu-speaking people, I told them that I was a Punjabi, which was not untrue in that though my parents were Urdu-speaking migrants of India, I had been brought up and lived in Punjab. But telling them that I was a Punjabi turned out to be a grave mistake because the times when the Sindhis hated the Urdu-speaking communities have largely passed and now they accept them on account of being the 'new Sindhis', and have allied with them against the Punjabis who were propagated against as 'alien and imperialist infiltrators'. I had been incorrectly told that the Sindhis were more likely to tolerate Punjabis than they would the Urdu-speaking. I found that while they would tolerate the Urdu-speaking, they would not accept Punjabis coming to Sindh.

I went to a lunch where the Sindhi students began discouraging me from staying at the University by telling me things that howsoever hard I worked and however long I stayed at the University, I would neither get a promotion nor a scholarship for further studies abroad because it was usually the Sindhi teachers who had the required influence and contacts to get promotions or scholarships. One of the boys told me that he was going to get appointed as a lecturer as soon as he passed his last examination and that he would get a scholarship to study abroad because he had got the right contacts. He said it was no use me staying at the University for even if I stayed for ten years, I won't get promoted at the right time, and that he would get a scholarship to study abroad much earlier than I was likely to.

When the Punjab football team came to play at the Sindh University, some Sindhi students got hold of one of them and broke his legs.

The first event took place when I was asked to invigilate the B.Sc. examinations. When I tried to stop the students from copying, they felt offended. The lecturers felt offended too. They asked me why I was being so strict, and the students demanded that I let them do what they were doing. They used to copy to such an extent that they had the official answer sheets, already filled in, smuggle into the examination hall and attach them with the regular answer sheets. I have no idea how they managed to get the answer sheets from outside. I won't say that the teachers gave them the question papers, but the teachers used to make questions from that part of the syllabus that was taught during the semester. Because the students knew that the exam questions would come from what the teachers had been teaching in the class room, they used to write the answers to all the questions that could possibly come in the examination, and then, during the two hour exam, search for the right answer sheet from among those they had brought in with them and then replace the issued answer sheets. Among the other methods they used were that they would bring in, what we called 'kartoons' (cartridges) or 'golay' (rolls) which were papers rolled into cartridge or ball shapes for easy hiding into their clothes, one roll here one there. They had strange and novel methods of hiding these in their dresses. On my first exam, I kept stopping them from using these rolls by taking them away from them. It was an unusual thing for them and so when they went out, they probably planned that the next day, when I would try to stop them, they would protest and walk-out of the examination hall. There was a student who brought in with him a lot of papers and rolls of which I took away as many as I could find. Then he deliberately dropped a rupee note near him which from a distance, I thought was a piece of paper. When I picked it up, he immediately got up and protested that I had taken his rupee, that it was not a cheating paper, and that I was being too much of a nuisance. I said to him, "forget about the rupee, you are wasting your time when you should pay attention to your examination paper". He said I had been unfair to him and that he was unduly checked and stopped

from concentrating on his examination paper, and in protest he was walking out. He went out and began shouting in Sindhi, "Fazal na khapay, Fazal na khapay" (Fazal is not acceptable) and some other things. Then most students got up, and began walking out to join him. This was my first experience of this kind and I tried my best to stop the students at the door, from walking out. Many pushed me aside and walked out but around eight or ten students kept sitting at their desks to whom I let do their papers until the finishing time. There was a Sindhi lecturer there, a very nice man. He came and told me not to worry.

I was amazed at the way they openly cheated and it reminded me of the time I was at Quaid-e-Azam University where we used to do so much hard work, during examinations there was such strict control over us that it was said that not a sparrow can fly into the examination hall. And we used to be so afraid of the invigilators and examiners. There were very strict rules; if one got a supplementary, he could get only one chance to pass it and if he failed the second time, they never cared whether he had passed all other tests and done his final thesis in the last semester, he was expelled from the University and could not be re-admitted except under very special circumstances.

Anyhow, the Chairman got the report of the incident and he came immediately. He said to me not to worry because such incidents used to happen there now and then, and that things would be alright. But, he added, that I should not have been so strict with the students. When the students finished their protest and left the premises, the Chairman called me into his office and said that I had been heavy handed with the students and that I should not have been so strict. He advised me to be lenient in future at which I got upset and I said, "Sir, I am sorry but either you do not give me invigilation duties or I won't tolerate cheating going on under my nose. Whatever you say, but I have this problem that I cannot accept such things happening in front of me. I will have to stop it. There was so much cheating material with the students that it covered my table. They had their notes and even books with them". Although they were instructed to leave notes and books outside, they still brought them in, and perhaps because they were so rough, one couldn't possibly stop them. In such an environment, I think the Urdu-speaking students too would be doing it but I couldn't possibly know about them because the students I was invigilating were mostly Sindhis (the Urdu-speaking were a tiny minority both in Sindh University and in the districts around it).

The Chairman said that I should take a leave for a week and go home to take rest and think. I left. When my (Sindhi) colleagues found that the Chairman, who was Urdu-speaking, had granted me a leave and that I had left for Lahore, they complained to the Vice Chancellor, a Sindhi, that I had just disappeared, and was not on my job, and that I had left without informing them. The Vice Chancellor sent me a telegram at home which said that the University administration had no idea about my whereabouts and that I should immediately report at my job. I was perplexed and worried at these strange events. It was the Chairman who had asked me to go on leave; how could he do this thing while the University administration had a different idea about my leave? Anyway, I rushed back to the University only to find that the teachers, my colleagues, were on a social boycott against me and would not talk to me. They won't answer me. I used to go to the tea room, make tea for myself, and sit alone because not one of them would talk to me.

The Chairman too was from the Urdu-speaking community but they accepted him because he ran the department exactly as they told him to. The lecturers used to tell him to do this and that and he seldom argued. I said to the Chairman, "now that the Vice Chancellor knows that I was absent from my job, I think I better see him in person and explain what has happened, that you allowed me a leave, so that he should not think that I have been neglecting my duties. He should know what happens here and what happens with us". The Chairman allowed me to see the Vice Chancellor. The Vice Chancellor was a Sindhi too. When I went to see him, he said, "Oh! so you are the person we have been hearing so much about. Well. Now the problem is that we have a lot of problems here. We cannot run this University if we confront the students head long. You will have to make compromises and do what other teachers and students tell you to do. You know that the whole area is full of arms, the students have got weapons and if you want to carry on in your way, I cannot provide you with an armed escort or guarantee your safety and security. It would lead us to great

troubles. Even when the Ministers and top politicians come to visit the University, we face great problems in arranging for their security. The boys here are at freedom to do whatever they want to do; there is no one who could possibly stop them. You will have to be very careful in future." I was greatly disappointed and I said I would rather resign than to compromise. He said, "you are at liberty to do whatever you like but please be very careful. You may stay here if you take precautions and do not offend others. I would advise you to avoid offending others and only then you may stay here". I then went to the Chairman and said to him, "if you want me to stay in this job, I might but I cannot let them cheat to such an extent because I remember how hard we have worked to get our degrees, and besides, how will things improve if we give in? How would the University benefit if we do not do our duties?". The Chairman just kept listening and went into a deep silence.....

Finally I resigned. I gave in the resignation letter and kept waiting and waiting for a reply but no one would tell me if the resignation had been accepted. I later found out that the resignation had been accepted but they didn't tell me that because they didn't want me to leave before the end of the session.... When the session ended, I went to see the Chairman and asked him to allow me to leave. He requested me to stay for a while until all things were finalized. I said, "but everything has been finalized. I have even marked the papers and given you the results". He said the result I had made was very bad, that I had been very strict in marking the papers, and he asked me to review it and be lenient. He asked me to add fifteen to every student's marks and I did that. So everyone got upgraded by fifteen marks. I then stayed there for only four days and then left.

I think the Vice Chancellor could have appreciated me. He could have said that what I did was the right thing to do, and that it should be done though no one had tried to do this so far. But could he provide me with the security that I would have needed? These were his words: "Do as the students want, because we cannot provide you with guards all the time". And this especially because I was living in the bachelors hostel where the students could come whenever they wanted to.

There is a feeling among Sindhis that they have been left behind in the economic gains, and that they are socially and economically backward while the Mahajars (the Urdu-speaking) have got businesses, factories, jobs and positions in government offices because they have got education and so they get good jobs. One way to compete against the Mahajars is to let the Sindhi boys have as much degree qualifications as they can manage to get. It seems to me that the Vice Chancellor probably wanted a large number of Sindhi students to get their certificates regardless of whether they deserved or not. His aims were to help the Sindhis come up because they could not come up if merit system was followed strictly.

Authoritarian and Inequality Values; Concepts of Masculinity and Strength; Authoritative, Theory X and Coercive Control; Obsequiousness; Inter-Personal Physical Conflict

The following narration by a quality controller in a Pakistani factory, reveals some aspects of the sub-continent authoritarianism linked to interpersonal physical conflict:

Until today, we had a worker from Laiyah (a rural district well known for honour-related disputes and feuds). This worker is bearded and stout and often boasts that people from his region are well known for upholding honour (often mistaken for arrogance and a big ego). He had been with us for the last six months and because he was hired on the *sifarish* (referral) of our director of administration, he thought that no one could touch him (sack him). Now, because the director of administration got him appointed, this worker would not pay quick attention to the orders of his supervisors. When the shift-incharge or the supervisors ordered him to do something, he would do it in accordance with his temperament, that is, he would do it in his own way and in his own time and not rush or do the work in the docile manner typical of an average worker. Though he used to do his job properly and correctly, he would not like to be ordered in the coarse manner to which our supervisors are accustomed. Now, most workers here are hard pressed for jobs. They could be fired

upon the recommendations of the supervisors, and this knowledge has sunk into the minds of both the supervisors and the workers. The result is that most workers, in their efforts not to displease the supervisors, have become more than obedient in that they usually rush to do a job at the first demand of the supervisor though they keep begrudging and resenting the high handedness, and show their grudge in mutual squabbles. The supervisors know their power over the workers but they also know that they too could be fired if the work is not done properly and in time, and so they are tense most of the time, and often take their exasperation out on the workers through castigation and rebuke.

Now this worker from Laiyah was a hard worker in that despite his so called haughtiness, there is a certain way to get good work out of him: For example, he has never been insolent to me because I did not hurt his self-esteem. I have got a lot of work out of him because I do not resort to tongue-lashing or instruct workers in a derogatory way or in high tones. He would not like to be shouted at, and if you let him keep up his bearing and be polite, he would do his work very well. If he was shouted at or spoken to in insulting manner such as our supervisors often do; "you owl", or "you donkey - do this or do that", he would be offended. During the last six months, the worker has had several arguments and squabbles with fellow workers and the shift-incharges. Sardar, the deputy manager, wrote a recommendation to the plant manager that the said worker be sacked. Many say that there was no need to dismiss the worker, but because Sardar has a personality clash with the director of administration, and because the said worker is an appointee of the said director, Sardar has been considered by many as rather prejudiced against the worker. The day before yesterday, the said worker had a fight with another worker who got his head injured. A report was made to the plant manager, and Sardar recommended on the report that the said worker be sacked. The plant manager got the due salary of the worker calculated, and was preparing the final papers when the worker walked in and explained that he was not responsible for the quarrel, and pleaded that he should not be fired. After defending his actions in vain, the worker left. When he was leaving the plant manager's office, he had an encounter with three men, Sardar, the deputy manager who had written the fatal report against him, and the assistant managers of two departments. They had just finished their jobs and were about to leave the factory. The three men were going upstairs to the plant manager's office to report that they had finished a certain job and were leaving, while the worker was going downstairs. One assistant manager, who usually acts as a minion to Sardar, the deputy manager, tried to please Sardar by being nasty to the sacked worker and said in Punjabi (a language considered coarser than Urdu, the polite language), "you disreputable man, why are you still hanging around? if you had any shame you won't show us your face". The worker had some respect for Sardar, the deputy manager, and had never been cross with him directly, but he considered the assistant manager not worthy of respect because of the latter being "a sycophant and a toady to Sardar". Therefore, he retorted, "you are a bootlicker and a greater disgrace than I am". This was the first time that this worker admitted that there was an element of disgrace in him, and he did so only because that the fact of being dismissed had begun to sink in his mind. But he had not yet lost his pride and believed that whatever disgrace he had caused himself, he had not sunk low to the level of the assistant manager who was a flatterer. Sardar lost his temper because the reference to his assistant manager being a bootlicker implied that he somehow patronized sycophancy. He thus shouted back, "shut-up and have some shame you (an invective which is not mentionable)". The worker had not been coarse to Sardar before, and had some reverence for him being a higher official and an educated man. He therefore pleaded to the manager's expected sense of fairness: "sir jee", he said, "you had a right to condemn me when I was your subordinate, but I have resigned from the job and I no longer work for you; you should therefore not resort to invective - show some kindness to me". The words, "I have resigned now", reflected the high sense of pride the worker had: Everybody knew that he had been sacked, but, by claiming that he had not been sacked but resigned of his own accord, the worker probably wanted to maintain his self-respect. Sardar interpreted this desperate appeal to self-respect as lying. I think that he had been seeing the worker as a cheater and as a liar, and therefore he was enraged, and threw a tirade of abuses at the desperate worker which made the worker lose all self-control. Thus, he slapped in Sardar's face so hard that his glasses went flying off

and his lips began to bleed. The 'toady' assistant manager, in order to stop the worker from hitting further, gave a strong blow on his neck from behind at which the worker turned towards him and pushed and kicked him several times. He then hit him again and again until several people rushed in and grabbed the worker. The worker kept shouting, "I will not spare you, I will see you all". The security men took him out and calmed him. Because the worker had already been fired, there was little action that could be taken against him; a police report would have been in vain because by the time the local police could have begun to find the worker, he would already have left for Laiyah, which is very far from our town.

Rafiq, another assistant manager, had once advised the said deputy manager, in my presence, that he being a high ranking official, must not come into direct contact with low ranks because he did not know how to deal with the common man. He told him that he must observe the hierarchical ladder of deputy manager to assistant manager to shift-incharge and supervisors and so on; that the managers in this case should not communicate with the workers and supervisors directly. If the managers would start talking with the workers directly, then there are several types of workers: Some are haughty and insolent enough to possibly insult them. For example, this assistant manager, whom the said worker accused of being a toady, was once wandering on the shop floor. He saw that the thread on the machine of a worker, who had big moustaches, had broken. He shouted at him, "hey, your thread is broken; where is your mind?". The worker, because he was addressed to in a coarse manner, looked at him but ignored his command. The assistant manager shouted again, "are you deaf? don't you hear what I am saying?; get the thread fixed". The worker, right in front of all the other workers, retorted by downright challenging his authority, "I can't fix it, come down and get it fixed yourself". The other workers began to laugh at the assistant manager being disgraced so badly. If the assistant manager had been wiser, he could have been polite or asked the shift-incharge or the supervisor to deal with the said worker; this would have kept the assistant manager's authority and control untarnished. Because of these officers sinking low to the level of menial and lowly workers by talking to them in the same vulgar manner as the workers do, most of them have lost respect which fact was well exhibited once when a trip of students came on a tour to the factory. There were twenty students and a couple of teachers. Now, our plant manager is not a professional, not even very well educated. He had joined the Wali Group of Industries after finishing his high school. From Wali, he went to Khyber Rayon and there he did his F.A. (Faculty of Arts) by studying in his spare time. Then he joined our organization and did his B.Sc. and since then has been promoted step by step to his present high rank. In other words, he is what we call, a 'ranker' and though he has got his degree, his tone, accent, gestures, and manner of speech betray his low upbringing and his coarse origins. When he talks, you cannot tell that he has ever received proper education. Now this trip of students was there on the shop-floor. There, in front of the spindles, we have small doors that have to be kept closed so that air could not come out, but many workers keep these doors open on purpose so that if the thread breaks, they could tie it quickly. This is not the right thing to do; the proper procedure is that the workers should keep the doors closed and check, after every five minutes, if the thread has broken. It was nine o' clock in the morning. Those twenty students were there, their teachers were there, and the workers were working with the doors of the spindles open. The plant manager came and when he saw the said doors open, he probably thought that if the university teachers saw this, they would think that the plant manager was a novice, and didn't know the right procedure. He lost his temper at the thought of being perceived incompetent and tried to build his self-esteem by showing, to the visitors, what 'great authority' he possessed over his staff. He thus called the assistant manager, whose name was Rifat. "Rifat", goes the plant manager in front of all the workers, the students and the university teachers, "why are those doors open? If I saw those doors open again, I will take off your trousers and make you sit at the factory gate for everyone to have a good look". Rifat went red with shame but couldn't utter a word. The plant manager didn't see that he was disgracing the assistant manager in front of the latter's subordinates - he could have called him into his office and reprimanded him in privacy to keep the latter's authority on his workers unmarred. when all had left, the assistant manager took out his frustration at the workers.

Authoritarian Values, Coercive Control, and Inter-Personal Physical Conflict

An event of physical conflict and the reasons for it were reported by an Indian assistant production manager as follows:

(Our executive) was very rough with them. He used to act in a proud state of mind and had an authoritative style. (For such executives) they would say, "don't bring him here, it would cause problems" ... and one of our managers kept telling, "don't take him, don't take him, it would cause problems", but they took him and it led to problems. Everyday he would tell the employees to work and one would say, "he touched me" and would fight back. When I had such problems, I would ask the supervisor, "who began the fight first", and the supervisor would say, "the executive touched him first" ... (a worker) grabbed hold of the executive and pushed him due to a fear of being hit first; he was afraid that the executive was going to hit him, and as a counter-measure, the operator hit him first. I knew that the executive was doing wrong against the operator and had to support ... the employee.... When the management came to know that I had supported the operator and was not taking sides with the executive, I was called inside and questioned. I told them that it was the executive's fault. My manager started questioning me, "why you have to, we have come to know that you are supporting the staff against an executive". I said I was not supporting anyone, but the action that had led to this situation of conflict between the operator and the executive, was wrong. I was just giving the facts that just because of the rough manner in which the executive handled the people, or his favoritism, had led to this problem. "By supporting the executive, we cannot change the facts or resolve the conflict. The executive has to change his attitude to change the environment. Because of his attitude, I am also having problems which I find very difficult to handle. If I have to handle the people, I want my colleague to change his way of thinking". You should have self control. I told the executive that he won't be able to work if he went on like that, and then it happened, and he could not work, and he kept saying, "I want to leave, I want to leave"... and in the last year, it came to that situation ... where it was difficult for anybody to work...

Authoritarian Values; Obsequiousness; Concepts of Masculinity and Strength; Upper Class Privileges

An elaboration of the sub-continent authoritarian values comes from a sales manager in Pakistan.

It happened so, why I kept a moustache; ...it was during the very early days when I joined M.G. We had a very special client, Babu[6] F., he is the owner of D. Laboratories and a regular customer of M.G. Apart from that, he is also a movie producer and a film director. He used to make Punjabi films of the kind of Maula Jat and Noori Nath (films that emphasize the Punjabi concepts of virility, heroism, honour and feuds, thus serving or creating a cheap but popular concept of warrior-like manhood). His character was not proper according to our social norms but acceptable for a rich men. For example, he used to drink, attend to the prostitutes and dancing girls in the red light area, and other things. But he never kept any of his acts secret because he was a very rich and influential man and not many would dare to condemn him. He used to boast openly about his alcoholism and prostitution in public and thought that this was how a true man should live. In fact he was a very

[6]The word 'Babu' has two meanings; when prefixed to the name of a distinguished man, it reflects honour and prestige usually among the rural people or those rural people who have migrated and settled in the big cities, but in its derogatory sense, a 'Babu' maybe defined as a soft speaking clerk in British India, educated by the British with a view, commonly believed, 'to serve as an obsequious pen pusher and to know the manners of the upper classes'. Many native Punjabis who subscribe to the Punjabi style of masculinity and pride, use this term in rather derogatory sense to discourage polite young men who like to wear western clothes that reflect decency.

entertaining and interesting personality, and as is common with these kind of people, he knew how to treat his guests and please them with his stories, but such people are very blunt and out-spoken as well. They do not spare words in expressing their true sentiments about a person or a situation and may get easily offended if they, in return to their frankness and candidness, are not honoured, valued and entertained. When I went to see him as our valued customer and began talking politely with him in Urdu he expressed annoyance and said, "oh Babu, what is this? You began talking to me in Urdu? Can't you speak your mother tongue? talk in Punjabi - I don't enjoy this Urdu". When I talked to him in Punjabi, he was pleased. When I would forget to talk in Punjabi and speak in Urdu, because I usually talk in Urdu, he would express irritation and pretend to be aloof, but when I spoke in Punjabi he was frank and open with me. To be intimate with him, my knowledge of Punjabi language and some cultural factors that he loved, helped a lot. When I would talk about things that interested him most, he used to feel pleased and say, "friend, you are really my own type". He then invited me to his son's wedding and entertained me very well though I was just a sales executive at that time while he was a very well known man. But then, because he was a rich man, he could afford to deal only with those who liked his style of life and his views, and ignore other people. He became a good friend and would place orders only when I visited him and would seldom complain. On the other hand, when our sales manager would visit him, Babu F. found his orthodox views, apparent from his beard and his usage of a language laden with religious terms, repulsive. Babu F. used to make fun of him while the sales manager used to flatter him which Babu F. did not like. He could tell sycophancy from true and genuine warmth.

The first time I went to Babu F., I was clean shaven and I looked very young. Now I had gone to him as a sales executive and on business but he straight away said to me, "what is this? the M. G. people! what are they doing? they send a kid to talk business with me! Go back son, bring an elder along with you"... he had a preconceived idea, when he had looked at me, that M. G. had send a kid to him, and when I couldn't reply to some of his questions, he blurted out what he felt. Later, in the same meeting, I answered his questions, satisfied him that I was not a kid, but he still stayed aloof. He was not cooperative. There were many incidents like this with other people and I realized the general trend that people make an impression of you the moment they see you, that your appearance and the way you dress counts a lot. When I began my projects ... I felt that people's attitude towards me was as if they were talking to a juvenile (that is why I had to keep a moustache, to look grown up and to be listened to).

Patriarchal/Unitary/Non-work Control; Favoritism; Intrigues; the Influence of Pressure Groups/ Political Clout on Employment Practice; the Inter-play between Patriarchal Values & Legal Provisions

The following was narrated by a head master, about the times when he was a school teacher:

Among the privileges and benefits which the favourite teachers could get from the head master were, relaxation in teaching hours, the casual periods that used to come up were shared unequally, when there were suggestions asked for in the day to day administration of the school, the favourite teachers were listened to more than the others. The group of disfavoured teachers used to keep the DEO (district education officer) informed about the indecorous acts, or what they thought was morally improper on the part of the head master. They would also bring the said things into the notice of the teachers, the public through news papers, and also make the students realize the same in such a way that they could not singly be pointed out and victimized.

When the elections of the Teachers Association came up, the head master wanted that a candidate from his favourite group should get elected. He thought that if his favourite teacher got elected, it would mean that administration would be done as he wanted and there would not arise unwanted demands from the Teachers Association. To get his candidate elected, he began exploiting the teachers. The teachers are basically very weak in front of the administration. They cannot afford

to be bold enough to refuse the demands of the head master because the head master is the one who writes their ACRs (annual confidential reports), he allots periods to them, he sanctions their leaves, he can recommend to the Director of Education that a certain teacher be transferred. He can create a number of problems for the teachers. To add to it, he himself was the presiding officer on the polling day. He was to get the ballot-papers polled. He and his favourite teachers sat together and made a plan as to how the votes would be casted and how they would defeat our candidate in the elections. We were confident of our victory because we had campaigned as much as we could, and the majority of teachers favoured us. We had calculated because we knew, in most cases, who would vote for whom.

When I went to cast my vote, the polling was close to an end and about six votes were left to be casted. I saw that the ballot paper which they gave me had a serial number on it, which act was grossly undemocratic because, when you issue the ballot paper with a serial number, anyone among the polling staff could write down the name of the person to whom they gave the ballot paper with such and such serial number. You can find out who voted for whom because they had a voters list as well which too had serial numbers. And they were doing so to put pressure on the teachers that the head master was going to find out who listened to him and voted for his candidate and who did not. When I saw this happening, I protested in front of the head master and the polling was stopped. We said we had no confidence in such an election where the secrecy of votes was not maintained. The DEO came in and he conducted the rest of the polling. The serial numbers were there and could not be erased, but he stopped that practice of noting down to whom a certain ballot paper was issued. A lot of hot words were exchanged, we protested, but when the results were announced, it was found that both candidates had secured an equal number of votes. The solution they found was to toss a coin. Our candidate lost the election. During the time we were protesting on the use of unfair methods in polling, the head master lost his temper and said that he did not accept us as "my teachers" (note the assumption of loyalty from the subordinate staff expressed in the words, "my teachers"). We said, all right, we are teachers at the school, not his personal staff, and we would carry on doing our duties. When the details of the events of the election were reported in the news papers, he made it a personal issue, a matter of honour, and he called in the President of the Head Masters Association to contemplate taking action against us. On our part, we called in our leaders in the Teachers Association. But after one week, four teachers from our group, including me, were transferred from that school. When the transfer orders came from the Directorate of Education, we found that we had been transferred to four different locations far from our homes. We protested a lot and got the transfers canceled once. But hardly had we heaved a sigh of relief that the transfer orders were sent again. We appealed to the Minister of Education, and then to the Chief Minister and the Governor, that we were being victimized on political grounds and that we sought their interference. A big conflict arose because of the politicization of the issue so much so that in the concerned offices of the government, the concerned officers and politicians could be divided into two groups; those who favoured us as being victimized without offense, and those who favoured the head master and the Head Masters Association as being morally right in seeking to control the "unruly teachers in our educational institutions". When our appeal was presented to the Ministerial Cabinet, for discussion, the Cabinet too got divided into two groups so that the Minister of Education supported the case of the head master because he did not want to lose support of the Head Masters Association, and therefore the Secretary of Education too supported the head master. The Governor of the province supported our group - then known as the aggrieved group. The Governor supported our case because a few relatives of the other teachers (who had been transferred along with me) were politically influential and had contacts with some Ministers who lobbied for the Governor in the Provincial Assembly. These Ministers had asked the Governor to favour the aggrieved teachers. They began a long inquiry into the matter which took six months. During these six months, several times the transfer orders were despatched to us and then canceled: The Minister of Education would get us transferred, my fellow teachers would rush to their relatives and then some influential politicians would pressurize the said Minister and get the orders canceled. At this, the head master would use

his influence to get us transferred again, and so on.

When the Cabinet was divided into two groups, when several teachers began to protest, and a major issue was made, the only way they could resolve the issue was to start an inquiry. The Minister of Education issued the orders and the Director of Education was sent for the inquiry. It was a one-man-probe. The Director spent seven days at our school during which time he interviewed many among the staff. We couldn't find out what he wrote and what allegations were made against us. But the benefit of the inquiry was that all the other allegations against the head master were brought to surface; allegations such as misappropriation of funds, partiality in sending admission forms of students for the BSHE (Board of Secondary and Higher Education) examinations. The Secondary School Certificate examinations are conducted by the BSHE and only those students are allowed to appear in this examination whose admission forms are approved and endorsed by the head masters of their schools. The head masters try to stop those students, from appearing in the examination, whose chances of success are the least, because a higher failure ratio reflects badly on the performance of the school administration and the teaching staff, for which mainly the head master is held responsible. Normally the admission forms of those students are sent to the Board who take 33 percent marks in the school internal examinations. This is the criterion. If you send the forms of some of those students, who have secured below 33 percent marks, and do not endorse the forms of some others who have secured similar marks, on the basis of nepotism or relationships with their relatives, then this is partiality and favoritism. So these allegations against the head master were made. Then there was a serious political case made against the head master: When D.M. had become the Governor of our province, he had issued orders that in all schools the 'slogans of our nation' should be written either on walls or on boards fixed on the school walls. Now, in between the two periods of the D.M. rule, the People's Party had taken over, during which period the school administration, feeling scant need for the slogan boards on the wall, had taken off a certain board and put it in a store room which in fact was not a store room but the collective toilets of the students turned into a store. When the Director of Education asked some teachers to file their grievances, they tried to score a 'major political point' against the head master, by appealing to the pro-government sentiments of the Director by telling that the contempt of the head master for the government was obvious from his haughty acts; that the 'sacred' board bearing the 'slogan of our nation' had been "thrown away in the toilets"[7]. When we heard this, we too picked upon this issue because we were in a war which we couldn't afford to lose. Though the whole issue of the slogan board was ludicrous, it nevertheless shows what kind of loyalties people show in order to win a battle. And many knew that if the Governor heard about the 'disdain' of the head master for the 'sacred slogan board', he would not spare the head master. In such cases, all parties involved claim that they are more loyal to the present government than their opponents are, and try to win the sympathies of the higher authorities. Because our opponents claimed to be faithful to the Ideology of the State and its rulers, we had to claim that we were even greater servants of the same cause, because once you accept what you are, you have lost the battle and you are out of the establishment. The conflict was publicized to such an extent that interested teachers all over the province used to talk about the 'battle' and were divided into two groups supporting either the transferred teachers or the head master. The Teachers Union too was split on the issue. The President of the Teachers Union did not favour us because during the elections we had campaigned for his rival candidate who, though he had lost the elections, did use his influence among teachers to create support for us.

The hierarchy of the administration in the Education Department had some internal conflicts amongst themselves. For example, the Secretary of Education and the Director of Education had a personal rift between them. The Director did not like the Secretary, and because the Secretary was

[7]Note that the State Ideology, called the 'Two Nations Theory', which says that Muslims and non-Muslims form two separate and distinct nations all over the world, however absurd, is considered very sacred in general, so that various legal and social penalties are imposed for lack of respect for the said Ideology.

against us, we found a soft corner in the Director who, luckily, was the soft conductor of the inquiry. The Secretary supported the head master and therefore we hoped that the Director would report the whole matter in an objective and impartial manner and write the facts as they were. The inquiry resulted in a compromise, a kind of patch up. It was decided that the teachers would be transferred, but they would not be sent to schools far off from their homes, but to schools within the limits of the local Municipal Committee. We agreed to this decision because this was the best possible result we could hope for in view that the head master had greater political clout than we had.

The influence of Pressure Groups on Employment Practice; Personality Clashes; the Inter-play between Patriarchy & Legal Provisions, Ineffectiveness of Rules/Orders, Sifarish (Political Contacts)

The following was narrated by a lecturer:

Legally, I should be transferred to the town where my wife is teaching; there is a rule which says that a husband and wife should be posted to one station. But transfers are not made according to rules, and I know this, and therefore when I wanted to get transferred, I did not start my case from the Directorate of Education. I did not launch a request at the Directorate that under such and such clause of the service rules, I should be transferred, because I know that they would find some other clause to keep me where I am. Because I am not in the fundamentalist group of Jamaat-e-Islami to which the Director of Education belongs, it will be hard for me to get transferred. Secondly, it is a big problem to have a conscience and to worry about the state of affairs of your country, because, when I say to someone that the appointment of the Director of Education was illegally done, it reaches his ears somehow and he then develops hostility towards me. I know that he is hostile towards me and therefore he is not going to transfer me upon my request. Day before yesterday, I met the President of the College Teachers Association, who told me that I won't get transferred unless I meet the Director of Education and ensure him that I support his appointment as Director of Education. My interest is to get transferred, his interest is to stay the Director of Education. Now I have to go to him and ensure him that I would not talk against his interests. But there are some problems of conscience, or you may call it an ego problem if you don't want to give me the credit of having a conscience. I don't want to go to him and say that he has a right to be the Director of Education. I therefore approached the Chief Minister through my relatives and friends who are close to him. We call it political approach. There is an ex-MPA (Member of the Provincial Assembly) who is my relative under the 'braadri' net-work (genealogical clan system) and I have asked him to get me transferred. There is no other way. The Chief Minister has to keep influential parliamentarians happy in order to get their support. It is a net work of power games. So I went to this relative of mine who got the Chief Minister to write on my application that I should be transferred. The Chief Minister has also got it noted down to his personal secretary that he should get the job done.

However, I still have some doubts. The doubts are that the Chief Minister is pressurized daily by dignitaries to write, to recommend, and to do this or that. He issues several instructions everyday, like the one issued for me, but for the administration, that is, the Secretariat or the Directorate, it is not possible to make all recommended transfers. So they take the orders of the Chief Minister lightly. If they pay no heed to the Chief Minister's orders, there is little one can do. The Chief Minister has no time to peruse every petty order and ask if orders have been obeyed or not. No one is going to ask if an action has been taken on the Chief Minister's orders. If I do not peruse my case, the order will stay in the pipe line and no one will bother about it. So I will have to follow my file step by step to whichever office it is sent.

Control on Personal Beliefs/Values; Non-Work Conflict; Imposition of a Unitary View of Culture; Authoritarianism; Penalties for Non-Conformers; Intrigues; Political Influence in Employment Practice

When I was appointed a teacher at the P. School, my reputation or rumors, whatever you call them, of being a liberal and a '*dehria*' (those who refuse to accept the supremacy of Islamic thought over other) had spread in anticipation among the teachers. Many teachers and the head master were keen to prove that I was a non-believer. Therefore, they made a special time table for me: I was to teach Islamic Studies (compulsory) to the ninth and the tenth class and then I was to teach Islamic Studies (optional) to the same classes. These were not my subjects at the University, but four periods of Islamic Studies were given to me and on top of that I was to teach Pakistan Studies as well. They gave these subjects to me because they suspected that I was not much of a subscriber to the 'Two Nations Doctrine' (the said doctrine, that Muslims and non-Muslims form two distinct and separate nations, led to the formation of the Islamic State), and did not show high reverence for the Father of the Nation. By giving me subjects where sometimes, they thought, by a slip of tongue, I would reveal my lack of faith in Islam and the need for the Islamic State, they expected that I would provide evidence against myself, thereby giving them excuse to get me expelled. Contrary to their expectations, that I would object to teaching subjects that were not relevant to my qualifications, I didn't object to the time table, at which they decided that I should also be given the periods of '*daras*', that I was to give sermons as well. It was the daily morning sermon. All classes begin their daily studies by reciting from the Quran in the first period which is called the religious studies period. I then said that I was not an Islamyat teacher, that I had never had a degree in Islamyat. How could they throw all Islamic studies periods and sermons at me? So they abstained from allotting me the sermons. I carefully avoided conflict on religious issues but conflict arose on other issues. There were some differences with the head master and his administration because there were a few incidents on which we had to take a moral stand. One incident was this: There was a wing of our school building where the walls and the roof had not been plastered. There were no funds for that and the wing was not usable. We motivated the students and launched a scheme called 'help yourselves'. The students collected some funds and bought sand, cement etc. They also provided labour because we could not pay for labour wages. There were ten or twelve rooms in that wing which our students plastered themselves and, to motivate them, we gave it the shape of a competition. We announced that the class which would be rated first in this competition of work, would have the honour of winning a cup and some prizes. I said to the head master that the way the competition had been designed was not fair because there they had included a finished building in this work which only required a white wash and fixing of some charts on the walls. On the other hand, the unfinished building required a lot of plastering job and so more funds had to be raised by the classes which were allotted the unfinished building to work on. More over, the work being done in the unfinished building had been allotted to the junior classes, that is, younger kids were working harder and collecting more funds only to compete against elder students who had lesser work and little need for funds. I said to the head master that it was not a just competition. To do justice we should divide the competition into two parts: One competition among the senior classes who were working in the finished building, and another competition among the junior classes who were working in the unfinished building and collecting more donations because they needed more money and labour. Such an arrangement would be fair and just, but the head master and three senior teachers, who were closer to the him, did not accept my suggestions. When the students had finished the work, judges were called in from outside. The judges were the DEO (District Education Officer), a retired Divisional Director, and a senior teacher. The criteria that they developed for the evaluation of work were prepared by the form teachers who had been supervising the work, were involved in the competition, and were in charge of the classes that made the efforts to finish and decorate the class rooms. The irony of the situation is that the list of items to be marked were

things like, 10 marks if there was a plaque outside the class room telling which class it was, 10 marks for a chart saying 'WELCOME' in front of the entry door, 10 marks for a chart saying 'FAREWELL' which should be visible to the evaluating judges when leaving a room, 10 marks for cleanliness etc. It was gross injustice in that the real hard work of collecting donations and the physical labour of plastering the walls with cement, which young kids had done without any training, had been all ignored. Finally, the three sections of the tenth class, the elder-most boys, who had done the least hard work but were adept at putting charts, were given the first, the second and the third positions. The judges had their tea and snacks and the junior kids and their teachers, who had been labouring very hard for the past several months, felt cheated and demoralized. At this I protested verbally, and spoke in the staff meeting.

The above mentioned incident, of the majority of teachers taking the question of justice and fairness lightly in a school, a very socially significant place, is just one small incident. There were many incidents of this nature in the school and it went on so that finally I was dubbed a 'political agitator' by the head master, and reports were sent against me to the higher authorities. The conflict arose when I had already applied to be promoted to the post of a head master. I had already appeared in the Public Service Commission tests and interviews and the PSC (Public Service Commission) had sent its recommendations to the government for my promotion to be a head master. The Minister of Education had recommended that I be appointed head master in a school in the district of K.. When the conflict arose, our head master tried to get the recommendation of the Minister of Education, in favour of my promotion, cancelled. The Secretary of Education turned against me when he was told by the head master that I was an atheist. But the government, by law, is not authorized to ignore the recommendations of the PSC (Public Service Commission), and the irony of the matter is that the Secretary of Education himself was a member, as a subject specialist, of that Selection Board of the PSC which had recommended my appointment. I had stood first among the candidates and hence there was no way he could stop me. When the recommendations came from the Minister of Education, though the Secretary could not stop me from being appointed a head master, he could and he did change the location and the school where I was to be posted. I had already received a notification of appointment about my new posting but he sent a cancellation and then issued a new order which stated that I was appointed head master in that God forsaken place, the last border town in the mountains. He could not stop my appointment but he could punish by sending me to the last corner of the country. I appealed to the Governor against my appointment to that God forsaken place, and when he asked the Secretary of Education why a man from town M. was posted in the remotest corner of district R., the Secretary said to him that I was a non-believer and a communist and whatever allegations he could raise against me, whereupon the Governor said, "look into the matter" and then forgot about me. The Secretary of Education got so angry at my going to the Governor that when Naseem, my brother, appeared in the Public Service Commission, though he had stood first in the written examination, the said Secretary failed him in the interview. The Secretary of Education was on the interviewing panel. Naseem had stood first in the written state competitive examinations for civil servants. It happened like this: There are fifty percent marks for the candidate's academic career, and from among the remaining fifty percent, sixty percent are for the relevant subject and forty percent for one's knowledge in Islamic studies and general knowledge. If one fails the sixty percent relevant subject marks, he is considered totally failed. Because the Secretary of Education was the subject specialist, he had the powers to pass or fail a candidate. The irony is that Naseem was already working as a section officer in the Ministry of Education under the very nose of the Secretary of Education, and that is why the Secretary knew that he was my brother and so he took revenge from him. Naseem could have been appointed an assistant commissioner had he cleared the PSC interview. That is why he worked hard and stood first in the PSC examination for ACs (assistant commissioners), ASPs (assistant superintendent police) and SOs (section officers). He also appeared in the PSC examination for *tehseeldars* (land record and revenue officers) and secured the first position among 65 candidates. That is, he secured first

positions in both written examinations. After the former PSC examination, he was failed in the interview by the Secretary of Education. After the latter PSC examination, he was interviewed by a Selection Board which comprised members not including the said Secretary and so he passed and was subsequently appointed a revenue officer. This shows that it was only the Secretary who sought to spoil his career, only because he was my brother.

I was transferred to the remote mountains, to one of the most remote villages where life is led much in the same way as it was many centuries ago. There are no roads, modern transport and electricity, and one can reach there only after a two days journey from the capital, and that only in summers. In winters, the mountains are covered with snow for around six months during which season, there are risks of famine and disease due to inaccessibility to the region. I worked there for two years after which I was posted to an even worst station called K. This village too is close to the Indian border (villages close to the Indian border are generally considered at risk of being caught up in skirmishes between military personnel on the two sides). Meanwhile, I kept trying to get transferred to some reasonable station, but the Secretary of Education kept sending the recommendations of the Minister of Education back on one or the other pretext. I once got recommended to be posted near my home town but he dropped the recommendations. He even ignored the orders of the Chief Minister. At that time, all transfers of officers of grade 17 and above were to be ordered by the Chief Minister but now, the Ministers have been delegated the powers to transfer officers of grade 17 and 18. Above these, the orders are to be issued by the Chief Minister. To defy the orders of the Chief Minister, the Secretary used to write back that the said officer is badly required at the station where he is currently posted, or that under the service rules the said officer cannot yet be transferred, or that the service period of the said officer in the capacity of grade 17 is too short to entitle him to a transfer, or that there are more senior officers waiting to get transferred, etc. He could make many excuses to stop the implementation of orders from Minister and the Chief Minister: Secretaries in government departments are relied upon by Ministers and the Chief Minister in that while the latter could be good politicians, they do not make claims of knowing such things as service rules and regulations. The Chief Minister's orders could be challenged in the High Court and the Supreme Court in which case it is the secretaries on whose legal expertise the politicians depend. Thus the secretaries can acquire enormous powers as experts in the ways governments should legally function.

When the government changed, and Peoples' Party took over, I found enough political contacts with comparatively liberal leaders to be able to get transferred into the very heart of the state administration, the Civil Secretariat in the capital. To get my orders of deputation implemented, I wanted to find a channel of hierarchies so that my orders should not be sent through the Education Department, because I was afraid that the said Secretary of Education might create problems for me. Transfers within the Secretariat are done by the Services and General Administration Department. The orders issuing authority lies with the Chief Minister but the notifications are issued by the Services and General Administration Department which functions as a kind of services controlling department. I wanted the orders to be issued by the Services and General Administration Department so that once I get my orders, I would go and join the Secretariat Education Department and then the said Secretary of Education won't be in a position to stop me. I could then work in his office and work in proximity to him as I had build this desire in myself to study what kind of a man he was who had put me into such a long trouble without even ever meeting me once. But I couldn't get the orders issued because the said Secretary found out that I was being sent to his department and he rang up the Secretary of Services and General Administration and said, "if you send this man to my department, I would be 'sandwiched' between these two brothers; one is already the section officer for colleges, and the other would be the section officer for schools", and so my orders were stopped in the Services and General Administration Department. The Secretary of Services and General Administration sent my file back to the Chief Minister's Secretariat with remarks that instead of deputing me to the Education Department, I should be deputed as a section officer to the Services and General Administration.

Control on Personal Beliefs/Values; Non-Work Conflict; Imposition of a Unitary View of Culture; Authoritarianism; Penalties for Non-Conformers; Intrigues; Political Influence in Employment Practice; Student Unions Associated with Political Parties

I began in 1975 as a lecturer in D. College. At that time, People's Party was ruling the country and there was a common social and political conflict between the left-progressive people and the rightist-fundamentalist forces. You could feel the conflict with greater force in the educational institutions. There were several student organizations. The leftist parties were NSF (Nationalist Students Federation), the PSF (Peoples Students Federation is a student section of the Peoples Party), NSO (Nationalist Students Organization). The rightist organizations were the Islami Jammiat-e-Tulba (follows the Jamaat-e-Islami), and the MSF (Muslim Students Federation which follows the Muslim League) which appeared much later. When it was time for the elections of the students union, the teachers had to play some kind of roles in there because if you are a liberal teacher and the Jammiat wins the control of the students union, you could find yourself in big trouble in the class room. There used to be many conflicts among students, among teachers, and between students and teachers, on the questions of their social and political beliefs and on the issue of elections. All these conflicts used to create an environment of fear. For example if the Principal of the college reports to the Directorate of Education that a certain lecturer has non-conformist views, it is enough ground for the government to sack the lecturer. A situation in which such a report could be sent against you arose often in those days. For example, my fear was at peak when, perhaps in 1978, the elections of the students union were being held, and the verbal and physical conflict between the left-wing students and the fundamentalists often used to break out. The lecturers too had some involvement in students conflicts and therefore the two most fundamentalist lecturers sent a complaint against me to the Director of Education that I held left-wing views and that I spread these views among students. The Director at that time was a man with liberal views and so he didn't take any action against me, and dumped the complaint, but if it had been a different man, I could get kicked out of the service. These conflicts still go on but we have now learned the tactics to survive in our jobs.

A conflict arose on the issue of my promotion. The Secretary of Education did not want me get the promotion. I was teaching at A. P. College those days and I have an impression that he said to the Principal to write one adverse ACR (annual confidential report) about me. The Principal wrote in my ACR, "an average performer but none of his students passed this year: Zero pass percentage". This was written in such a haste that the Principal forgot to check that I had been transferred to his college when this class, with zero pass percentage, had only three months to go for the examinations. By the Service Rules, the credit of the result of a class, good or bad, could be attributed to a lecturer only if he had taught that class for a minimum period of six months. At that time I didn't know that one adverse ACR could have so much bad effect on one's career and because my previous ACRs were all good or average, I didn't bother much about the adverse one. But because the Secretary of Education was resolute that he won't let me have my promotion, when he sent my case to the Minister of Education, he wrote the following statement: "In our God blessed Islamic State, we should not employ lecturers with views such as those he cherishes: The question of promoting him does not arise". So what he did, he used this ACR with adverse remarks, and he found that in 1978, in 1980 and in 1987, my ACRs said 'average' about me, and so he attached only those ACRs with his letter to the Minister of Education, concluding on the basis of the enclosed ACRs that my performance was not adequate. No one among the concerned officers of the Education Department paid attention to the fact that my ACRs, other than those ACRs that were enclosed with the letter to the Minister of Education, were all good, that is, above average. And on top of it, he went so far in his prejudice against me that he broke another service rule which says that while evaluating a man for promotion, you have to see his last five year record and not the record before that; he did not care that the ACRs of 1978 and 1980 had been written nine and seven years ago, in other words, he selected the four worst ACRs

from among a list of last eleven years ACRs and attached them in support of his claim. He succeeded in stopping my promotion the first time it was due. I was to be promoted from lecturer to assistant professor. I appealed to the Chief Minister that the ACR for 1978 should not be counted in evaluation because that was written a long time back. Then I checked my personal file at the Education Department and found that my ACR for 1982 had been tempered with and though it was better than 'average', they had made it look like 'average'. When the Chief Minister sent my case to the Chief Secretary for consideration, I went to the Chief Secretary and told him that the Secretary had lied about the 1982 ACR. At first the Chief Secretary would not accept that such a thing was possible, that such a high ranking officer would temper with a lecturer's ACR, but when I stressed that he should call for my file and check it, he called for the record to be brought in. When the record was called in, the Secretary of Education found no way out because he had to send all my ACRs which would prove that only two years 'average' ACRs were valid and a third had been tempered with. To justify his partial treatment of my case, he attached a note written to the Chief Secretary saying that the lecturer in consideration was a communist and therefore, ideologically, he couldn't be promoted. Thus, he gave a new twist to his arguments (knowing that in those days of General Zia's regime, with Afghan war going on and the Russian troops close to Pakistani borders, the allegation of being a communist was nothing but horrifying) and gave a moral dimension to his partiality. However, to cut the matter short, his allegation was not believed in. The Chief Minister accepted my appeal and I got my promotion from the date it was due. The officer who was asked to write a report after an inquiry on the issue, wrote that the promotion had been stopped on insufficient grounds. However, it took me nine years to get my right. The first time my case was sent to the Directorate in 1989. Then I had to go to the Chief Minister, to the Chief Secretary, and there is a long list of intermediary functionaries and offices.

Nepotism and Intrigues in Hiring and Promotion, the Consequent Unhealthy Competition for Jobs and Positions; Incompetence; Pseudo Organizations in International Development Projects

The following was narrated by a former section officer in the Ministry of Education:

The World Bank has given some aid, called matching grant, to our government. Matching grant is that if in a certain project we are using 40 percent local resources out of the total project cost, then they would supply the rest of 60 percent funds. There is a Health and Sanitation Project of one billion rupees that would take eight years to completion. It is a project for those areas which do not yet have clean water supply systems. Under this World Bank grant, health educators were to be employed. A certain criteria was given for the selection of health educators. There is a complete feasibility study of the project and an annual development program under which these vacancies were created and people were to be employed. There were criteria made for monitoring and evaluation of the work that was to be done. The financing agency keeps evaluating how much of the target has been achieved. Now, the people being hired were taken in without following the recommended criteria and proper selection procedures. Hence the required results could not be produced, the objectives remain unachieved but on paper. The Ministers want people to be hired on the basis of their political needs of pleasing their supporters, thus employing their relatives. Healthy competition cannot exist in such environment. People affiliated with the ruling party have to be given employment. The department which is entrusted with the task of making recruitment and selection rules and determining person-specifications and qualification for different posts to be filled, keeps the person-specification and qualifications as vague as possible so that the political allies and relatives could be hired, and this leads to having a workforce unable and incapable of achieving the organizational objectives. The person-specifications are made obscure so that they could hire their men who may not otherwise meet the criteria if genuine specifications were made.

The concerned top officials of the Ministry of Local Government, under whose supervision

this project has been launched, created two posts for health educators which were grade 18 posts (equivalent to the post of an assistant professor in the educational institutions). One was to be filled in from within the department because they wanted to promote a certain officer and therefore did not stipulate high qualifications, because when there are people who have put in a certain length of service and deserve promotion, they would be promoted regardless of whether they have a Graduation or less. If an officer is in grade 17 and may be promoted to grade 18 for the length of his service, has less qualifications than would be required from a fresh grade 18 candidate, he can still be promoted to grade 18. These are the Service Rules. For the second health educator who was to be recruited externally, they advertised that the required qualifications were a masters degree in social sciences. Now, social sciences include several subjects such as political science, economics, history, psychology, sociology, social work, anthropology, business administration, public administration, etc. There are about twenty-four subjects that are deemed as being social sciences. The term 'social sciences' did not clarify whether they would be willing to hire one with a masters degree in Islamic studies or in economics. Keeping in view the job description of a health educator, a candidate with a masters in social work or in sociology would be appropriate. They could even ask for one who had masters in psychology or in education because, the job required educating people in community health and sanitation aspects. But they used this vague term 'social sciences' in the job advertisement and thus involved a very large number of subjects. Their purpose in doing this, as we found later, was to establish the candidature of a certain official already working in the Local Government Department. This official was in grade 17 and had a masters degree in statistics and, therefore, they included statistics as being among social sciences and accepted his application for consideration. They wanted to make him eligible to apply for the post of a health educator. When the job was advertised, I applied for it because I had masters degrees in social work as well as in education. There were several external candidates because of whom an easy selection of this favourite candidate was not possible. When they were to issue call letters for interviews, they, in their efforts to exclude many from entering into competition, played another absurd trick: They determined that social work, sociology, and business administration could not be called social sciences and hence candidates having degrees in these subjects were not considered eligible for the said post. Incidentally, the Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Local Government, who was to sit in the Selection Board, had a MBA and he took offence at this trickery. He declared that if business administration was not a social science, then no other subject could logically be called a social science. Therefore, he issued call letters to all candidates who had a degree in any of the social sciences. We went for the interviews which were conducted by a special Selection Board which is different from the Public Service Commission in that it is an internal Selection Board of the Ministry of Local Government. This Board comprises the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary and the Director of the Local Government Department, a senior officer from the Planning and Development Division and a few other members. The candidate with masters in statistics also appeared for the interview and because it had been mutually agreed within his department, the Local Government Department, that he will be appointed, they placed him on top position while I got the second position though I thought that I was the most suitable person for this job, that I had all the right qualifications which he did not have, and I had done very well in the interview as well. My qualifications in social work and education were the most relevant and I am the only one in the Civil Secretariat with a combination of all relevant qualifications. When I found that they had selected their favourite candidate, I appealed for a review saying that statistics could not be placed among social sciences. I appealed to the Chairman of the same Selection Board which had interviewed me. The candidate who was selected was so influential that he got a letter from the Director of Education saying that statistics was a social science, another letter from the Registrar of the A. K. University to the same effect, and a third similar letter from the Public Service Commission. Now you know that all universities are controlled by the UGC (Universities Grants Commission) and it is the prerogative of the UGC to determine what was the right classification of various subjects, which degree was equivalent to which one, and all these

matters of categorization. I knew that in 1984, the UGC had given a decision saying that statistics was classified among natural, pure, or physical sciences and not among social sciences. I presented this decision of the UGC to the Chairman of the aforementioned Selection Board but the successful candidate apparently approached the Director of Academics at the UGC and brought a letter saying that statistics was a social science but, when I looked at that letter, I thought it was a dubious looking letter. I said to him that I was prepared to take this matter to the court and there they would find out that the latter was fake, at which he withdrew this letter which he had claimed was issued by the UGC. He got so afraid that he wrote to the Selection Board that the letter from UGC which he had given earlier to the Board, should be considered null and void because he had been issued a second letter. I got an official letter written by the UGC to the Registrar of A. K. University (because the UGC would not write a letter to the Ministry of Local Administration directly, which Ministry it thought had nothing to do with the UGC) that statistics did not fall among social sciences. The Registrar wrote them back asking to confirm that they had sent him that letter (for fear that it could be fake) and when he received the confirmation, he too wrote to the Selection Board saying that his earlier letter should be deemed cancelled and that statistics was not classified among social sciences but among natural or physical sciences. I took this letter to the Public Service Commission and the Director of Education who then withdrew the letters they had issued earlier to the Selection Board. All letters were withdrawn and yet the Selection Board remained adamant that their favourite man should be appointed. Thus, they sent their recommendations for appointment to the Minister of Local Government. When I found this, I filed a petition in the High Court that injustice had been done to me by the said Selection Board, that I had the qualifications which were sought in the job advertisement but they were appointing a candidate who didn't have the required qualifications. The Court has been giving us dates for the last two years and has not yet reached a decision. A couple of months ago, the Local Government Department advertised the same post again stipulating the same required qualifications and experience as before. I wrote to them that until the decision of the High Court, they cannot advertise this post and seek fresh applicants. They withdrew their advertisement but they played another trick: They have written to their Selection Board that we need a health educator badly and therefore that man, their favourite man, should be appointed. And this they are doing despite the knowledge that the matter is in the High Court. The irony of this situation is that the man was so influential that he got three highly responsible men (a Registrar of a University, a member of the Public Service Commission and the Director of Education), representing three prestigious institutions, to write a statement which they knew was false.

In the High Court, during the first hearing, there was only one Judge present. After the hearing, he didn't give a decision but said that this needed the presence of the full bench which normally consists, in such cases, of three Judges. When there were three Judges, all the hearing was redone, all the things were repeated and this took five months. The date for decision was given but on that date they postponed the proclamation of the decision and while we were waiting for a new date to be given for the pronouncement of the decision, it was discovered that one of the three Judges had been retired. This Judge was expecting retirement but he didn't include it in his case hearing schedule. Now the previous panel of Judges is said to be incomplete and therefore a new panel has been formed which means that the trial shall start from the scratch and we shall be going again through the same procedure, that we have been through twice earlier.

Nepotism, Regionalism and Favoritism in Employment Practice; the Significance of Loyalty

The following was reported by a geophysicist in the Oil and Gas Development Corporation:

It happens at times, and it amazes me, that if someone in the department is from the town C., you later find that someone else too is from the same area, and later you discover that the two

are related to each other. For example, I had worked in Pakistan Petroleum Limited and I knew an accounts officer there for two years and, after four years since I left the company, I met that accounts officer somewhere. He told me, to my utter amazement, that a certain manager in the said company was his uncle. They had never mentioned this to me when I was with them for two years. Now, I know, that the accounts officer was not able enough to find his way himself in the company and you put two and two together. Similar things happen in our company and I feel surprised when I find that, for example, X is the brother of Y and that they had never told this to me before but casually, just during conversation, it slips out of the man's mouth or some reason compels him to tell. Then you find someone is someone's uncle, that two or even three brothers are working in the same organization (there used to be a rule in the Employment Legislation for state companies that relatives could not be hired and, in the application forms, you had to fill if you had any relatives working for the organization you applied in). You find cousins and brothers working in a department you know and that tells you about regionalism or nepotism.

A geophysicist has recently been promoted to the post of Senior Geophysicist as a special case, that is, he superseded about ten or twelve people due for promotion. None among his batch have been promoted and it is commonly known that he was promoted because he spends more time with the Chief and is very close to him. The Chief wrote a very favourable ACR about him and some exceptional remarks saying that he deserved 'accelerated promotion'. Though he spends more time with the computers, this is just because he was posted in that section, that he was given the opportunity to work there. Anyone could be posted to the Computer Section. We are all equally qualified and when one has been working at that level of professional work and has that much experience, you cannot usually say that one among others is exceptionally hard working and the others are not hard working or inefficient. There can be a difference of that as nineteen to twenty; some may have a bit more ability or capability and some may have a bit less but the nature of the work we are talking about, we all have to give reasonable production, make geological maps and therefore it is not the kind of work where either one may show exceptional talents or another may prove to be stupid than the others. The level of work remains roughly the same for all geophysicists. They all have done their Masters in Science and do the work at similar levels and therefore when one is promoted and the others are not, you can attribute the reasons only to loyalty, favouritism, regionalism etc. It did not use to happen much in the past but these days such things are happening a lot.

Nepotism in Employment Practice

The following was reported by a production manager in Pakistan International Airlines:

I recently mentioned to the top management that I require to hire people, and the usual way of doing this is that I make a list of required people and the General Manager signs it and the Director approves it. I had said to them that the people I require should be of certain qualifications, science graduates, but they sent guys, who had qualifications in commerce, because they were from among their acquaintances and they asked me to let them join in. When I objected to it, they said no, you will have to take them and make do with them, and train them to work. The result was that, I needed to hire eleven staff, and they sent nine persons who were relative or friends and had unsuitable qualifications: None was of the merits that were required. Two of my colleagues and staff said to me that their brothers were jobless and in severe hardship, and now that all new people were being hired like that (i.e. on the basis of nepotism), and you have to accept them, then why don't you be kind enough to take our brothers in as well. I then had to fight for these two till the last stage to get them accepted, not that they were my relatives or they were on merit or had proper qualifications, but only because I said that these two men who were already working so well and giving good service to us, and now that others' relatives and friends

were taking jobs, then why not these two should be taken in so that our employees should not feel left behind in the race for jobs.

In Pakistan International Airlines, for a long time, appointments had been altogether banned. But they had found a loop-hole in the manpower-ban regulations. The loop-hole allowed them to hire one as a casual worker, for which they didn't need to advertise and follow a regular hiring procedure. This loop-hole became an easy way to employ relatives or friends. It went on like this for a time and many told their relatives that if one of them needed a job, bring his application and we would interview him. It was also notified at certain institutes that fresh leavers could apply as candidates for casual employees.

The procedure to be adopted is that the department manager, the administration manager, and the man who would be the direct manager to the new employee at the shop floor, should interview the candidate. But in my particular case, the higher management never gave me a chance to interview and select those who were to report to me and through whom I had to get the work done. My superiors began sending new staff to me. I hadn't yet secured the approval to fill the new vacancies when new employees began appearing with appointment letters in their hands. The result was that I had staff for which there was no work because, I had applied for new staff approval anticipating heavier work load in future and, while the work load was still to come, they sent new staff in. The work load was to come in future, contracts were being signed for which work was to start in three/four months. But they sent their men before even giving the approval for new vacancies.

The Use of Political Contacts (*sifarish*) in Getting Undue Favours

When I joined the University, a number of students came to me and invited me to lunch. I had been there for a month by then and I had obtained enough information to suspect that they would tell me things like they know some influential people, that some relative of theirs is the Deputy Commissioner of the district, or that they have contacts with some other high official and then they could use this influence to impress upon me in order to give them more marks and higher grades. I therefore asked the Chairman of the Department if I should accept their invitation or not. He advised that I may go for once in order to see what their intentions were, or what kind of people they were, but that I should avoid such meetings in future and not accept any more invitations because, he suspected, that the students will then begin asking for undue favours. The reason that it was easy for [many] boys to cheat is that they were supported by many from their community and in case of trouble, the local influential persons came to their rescue.

Political Corruption in Employment Practice; Desire to be in High Positions Despite Incompetence; The Effects of Incompetence at Higher Levels

The following was reported by a section officer at the provincial Ministry of Services and General Administration:

There was a time when the Services and General Administration Department [in the Civil Secretariat] was considered a model department and it provided an example for other departments as how to function better and how to provide good service. But conditions have deteriorated there now. It is no longer a model department. There are several reasons: What is essential for a department? An adequate organizational structure, proper distribution of work, and suitable employees who have the right skills, qualifications and aptitude for the job specifications, that is, they are competent and have been placed on the right positions. These four or five things are essential for a department to work effectively. Now in the Services and General Administration

Department, the top management, that is the Secretary and the additional secretaries, are not taking enough interest in the departmental problems, or we can say that they are not solving the problems that are there. The problem is that incompetent people have been posted there. The department has been so over-crowded that they don't have enough space to accommodate all employees. One room is being shared by three section officers who deal in three separate sections and have cases and tasks of separate nature. When I was posted there, my work was continually disturbed by the presence of too many people. Over the last decade, not only that the volume of work has been increasing in almost every department, the nature of tasks too has been changing. We need changes in organizational structures to go along with these developments, new dimensions, extension of tasks and more employees. There has come new staff but no new accommodation. I remember that section officers a decade ago, were considered high status officials and at least, they were given a room of their own. The reason for the decline of prestige is that incompetent people, hired on the basis of nepotism and political affiliations, show their inaptitude in doing the business of the state in a shabby manner. They don't know how to do their work. Work is not being done. I will give you one example: An additional secretary was appointed by the government on the merit of his being a political ally. He does not know his job and has no training, the consequences of which are that his work is being done by somebody else. Such practice leads to greater load of work on others.

I have two good examples to show how incompetent people behave when they are appointed on as high ranks as the head of an attached department. When I was a section officer in the Ministry of Social Welfare, I had the Secretary of Social Welfare as my direct superior. Now the Secretary sees a file only to give a decision, put his signatures, issue orders, and send it to the Minister, of course after seeing that all the basic work has been done on the case. The detailed analysis of the case after consulting the relevant legislation, bylaws, government rules and regulations etc. is all done by the section officers. In our case it was all done by me. Now the head of the attached department is the Director who, in the hierarchy, is one step below the Secretary. But the Director we had was incompetent. Now there are several institutions and their employees upon whom a Director has to keep control and implement the decisions sent to him by the Secretary. In short, he has to supervise the operations of all the institutions that fall under a particular ministry. He is responsible for the proper running of these institutions. If he cannot do this properly, then the Secretary guides him how to do it and what to do and how to resolve the problems. Now our Director had little aptitude and relevant qualifications to do his job because when they place a man as a head of a department, they usually do not see whether he has the relevant aptitude, skills and qualifications for such a job. They don't even see if he has had, as a basic minimum, some relevant training in the department which he is going to lead. He does not even know about the organizational set-up of his department and hence no plans as to how he would run it. When the head of an attached department does not know all these aforementioned things, how can he be expected to solve its problems? Ignoring that he does not possess proper theoretical or academic insight into the nature of his job, he does not even know how office work which we call 'file work' is done and has no aptitude, let alone the competency, for it. If one cannot even do the file work, he would not be able to move papers or files ahead to the next processing section. Work will start piling up and so the problems arising in the institutions under the control of the said departmental head will not be resolved. What happens then? The whole organization becomes ineffective. The tragedy is that almost all departmental heads are appointed here on the basis of political affiliations and not on a professional criteria. The Governor, the Chief Minister, and the Ministers have to win the next general election and they cannot keep their seats in the Provincial Assembly unless they hire and promote the relatives, sons and nephews of influential people in their constituencies, or those political workers who have worked hard for the party that has won the elections on promises that they would be given big posts to satisfy their status and prestige needs. When appointing a head of department, it is not seen as to who is competent enough to run the organization effectively. Now this Director of the Ministry of Social

Work, who was sent to us, was previously a Deputy Director in the Ministry of Industries. He was there in grade 18 and with us he was promoted to grade 19. He worked for one year but he couldn't run the organization and so much work got piled up that he was transferred to some other department. An additional secretary from another department was sent as our new Director, apparently to sort out the mess, but after trying unsuccessfully for eight months, he too requested to be sent back to his previous post and was thus transferred. These people had all the prestige, facilities and status symbols that are attached with the post of being a head of department but they were not competent. Now what is competency? It is decision making skills, skills to get work done from the subordinates, if a subordinate does not know how to do his job properly, the head should be able to train and guide him. If the Director says to a subordinate, go and get this work done but the subordinate does not know how to do it and the Director does not know how to train the subordinate, who will do the job? The untrained subordinate may not present the file back for fear of being criticized. There are many little things that one has to teach to his subordinates, slowly and gradually. If you cannot do this, you cannot get work done from the subordinates. Ours was a new Ministry and therefore we had greater problems. If the Director had found himself heading an established organization with properly trained subordinates, the latter might have been able to prop him up, despite his inaptitude and incompetency, and continued working in a stereotyped fashion. The subordinates could guide their boss, but this was a new organization.

Seeking Higher Positions and Status Despite Incompetence; The Effects of Incompetence

The following was reported by a production manager in a semi-government manufacturing unit:

When someone is given the designation of a manager, it is not that only his salary is increased or that his status and benefits get raised, like for example that he gets a car and a peon, he also gets the powers that should in fact stay only with the 'real' manager. The Officers Association suggested another thing: We said, all right, we have colleagues who say they are, after all, working too, they are doing something and they think they are entitled to promotions. But though we have no objections to annual increments, salary raises, and grade enhancement after five years, we do want that their designations should not be raised so that the power and authority should rest with the 'real managers', so that they [the incompetent yet promoted] should not be able to say to the manager that they would not do this or that, that they, being equal in designation, would not obey his instructions. Only the designation of those be raised who are really capable of working in the higher designation. This would then motivate those capable of a higher designation.

The Effects of Corruption on Motivation

A production and purchase manager in a high-technology defence sensitive industry reported the following:

A certain part that goes into the product we make, used to be bought either from Taiwan or Singapore at US\$ 66 a piece. Through some kind of maneuvering among the competitors who supplied this thing, I managed to get the pieces at US\$ 50 a piece and this led to a saving of \$96,000 but, the General Manager said to me, about the import project, that he would hand it over to some other manager (instead of appreciating me).

I have developed a feeling now that the higher management had some understanding with the suppliers from whom they used to buy that product at \$66 a piece so that they used to get a certain percentage as their (illegal) commission. When I got the same thing at lower price, their

percentage commission got cut. How can they then appreciate me? Such things have happened a number of times and so they don't like me. However, because I do so much work for the company, I know that they cannot withdraw many projects from me. They know that if, in reaction, I gave up my enthusiasm in work, then the deliveries we are to make this year would be affected. Thus they keep saying, "okay, carry on, do this, do that, okay, we will see, we will do this or that for you". Last week I got fed up and I said to my General Manager that I didn't know what would happen to me and I asked him to resolve once and for all what they are going to decide about me and my work load so that I could sit on one side in peace and quiet and forget about high performance. But he knows my nature, he knows that I cannot live without doing hard work. Everyone has some natural compulsions. Some are different, and therefore, they can say, let all go to hell, but my nature is such that I want things to happen by whatever efforts. They know that they can linger on decisions about me until all deliveries have been made in time - and then they would see what could be given to me and what not.

Many among the higher management have tried, during the last fifteen years, to find someone to replace me, but they cannot replace me because people of my qualifications are not normally interested in low paid government jobs. People are not interested unless special privileges and salaries are given. And who wants to work so hard and get so less unless they have side-businesses benefiting from their official capacities. I know that I can run the factory at much greater profits and much lower costs, with greater efficiency but the corruption of many gets into the way. I once got frustrated at the lack of appreciation for honest work that had shown results, and I said to my General Manager, concealing the bite behind a smile, "if you lend me this factory and take me as a sub-contractor, I promise to raise the profits by ten million rupees and even then I would make much more for myself than what I get". He laughed it off but the thought of having my own factory, now that I know every thing from how to get orders, manufacture the product through to the last stage of receiving the payment, has been circulating in my mind. I have talked to a couple of investors but then, in private business, you have to do things such as, one of the potential investors in my proposed factory told me that he can introduce me to a senior government official who would create a requirement for our products in his department and get such specifications of the product approved for purchase by that department as could be made only in our factory. Obviously the order will be placed with our factory and then I can negotiate such a price per piece as will include a certain percentage for ourselves well above the normal profit margin, but we can charge this price only if we add his [the senior government officer] commission as well. It will be difficult to get returns if we do honest business.

Corruption and Motivation

The following events were narrated by a sales manager in a private pharmaceutical company. The events explain how strongly corruption is linked to improper motivation and control. Therefore, the strategies, designed to fight corruption in the said company, incorporated proper motivation and control, along with increased incentives for the sales staff:

The top management introduced some changes to fight corruption. In the beginning, the managers and the sales representatives used to collude amongst themselves, and instead of distributing samples of medicines, that used to come from the Head Office for free distribution among doctors and consultants, they would sell them (though these samples have printed on the boxes: 'Physician's Sample: Not For Sale') to certain medical stores that take them cheaply and sell them along with the other product. They made enough money in this way and so they would just sit all month and do little work. It used to happen like this, for example, I have received 200 packs of a certain medicines each containing 500 tablets that is 100,000 tablets in all. The retail price of each pack is say, Rs.165 and the trade price is say, Rs.140. Now I would go to the main

market and see a friend distributor and offer him the product along with all the samples so that each pack would cost the distributor say Rs.130 rather than Rs.140. The distributor would make Rs.10 extra on each pack and I would take my share. The retailers were happy too and so they used to give massive orders to the corrupt sales staff who then didn't need visiting many doctors, but it was a bad name for the company and a few medical representatives were fired when this was discovered. The General Manager (sales) got rid of this problem by dividing our marketing area into three zones. He appointed three zonal sales managers, and asked all sales representatives and zonal sales managers to make monthly and weekly client visit schedules in three copies, one for the zonal managers, one for the regional managers, and one for the General Manager. They were asked to give their appointment times, meeting times with clients, and they were told that they could be checked at random at the time and place which they had supplied in their client visit schedules. If the person being checked was found absent from the place at the time he was supposed to visit a client, he would be inquired and could be considered a defaulter. Then, we added some incentives for the distributors as well. For major sales orders, they were given discounts. We also had incentives for our sales teams to encourage them to work hard and not resort to irregularities. We made a policy that no new staff will be hired, people in senior positions will not be hired from outside the company, and good workers will be promoted. The said measures put a check to the corruption described earlier.

Low Motivation; Lack of Creativity and Initiative; Hooliganism in Institutions

The following narration by a former lecturer in Physics, is so typical of educational institutions in the sub-continent that it would be hard to find many academicians who would disagree with the typicality of the described situation:

I resigned from lectureship basically for two reasons. One was that, in teaching jobs, especially in science teaching jobs, there is little room for self-development and improvement. I mean that you go on teaching the same things again and again and you feel getting rusted (it was said about such experience that it was not a six years experience but one year experience repeated six times). The second reason was that the working environment at the college had become such that I couldn't deliver the things that I wanted to deliver. I had begun to feel that I was unable to impart this consciousness to the students that they should take some benefit from the teachers, that they should learn something of value to them in practical life. Some kind of improvement in consciousness was not taking place. The attitude of many students was that they would come to the college if they had nothing else to do. They were either studying for jobs or because they couldn't get high marks in intermediate examinations to be able to get admission in either a medical college or an engineering university, so they took admission in B.Sc. and if they still won't get high marks, they went on to do their M.Sc. Many took admission in the Science College because they couldn't get admissions elsewhere in subjects which are in high demand in the job market, for example, business subjects.

With my colleagues, there was not a lack of coordination but if you wanted to introduce a new system, people used to resist it especially if the implementation of the new system implied hard work on their parts. For example, I found that students who came to do their experiments in the laboratories, required good command of logarithms. I used to take an hour test in logarithms in order to determine their strengths and weaknesses in it so that I could teach them the use of logarithms. I did allow them to begin their experiments until they had passed the logarithms test. I offered them to understand logarithms from me in extra time before they could qualify for starting experiments. Now the other teachers began resisting these tests saying that if the students don't know logarithms, then it was not the teachers' problem. I wanted the students, as a matter of routine, to give me a short weekly report of the work they had done in the laboratory. I wanted

them to give me the figures and results of the tests, whatever they were, irrespective of whether the readings appeared correct or not, so that these could be discussed the next week. If the readings were incorrect, what caused the errors, and if the readings were correct, how they could be improved. This meant a lot of work on the part of the teacher because it involved reading each student's report and then discussing the strengths and weaknesses of each report: It meant giving time to each student individually. Many teachers did not like this because it meant more work load. Then, at the B.Sc level, I wanted the concept of uncertainty to be understood by the senior students, that is, the results they get in their experiments are not one hundred percent accurate, that there are divisions and fractions of errors, that they should know how to detect and calculate these and how to write about these; what is the practical significance of these tiny deviations, what ramifications they have for our practical purposes. Many teachers thought that I was overdoing it and that I created problems and hardships for them, that I created hardships for students as well as for the teachers.

Both students and teachers had low motivation to pursue education in science in its true spirit. But the level of motivation in many students was not as low as that in many teachers. I had many good students as well. Normally we had an intake of students who had low grades, 'C', 'D', or even 'E' at the intermediate level. We seldom had students who had had 'A' or 'B' grades at the intermediate level. But, I used to get good results and our out-put did include some who secured 'A' grades. At masters level, we used to get better intake with some having had 'B' grades and one or two with 'A'. After hard work, we got better results and our out-put included students who secured distinctions in the University examinations. The studious ones would gather around me and visit me often which created a problem that the other teachers felt that I was gaining popularity among students.

The basic causes of low motivation in teachers for hard work was that they were low paid. The second reason was that there was no novelty or interesting things in the syllabus: It was a fifty year old syllabus which had not been revised since. Most teachers had passed their examinations by memorizing the notes they got from their teachers who in turn had got them from their teachers and so this fifty year old syllabus was carried on for several generations. Even the pattern of question papers and examinations had not changed. Most remembered by heart that such and such questions could be made from such and such parts of the curriculum and these questions had such and such answers and that if the students would answer in such and such way, they may be given so many out of so many marks. It had not changed for decades and there was little that could be used as a method of assessment for one's genuine abilities. The teachers knew that introducing new things would not lead to any self-benefit and so did most students whose primary targets were to score the maximum possible marks in the examinations so that they could get admissions in medical or engineering colleges or some other prestigious institutions. Thus it was easy for the students, as well as the teachers, to know and follow the established pattern rather than venture into newer methods of learning and evaluation. When a teacher was allotted a subject, he usually wanted to stick to it because he could memorize the syllabus, the concepts, theories and problems related to his subject, and pass them on to the students each year in the same fashion. If the syllabus or the methods of teaching were to change, the teachers would have to study new concepts and theories, keep abreast with modern researches in their subjects and tell to their students about these: it could boost creativity among teachers and students alike but would bring no quick gains; intellectual improvement for its own sake was not the criterion.

When the students used to conduct experiments in the laboratories, there used to be two supervising teachers. Some teachers supported me and these would like to join in supervising students along with me. Those who resisted, wanted their names to be struck off when they were grouped or paired with me in laboratory supervision. There was no verbal conflict. The benefit of being educated is that even if some didn't like me, they didn't go for discouraging me. The Principal had a degree in languages and so he had little idea of what we were doing but the Chairman of our department appreciated me a lot, increased my responsibilities, got me involved

in other departmental affairs, and when problems arose which others didn't want to tackle, he would ask me to help him in solving them. When I was a new entrant, normally junior teachers were not given degree classes, but he allowed me to teach degree classes in the very beginning. And he also allotted me to teach experimentation at degree level. He could not use my services as an examiner due to certain rules and regulations which stopped new lecturers from examining answer sheets, but he asked me to serve in conducting examinations.

I was not given any promotion during the six years of service. Nothing for the extra hard work. I felt discouraged not just because of that, because, in those days, things were happening in such a way that many, who were my seniors, had not been promoted and were pulling along in grade 17. One satisfaction I had was that many students used to appreciate my efforts. If my class was to take place in the afternoon, and they had free periods all morning, many used to stay so that they could attend my class. When there were empty seats in the class room, many students from other classes would come and sit to listen to my lectures because they thought that I could explain better and give better material. I felt pleased that I was delivering something and that I was being appreciated.

The basic reason for my resignation was that I had begun to feel a kind of stagnation. Things were not changing further and I realized that I had done all I could in that environment and there seemed no room for further changes. I had begun to teach the same things year after year, and what happens is that you then go on becoming slower and slower. The enthusiasm of the first experience dies out and you begin to lose motivation. I wanted a change. Another reason was that newer groups of students brought newer environment with them. Respect for teachers was beginning to fade away. An event happened where I stopped a couple of students from cheating in the examinations and it led to a quarrel. One of the students threatened me with a knife. I felt unsupported and unprotected. The other teachers were afraid too. Some advised that we should just pass such dangerous students and it was no use confronting them. They may attack you outside the college premises. Another teacher, who was senior to me, and had supported me in my earlier efforts, once conducted examinations with me. We didn't allow any cheating to take place but this senior teacher was attacked and beaten outside the college. A court case was filed and we had to go on and on for court hearings. After an year, the Examinations Board at the college decided that the student, who had attacked, be rusticated for three years. Regrading the court case, it took so long that I don't even remember if a judgement was passed.

Unhealthy Competition for Promotions and Higher Status

Excerpts from interview with a geophysicist:

Some problems arise in the distribution of work load. Sometimes people try to conceal data from one another. They do this in their efforts to what we call 'increase one's score', that is, to get promotions, to be seen as more hard working. Everyone wants to increase his score. This creates some problems and conflicts. Like for example, I have done most of my work on the North district. There is no area of the North on which I have not worked. But what happened, I was sent on a two year deputation to another company. During my absence for two years, my colleagues had access to all the data and they began to 'possess' it. When my deputation ended and I came back, I had no data to work on. My colleagues kept guarding the data and each thought that if he gave some data to me, he will have less data to work on and consequently less work on his part. This caused much problems for me. I tried to get into those project areas which I myself had handed over to some of my colleagues when I was sent on deputation, but they kept the data under lock and key, and won't give me some to work on. It would have looked childish of me to go to the Chief and make complaints. Besides, I knew that the Chief's attitude to such complaints in the past had been to just ask us to compromise with each other instead of complaining. He

didn't ask all to give data to each other or make a data library where all who needed data could have access to it and work on it. The data for the G.K. area had been snatched by a colleague though he was working on another area. So I had to force my way into that area and he finally gave half of his data to me. But I couldn't force my way with the seniors because when I tried with one, he brushed aside the request in jokes and said, "why don't you take some rest? There is little need to work. If some senior asked you why you aren't working, come to me". I couldn't argue with such seniors who are cunning yet act innocent, and those who know how to dawdle. They waste their time in laughter and jokes but when there is some trouble and they cannot answer to the Chief's questions and demands, they send you in saying that it was you who claimed to be the expert. During those days when I was asked to give my opinion as an expert, all I had to say was that I had no data to give my opinions, and that opinions should be asked from those who were sitting on the data.

Unhealthy Competition for Promotions and Higher Status

Excerpts from interview with a sales manager:

At managerial level, there is a regular tussle between regional managers and group managers who try to show that they are doing better than the others or that others are doing worse than they are. In order to score more points at the Head Office, they not only highlight their achievements but keep recording the faults and flaws of other regional and group managers and try their best to get documentary evidence of others' faults, weaknesses or negligence (visit schedules for example) and do not hesitate a bit in reporting these to the Head Office even when it is just hearsay. Our zonal sales manager is trying to resolve differences among regional managers and create harmony among them. Basically, antagonism among regional managers is related to the volume of sales. When the sales of one group increase above those of others, the other groups feel low and undermined, in which case, the manager of the low performing group would try to concoct alibies or excuses or charges or allegations that could be brought against the successful group in order that the former's lower sales volumes may be overlooked by the higher management.

Unhealthy Competition for Promotions and Higher Status

Excerpts from interview with a production manager in a private leather tanning industry:

There were some conflicts between managers from one department. Lets say, the production people used to have conflicts amongst themselves but if you look at the Mechanical Department versus Production, there was no inter-departmental conflict. The reason for conflict within a department was that people within a department were in competition with each other. Like, when a senior officer was on leave, his replacement man used to think that if he gave better production than did his senior, he might take the latter's place. The seniors used to be wary of ambitious subordinates who could jeopardize the formers' position, and so they had skirmishes, but there was not much inter-departmental conflict because of the separate nature of tasks and lack of competition between departments. Intra-departmental conflict had its base in people seeking position and status. There were events such as hot discussions, someone would complain, there were counter-justifications, followed by more incrimination. Nothing physical. Such things used to be repeated time and again. There were problems of proper quality control and because quality control and production was joined in one department, officers would blame each other, there was always some senior blaming a subordinate while the subordinate held the senior responsible - it

was a routine matter. Normally the issues were resolved by us within the Production Department. If we couldn't, then a Director used to come in and resolve the issue.

It happened once with me. Last time, when I went to Germany for a month, it was a time when we were holding in our stores large stocks of raw hides. There appeared a quality problem in my section and about seventy hides got burned during the process. The skins were worth one lakh rupees. My seniors held me responsible for the loss, while I held them responsible because they had piled up the stock during the period when I was in Germany. As soon as I had returned, they had given me an unusually heavy work load which I could have been able to manage in a better way if they had taken an early start. But because they hadn't started the work, and had the hides piled up, I had to face a backlog. Now, in quality control, problems arise at this stage due to a time factor. If you lose time, if you do not take the hides into the chemical processor within a desirable time, you are likely to mess them up in the way we got them messed up. The skins were putrefied. Rotten. They couldn't be processed for the right kind of leather. But no one knew that the hides had been putrefying. The effects of putrefaction appeared when I got the hides chemically processed. I hadn't held them in stock. They had been held in my absence and petrified during the time they were held in stock. When I came back and began processing them, now it is not possible for the manager to observe each and every piece of hide individually before starting the process. There are large quantities of hides in truck loads coming now and then. You cannot possibly know the fate of each skin. Large quantities are entered into the processing vessels and when they come out, they go through several processes, and only after the process, each and every skin is observed. That was the time when it was found that about sixty-seven skins were burned.

I was asked to explain, in writing, why this loss had occurred. I explained, as I have told you, that this happened because of the lapse of time before the processing was started. Work on these skins should have been started in my absence, but when I came back, I was given this much stock. I attached stock statements with my explanation, clarifying that I resumed work on such and such date by which time there was an unusual piling up of the stocks, this much was the incoming load, and I did the best I could in such circumstances. I did the maximum processing I could. In such cases there is nothing else one could do though I probably saved as much skins as I could. The Director agreed that it was not my fault. I was just asked to be more careful in future and take precautionary measures so that we do not get into a situation like this in future.

Work Pressure and Transfer of Blame down the Hierarchical Chain

The following was described by a production manager of an Indian manufacturing company, but similar has been reported about many Pakistani organizations particularly where there is a clearly identifiable chain of command and control, such as in the police or bureaucracy:

There was some conflict especially between the production people and the top most managers when we had high demand and had to meet deadlines. In a drug manufacturing company, there are no short cuts for quick manufacturing. You have to manufacture drugs in accordance with the standard manufacturing practice. We cannot do things overnight or in a humbug way - the scientific procedure must be followed - so, what happened, when the top bosses would say, "we need this thing tomorrow" and you know there are some issues, some problems with the type of materials that are to be filled, problems could arise, then there used to be a severe conflict that would often lead to reprisals from the top management saying, "this fellow is not efficient". The blame used to drop down the line: One would take the blame from his superior and pass it on to the next down the line so that finally it was my head that would be in the block because I was at the bottom of the managerial chain. I used to present facts to the seniors, why something had happened, for them to understand the problem. Some managers used to understand the problems but then there were some at the top with whom you just couldn't reason.

The Significance of Loyalty; Repression of Initiative and Creativity; Personality Clashes; Dislike for Challenges

At V. Industries, one of the largest native shoe manufacturers employing six thousand workers, when the workers showed some initiative and developed something, Gauhar, a production manager, wanted that the credit should be given to the workers. However, many managers used to get credit for the innovations of the workers. Gauhar used to appreciate skilled and innovative workers which encouraged them to give more production and utilize more of their skills. The problem with Gauhar, for which he had been expelled from the Military Academy, and later from V. Industries, was that he criticized the system of favouritism and authoritarianism. He gave excellent performance at V. Industries and was very popular among the staff.

He was fired once because he had a personality clash with the General Manager. After a while, Gauhar applied again at the same industry and was taken back. The same General Manager fired him a second time. The said General Manager was a retired Brigadier. Retired military officers are commonly taken in as managers in Pakistani industry. The said G.M. was so offended at Gauhar that he said, "if Gauhar comes back to this company, either he or I will work here".

Gauhar stayed out of employment for one and a half year and then went to B. Industries who are the market leaders in this field. After having spent some years there, he admitted that "pampering and buttering" (the Pakistani slang for sycophancy) mattered a lot, and though he is still not doing these kind of things, because he is not of that type, somehow he is not that blunt as he used to be. He has learnt some lessons and he is doing so well in B. Industries that he was sent to Indonesia for three months, to Europe for a month, and then on a tour to India on training.

The Significance of Loyalty/obsequiousness; Repression of Initiative/Creativity; Personality Clashes; Lobbying; Unhealthy Competition and Intrigues; Corruption

A sales executive in a large public limited pharmaceutical industry, now working as a sales manager in another company, reported the following:

The company was planning to undertake a new venture for which I was doing some research. I had advised the company to take a step forward, but all managerial staff except me had voted against that step. The Chairman had agreed with me and this, my boss, the Sales Director didn't like. He thought I was being a threat to his position in the eyes of the Chairman and there the conflict started. There were two more reasons: The Sales Director was rather antagonistic towards me because I did not try to please him in the customary way as subordinates do. To be blunt, I didn't flatter him. For example, I refused to run errands for him when, in fact, our sales manager had gone to such an extent of submissiveness that he ran errands for the Director. Then, the Sales Director expected compliments now and then, he wanted obsequiousness.

When my proposal was admired by the Chairman, and he began showing that he liked me, the Sales Director's dislike became obvious because he stooped to the level of trying to undermine me in front of the Chairman. He began taking false complaints against me to the Chairman, like for example, he complained that I did not come to the office in time, that I did not work hard enough, that I leave my office on pretext of visiting industrial clients but I just go home and come back in the evening claiming that I had visited the clients. He made up these false complaints because he did not want anyone in the Sales Department to become an important figure and thus jeopardize his position or pose a threat to his rank. He did not want the existing status quo to be disturbed. Later, the Chairman appointed a Managing Director who was a friend of the sales manager. This Managing Director was a liberal and friendly man and he invited us to come to his house and have drinks. I overlooked this offer which offended the Sales Director because he began thinking that I thought so high of myself that I did not want to mix up with them, and because I

came from a high status family (my father and uncles are land lords and one of my uncles was a Minister in the provincial government), he assumed that I thought that the Director, the manager and the Managing Director were not worth my standing. He thought that I despised them and considered them low class though they were all my seniors and my bosses. They knew that the Chairman was related to me, and when I was hired by the company, they considered me a mole (informer). Then they began suspecting that I was not a mole because I never reported against them to the Chairman. Then they tried to win me and be a part of their lobbying group. When I declined their invitations, and stayed non-aligned, they assumed that I was ambitious and hence a potential threat to their positions. Gradually, what happened, they even began undermining my big successes in my job, and when I gained success in the research and development of the new venture, they presented these to the Chairman as my blunders and issued me 'show-cause notices' on that account. I was given notices that contained charges on very weak grounds.

We had a buy-back arrangement with a certain industry. In those days, our own pharmaceutical factory was not operating, and we used to get our products made at another factory and then sell them at our sale points. The factory used to invest half a million rupees every month in this project and got a net profit of between sixty to seventy thousand rupees per month. It was all done on my initiative and my responsibility. In short, I was getting them sixty to seventy thousand rupees per month on a rolling investment of half million. We used to take finished stocks from our sub-contractors. Once, the sub-contractors had to stop production, for certain reasons, for a few days. In those few days, these three men went there and inspected the finished and unfinished stock and found a few boxes missing. What had happened was that our product was such that there used to be some regular breakages - sometimes less, sometimes more, and some of the boxes therefore were not usable and hence not considered part of the stock. This clique of the three wrote a report against me, attributed that small bit of shortage in stock to my inefficiency and to my corruption, and blamed that I had sold the missing boxes and expropriated the sum. A show-cause notice was issued. The second complaint in that notice was that when the sales manager and the others went to inspect the stocks, I was not present at the site though, they claimed, I should have been there. The fact was that two days earlier, I had informed the Sales Director, verbally, that I was going on leave: It was a custom there that you could go on leave after communicating verbally to your boss. They wrote that I was not on leave, I was supposed to be at the site of inspection and that I failed to be there in time. There was a third allegation against me that I had given too much credit to my clients and, because of this, the liquidity position of the company was in danger. I got this notice asking to explain why I had not kept the liquidity position of the company in mind while issuing credit to clients. In fact the entire amount of credit was only half a million rupees. There were no bad debts. Not a penny was lost because the credit we used to give was not a long term credit. It was a credit for only three days and they blew it beyond proportions, turned it into a major issue, a gross irregularity, and presented a whole case against me to the Chairman. I didn't resign on this account. What happened was that they placed me in a corner and took away important assignments from me. They hired a new Sales Executive and asked me to give him on-the-job training. I knew that the new man was taken in to replace me. I knew that if I did not dispense with the new man, he would get me despatched with the help of the Sales Director, but even then, I stayed loyal to the company and gave him the necessary training. And it turned out as I had predicted. When the new man had learned about my assignments, they transferred me to the Accounts Department. I was dumped there and it became hard for me to pass my days because I was not made for the accounts. It was a great torture to be in the Accounts Department. And apart from that, I had no experience of working in accounts. They assigned me to do things like making vouchers, bringing in cash from the bank, depositing cash to the bank, petty jobs, so that I should get frustrated and leave the company.

The Chairman didn't like that I should be cornered like this. He called them and asked them to transfer me back to the Sales Department. Four times he called us and expressed anger at the Sales Director, in front of me, though I don't know if he was sincere in his words because,

I used to think, the Chairman has made it clear that he wants me back in Sales, then why aren't the orders being issued? He seemed to be sincere but perhaps he was more busy with his other ventures (he was on the boards of many other companies) and didn't want to lose the Sales Director who was one of the prime figures running the business, or because they used to drink together at night, or some other reasons. I got fed up at the mock angers which the Chairman showed, and the lack of action at my transfer, and so I just resigned. When I tended in my resignation, the Managing Director called me to his office and asked why I wanted to leave the company. I said, "it has been five months since I was dumped in the Accounts Department for which I have no aptitude. I am fed up of your delays in transferring me back". I had known that the Chairman had issued his last warning to them to take me back to Sales. The Managing Director got worried at the ensuing potential conflict between the Chairman (who was my relative) and his clique. He called in the Sales Director and the General Manager (production) and these three high-ups began coaxing me to take the resignation back. They wrote an order that Salmon is hereby transferred to the Sales Department and they increased my salary to almost double the amount that I was getting. But I refused to take the resignation back saying that I had been humiliated too much to stay with the company. I had done so much work for the company, and in return what had been done to me was enough. I said, even if they increased my salary four times, I would not stay. They tried a lot. They had called in the General Manager (production) to coax me because I had been on good terms with him, he was not a part of the clique and they thought perhaps he could influence me. So they asked him to pursue me to take my decision back because, as they said to the General Manager (production), the Chairman had warned them that he would take it seriously if I was not sent back to the Sales Department. On the contrary, I was resigning and they feared that they had lost the game with the Chairman: If the Chairman heard of my resignation, he would be mad at them. The General Manager requested that I do not leave the company, he promised that he would create several prospects for me and that they would give me a company car. He said that the sales manager would be leaving the company shortly and that I would be promoted to his post. But I stopped going to the company from the next day because I believed that they will not stick to their word: in most cases, they had not honoured their commitments whether these commitments were done at corporate level, or with the vendors who supplied raw material to the company, or with the banks. With all business organizations that dealt with us, unless these organizations had been strict and demanding, these men had tried not to pay their dues and stay away from their commitments. Usually all our bills were paid along with fines. Regarding tax bills, their first attempts were to avoid taxes, but if some bills had to be paid while the fine had already accumulated, then they would contact their friends in the tax offices and ask them to get the fine deducted. There had been so many incidents like that and I had lost whatsoever faith I had in them. I had seen them promising one thing one day and forgetting it the next day.

Dislike for Challenges; The Significance of Loyalty; Personality Clashes

The following example comes from an assistant production manager in a very large state enterprise in India:

About inter-personal conflict between managers, we had our engineering section headed by a dynamic manager called Mr. Phillips. He was a Tamilian Christian, a lowest caste which is not categorized as a scheduled caste because they were those people who were previously in a very poor scheduled caste but then converted to Christianity. He came up to the level of a department manager because he was smart enough and had good education (*note the Indian preoccupation with people's castes when talking about them*), his wife was a doctor from the United States (*note the status symbol here*). He was heading the engineering section of our company. He had two people

working under him, one was a Brahmin, the other was a non-Brahmin Hindu of the second highest caste, the Vishuas. The first subordinate was an engineering graduate, a professional, very good at his job. In addition to his professionalism, he was also a very good person and was liked by the production staff. The other subordinate had only a diploma in engineering but had long experience of work. Both subordinates were at same grade, they were both executives. When it came to promotion, Mr. Philips knew that the first guy, with more education, had the right aptitude, and so he favoured him and promoted him to be a deputy manager. The other guy too was promoted to be a deputy manager but after a delay of one year.

When Mr. Philips left, another man took over. He too was a Christian, a Mr. Thomas from Kerala. Now the engineering graduate whom Mr. Philip had got promoted, was given responsibilities, but he had a habit of talking back in that he used to discuss things straight on the face and speak his mind that this was wrong and that was right, which Mr. Philip used to take as a positive attribute that showed knowledge and understanding. But the new manager, Mr. Thomas, who had been working in the Gulf and had come back, took this habit of the engineering graduate, of speaking his mind that this is how you have to do it, as personally insulting, and pondered to take revenge. When it came to promoting the two subordinates further, Mr. Thomas denied promotion to the engineer but gave promotion to the second guy. In other words, the personality attribute which Mr. Philip saw as a positive thing worth developing, the new manager didn't like it, and so the engineer didn't get a promotion but the diploma holder got it and became a joint manager. The engineer just could not take it and so he resigned from his job. Because of the dislike of a senior, he could not get promotion. What I am trying to say is that one manager had the ability to analyze the potential worth of a man but the other didn't like to be challenged. Mr. Philip was a forthright man, commanding and authoritative, hence undaunted by the other's free expression, but Mr. Thomas was a very soft man and he saw the self-confidence of the engineer as an attempt to control him, to mould him, as an affront which he took as personal and so he brought him (the out-speaking man) down and brought the other guy up. The engineer's resignation was accepted but he was so much liked by the production staff that they fought for him, but nothing came up and he didn't stay, he said, "I cannot accept this, there is no chance that I am going to work here, how can one take this shock?".

(Note how important promotion to higher ranks is in sectionalized societies, because of that, being low in some respect means little de facto citizenship rights, little respect and security, and lesser access to civic institutions that are taken for granted in the West).

He could complain to the Managing Director, but the M. D. naturally has to accept what the managers tell him: He has a responsibility to listen to the managers more than to the lower employees because the manager is the one who is analyzing and so, what he says, the M. D. has to accept it. Otherwise the manager is not going to work for the interests of the Managing Director and the two would have a conflict of interests.

Unions in the Sub-continent: Chaotic Behavior; Ineffectiveness of Union Activities

The following was narrated by a marketing manager in a British multinational run by Pakistani management:

The management implemented some new rules to enhance productivity, that is, they revised and raised the existing productivity standards. This revision in productivity standards was not a counter-attack on the workers' demands for increase in pay but had coincided badly at that time. The productivity standards that were applicable at that time were for the machines that had been there since 1950. New machines had been brought in and these machines were faster and produced more. As a consequence of the introduction of the new machines but older productivity standards, an average worker was making lot of money in the form of over-time. So long as the

old productivity standards were in force, we were bound to pay them over-time and this led to unduly high production costs.

For three and a half months the factories remained closed. It was the longest dispute we had. In the beginning the union was not willing to go to the Industrial Tribunal. They were insolent and misbehaved with the managers at which the matter was reported and cases were filed against three or four union leaders. When the union leaders saw little chances of winning in the courts, they ended the strike. Then they began apologizing for misconduct and went to great lengths for getting reinstated. Some were fired but they were later taken back after a compromise with the management was reached. During the compromise settlement, the new productivity standards were accepted by the workers. During the strike, we had to bear some losses. We lost our target of production but got rid of some stocks that we had piled up from earlier productions. However, we kept realizing the effects of the strike for six months onwards because then there was a shortage of finished goods.

MNEs in the Sub-continent Handed Over to Native Management; Greater Profit-Orientation of the Native Management Compared to the Western; Transformation of Organizational Culture from 'Less Differences between Hierarchical Levels' to a Greater One, and towards Greater Benefits for the Upper Levels but Exploitation of the Lower Levels; Creeping in of Nepotism, Inter-Personal Conflict, Favoritism, Power-Seeking, Personality Clashes, Intrigues, and Non-Work Cultural Pressures

Case I: The following was reported by a marketing manager in a British multinational recently handed over to native management:

When we had British management, they had given cars as a matter of functional necessity, maintained by the company, to all field managers. When the Pakistani Managing Director took over, he reverted this facility and introduced a new scheme which meant that we were more than a thousand rupees worse off each month and that in addition to the instalment of the car loan. This was quite a de-motivating factor and I felt frustrated. Then the Pakistani M. D. immediately had a union problem.

The basic issue for strike was that the new government of Nawaz Sharif had announced an increase of rupees three hundred in the workers' salaries. The workers demanded that they be given this increase: Our management claimed that this increase of rupees three hundred had been incorporated in the regular annual increment of the workers' salaries.

The Pakistani management was more profit-oriented than the British but there was a contradiction between these cost-cutting policies for the workers/middle management on the one hand, and those for the top management on the other hand. The extent of cost-cutting did not go farther than the level of junior/middle management. Cars were taken from us, but the top managers were given two cars, one for official use and one for personal use. The second car was in fact used by the wives of the top managers. These cars, for personal use, were maintained on company's expense - and brand new expensive cars. When I was leaving the company, they had promoted the four divisional managers to Directors who were thus entitled to luxury cars worth rupees sixteen hundred thousand each. At the middle management level, people were feeling that they were not being rewarded for their hard work despite that at that time the company profitability had reached a record level. The high profit was partly due to our hard work in the field but every year, when the increments came, we felt that our benefits were not being increased in real terms. I felt my motivation declining. I had been happy in getting more and more responsibility but there was a limit to it. When that limit was crossed, I began complaining to my

boss that the work load and responsibilities had become too much for me. You can estimate the situation of work progress from the fact that when I joined, we used to have a small office in Lahore but when I left, we had a huge 9000 square feet bungalow as our office and a ware house, all under my supervision and control. I was doing office management in addition to marketing functions and on top of that I was dealing in legal matters as well. I was controlling the sales officers in consumer products for the entire country. I asked them to give me an office manager, or an assistant, or an additional manager so that somebody should look after some of my jobs and that my tasks and responsibilities should be reduced, but the new Pakistani management was cutting costs. They said a manager would be expensive to hire so I take another sales representative and make do with him. The more sales representatives I took, they proved to be an additional burden on me in that I had more sales staff to supervise and control.

If the British management had stayed there, they would have given me a manager. Perhaps yes. One thing I want to add: I have worked so hard there for five and a half years, but I don't think I got my due. I think that they always underpaid us and they knew that. When I got the provident fund and gratuity, for the calculation of this, they used the rules made five years ago. And I asked them to revise the rules (because our profitability had gone very high in these years), but they refused straight away.

Between divisional heads there were conflicts. Mostly the conflict was based around getting more power and authority; who had more powers. Our marketing manager had such a personality that he didn't like being dictated by others. In some issues, the finance manager, who was also a company Director, wanted to interfere but the marketing manager didn't like his decisions being influenced by divisions he said had nothing to do with it. When he didn't accept the opinions of the finance manager in such cases, there used to be some tension between the two. I would say that there were personality clashes as well as work-related issues. When it comes to having authority in certain matters, the issue is work-related, but there were personal stances as well. One of our managers - the same thing - my boss didn't like him and said he was talkative and unproductive, that he was taken in on nepotism and favoured nepotism, that he was a trouble-creator in our department and goes for 'groupings' and this and that. So he was fired.

The finance manager, and the heads of Personnel and Logistics were not keen on fair selection and hiring. When we had a vacancy, they would send recommendations saying please hire this or that of our relatives or acquaintances, and this frustrated our boss. We once had a vacancy in Marketing at the Head Office. There was a lot of pressure from various managers that their men should be taken in but the marketing manager was not prepared to do that. When I resigned, my boss asked me not to let anyone know that I had resigned, not even the Managing Director. The reasons being that because my post was a very important one, everyone including the Managing Director, would put pressure on my boss to get their own men appointed in my place. My boss feared that if the other managers succeeded in placing one of their men at the vacancy, this would be the equivalent of having their informer in his office. He didn't want to have their informers in his office. My boss felt particularly pressurized from the Managing Director and the other Directors and managers and feared from offending them. If he didn't take one of their men, that is, if he refused to take their recommendations and pressures, there would be a new conflict springing up which he might not be able to manage. The result of this was that I didn't tell anyone for six months and finally, in the last days, when it was revealed that I was leaving, many managers got angry with me that I hadn't told them earlier that I was leaving. Thus, many people from other departments did not attend my farewell party. My boss sent R. from his Karachi office to replace me in Lahore so that he could make an excuse that filling the vacancy created by my departure was an inter-departmental affair and because there was no new appointment, no one should feel hurt that we didn't take their men.

Case II: The following was reported by a sales manager in a German multinational recently handed over to native management:

There are about one and a half dozen assistant managers. They belong to non-field departments in that they are not marketing people and hence do not need travelling for company sake. Four of these one and a half dozen assistant managers have been given cars. Having a company car is a big incentive because after four years, you are the owners of these cars when all you have to pay is twenty percent of the market price of a car and that too you pay in installments and, to add to it, if deductions are made from one's conveyance allowance, you are more than compensated even for the installments that you pay, so the contribution for these cars does not go from one's pocket. Because the cars have been given only to selected persons who are very close to the higher management, many say that this is favouritism and this has caused personal conflict among many equi-status people who feel that either all equi-status people should be given cars or none. Those who haven't got the cars resent it. A lot of resentment, and they are developing it further.

In many departments there is conflict. There are many misunderstandings, serious at time. They are just on working relationships so as to be able to carry on working but they are not really a team. In some departments, sales are declining. In one such department, the manager has hired three or four technical sales officers whose hiring cannot be justified. To justify these recruitment, you have to either promote sales or else cut down on other personnel. When it comes to cutting down, all become tense; whose turn is it?; it could be their turn in future. The managers in departments where sales are declining and cuts in staff are demanded, generally become more critical of their staff. It is hard to find real justification to sack someone when sales are dropping due to market conditions and not from a lack of efforts on the part of the sales staff. We are no longer as competitive as we have been, hence sales have dropped and everybody knows this, if there had been a different staff, they too would have failed in promoting the sales. This leads to arguments, discussions and conflicts. But mostly the conflicts we have are work-related. Non-work conflicts, such as personality clashes, are much less in our company than found in local organizations.

Control & Conflict Attitudes in Asian Firms; Non-Work & Theory X Control; Authoritative; Control by Informers; Machiavellian Control; Control Related to Conflict; Inter-Personal and Non-Work Conflict; Unhealthy Competition and Intrigues; Domineering Attitudes; Harsh Working Conditions

1-[*In a large Asian factory employing 150 workers*] the three partners were owners, directors, and supervisors themselves. There was one supervisor but he would only keep time-record. For control, they had internal video cameras and they could see who was working and who was not. One of the partners would sit in the "control room", attend to the telephone, receive visitors (he had a secretary as well) and did all the office work while he could watch the workers on the internal TV screen. The second partner was an "all rounder": He was working as a supervisor as well as a manager. The factory was very large but he would walk from the cutting branch right to the end where the ladies sew, to the department for pressing; he would wander all day and did all the "control" himself.

All the control system and conflict resolution was done personally by the owners. There were no established procedure for either control or conflict resolution. There were no forms or sheets for recording the production level of each workers. All these things were done orally. First of all they emphasized the need to produce more. Secondly, they wanted people to remain silent during work. When one partner would sit on the screen watching us, he kept looking for incidence when someone would talk with the other. Now, at times, it was inevitable for one to talk with another. The first partner would then inform the second partner on an inter-com that a certain person was talking and then the second partner would go and catch him talking. The worker would say, "but I am working and my production is okay". He would say, "I have received many complains against you, that you spend more than usual time in the toilet"; this, it was found, had been reported by the supervisor. He would warn that if we talked, we would produce less. But about the senior workers, like I was one of them (many had come and left since I joined but I had stayed), they knew that even if we talked, our production would be okay so that my behaviour was acceptable such as, it had been established, that I would come and leave at the right time.

Mostly the reason for quarrel [interpersonal conflict] was that the supervisor would go to the owners and fill their ears against one or the other worker, such as a certain person spent more time in the toilet than he should, or that he wanted to fight with the supervisor. The owners of the factory used to give extra money to the supervisor for drinking in return for keeping them informed of all that went on among the workers in the factory such as which worker was more in a position of leadership among others or who had such ambitions.

The workers quarreled amongst themselves because of that supervisor. He would never talk with the owners in front of the workers but gave them reports secretly, to keep face that he had no special relationship with the owners. He had become greedy and wanted drink parties now and then. He was nice to those workers who bought him drinks but those who gave him nothing, he would report against them. Most quarrels were caused by the supervisor's attitude. He would incite one to fight against the other. The owners favoured the supervisor such as if we took a trouser from the factory, we had to pay for it but he could take things without payment. Every Friday, after the work, they would go to the pub for parties and some workers would entertain him. Those who didn't try to please him, he would complain against them and get them sacked. For example, he tried his best to get me into trouble because I never gave him any gift. He was troubled at that I was allowed an hour's break on Fridays, and that I would take paid holidays on Eid days. Thus he once complained that I had stolen. I think he did complain before this incident as well but the owners never called me in. In fact I knew that even before this supervisor had joined the factory, I was allowed to take a trouser when I needed one but the supervisor saw this as an insult that I had not told him. He added, "this man is trying to be a leader among workers and while they are supposed to be under my control, they listen more to him". The owner pretended that he was angry and he scolded me which I think he did only to satisfy the supervisor. When the supervisor left, I told the owner that [the supervisor]

was against me because I had never bought him a drink and that he had tried on several occasions to incite the workers against me. The owner said he knew it all but he advised me to stay calm. Perhaps he [the supervisor] just wanted to create a misunderstanding between me and the owners. He thought that the owner would reprimand me, that I would be rude to him or that perhaps I would quit the job myself and this would leave him in full control of the workers.

The owners had seen that I worked very hard, that I worked even on Sundays and was ready to come whenever called, and so they didn't want to sack me but, on the other hand, they were also depending on the supervisor. This supervisor was important to the owners because he was quite senior, almost as senior as I was. He was very good at his job. The best attribute that he had, from the point of view of the owners, was that he understood the psychology of the factory workers very well. He was senior, and he was an expert in telling the owners whatsoever happened in the factory. He was serving as an intermediary between the workers and the owners and he was to the workers just as he was the owner himself. When the owners had, for example, a party, they would give him some extra cash. The greatest benefit to the owners was that they had bought just one man and that was because they didn't want to go to each worker and say, for example, "you don't work hard", or that, "you don't do this or that properly". They just wanted the right kind and amount of production and they were happy in giving him ten pounds extra so that he would then deal with the workers and it was all left over to him. In those five years I was there, he quarrelled with between 15 to 20 workers. One of the workers grabbed him outside the factory and beat him so much that he became all wounded and bloody. The police came in but all the workers laid the blame on the supervisor, that he was very mean. The workers and the supervisor decided to solve the matter amongst themselves and a truce was made. But the supervisor developed an enmity with many others too. The worker who had beaten him, was fired by the owners though he had been wronged against beyond limits...

2-There were two workers who quarrelled a lot and one was expelled from the factory. The reason for the quarrel was this: The workers had to pack the finally prepared dresses in see-through bags. When the packed product was sold to a warehouse, they returned it because of certain defects. The boss called the two packers in for an inquiry. Each accused the other of carelessness. The goods were returned because they were wrongly packed. But there was no way to find out who packed wrongly. So they blamed each other and started to fight. The fight went on to such an extent that they fought outside the factory after it was closed. So the boss called both inside and dismissed one of them. Such quarrels were common. (Oldham).

3-Once, one of my co-workers was expelled from the factory. The owner pushed him physically out of the factory. The owner said he talked too much. He was a part-time worker and had his own taxi cab so he was not desperate for work. He therefore didn't submit to the scolding but answered back. He said that he was working properly and that the target of work was being achieved and therefore it didn't matter if he talked whilst at work. The owner said, "I am the boss here and you will have to do what I say". He said, "I don't know any boss. I only know my work. If I do the work incorrectly, only then you have a right to reprimand". The boss resorted to invective and said, "get lost". I asked him to be polite to the workers. He said, "all those who want to leave can pick up their jackets and go. We can get as many workers from the market as we want". However, later, the boss realized that he had lost his temper and asked me to call the fired worker back but the latter had already left. Physical clashes or little short of that happened four or five times during the last year; it is always those present around who stop the two involved from hitting each other. (Oldham).

4-We had a worker there, for ironing and pressing dresses. He used to drink at work but he was good at his job. The supervisor kept filling the owners' ears against him, about his drinking, and that he didn't do his job properly. We knew that he was a good worker but he drank because his duties were very hard; when you iron you have to work in steam. He seemed quite fed up from his work. The owners reprimanded him at drinking at which he became so angry that he picked up a rod

and broke the windows glasses. He shook the old lady, who was one of the owners, by her collar and threatened to kill her. The police were called in and they arrested him. Later we saw him being brought in police custody to collect his wages. Three police officers escorted him. (Manchester).

5-Many times we have a conflict at the workplace. Once two of us quarrelled at playing a tape recorder. They shouted at each other because one wanted to play it and the other wanted silence. (Manchester).

6-Often, when one would take a bit longer tea-time, because all were Pakistanis, the others would fill the boss's ears against him that X was wasting time or Y had gone there or done this or that. Even if the boss was away from the factory, he found out all that happened in his absence. The selected workers would see to it that he was told of all that happened in his absence. (Oldham).

7-Now it is like this; I know this job well because I have experience of doing this job in two factories, but there is a tradition among our people that they want to show that they know better than others which they show in the often said remarks about others' performance and comparing it with that of their own. They say, "I know the job, I work more than he does" or that, "he doesn't know the job", or "he doesn't do his job properly". Because there are no certain criteria for performance evaluation, and there are many tasks of different nature and dimensions, you can't easily compare one's performance against the other. There is no major issue or a big problem here except the remarks that people pass about each other, "I am better than him". Now my co-workers have been in the same factory for a very long time and so they think that they are more experienced, and that they can handle situations of trouble, but they want to believe that I cannot do the trouble shooting when needed. Now a time of problem or crisis doesn't come every day, so how can you prove that you can do the trouble shooting? So they form negative opinions about a person that he wouldn't be able to handle a situation when, in fact, the situation hasn't appeared and the man hasn't been tried. It is rare that a machine breaks down and you have to pull up, or there is a power failure and you have to locate the cause. The usual faults that arise are only that the size of bags is smaller or larger than required which you can easily correct, or that the printer has stopped and you have to fill ink in or make it work, or mix the raw material in proper proportions, what ratio of which colour, and so on. When the supervisor is on leave, you are supposed to do his job but then the workers compete to take his place because they think that by showing that they are more capable than the others, they could be promoted to the level of the supervisor and at such a time they discourage others by saying that the others don't know many things and therefore should not be trusted to work in place of the supervisor. They [my colleagues] were ignoring me and they believed that in the absence of the supervisor and some senior workers, I wouldn't be able to run the shop floor, they even went so far as to say that I cannot run the section if the supervisor is not there.

Once the supervisor went on a leave for four weeks. I and a senior worker were supposed to run the extruder section and we took in a third worker to help us in running the section. On one weekend, the senior worker working with me had to attend some social events and then attend a religious gathering, and so he said, "lets close the factory for three days because the supervisor is not here, I will not be here, and Zamir cannot run the section on his own". I said I could run the section on my own but they didn't trust me and they decided to close the factory for the weekend. On top of this, they mistrusted me so much that they kept the decision, to close down, a secret until Friday came. Friday was the day I had to take full responsibility for the working of my section and they believed that I would not be able to do and hence would ask myself that work be stopped that weekend. When I reached the factory, the supervisor of the day shift told me that there was a power failure and nothing was working. They told me to ring the manager at eight in the evening and tell him that there was no power, and then shut the factory and go home. When I rang the manager and told him that there was a power failure, he said, "wait there, I am sending a technician who would sort out the problem". A technician came and I told him about the circuits at which he corrected the

system and we started to work. I was able to get the factory going all weekend as against the expectations and predictions of my colleagues. My colleagues didn't like it much. (Slough).

8-When I realized my mistake and began to sweep the floor, many began laughing at me; they ridiculed me by calling each other and showing them, "look he is cleaning now". And then they would satire, "now clean the other side as well". I thought I could not stay there. People there were wilfully dishonoring me. I felt tense because there was no respect for me there. They treated me bad... when I had that problem with the supervisor who said, "I will cut your throat", the Asian workers told me to go and apologize... The workers told me he had stabbed someone before, not in the factory but outside somewhere. It could be a rumour but he was fit [strong]. (Slough).

Typical Cases of British Asian Coercive Control on New Immigrants; Harsh Working Conditions; Demeaning Attitudes; Off-Books Work; Non-Work Control; Frustrated New Immigrants and Inter-Personal Conflict

1-Kalim came to Britain when someone, taking pity on his sheer depravation despite education and hard work, gave him his British passport on which he pasted his own photograph. His description of the working conditions is typical of the Asian restaurants, has been narrated by many working in these restaurants, but the employers are seldom short of man-power in this sector due to the continuous arrival of new spouses from the sub-continent. We note here, to show the extent to which the desire to control others exists among Asians, that in most arranged marriages, the spouses are brought over from home countries even when proposals from British Asians are available, mainly because the new comers, owing to their legal/social dependence upon the host family, are more amenable to control:

The restaurant opened at nine in the morning and during the week we worked from nine to nine. Then we would close after cleaning up and arranging things. During Thursdays, Fridays, Saturdays and Sundays there was no limit to working hours. We could work until mid night or carry on until one o' clock in the morning (that is, much more work on the week-ends). We could sleep only when the work finished. The employer said we must start at nine every day but the time to leave depended on when the work finished which was not certain; no holidays at all, seven days a week work. But we had lesser work on Sundays when the work would finish at around nine in the evening and then we needed an hour to clean up things. But on Thursdays, Fridays and Saturdays, there was no limit to work ending. On one night I finished working at two in the morning because we had an order for a marriage party and then he rang up and said that I should come back to work at six in the morning (this means that I worked 20 hours out of 24 that day). But for all this hard work there was no credit because I had a weak point in that I was not allowed to stay in the country and so he knew that it would be nearly impossible for me to find a better job (and he took advantage of this): Once, it was the Eid day and I said to him that I wanted a holiday. He said that as our restaurant was an Asian one, more people would visit the restaurant on the Eid day. I said it was his business, but I am a Muslim. He said, "well I am a Muslim too but we have to make money". I said, "you are a businessman and you need money, so you would keep the restaurant open, but I am just a worker and it is my holy day and so I want this one day to stay at home". He said I couldn't take a leave and he talked with his partner who said that though I couldn't leave, I may go for the prayers but then I must come back to work. My weekly wages were £30. I said to him that he could keep my one week wages (£30) but he must let me have one holiday but he refused at which I said, "during the last five months, I have worked seven days a week and had only five holidays and that only because I was so sick that I couldn't come to the restaurant", but he said that I must come to work after the prayers. At this I said, "I will work for you after the prayers but that is all, and I resign". He then told his partner that I was determined to leave at which the partner asked him to give me £10 extra for the

Eid day. I said to him, "I get paid for my work and this money on the Eid day is given to children. I am not a child that you should give me these £10". He said he would be happy to give it to me. I said, "if you are so generous, why don't you give me a day's leave for which I am willing to give you £30; my one day wages are only £5 but I am giving you £30 and you can hire someone for that sum to work tomorrow". He said, "you know that it is only me who has hired you. If I file a complain to the police, they would send you back to Pakistan". I said to him, "don't complain but do sack me and keep the money due to me". They used to pay on Sundays and the Eid was on Thursday. I said to him, "keep my week's wages but don't complain. Let's part as friends". He kept insisting that I should come to work and so I was left with no choice but come to work. But there were no customers that day and after mid-day he allowed me to take a half day leave. He knew that if he was to replace me at the least wage of £1 an hour, he would have to pay £96 a week.

On another occasion, a friend of mine came at 11 at night and told me that the brother of a close friend had died. I wanted to go for condolence. I said to the owner, "my job is all done and I want to go for condolence on the death of a friend's brother". He said, "there is still one thing to do; you haven't mopped the floor". I said I would come early the next day and mop the floor but this friend was waiting outside for me and we would be very late to the house where a man was laying dead. He said, "no, you must finish before you go". It took me 45 minutes to finish the work and my friend kept waiting for me outside; this was the attitude of this Pakistani. After five months, the Indian took over and the Pakistani became the assistant. The Indian was a bit better in that he raised my wages from £30 to £35 and allowed me one day off in a week. I requested him to keep my wages low at £30 but allow me two days off because I was not able to work so hard. I wanted two days to be able to look for other jobs, but he refused to allow me two days off. I worked for nearly a year and a half until I saved some money.

I was paying rent to a friend with whom I shared accommodation, £7 a week, and I could eat at the restaurant. The most difficult task in this job was to load and unload heavy objects. The van would come and deliver heavy things like sugar and flour sacks. He would say, "you have such a healthy body, these sacks, even a child can lift them up". I used to tell him that I had a back-bone problem and if some thing happened to me who would be kind enough to give me food at home? I was not entitled to any welfare benefits, who would support me? On the other hand, if something happened to him, he could even take a private treatment. But he kept insisting that I should lift those things as well as do my regular job. And he used to say that in a taunting tone. Once he asked me to lift a huge pot of boiling milk which I couldn't. His partner had had an operation but he lifted the pot and then they made fun of me. I said I got £30 a week but he made between £1000 and £1500 every week and so his morale was high and he could take risks but I couldn't afford to take a risk with my physical safety. If he got hurt, he could still manage, but if I was sick and off work, they wouldn't pay me a single day's wages, so why should I endanger myself? However, they kept criticizing me that I didn't do this or that. When I had saved some money and cleared my debts (I had borrowed money to buy a ticket to come to Britain) I gave up that job. But the first five months were horrible. I knew nothing and would understand little of how to wash and clean things and he would criticize me all the time. The first five months were terrible. But then I learned.

(We may note the difference between the earnings of the employer [between £1000 and £1500 a week] and the employee [£30 a week] though they were putting, at least, equal efforts in making the business succeed. Most Western employers in such circumstances would normally be more considerate. Many hard working men in America and Europe have the chances to rise and even end up as general managers in the businesses they put their efforts in, but Kalim, as are most of his social class in certain cultures, was exploited in one business after another).

In my second job, the wages (£1.25/hour) were cash-in-hand wages. No tax was paid on these wages and they never gave any wage slips. At no job I was given a wage slip and no one else got it. The supervisor, though he was not really a supervisor, would tell the office how much overtime anyone had worked. If there was a mistake we could go to him. There was no clock system. Nothing written. They just remembered it that, for example, I worked three extra hours on Monday etc. There

was never a quarrel about this, it was all on memory and during this they also would take some hours off if someone had to go to the doctor or for another problem, and all this was remembered. They allowed me a leave on Eid day and didn't deduct wages.

(In his circumstances in this later acquired job in a large factory, Kalim was grateful for only two paid leaves in an year, and one hour paid leave for prayers in a week).

But that was just two days in an year; if we needed a leave other than that on Eid day, we could get leave without pay. No leaves with pay. Not even on a sick note. If you miss a day they would deduct wages for the day. One day, I said to them, "look, I am the most senior worker in your factory, I have worked for so long with you, for about three years, and if you calculate the tax you would have paid to the government it comes to several thousand pounds which you have saved. Now, as a favour to me, why don't you give me a return ticket to Pakistan because I want to go for a month". They consulted with each other and agreed that they would give me a ticket, which was worth £400 those days (1985), and a leave without pay for sixty days... I came back after an year and they welcomed me back to work.

(However, Kalim's weak point became a source of black mail when his supervisor, who didn't want him to jeopardize the latter's privilege, of being the only man trusted by the owners, began harassing him. The supervisor didn't want Kalim to be close to the owners and he harassed him so much that Kalim had to leave his job. When the supervisor and his men wanted to fight with him, Kalim couldn't retaliate because of the fear that if police was called in, his secret would be found).

The supervisor was astonished that I could be such a coward. When I refused to fight, they knew that I had something to hide - some weak point. The next day I went to one of the owners and told him everything and said, "look, he wants to put me in trouble and if the case was to be brought to police investigation, it would be bad for me and bad for your reputation as well. Perhaps it wouldn't harm you much but I will be ruined and so please just sack me". He didn't want to sack me and so he called the supervisor in and, pointing at me, said to him, "this man, even if he does not work at all, don't bother at all. Don't even tell me about his time of arrival and time of leaving. Leave him on his own. Even if he wastes time in the toilet or steals, let him do what he wants to do". The supervisor was very angry to find that I had such intimate relations with the owners. But the fact was that the owners knew that I was worth a lot to them. They paid me less and got so much work done; they would call me whenever they needed me. And then they knew that I could not leave them. The other workers, when they got legalized, learned the language, had some experience, and would leave for better jobs but I had to stay where I was. I was the only senior worker who also gave training to the newer workers. It is hard job to train a worker; you have to spend hours training them and save material from wasting. The point is that it was not that they liked me, they just needed me; I was invaluable to them. [But] the supervisor had become a senior member of the staff and he quarrelled with me almost every day. He would find newer and newer persons to incite them to fight against me. One day I became so upset that I told everything to a friend that the supervisor prepared men to challenge and fight with me and I had to beg apologies from them for I could not fight on account of being an illegal person in the country. He said, "don't worry, when they come to fight, you just escape from the situation so that no blame should come to you and I will teach them a lesson". He was very strong and he worked as a bouncer at a club. He was Pakistani, an uncle of those with whom I was living. He knew my position as an illegal immigrant. He waited outside the factory. When the supervisor sent his man, drunk and shouting obscenities at me, I told him to shut up, that I would break his teeth. When he came to fight, my friend intervened and asked him why he was mad at me. "You have insulted a Pakistani", my friend said, "I am a Pakistani too and I can fight with you all. Come out all of you". When they realized that this wouldn't work, they abstained from fighting with me and began thinking over some other scheme. Realizing that their next step could be dangerous for me, I just left the job. If I had a legal right to stay in this country, I would definitely have tried to get him sent to the police and to the prison for his mischiefs with the workers because it was only because of him that the poor new entrants got lesser wages.

In my fifth job, my new employer was a nice man but someone complained against me to the

authorities and I left the city.

2-I didn't have a work-permit and there were three or four men and a similar number of women [in my section] who didn't have work permits and these were particularly pressed by the owners to do more than the others but were paid less than the others. We were paid just £1.00/hour but we had to do almost double the work than the others. After two and a half months I left the job. In my next job, they gave us £40 a week out of which £5 had to be paid towards petrol-share to go to work. When I went to work there I told them that I didn't have a work permit. So they said they would pay me £2.00 an hour. I was told that there would be lots of overtime work. But then they told me to work on piece-work because that meant that the more I produced, the more I could earn. It all depended on one's efforts. So I worked and worked hard. I went there at 7 in the morning and left at 7 in the evening. I had the greed to make more money so I produced bundles and bundles. But at the end of the week, when I was to collect wages from that officer who paid wages, he just gave me the fixed wage. When I asked that I had worked on piece work basis, and that I had worked so hard and made a lot of units, they said there was no need for me to talk much, and that if I wanted to demand to be paid on piece-work basis, I should first get my work-permit. He said, "here's your wages, if you don't want it than you may leave the factory". What happened was that they used tricks to get more work out of us but when they found that the wages came to an amount more than their limit, they would refuse to give more than the limit. That is, they had a fixed amount of £60 a week as maximum wage limit. If the actual wages amounted to more than £60, they would not give more than £60. But the supervisor had told me that if you work on piece-work basis, you earn more. He said that I could work on piece work basis. And he even calculated my wages on piece-work basis and handed over his calculations at the counter. But when he tried to get our wages from the office, they said they won't pay the exact amount because they weren't authorized by the owners to pay more than £60 a week. They told me to get confirmation of wages from the boss's wife. When we went to see her she said, "you can only get £60 a week and not more than that". If I had argued further, there would be a quarrel. I just left the work after three weeks. The first week I worked eight hours a day. The next week I worked twelve hours because it was summer and days were long. But when they didn't pay me my due amount, I worked eight hours the third week and then left work altogether because they made us work too hard. Some people worked five days and some worked six days. But this was meaning-less for those who didn't have their work permits. They won't pay more for more work, no over-time, and no piece-work. (Manchester).

3-Most of my fellow workers suffer from bad temperament. They have just arrived from Pakistan as spouses. Many have regular quarrels with their wives because the wives talk in English which they cannot understand. In the factory they take their frustrations out on others. (Manchester)

4-The largest problem they had was that they got a lot of men who had come to Britain as spouses and as such were not entitled to income support for an year. They couldn't speak English, and knew nothing about this society, the offices and other things. So they just lay wasting in the homes... they were spouses and were bullied at the home of the in-laws where they lived... and they kept searching for other jobs. Now when they weren't even allowed to talk [at workplace], when they had weaker immigration status, and had to work nearly double than an average worker at wages of just 50p an hour, because they were new and it was said about them that they knew nothing... they would get say 50p an hour if the usual rate was £2 an hour. They were even happy with that for they thought they would learn to work in a factory and then would have some prospects. But the owners took advantage of their weak points. They would call them whenever they needed them - even on Saturdays and Sundays. These new-comers knew that if they didn't obey, they would rot as jobless with absolutely no source of income. (Keighly)

5-Many times there were quarrels among the workers. The Asians working there all had a

weak point that they were newly arrived from India or Pakistan, and when they would come, usually as spouses, they didn't know English. Second, they could not work in the English firms for they either couldn't talk to them or knew nothing about the English firms. (Birmingham).

6-When I began my first job, I had no desire to work in a factory. I had just come from Pakistan and I wanted either to continue with my education or go back to Pakistan. I had no intention but I was compelled to work... there was a tension among my relatives about why I was not working. I neither had funds for education nor was entitled to a grant. I didn't even have money to go back to Pakistan (where higher education is very cheap compared to that in Britain). I therefore began working. After some time I began losing interest in work especially because of the drudgery of twelve hours a day; monotony and length of hours. Gradually, I began developing conflicts. (Brentford).

Low Wages in Asian Businesses; Money Motivation; Exploitation

1-I thought, £2 an hour, having looked around everywhere, it was £1.50, £1.75, and £2 was decent compared to what was going... I have never heard of that thing called, there was no 'basic wage'. I heard about a basic wage in this kind of a field when I was talking to a friend who worked for 'Marks and Sparks' and she said that they had a basic wage and then what they did on top, that was a very good idea, I thought, and I thought if there was a factory here (with that system) I would love to work there, but, you know, this is very very high class, I'd love to work there instead of £1.50 or 1.75 being morally, emotionally screwed up; that's what I call it... (Leicester).

2-Even if you worked extra hours, they didn't pay the extra sum. There is no rate system [for wages & overtime] in these (Asian) factories. (Slough).

3-Because it was all piece work, so what happened was that women were also driven to work harder, thinking they will make more. And they were obsessed by that little books they had and how many pieces they had made. I mean, like if they made 150 pieces at 50p, or whatever, they would write it down, right, and he (the employer) was always checking that they didn't add more on. And there would always be slight skirmishes about how much. Even if paid 50p less, which he always tried to, that was his nature, what they would do, they would say, "no - I want that 50p", they would demand it. And, he (the owner), he used to be very religious, he was a very nice person but what I couldn't understand was that he was obsessed with money, and I used to think, how can you be religious, because your religion doesn't say that you have got to hoard all this money, and he was very niggardly, I would say, penny, he used to calculate every penny. And, (his) sister-in-law, she told me that one of the brothers, he was kind of a millionaire in India. So that was what puzzled me. That religious, you know, religious piety, when he was talking, and yet the accumulation of wealth he had. I used to get on him on that and he didn't like it. (Leicester).

4-When it comes to pay you, its like you are taking an arm off them, you are going to hurt them to give you the wages even though you have earned it, you have done more than enough to earn that money, you really have. (Huddersfield).

5-An Asian employer reasoned as follows:

We have girls working who have also worked in English factories and found no difference in wages or in working conditions. Girls in the fashion or knit wear trade make a piece that sells for £5.99 on an average, while our product sells a dozen for £5.99; there is a difference of one to twelve. According to the custom here, the company rates, i.e. the government fixed rates for underwear/socks manufacturers, are exclusive of the fixed rates. So our profit ratio is very small. One knitwear jumper is equal in price to 12 underwear. For an underwear we have to put in pieces as small as three

to four inches - jumpers are made up of larger pieces - so more work is put in for lesser unit price... We give our workers the same facilities as they would get in English firms... The girls who make underwear in English factories are paid the same as we do. Then we do give them a 10 to 15% bonus so that if someone has been paid less, the shortage is made up for by the bonus. If someone has been paid more, the bonus would encourage her to keep working better. (Ashton-u-Lyne).

(A logical conclusion of such reasoning as given above about the difference in unit price between an underwear and a larger piece of clothing would be that workers in the latter industry should be better paid. But it turned out that wages in knitwear and other Asian textile industry were equally low: But then, again, this could be reasoned out as that the amount of work put in for one jumper would be much less than that put in for a piece of underclothing).

6- The doctor gave me a sick note and said that I was not fit for work, from the first of November. And Shahid (the employer) didn't pay me due wages for two weeks although he told the DSS that he had paid me wages for two weeks. So neither the DSS nor Shahid paid me. The DSS said that the factory owner had written that he had paid me. In addition to the money he owed me, he didn't even pay the sick-pay. When I went to the factory to get a sick pay form they made me wait outside the factory for three hours. At first, on telephone, he said they had no sick-pay forms. I went there myself and after three hours when they gave me the forms, they would not fill it in. They said they couldn't fill it for me and that I should get it filled in from the DSS. I went to the DSS and they said that the form should be filled in by the factory owners. So I went back to the factory and when, finally, they filled it in, they filled in the wrong dates and they didn't sign the form, which the DSS pointed out, and so I had to go back to the factory again. Then they refused to give my P45. On telephone he said that he would report my doctor for giving me a sick note for a very long time. I got my P45 later after too much hassle. Pakistanis don't deal properly. But not all of them. Some businessmen, even though they give low wages, talk politely and give you respect. Shahid was upset at losing an experienced worker. It was not my fault that I left the job. I wanted to work but the doctor said I should not. (Manchester).

Off-the-Books Employment; Low Wages; Harsh Working Conditions; Corruption; Tax Evasion; Exploitation; Money Motivation; Luxurious Life Styles; Perceived Upper-Class Power

1-I have always tried to work off-books because, you see, living expenses are high, right, and so, this job they only wanted to give me £1.50 an hour and I said no, I wanted a bit more. And they gave me £1.75. Now, if I could afford to go some where else where I was on the books, I couldn't, and I couldn't say no to them and you feel bitter because you are paid £1.75 and you do so much, its more the jobs, this again consisted of packing but it was good quality stuff; it was for Dorothy Perkins, C&A, who would be selling a garment for £50 yet the people who are making these garments, people like me, were paid a pittance. And they (the owners) were paid much, they got enough to make a profit but I used to think, my God!, I buy these garments from these reputable shops and its people like me who are working. When you need money, when you have your own bills to pay, and food, and God knows what else you want, you would do anything, well, within limit, I mean like, they were going to pay me £1.50 but I said, "look, pay me a bit more because I am damn broke; £1.75", they were doing me a favour, the man thought, 'Oh great, I am paying her 1.75 and I am doing her a big thing', the bastard, I felt really angry but that's life. (Leicester).

2-It does help. For example, if I was to work off-the books, I could get DSS help in mortgage payment. But these days it is risky because the VAT officials and tax officials keep inspecting the place so they try to avoid illegal workers. But this was quite common in the past. For example, they entered fewer hours worked in the books to save tax. (Manchester).

3-I had been unemployed for six months and so I thought I must work. My job was off-books and my wages were £70 per week cash-in-hand. It was an off-license and general store. The working hours were very long; I worked from nine in the morning until eleven at night; sometimes more than that, and for almost seven days a week. (London).

4-The Asian manager seemed to be doing more people off-books, and they [the owners] seemed to be getting more money than they would by doing on-the-books because the cars they had got, they couldn't possibly be earned, like Mercedes Benz and things like that and I mean, for a small factory only having eight people, you can't get a car like that. And they [the owners] can afford a luxurious life style, and they are not scared of showing it. Because, another thing, Asians always want to sign on (DSS) and work off-books to get more money since they come from another country where you don't get; once you've got the money, like if you come from a country where you have got no money, into another country where you have got some money, you want more money. Why should you have a little bit? (Huddersfield).

5-I think it would be hard to make a good profit from that kind of work if the workers were not exploited the way they were. But because they paid too little to the workers and seldom hired one on NI card, hired mainly illegal residents, irregular workers or people in hardship, that is, people who could work at the least pay, some were even paid 50p an hour, they made money basically through exploitation. If they had workers on regular payroll and at legally acceptable wages, perhaps they couldn't make a profit. If they could, I presume the profit would be barely enough for the owning family to survive. (Manchester).

6-When I joined there as a manager [an Asian warehouse], the owner was very friendly with me and kept calling me "brother". "You are my brother, my friend", he said. I said, "I am grateful and thank you for that. Now what about my designation and my salary". He said, "don't you worry about that, we shall keep you happy". I kept asking about the terms and conditions of the job and he very politely and very amicably kept avoiding the real issue, "don't you worry we will give you more than what you were getting before". I told him that now that I was a legal resident of Britain and had a NI card, I wanted to work in the legal way and wanted my tax and NI contributions to be deducted from my salary, but he said, "you just start work, after a week or two we will sort out this matter, we have just opened this warehouse and we have to make it a success". I worked for the first week and when it came to wage payments, he paid me £80 for 6 days which was less than my expectations. I had been working from 10 in the morning till 9 and 10 in the evening. I said, "Mr. Farhan, what would be my salary for six days, twelve hours every day?". It was not only sales job but all arrangements in the warehouse and there was only one man working with me in the warehouse. We were dealing with the customers, receiving deliveries and displaying the clothes - doing all tasks at the warehouse. I told Mr. Farhan that I used to make around £120 a week at G. Brothers and therefore, when he had asked me to work for him, he had promised that he would give me more than what I used to get before. I said that if he didn't want to give me more, at least he should give me as much as I got at G. Brothers especially that I had resigned from there because I was told that I would get better pay. Mr. Farhan said, "lets see what happens the next week". The next week he gave me £100. I protested again but again he was very friendly but evasive on the real issues. He treated me as a friend, used to call me to his office to have a chat with him, have lunch with him but when it came to salary, he very nicely evaded the issue. I felt bad especially because I had waited so long to get the NI card in the hope that I shall have a decent wage, a legal status as an employed person and a record of work so that I could rise in a legal way, and that I had so much valuable experience in sales and Mr. Farhan badly needed a man like me to increase his sales in his new warehouse; it was because of my contacts that they were getting many new customers but he was not being fair with me. The next week I pressed hard and I said that I wanted a decision about my status and salary in that firm. He asked what I wanted. I told him that I wanted to work on the NI card, as a legal

employee, and on a decent wage. I told him that I wanted to be on the payroll, I wanted a job description and hours of work and all terms and conditions of my job and I wanted a job title and a position and a fixed rate. He uttered, "all right, lets say that you are the warehouse manager". I said that was fine with me, and what about my salary?. He began arguing, "see there are many problems, we can't be successful if we pay taxes on wages, running a new business is not easy, we haven't yet begun to earn much and I have to give a share of profits to the partners as well; you don't know about many things". He wanted me to work off-books. That was his whole point and I refused. I said I had waited for the day when I would be a legal resident and a legal employee in Britain and now that I had got it, I couldn't carry on being an illegal employee. He said, "all right, lets do it this way, we will officially declare that you are our legally part-time employee; in this capacity, we shall pay you £40 a week from which tax and NI contributions will be deducted, and you would benefit from this arrangement that the tax and NI contributions on £40 would be minimum, and we would benefit that we will be paying an insignificant amount to these institutions (DSS and Inland Revenue), but in fact you would be our full-time employee and your full wages will be given to you as cash-in-hand, and for this amount, no official records will be kept". I asked what would be my total wages, at which he replied that the total per week would be £125 from which £40 would be paid on record for my NI contributions. Although this offer was not the ideal one, I had no alternative and I thought at least I have progressed that bit further. When I asked about the timings of work, he said, "brother, why don't you consider it your own business, your own home, just feel at home here and don't worry about the hours, come when you feel like coming and just see that all work is done; we are all a team and a family here". I said, after all, I had a family and they needed to know when I shall be back home. He said, "come on now, this too is your family here and just see that customers get what they want and when there is no work, you can go home". He didn't fix any time.

I worked there for more than two and a half years and I realized that none of the Asian owners ever want to employ one on legal basis, they cannot refrain from exploitation, and if they would hire someone legally, they would either exploit him in an outright and obvious manner or they would exploit by using a very polite and brotherly tongue. The second kind of employers would make you feel as if you are one of them but would not give you a dime more than what is the barest minimum and without which nobody would stay.

At this job, apart from that my working hours were so long that we sometimes had to work well past midnight, I was generally treated with great respect and politeness. However, there was never a pay rise given and whenever I would ask for a bit more, he would evade it; there were no overtime or extra benefits. After six months, I asked them to make me on their records a full-time legal worker, he said, "come on, why are you so keen to pay taxes? have you lost your head that you want to put yourself and us in this hassle of government institutions?".

My basic reasons for quitting was that I wanted a legal job where I would feel secure in the eye of the law; I wanted to pay tax and NI contributions and that if I ever wanted to apply for better and high status jobs, I should have a valuable experience and a good background. This desire was not being fulfilled there. They didn't want to legalize my status as a full-time employee and I knew that I had no employment rights unless I was not a legal full-time employee. Eventually I got fed up. After submitting my resignation, I tried at a few places to get jobs in sales but because, in Manchester, particularly in clothing sales, the market is perhaps dominated by Asians, they exploit their employees too much and secondly, they try to keep you as an illegal employee or a part-time legal employee. I talked with about fifteen employers whom I had come to know in the course of my work at the K.S, at G. Brothers and at D. and C.. Many wanted to hire me but at the same conditions as were common in the industry and for which I had resigned from D. and C.. So I decided not to seek employment at all and instead I bought a taxi and became self-employed. I saved some money from this job and opened a gold smith shop in partnership with a skilled gold smith. He used to work at the shop while I did the taxi job. I was a sleeping partner at the gold shop because my partner was the skilled man. In a goldsmith business, even if you make twelve bangles of a tola (10 grams) each, it comes to £1200 and so very quickly you get a high VAT amount that you must pay if you are doing your work

honestly. Many of my relatives have made millions from goldsmith business because they do not keep any records and do not register themselves with the concerned institutions. The way Asian goldsmiths do business, they become rich quickly but in fact if they do their work on a legal bases, the profit would not be that high unless they increase the price of the finished goods by the amount of the VAT. Hence we began losing Asian customers because they go to the goldsmiths who do not charge the VAT amount. The only alternative for me to succeed, after having registered myself for VAT, was to make fake invoices to pay small amounts of VAT, keep the VAT inspectors satisfied, and sell the rest underhand. So these two factors, my desire to be honest and the disorganization of my partner, led to failure and finally I closed the shop after having made a net loss of £6000. Because my competitors were doing business without paying the VAT, there was no way for me to win customers. For six months, I lived on income support and kept looking for jobs. When I applied for jobs in English-owned factories where I hoped to be employed legally, they asked for relevant experience and skills. Eventually, in great depression, I left Manchester and moved South because I was told that job prospects were better in the South. I applied for jobs in about six or seven factories but the problem of having all experience in sales became a barrier in getting jobs in production. When I applied for income support, I mentioned that I had a house on mortgage at which the DSS refused to give me financial support on reasons that I owned a house. I told them that the house was not a property but a liability because it was on mortgage. But they refused to give me any help. One of the dealing clerks at the DSS said to me, "I don't understand why you had to mention that you own a house; there are people here who own six houses and still live in council houses".

7-... some of the women, they work there because they are supposed to work only 15 hours a week, and that because they have a child and the benefit (Single Parent Allowance) is regulated in such a way that they cannot work more than 15 hours, and there is a factory where I was supposed to go and my friend told me not to work there because they, what he used to do was give you £5 a day no matter what you sew and you have got a lot of those women working there. There are many factories in Leicester you could move to but that one that we are talking about, I couldn't understand why they worked there at £5 a day. [I later found that] they were on the DSS. And some of them were working off-books and the owner said if they quit job he would tell the DSS. I was going to go there, I was ready, but my friend warned me, look don't go there because once you are in there, if he said I will go and tell [the DSS], I'd lose everything. I mean I'd lose my income support.

But if he was keeping them off-books, how could he tell the DSS? Wasn't he equally guilty?

Yes. But the problem is what would he lose? Not that much as the other person. Because they (the workers) themselves had told the DSS that either they were not working or working 15 hours, but were working full-time, he had the upper hand.

I see. But wait, he had no record of the workers who were off-books?

You can tell that to me and I will find a way out, right, but you tell that to the illiterate women! And even if they do, right, so much information comes to them that so many cases are quoted, 'Oh, I know sister, I know *pahn jee* (dear sister), this is what happened' and they get frightened. And if your best mate tells you, or the one who lives next door to you or works with you tells you oh don't do that, this is what happened, then you get more scared. (Leicester)

8-Even the legalized workers had a weak point that they all claimed social security benefits as faking unemployment. The work at the factory was just an extra source of income to them. If someone complained against the owners, his own status, his records showing him as an unemployed person who got everything from the social security, could be pointed at to the DSS or concerned authorities. So the workers as well as the owners were thieves in collusion and no one could complain against the other.

My point was that, for example, when the owner threatened you that he would report you to the immigration, couldn't you say that he too would be charged with employing illegally?

No. It was never known that if an owner had hired an illegal worker, or a worker who also

claimed welfare benefits, and the matter was reported, that the owner was ever fined or jailed. Nobody thinks that there is some law of the government that says that owners are responsible for such things, or so did the workers explain, or it was said that if someone was caught working illegally, he will just be deported. This meant no harm to the owners. (Bradford).

Conflict Related to Religious Divisions; Hooliganism; Non-Work Conflict; Social Control on Personal Beliefs, Values and Activities

1...there used to work, in that factory, a Muslim girl, who used to sew. Ramaish [a Hindu manager] fell in love with this girl to such an extent that he converted to Islam and married her, but because of the affair between the two, the Muslim workers in the factory caused a lot of trouble. The majority of workers there were Muslims and therefore the conflict became serious. They refused to cooperate with the manager, refused to obey his orders and worked as they liked. For example if he wanted to stop the workers and offer them overtime work, when there was an emergency order to be completed and shipped, the workers wouldn't stay to work. The usual way of resentment was to disobey his orders. They [the Muslim workers] approached her [the girl's] family and put pressure on her to such an extent that she ran away from her parents and took up residence some where else. The major reason for my leaving that factory was that I had a confrontation with Ramaish, not on the issue of his love affair and the workers resentment, but because Ramaish got this false idea into his head that I was leading the workers against him, that I was inciting them against him. He got this idea because he saw that the workers used to come to me. He also felt bad at the bit of influence I had with the owners and he began playing tricks to downgrade me in their eyes. The tactics he used against me were religious background, religious divisions; he told the owners, who were Hindus like Ramaish, that I resented Ramaish marrying a Muslim girl because I was a Muslim and hence, I have joined the gang of Muslim workers who were creating trouble in the factory.

The owners were very religious and they resented Ramaish accepting Islam but when he told them that he loved the girl and wanted to marry her, and that his conversion to Islam was not genuine but an act put up only to marry the girl, they stopped bothering about him. Then they began supporting him and offended many of their Muslim workers to the extent that many left their jobs.

2-In the beginning they were three partners. Two Sikhs and one Hindu. But when the Khalistan movement was at its peak, the Sikhs developed some differences with the Hindu and the differences became so sharp that even the factory workers would get involved and it seemed that the factory would shut down. Then the Hindu's partnership was dissolved and his share was paid back... The Sikh factory workers began hating the owners for favoring a party that had led the attack on the Sikh independence movement. They said how could they join a party like the Congress when they are Sikhs and how could they entertain Hindus and be hospitable to them. The Sikh workers began whispering to each other. Even the supervisor would join in this gossip against the owners but never in front of them. Then the supervisor did a mischief. He got a worker drunk and planned to create a scene of a brawl between a Hindu and a Muslim. Prompted by the supervisor, this worker got drunk and he came to me and challenged me to fight with him. I thought how could he fight with me?; he was so weaker than me that I could have beaten him very easily... (Birmingham)

Inter-Personal Conflict Related to Sexual Harassment; Sexism due to Segregation of Sexes

1-I know of three cases, but the supervisor would trap only those girls who had just arrived in the country, particularly from India or Pakistan, who needed help. Later these girls would tell other girls and they all turned against him so that they went to the owners and demanded that this man should not be allowed to come to the 'women's section', and they demanded that instructions be given

that instead I should be sent to the girls. In fact I worked in the 'women's section'. They said if the owners need some urgent work to be done, or if they had any complains about women's work, then I should be told to come to them. Then the owners told him [the supervisor] not to go to the women and this led to another problem that he bore a grudge against me and he was angry why the women, senior and junior alike, supported me for supervision instead of him.

On one occasion, the supervisor said some filthy things to a girl. She brought along her husband and when the supervisor went out of the factory, he beat him black and blue so much that the owners had to go out of the factory to his rescue. They grabbed hold of the husband and handed him over to the police. (Birmingham).

2-(The following narration comes from a female interviewee. In the beginning, she asked me to turn the tape-recorder off, but when I did, she changed her mind and allowed me to turn it on).

In an Asian factory, when I was at work there... because these people expect a woman to be religious, an Asian woman, you know, because she is not supposed to know about marriage if she is single, and she is not supposed to know about - er - any other matters. So when women used to talk, they would talk, kind of, very low (voice) because they considered, even though I was 20 or 21 at that time, I was too young to know about such matters... I think one of the brothers [the owners], I think he liked me. Well, because his wife was there, and you see, when you work in a place like that, what you do is you pretend that you don't know about these things; you would when they make a, er, remark that is very 'suggestive', you kind of cut them very kind of - innocent, that either you don't have enough experience, you don't know what that remark is and you look at them. I think he did that about three or four times to see 'is she aware of what I am up to'. I knew what he meant but I kept my face straight and said "*bhai jee*" (dear brother), and that used to really get him. (*Miss O.G. seemed well aware of the cultural symbols of the sub-continent where the best way to deter a man from making advances would be to call him a brother; thus implying that his unwanted thoughts are too horrid in the cultural context where men are raised to protect their sisters to an utmost level; many a murders have been reported to have cause in just leering at the killer's sister. Note Miss O.G.'s awareness of the employer's frustration at being called a brother*) ...because, to be always on the safe side, you always say to every one, er, "*aunt jee*", "*uncle jee*", or "*bhai jee*" (*using the familial terms in order to evoke a normative concern in the other for the maintenance of respect and decor is a psychological way of normative control which is often used in the sub-continent in many contexts, also in contexts other than the one being discussed; e.g. a sales deal maybe sought by calling each other 'brother' if only to get the price changed*) depending on their age and everything, and I used to think, "put him off", and I kind of look at him as if saying, "oh, what did you say? what did you mean?". But it was very frightening, sometimes, because I was working after the other women had gone ...

We do some kind of ground work before we go to a factory to work; like asking people if they are decent enough to work for them? that they won't want to exploit? Because, what happens is that most, yes, 'cause, I'll tell you why because I used to work for - I was very desperate for money- and, what happened, this was absolutely terrible because the women there, er, I usually find that women are very good, er, cooperative any way to work with, right, but this woman [the wife of the employer] was very very hard to work with, you know - my fingers, sometimes I would catch them on the hanger that I used to put, right, and it used to tear the skin, and even though I worked as hard as I could, right, she was never ever happy. And, what happened, I think she knew that her husband - right - was one of those what we call, funny men... and he really was, er, er, always touching - everything like that, right, and she [the wife] used to be really nasty to me. Every time she came, right, and her husband was there, right, or he would come, right, like he would send his son away, "go and get that", and then he would kind of talk to me, look at me, some of the things like, "have you got a boy friend, and where are your parents"; I mean it was one barrage of personal information he was demanding out of me, regularly, about everything, right, and I don't understand, I think, she [the wife] knew that her husband was, kind of philanderer, to call him. But she would

get angry with me, and I just didn't understand. You know, I tried to tell this other woman, only one woman who used to come in, right, it's not very nice thing to say but she [the wife] was not exactly pretty, she had about two or three children. I think men would generally say pass it, you know what I mean, and I would ask why would he do that to me; it's like he was always talking to me, because it was just a coincidence that whenever she [the wife] came in, right, that man was talking to me. He was always talking to me and I couldn't, what could I do? Could I say, "shut your mouth please?", he was my boss. Do you understand? er, she never, I think, it was like doing the early stages, lets see how far we can go, right, and she [the wife] used to ring from the home, she used to absolutely run, "I am coming to the factory", she used to come, straight, I couldn't believe how fast she would come to the factory, right, I think she knew and it was terrible. Because what happened was that he was like touching my clothes and practically breathing in your face and you can't even say well you've got bad breath you know, and you can't say that to him that you are a small ugly man, right, you are old enough to be my father; but - it was terrifying. But , er, he had, he had the power. I mean she [the wife] used to harass me to do more work, he was harassing me like, emotionally. I mean, how much a person, how much can you take if some one is always like, bumping into you?. And it was terrible. I would never ever want to work there again. For a woman, its much harder because you see, I don't know, maybe, when you stand next to a man, or a man standing in front of you, you tend to feel very small. You feel as if, if he was to touch you, you couldn't fight back. If you feel that much, but then, having said that, maybe its because of the way I was brought up. (Miss O.G. told me later that she had oppressive fundamentalist parents). (Leicester).

3-There were between fifteen to twenty female machinists, three male cutters, four men who laid the clothes for cutting, four press men, five packers; I think there were about forty workers in all. The three brothers [the owners of the factory] were well behaved and decent and didn't take advantage of the female workers but their brother-in-law, whom they had brought over from Pakistan, did all that. He took advantage of his position in the family and in the factory and he began having affairs with the Asian girls in the over-locking section. The brothers and their sister, that is, his wife, knew about his flirtations but they usually turned a blind eye to this because any confrontation with him could lead to their sister getting divorced and thus stigmatized in the Asian community. Besides, the girls he had affairs with, never complained and therefore it seemed that they were willing partners; perhaps the girls allowed him to exploit because they were hard pressed financially, or they were afraid he could dismiss them from job, or there could be other reasons.

The brothers were only concerned with the work and were reserved in their attitude; they sorted out the wages but while they played soft, the brother-in-law was there to control and pressurize the workers. The supervision was all done by the brother-in-law and during supervision, he used to get his own purposes sorted out. (Manchester).

Racial Situation in Asian Businesses; Differences in Work Patterns and Life Styles; (Analysis given in pages 191 to 198)

(There were fewer statements about racial situation in Asian businesses than those about the same in native British businesses because the former predominantly employ from among Asians only)

I-[When] the White people said well I want a break he could have a break, when an Asian said can we have a break he couldn't. The White employees were treated much much better; they were at par with the manager who was there, an Asian manager, though he didn't get as much work out of the White employees as he got from the Asians; the Asians sometimes stayed till night. This was because they (Asian owners) are from the same culture, they know how we live, they come from the same background [and so] they know that the Asians are more easily - you can get more work out of the Asians (but they) won't give them (much) but they give it to the White employees and

another thing, they told the White employees not to tell it to the Asians that they were giving (more) so there was a secrecy in pay here. Nobody knew how much the other got. The White employees sometimes got together at the end and compare, I think, but when an Asian came (they were not supposed to tell) - and there was a lot of prejudice between the Whites and the Asians which I couldn't understand because the Whites didn't want to do that much work (more than eight hours a day) and there was already prejudice about being Black or Asian that they shouldn't come together because, people, and another factor, that people who were working in this factory were all the working class - there is a lot of prejudice in working class - prejudice against each other on racial grounds. Well, left the Asians because the Asians have nothing to gain from prejudice, they are here to make money, the Whites are because the Asians are going to take over their jobs which [resentment] is rightly so because in Huddersfield if you look anywhere there are Asian factories here and there scattered around and you won't see many White factories, right, the White employees, now I am talking about the old ones, who got out of school at 15 and started working, now when they were working, there were White employers, and there were a lot of them; if they [White workers] got out of one job, they could go to another. Now there being, they [White employers] normally used to employ Asians; now its the reverse, the Asians are employing the Whites which disillusioned them [the White workers] because when they were little they used to have a lot of White businesses and this gets them angry because, I mean, wherever you look you've got restaurants, you've got take-aways, taxis, you've even got the higher-up, which were all White dominated, well now it isn't, and the White people are getting angry.

Asians are employing Whites because Whites are more reliable. True that Asians are more hard working than the Whites but only to a certain extent. If the manager is there on the shop floor, and he looks over them, there is nothing like an Asian worker, but when he goes, they start talking like women and do what they find. And if they hear that the manager is back, they go on. The White worker is constantly with the work even if the manager is not there: They are very loyal to the firm. But another thing; if they [the Asian owners] do have Asians, they know that they can do it off-the-books, and that brings them more profit. (Huddersfield).

2-Two of them are Asian girls, one Muslim and one Sikh, and then one White boy, Ryan. They don't consider; we talk about White people considering Black, coloured people, not much, well, they treat him like, something out of - the dust bin. The employers don't want him to do anything like going to the safe, and (they assume he would) take some money out - he is not allowed to go in there. All he has to do is pack and stand at the shelf - and that's it. The other workers think like he is always, you know, he is very clever. I feel sorry for him - the poor thing. I'll never do that to a person. (Leicester).

Racial Situation in English/Western Businesses (Analysis given in pages 191 to 198)

1-The workforce [at Ford] was mixed; Africans, Asians, Whites. In my section, the majority of workers were immigrants. The total number of workers at that plant were between four and five hundred. There was no conflict; the relationship environment there was pleasant. There were just jokes about each other but even that too happened within one's group. People usually stuck to their own kind; for example during tea and lunch, the Asians sat together and chatted in their own language about their own affairs, the Carabians sat with their own kind and talked about their own affairs. Sometimes they also mixed and sat with other groups. Jokes were quite common and sometimes we used to refer to some characters in some movies and make fun of the Carabians who then called us names but only in fun; generally it was quite pleasant there and mostly we talked about work and compete with each other, "you have worked less, I have done more than you", etc. (Slough).

2-There was no conflict between the Asians and Blacks but the Blacks have somewhat lesser

understanding than others; they are a bit wild in their treatment of others. But that is all. I once did some favour at work to one of them but after that he used bad language with me and expected me to go on doing further work for him. I told him that I had done a favour to him but I would not go on doing his work all the time. At first he tried to bully me but when I didn't budge, he became alright. If they treat me bad, I do the same to them and then they settle down. Perhaps there is a value among some people that if you assert yourself and show that you are not weak, then you are accepted as equal, then they are friendly. Otherwise they want to press their colleagues. They don't care for a friendly environment but only for their money and if you treat them nice, they think you are soft and they want to encroach further to get more favours. If they give you a bad response, give them a bad response because if you are nice to them, they won't care. (Slough).

3-It did not cause any resentment among the English people that Asians were taking up their jobs because at that time they needed workforce. And a lot of Pakistanis came to textile industry which demanded a lot of people. And they carried on... In those days because the employment situation was fairly good, nobody took notice of such things if anyone was coloured or White or Black - whatever it was. Everybody carried on. (Manchester)

4-There were no tensions between the Whites and the Asians. But as far as the Whites (are concerned), a wonderful term once used by my manager, said to me; there was an Asian lady who had just joined in, and it was Saturday morning and he said, "we'll let the Asian invasion stay on the shop floor and we are going to the back and finish the back off". You know; clearly amused, small remarks like that but all ignorance, White ignorance, I call it, that only Asians torture Asians or only an Asian can be attracted to an Asian - you know, things like that, but I mean these are petty things [not conflict]. (Leicester).

5-I am sandwiched between the Whites. But I have got no problem, no problem working with them. I don't know if there is any resentment really because everywhere I have worked, you know, I mean, when I started at the age of sixteen, I was the only coloured apprentice. You get little problems but you get on with life, there is no point in making big deal of it, there might be someone calling you names but that happens everywhere. If you prove yourself that you are better, if you prove that you can not only manage yourself but others effectively then obviously people have respect for you. I don't know if there is racism; maybe if I was White I may have progressed a bit quicker but there is a 'maybe' in everything. Isn't it? Maybe if I was in my own country, I won't have got respect because over there you need, you know, you need personal contacts for a start. (Slough).

6-Well, after living in Britain, we start criticizing the system here like the local citizens do but there are many times more efficient systems here and in the offices they show you many courtesies in an impersonal way, which would not be extended to one in Indian offices unless they personally know you... I have really come to believe that people in poor countries exploit their fellow countrymen much more than people in rich countries do, and I think this is because of the need to have some security first before we could be charitable to others. (London).

7-It generally appears that there is not a prejudice here against any race but in some acts and in some events, one may feel such a thing and only a very sensitive man can feel it; it does not normally show up and it's manifestation is normally resisted. For example, when I was an operator, I worked for some time in the morning shift with all White workers, and then I worked in the evening shift. I used to keep a diary in which I noted my observations. I observed that the speed of machines during the morning shift was reasonable. As soon as the evening shift took over, the setters used to increase the speed of machines but our Asian workers seldom noticed the difference; only very few noticed this change of speed. I used to wonder why the moment I sit to work, the setter comes to the machine and adjusts it. I then began noting the speed on the counters of the machines when I would

enter the factory and then I noted the speed after the Asian workers had taken over. Twice, in front of the manager, I alluded to this increase, I didn't say it directly but I just said, "I wonder why the machines work faster when the Asians take over"; the manager explained it by saying, "that is because you Asians are among the best workers in the world". (Slough).

8-There were two persons, one was an Asian chap and one was an English chap. The Asian chap, he claimed that he was being racially harassed and also that he was being discriminated against. So, there was an inquiry about that. And the other chap was transferred from our department to another department - that was basically it ... according to the management, they were both not pulling their weight, not doing the work that was expected of them. The Asian had been on numerous occasions, according to the management, not doing his work, wasting time, wasting resources. But according to him, he said he had been threatened, bullied, harassed. The Asian chap gave his notice in. He resigned. Then he went to the personnel and said, you know, I have been racially harassed and everything, there was an inquiry, everybody was called in. Half of them would not say anything for fear of losing their jobs. One chap, er, before he went to see them, the personnel people, his manager said if you say something wrong, you know, your job might be on the line so he didn't say as much as he would have said otherwise, and some, they spoke the truth to an extent. I myself said, I was leaving any way, so I said to the people who did the interview, I'll speak my mind because I don't care, I am going any way, and I said, it wasn't a colour thing, because if it was a colour thing I would be in the same position as well, it was just that, you know, because they thought he wasn't working hard enough, they kept him messing around and, he had said that he had been threatened, pushed around, but there was no proof because it was basically the manager's word against the Worker's word, and basically the manager, he is looked upon as telling the truth while the workers are probably just complaining all the time. So then I said that I believe him, in the sense that he had been pushed to this position any way, so, but there was no result. The inquiry went on for two weeks. I spoke for about forty-five minutes. Just said yes, no, yes, no, and then what I found out and what I said to the personnel people, was that she, the personnel manager, was writing everything that I was saying, in an abbreviated form, and when she reread it, it didn't sound the same as what I had said; it was watered down, and I said to her, "you seem to be watering this down you know, you do not seem to be taking this seriously", she was surprised by what I said, you know, basically nobody had been bold to say this to the Department (Personnel), and I said, "if this was a manager complaining, you'd be quick marching to find out where the thumb was, but because he was just a worker, you don't give a *** basically", and so I said, "could you write down what I said", so she said, okay, and she had to, you know, it was my statement, so she said, fair enough. But nothing came out of it. During the last year there been three situations of dispute but these are classed as minor incidents. There maybe (more) but nobody was brave enough or out-spoken to say something about it. The only complaint I had was once mismanagement of my wages. Apart from that I had no conflicts or confrontations with the management at all. (Leicester).

9-I was in-charge of White workers. The workers there had no resentment at all. It was the assistant manager, you see, who didn't like me; it was a personal affair. For some reason he had a notion that a Black man, or a coloured person should not be in a position of management or - because I stood a chance of getting further beyond, and there, I was dismissed. A few months later I received a call and I was offered a position of a training officer by Courtauld in the Head Office. I went back and I was told about the situation that "we know what happened to you before and if we had borne that in our minds we won't have offered you the job. We know, we sympathize with you but lets forget the past and start again". As a training officer I did my functions properly, build my trust but somehow, after a few months, I realized that whenever a vacancy came up, for a job as a group training officer who is in-charge of training of a few mills, instead of offering me the job, they recruited somebody from outside. They would not offer me the job of a group training officer but kept me as a training officer in the Personnel Office. When my divisional manager died, I was the

senior most person with higher qualifications, practical and theoretical, I was a group training officer, he was a group training manager, I was the next person in line for promotion. I was not given the job.... [but] somebody who had no knowledge about the textile industry.

I don't think that the English saw me as culturally incompatible. They knew I was a Muslim, I stick to my views, I was unbending in that respect that whenever we had our annual parties I would take my wife with me but we never danced, we never took wine, we ate exactly what suited us. We would say we would come if you provide us with our meals and they were cooperative in that.

Have you ever seen a person who mixed with them entirely, ate pork, drank and danced, and adopted all their habits, was there a greater chance of him being promoted?

Tony was promoted. He was like that. He was a Black Indian Christian but he never rose above the post of training officer. However, he was working on a machine before that.

10-For one year I worked as a machine operator after which a vacancy arose in the Maintenance Department. I applied for this vacancy. There was a senior worker in the Maintenance and his son also worked in the factory as machine operator. When I went for the interview, the manager and the supervisor of the Maintenance Department were there. The supervisor asked me some questions which I thought were irrelevant; for example he asked, "how would you feel working with all White colleagues?"; this he asked because the maintenance staff was all White. I said, "there are people of many races working in this factory, I don't understand why there should be a special racial consideration for the Maintenance Department". Perhaps he had in mind that Asians could only be machine operators. I further added, "I am living in a country of White majority, the staff in this factory are predominantly White, if I have no objection to living in a White country, why should I feel awkward working with all White people. I have been going along well with all kind of people and I have no qualms about working with all Whites". There was a long list of attributes that they wanted in the person to be taken for the said vacancy and this included that the candidate should have some O levels etc. Eventually they refused me the job and gave me a letter which did not mention any reasons for refusal. The one who got the job was the son of that senior worker whom I have mentioned earlier. When I got the letter of regret without reasons, I just forgot about it and didn't go to ask for the reasons of refusal. Perhaps the supervisor, who had asked me critical and irrelevant questions, felt some guilt or something and he came to me of his own accord; I hadn't complained or anything, and he began explaining that the reason they took that man was that they wanted to train a young apprentice with a view to sending him to college for further education in mechanics. I said I didn't mind though I felt bad at not being given the opportunity. After some months, the same vacancy arose again because the man they had taken for the job instead of me was not regularly coming in and was therefore sacked. When the vacancy was advertised, I didn't apply for some reasons. This time they took in a brother of the maintenance supervisor. Anyway, during the time when I was refused that post in the Maintenance Section, another vacancy arose in the Inspection Department. This vacancy had arisen from the resignation of a Pakistani worker, the only one Pakistani working in the Inspection Department who had been facing some problems about which there was a general impression among the Pakistani workers that the problems arose from his being coloured. When this Pakistani worker resigned, there were rumours that he had met with racial prejudice but no one knew the truth. People used to say that, "he got so fed up that he had to resign". When this vacancy arose, it was advertised on the factory notice board. I applied for this job though the requirements and person specifications for this post, as mentioned in the advertisement, were quite discouraging, for example, so and so number of O levels - high sounding phraseology - good command of English language and some very high standards of experience which showed that they wanted to discourage Asian applicants. But I was a man there who considered himself well educated compared to an average White worker and was trying my best to get into a better position. I was undaunted by the high sounding phrases and eventually I applied for the said post. There were about twelve candidates, including some very senior operators, at least more senior than I was, but only two were short listed; I and a White woman called Maria. Now Our Production Department consists of

two shops; one is the 'Mould Shop' and the other is called 'Secondary Operations' where we do the sealing and packing and other things. Among the two people short-listed, I was an operator at the Mould Shop, and Maria, the other candidate, was an operator in the Secondary Operations. Now, when workers are taken in as operators, they are told that the operators at the Mould Shop are the 'first inspectors', because, they have to check their product first and then send it to the 'Secondary Operations' and any faults must be discovered first by the operator himself; the operator at the Mould Shop is supposed to mark and rectify the faults before sending the product to the Secondary Operations, or at least, mark the faulty products for recycling. The operator at the Secondary Operations has only to take out the marked faulty products and pack and seal the rest. I believed that because I was a Mould Shop operator while Maria was at the Secondary Operations, I was more suitable for the post of an inspector than her. But Maria had joined the factory a few months earlier than I had and was therefore considered senior to me in terms of length of service; she also had done some O levels and worked as a nurse as well. But then Maria had never worked in the Mould Shop; she had always been in the Secondary Operations, and I believed that I was more educated than she was because I had a B.A., though from Pakistan and that I had the relevant experience of being the 'first inspector'; her experience at the Secondary Operations was not that relevant. However, after conducting the interviews, the management offered the job to Maria. After giving the job to Maria, the personnel manager, the manager for Quality Assurance, and the supervisor of the Inspection, without any complaint on my part, without any protest or initiative from my side, called me into the office and instead of giving me a formal letter of refusal, said to me, "we are sorry that at this time we have not given you this job; the reasons are that Maria is senior to you in length of service". I said, "I have no objection to that though I feel that I have been evaluated with less than fairness; first, I had more education than you demanded, secondly, my relevant experience is more than that of Maria; she has worked in the Secondary Operations while I have been in the Mould Shop, and I was always told that the operators in the Mould Shop are the first hand inspectors. Even then, now that you have decided to give the job to Maria, I will not protest". Perhaps they felt that I had been treated with some injustice and therefore the manager of Quality Assurance said, "I have an idea, we would be having the post of a back-up inspector soon, we would like to offer you the post of a part-time back-up inspector and we would give you training for this post; for the time you would work in the Inspection, you would be paid in accordance with the wage rates of an inspector but on all other occasions you would continue to work in your present position and we would keep calling you to work as an inspector when one of our regular inspectors would be on leave; in addition to this, when we would have a full-time vacancy, we would give you priority in consideration for the post". I accepted the offer and worked as a back-up inspector for an year and a half. I was given training for a quality inspector and then I began working as back-up inspector in addition to my work as machine operator. Then I got myself transferred to a night shift job in the Secondary Operations Department. I worked two months there. Then an inspector, a White women, was sacked on charges of gross misconduct and the vacancy arose at the post where she worked. I had been promised that as soon as a vacancy of full-time inspector arose, I would be given first preference and therefore I applied for it. An assistant manager said to me that the vacancy of inspector would not be automatically given to me but would be advertised on the notice board. At this I protested a lot because I had believed that this job of inspector was my long due right. We exchanged hot words and arguments. I said, "why do you want to advertise this post when you already have a fully trained back-up inspector who was promised that he would be given priority for this post - why then advertise?". He said that it was a normal procedure at the factory that all vacancies should be advertised. I quoted several examples of vacancies that had arisen before and given to people without advertisement. I said that if I was given this job without advertisement, it won't be considered favouritism because I had been promised earlier that I was being trained with a view to be taken in as full-time inspector. He said, "even if we give this job to you, we must advertise it". The job was advertised and nine people, including Whites, Blacks, Asians, applied for the post. These people knew that the job was my due and they kept saying to me that they knew the job was my due but they had

applied for it only because it had been advertised. Interviews were held and eventually, I was offered the job. Now I have been working as a quality inspector for the last two years.

We had a female inspector with whom I once had a conflict and I wrote a letter of protest to the management about it. She had often been rude with the operators and all including her supervisor and manager knew that she had an insulting tongue. It was said that she had, in the past, been a reason for getting two Asian operators sacked because she had presented her side of the story well enough but the Asian workers had been unable to defend themselves against the charges she levelled against them and certain facts remained unproven. On one occasion, an operator was standing by the clock-in/clock-out machine. She was standing in front of him in the queue. This worker, only in fun, went ahead and said that he would clock-out first; she retorted seriously by using the F-word and a racist invective. The operator in turn did something not mentionable. She complained to the management and the operator was given a written warning. The incident did not occur in my presence. I didn't know what happened because I was at the end of the queue; what I am telling you is what I heard from other operators who were nearby. The operator couldn't explain well and he took an interpreter with him when the inquiry was held. There had been two similar incidents involving her in the past and two operators had been sacked. People used to talk about them but I don't remember them exactly. She also had a conflict with an Asian material handler who was a kind of chatter box and used to make jokes with all people. All knew that it was his habit to joke around and so no one bothered. But one day when he joked about something with her, she threw a bundle of tie wraps, which she was holding in her hand at that time, right into his face. She then ran to the shop floor where there were many people working so that she should have witnesses to whatever happened later; the man ran after her and slapped in her face in front of all the workers. The man was so angry that he slapped her again. The supervisor on the shop floor saw all this and when the case was sent to the Personnel, he gave his testimony that he had seen the man hitting her. The man was suspended from job and sent home. But then, another material handler, an Asian, came forward; he had been working in a corner and had seen her hitting him with the tie wraps first. He gave his testimony that she had hit him first, and so she too was suspended until further instructions. The second day, there was a meeting among the personnel officers and both, the Asian man and the White woman, were sacked on charges of gross misconduct. (Amersham).

11-The following statement was discounted on account of self-contradiction and for reasons given in p. 198, footnote 13:

Mostly they pressed the Asian workers too hard - the English workers never stayed in the factory because they could not work that hard. They promoted the English and looked after them well; if they did something wrong it was ignored but if we made mistakes, we were given strong warnings. An English man worked with me. He was usually absent from his work in the beginning. I complained that because of his frequent absence, I have to do his work as well and therefore, either he or I should be transferred to some other department. But no one paid attention to my complaint because I was an Asian while he was White. When I requested several times, they finally transferred me to another department. I once got a very good place in the factory; it was a very good task with good money and I considered myself lucky but later on, an English superintendent transferred me to another department and appointed an English man, who had recently joined the factory, in my place. When I asked the superintendent why he had transferred me, he said that he had the authority to transfer and I had no rights to stay at one place. I think I should not have been transferred.

Any other incidents to show that they were unfair to Asians?

No other such event took place.

Are there only these two incidents that made you unhappy?

Yes, the two incidents. (Slough).

Control Attitudes in English Firms; Impersonal Means of Control; Task-Related Control; No Non-Work or Personal Control; Consideration for Others' Cultures, Values, Beliefs

1-There was a system of control. Each noted one's production on sheets at the close of the shift. Registers were kept. There was a Quality Control Department and inspectors used to come for checking the quality of product.... there was a certain discipline. There was one foreman to whom we were responsible. Not every manager would come down to pique us. There were clearly defined jobs and responsibilities that were easy to follow. (Oldham).

2-The method of control there was simply that whatever we sold was there on the registers, recorded, and that determined how much we had been successful. (Manchester).

3-Personal watching of the subordinates does not play a role in our control procedures. In fact we have no regular control system because it is never the same; one day a forklift may break down, the next day we might get a problem with a lorry outside. Next day, the temperature of the warehouse might be rising. Next day the system computer maybe malfunctioning or a conveyer break-down; its always different, everyday it is different; its never the same. You can't say, "I am watching you fixing this truck"; there is no predictability. Obviously, once you get better and better, you can do the job quicker, it is like this, if, while I am working and the system is always running, and it hardly stops, then I must be doing something right. If the system stops, then I must not be doing something right. (Slough).

4-Regarding control on work, they used to give us a work sheet which was a list of jobs or tasks that a worker had to do each day. The quality of work was checked personally by the supervisor and the owners; if they were not satisfied, they would instruct you to do it in some other way. I had no complains there. (Brentford).

5-The control on my work was only through the phone calls and there was a gap of one hour between two phone calls. There were certain points in that huge building where, after fixed intervals, we had to go and check, patrol the ground area to see if there was an intruder there, see there was no power failure, take more observations in wind and stormy conditions; if there is a work going on in the building, then we had to see that it did not interfere with the security installations. There was a clock there and a key with a certain number for every check point and we had to key in all the points. When we would apply the key, a print came on which told that at a certain time the key was applied. So they controlled without anyone watching what we did. In the morning they would get the details of the times at which all the points had been checked. (Slough).

6-Our work was checked by the seniors by personal observation made by the next person in-charge of you, but generally, like myself, or another one or two people of my department, we worked our way up, worked our way up in the sense that, you know, we were trusted that we could work ourselves so we were in-charge of our department and we handled it the way we thought was best; so basically, we became the managers in that sense. When a manager was away on a whole day, we took his jobs up. We were controlling our work ourselves. The management found out that we did our work properly just by looking at the shop floor. If it looked tidy, we were okay. If there were any problems, we were told. So they weren't observing personally but observing the situation. We had a new system brought in; then everything was monitored; our dress codes, we were marked on, performance was noted. When you first start your job you were on temporary parole, what they said, for four weeks your performance was noted and then management decided to keep you on job or not so that's the only thing so, otherwise you never get - you got compliments now and then for what you have done that everything is okay, you know, carry on. They were strict in that if you did your job the way you were told, then you are okay. (Leicester).

7-This too was owned by the English. They were good people. They made us work hard but they did not oppress us. We could take rest for half an hour to an hour between work, we could go to the toilets and we could wash or comb hair, or take tea time, but so long as we produced a certain amount of goods they didn't bother about what we did in spare time. We worked eight hours a day, we could also work ten hours, but it was flexible to suit our convenience; we could work less on one day and make up for it the next day. I was happy there but they too moved the factory elsewhere. (Windsor).

8-I have worked for a number of White employers. I have worked in four shops. All owned by Whites. Work experience - summer jobs, things like that. There is a difference between an Asian employer and a White employer; They [the White employers] give you good pay, they let you have proper breaks, and they let you, they don't supervise you; in fact you are your own supervisor; at the end of the day they go with stuff like, I was working in a book shop and how much books I did repair in and they say well, you know actually you do more, and you need keep count of the numbers that you are doing. (Huddersfield).

9-I had a responsibility for certain machines that I had to make sure that those machines were maintained and were running and that the operators working on those machines came on time; if they didn't, I had to report to the Cadre. Actually you are a 'general dog's body', responsible for a lot of things, ... The position and authority remains with the manager and the Cadre. You are simply a Cadre's arm. To go around and if he has to tell the workers something - nasty things - then Cadre can't go. He sends you there and asks you to tell them off... there was a resentment among the English workers that there is a Paki telling them what to do and what not to do. But the job was such that if the machines kept on working and everything went going then nobody bothered about other things. There were no physical conflicts but a lot of verbal conflicts. But generally there was tolerance, because in the textile industry, if a person is working on one machine, he is working on the machine on his own. He is not concerned or connected to anybody else. The work does not depend on somebody else. So if you put him on one machine, as long as he keeps running that machine, looks after it, and the production is okay, no body is bothered. (Manchester).

10-I would like to see better relations between management and workers. Each manager is only interested in reaching his target. Also they have - basically, they want to be looking good in their senior manager's eyes; so his department is okay, you know, he's given the okay - that's the main reason. This is not always troublesome to the staff but depending on which manager you have, it can be a big problem. I have no complaints about the attitude of my supervisor. If you know how to handle your supervisor, or anybody in authority, you just be nice, you do your work - thing I believed in was, you do your work regardless of anybody else, you do what you have been told to do, there is no complaints that could be made against you. I have no problems with the management. Not myself. No. About attitudes, I never had a chance, never had a reason to make complaints. But one manager in particular, all he was interested in was to be the number one, he was like that, there was an incident in the cafeteria, some workers, gave them two minutes to have a break, you know, and he was very, I mean its gone to his head basically to be the power, be the manager, you know, lucky I had no confrontation with him but the people who had, hadn't had the guts to basically, go to the Personnel and complain; nobody had made any complain against him. Two of my friends, not in my department but another department who had been sent to have their break, morning, it was two minutes to ten o' clock, this manager, he is the Food-Hall manager, he had just finished his breakfast and he was on his way down and as he bumped into them, the two workers, he said to them, "ten o' clock, on the shop floor", and they looked at him, looked at their watches and said okay. Basically, they had only two minutes break, they didn't say to him that they had just been sent up and the next thing is the command from you. They said okay. And I asked them, "are you going to go downstairs?" and they said, "yes, its not worth a hassle". If it was somebody like me, I would have

said, "I am entitled to a fifteen minute break", and if not, you know, if he had made fuss, I would have gone to the Personnel and made a complaint. About the attitude of seniors/management, I'll give you an example. My first day on the job, I was waiting to be received by my manager. I was waiting in the hall. I didn't even know what provisions (I was to handle) were at first and then I found out it was meats. So I went to see the personnel manager and I said, "is it possible to get - 'cause it's against my religion to handle meat", and she said there is nothing, and there my manager - the manager - walked in at the same time, and he overheard this conversation, and she (the personnel manager) said we will see what we can do about it but just try it out and he (the provisions manager) goes to me, "do you want the job?", I said, "yes", goes, "we have got the job, go over there, if not, tell us now we get you out - hop out if you don't want it", I says, "I want the job, I want the job, yeah, all right", and I stuck with it but he, you have to watch out for this guy, you really have to, he was a Polish chap. And I says yes and he says, well go on with it, and I say, okay fair enough: I understand that he has a job, you know, business to run and he does not want anyone messing around, could be understandable. But if you can't handle meat you can still work in another department. I didn't work in the meats though, they put me to frozen foods, so it did work in a sense.

[One problem was] different implementation of rules. Every so often we had some new rule in and the old rules were disregarded. Like we had a period when we never had a food manager, so we had temporary people coming in each with his own system of rules. One would say, once empty boxes have been used, they should be immediately discarded, then someone would say, just leave them in the back, someone would say, bring them down. We had at one period because there was nobody to fill a vacancy; we had different people acting fresh-food managers as they say. So they all had a different rule system but usually you know what is expected and you know what is not expected, so you don't bother what is not expected and you are not always to comply to the rules any way so, you know, like I said, if you can reach this position where the management can leave you on your own and they are not on your back and they basically expect that you know what you are doing, you are on your self, then you are not questioned as much, you are careful. (Leicester).

11-Personal authority was not exercised. There was no non-work control.

12-We were allowed to pray. We could keep fast. (Oldham).

13-At Courtauld ... culture was not a barrier as such. When Ramadan came or the Eid came, I fought for my people that they should be given "taraveh" (long prayers during the month of Ramadan) time. There was a lot of resentment from the management that why were they given time (note that the taraveh prayers during the whole month of Ramadan take more than an hour each day and as such should be seen a big concession on religious grounds. Even in Pakistan, workers are not allowed free taraveh time during work, particularly in private enterprise. I know many Christian workers were not allowed a day's leave on Christmas). Finally they were given the time and paid for it. The taraveh time changes. When it was deep winter they used to come at ten at night and go straight for taraveh. Within an hour they would finish and start working. That one hour was working time. But the problem (among the Muslim sects) was always for the Eid time because the mullahs could not agree amongst themselves when the Eid should be from among three days (because the Muslims follow the lunar calendar for their religious festivities or prayers, the days do not fall on fixed dates in the Gregorian calendar and hence there is all the room for sectarian disagreement on which dates to celebrate Eid). This was the most embarrassing situation for me, what do I tell the management as to when Eid would be?, because I had become the spokesman. Different Muslim factions celebrate Eid on different days. Whose spokesman should I be? One faction or the other one. So whatever I did, the people of the other factions would say, he is a dictator, so I was in a difficult position. Half of them would agree (on which day to celebrate Eid) and those who didn't agree would come to work. (Manchester).

Speed and Level of Difficulty at Work in the English Firms (Analysis on page 159)

1-The union had agreed with the management on a maximum limit of 160, and told us that 130 was acceptable limit. But many could make 140 or 150. Some made as less as 120 and were tolerated. (Oldham)

2-The speed of work was checked in this manner; if a worker in the day shift could prepare 700 moulds, then I was supposed to make at least that much; in other words there was an average production target. If I made ten or twenty less, they won't bother but if there was less production than that, we had to explain to the management what were the reasons for less production such as machine break down or something. If you made 750 or 800, it was deemed good. (Slough).

3-The machines were automatic and we had to ... feed stacks to the machine after regular intervals ... the product would come out and was packed in boxes automatically. We had to give plastic bags to the machines and a robot like arm would put a plastic spoon in each bag. It was an easy job but had a lot of responsibility to see that for example, every bag had a spoon - somebody could complain that there was no spoon in his pack. Our speed of work was determined by speed of the machine and it was very high, in eight hours, one machine would made around 4000 boxes... *(The interviewee contradicted himself in the subsequent passage by saying that the speed was all right)*. It was all right because we got time - it was easy to control the work because the machine was automatic and all we had to do was to see that the packing was being done properly - that it was not wrongly packed - that the boxes were going in the right way, and that the weight in each pack was of the right amount. (Slough)

4-There was a "bonus system" to regulate the speed of work; if you haven't given the specified amount of production within the specified period, they would ask why, or give you a warning. We used to get a bonus if we produced the given amount within the given time. (Slough).

5-You are monitored by if your manager is standing there, you work, as soon as your manager disappears on a side, you know, you don't work that hard, but the manager is not always there. Main complaint was that they were asking for continuous work; work, work, work, work. Basically that was it; you were being watched constantly. If you weren't watched by your own manager, you were watched by the equivalent of a floor manager or the equivalent of a fresh food manager who kept eye on everybody who was everywhere. I don't know if he was a fresh food manager, but he was a manager and he kept an eye on you. So, once or twice I was told for being slack and my manager was away, supervisor was there, and she said to me how come this hasn't been put away; you give them one cage of goods to put out and because it was ice cream, they would melt and the fresh food manager went over to the supervisor, had a word, came over to me and she said, "why haven't you put this away?", I said I was doing it. She said, "you have been here half an hour". I said I've been here only fifteen minutes and she said, "just get on with it". I said, "I am doing it as fast as I can", she went off. That was it but they expect a lot from you, you know, this one, this one, this one. To an extent but not continuous. They were overdoing it. Robotic. It came to a point, Zahid worked there (Wines and Spirits Department) and he witnessed surprising things. There were the pre-Christmas results for that Department's performance; only one person in that department works all the time, yeah, very large department, the manager, again - Mr. Putnik - came on a tour, the lady supervisor or acting supervisor what she was, he says "do you know that since such and such date, sales in this department have fallen", she says, "no", he says, "do you know that this is all your fault that we are making this money (less)". Zahid was just watching this and she goes, "well you can't blame me, I only work here, I don't, you know, stimulate the business here by any sense", and he, you know, he, there and then, blamed her for lack of sales. Zahid, it happened with him, he was working, and [the manager] says to Zahid, "work faster", and Zahid said, "yes", "work faster", and

I think Zahid probably under his breath told him to *** off or something like that I am not sure, any way, so, but then he came around and he says, "go to this, go to that, go to this"; Zahid gave his notice there and then. He went off and he says I am not working for you. And they said to him, can you please come in tomorrow, this is Christmas season, we need staff. And Zahid says, "if I am treated like **** I don't know why I should come in and he said can you please send me the money I am due, thank you very much but I am not working for you any longer. (Leicester).

6-I did not find any differences there than the Asian ones. They were always around you and you were always working... they were also very demanding. By the time I had finished at eight or nine, it was hell, because what they would do, they made ski-pants, ski-tops and they would lay these huge garments out and I had to fold them and pack them and put the sizes on them and also, you know, those labels that go inside, that very sophisticated labels, and the price, everything that goes in, had a machine to put it in, and, it was just so hard but because they were so experienced they could put the labels on, they could fold them up, put them in bags and throw them in boxes, they seemed to think oh yes this is so easy. I mean, because they also gave work out because it was a very good factory any way, you see, they never employed anyone who, unlike the other (Asian) factories, couldn't work on a machine and like that, there were experienced workers. I think if I had stayed there long enough I would have been as experienced as them.. it is the quickness of the hand you know and that comes with experience (in time). (Leicester).

7-At this sixth job, the management and the supervision were English. There was no union there. I don't remember any incidents of conflict but the owner there was very strict and would fire a worker immediately for minor negligence. If you were slow, you got fired on spot. Many times, I saw a worker beginning work at 7 in the morning and found that he was not there at 12 in the noon because he had been fired or because they could not work as fast as they wanted them to do. We didn't have complaints but even if we had they were not of the listening type. (Luton).

Better Wages and Working Conditions in English Factories: No Non-Work Control and Conflict

1-I think people are happy with the wages, they pay wages which are quite well but I think they expected more, but when they found out that they would go down hill, the company as a whole, then they won't [demand]. Overtime depends on the hours you do. Sundays is double time. Anything after eight o' clock is time and half. Anything before that is a time and a fifth. (Leicester).

2-They made us work hard but they paid good wages. This was 7 years ago but we made between £100 and £130 a week. (Windsor).

3-It all depends on the owners. Some English too pay less but they are honest in their deals in that they pay the exact wages as per the deal and don't deduct unfairly. (Oldham).

4-There was no conflict, no union. People had been working there for long periods of time and getting proper pay rise every year. (Slough).

5-The Asian workers at Courtauld behaved better than they do in our Asian factory because they had good wages and good environment. Hours passed quicker than they pass now. They had showers where all could wash after the work. We were friendlier to each other. Good working environment made us work better, and treat each other respectfully. (Manchester).

6-I have worked for eleven years with three English-owned factories. They calculated our wages correct to pennies. They properly deducted tax and national insurance. (Huddersfield).

7-Issues of conflicts usually, I would say, like people not willing to do what you ask them to do. There are no non-work conflicts. They don't really mix them with outside work, you know, with the English, they have a different way of living to us. (Slough).

8-I was a shop steward ... I used to listen to the problems of new entrants and interpret them to the management. Those were good times. (Windsor).

9-I never made any complaints. Once you've worked in an environment you know who does what and who is like what and there is so much to wince all the time about doing the work; why isn't he doing it and why am I doing it but then you just sit on it, basically. That's about it. The fellow workers were generally okay. We generally shared the same views; management are pain in the *** and that was it, basically, you know. In the eyes of the management you can easily be a pest. I never came into conflict with a fellow worker or senior or another at the workplace. The attitude of fellow workers was very easy going. I mean you always get one who is only concerned about the work and the rest don't give a damn. And one other thing, if you are new, they start to take advantage of that and they say, "oh you gona do this and you gona do that, you do this", but basically if you just sit on it, then they know he is okay. (Leicester).

10-I had a good fortune of getting a good job in a well paying firm where I was in the day shift where, for only forty hours a week work, I got the same amount as I was getting in my previous job (£130) for sixty hours a week work. This firm too was English owned and they ... also had a workers' pension scheme, life insurance scheme and sick pay scheme. There were some other facilities as well such as five week paid holiday in an year. The overtime was time and half for Saturdays and double for Sundays but we normally worked only five days. The workers were almost all Asians. The Whites were only in higher ranks such as setters, the foremen and above. (Slough).

11-The workers union at Ford was comparatively a strong union and if we had any problems we used to take it to the shop steward and to the union. Union membership was compulsory. We had some minor conflicts with the management about pay rises but there was never a strike. I don't know how the collective bargaining process took place because such negotiations were conducted between top union officials and the management but I did attend many union meetings where issues and problems were discussed; the issues usually discussed were related to pay rise or working conditions but such issues arose rarely - probably once an year. About working conditions, there were hardly any significant issues but minor things about adjustments at the assembly line which were solved without much trouble. There was neither a major conflict nor a big issue there. (Slough)

12-There was no dispute that I could recall, about pay rise or other issues; the management used to give pay rise itself to workers who worked harder. The owner used to visit after a week or two, observe the work, and increase the wages of good workers. There was no opportunity to demand a pay rise; it was all on his discretion. There was no union. (Brentford).

Tensions among Asian Workers in a British-American Firm; Team Leadership as a 'Status Symbol'; Intrigues; Fear of Management; Inaptitude for Collective Action (Analysis given on page 169)

The following narration comes from a quality control inspector in an American industry with a multi-cultural workforce, operating in Britain. As is usual in companies employing Asian and White workers, the White workers worked in the morning shift and the Asians worked in the night shift. The events described below took place among Asian workers who worked in the night shift:

There was a rota system among operators on the shop floor whereby, at one time, one or two

operators would not operate the machines but do auxiliary tasks such as putting boxes here and there, fixing tags and so on, which were easy tasks compared to operating the machines. The rota system enabled the operators to take turns in doing the easy tasks once a week, which enabled them to relax once a week, otherwise it would be very boring and dull to do the monotonous, hard and fast job of operating the machine all week long.

When a new English production manager took charge, he began doing things in a different way. To bring in changes in the work organization, he created a new job title among the machine operators; he selected team leaders from among the operators so that for every four machines, he created one team leader who was not to operate a machine but do all the easy tasks so that often he would do almost nothing; at times he would just stand smoking and watching the hard pressed operators. On top of that, because the new selected ones were team leaders, they were given more wages than the operators. Under the previous rota system, all operators used to get a chance of doing relatively easy tasks once a week but under the new system of having team leaders, all easy tasks plus more wages were handed over to the latter, and the once-a-week opportunity to do easier work was taken away from the operators. This system of team leaders brought no benefits to work organization but added an idle rank in the hierarchy among the workers which was previously like this; from the bottom, first there were the machine operators, then the setters, then the supervisors. Now in between the operators and the setters, the new manager placed this additional rank of team leaders unnecessarily, another barrier, another watch dog who could do the dirty job of pressing upon the operators so that the operators got one level more separated from the supervisor and, in addition to the scolding from the supervisor, they had to listen to the exhortations from the team leaders as well, "your production is less, you are not concentrating on the job" etc. etc; things that previously the supervisor used to say, now the team leaders would say as well. It caused hurt and resentment among the operators especially because the one-day relaxation of doing the easier tasks had been snatched away from them and given permanently and for all-the-week to the team leaders. The workers used to say, "what is the task of these team leaders?, they were operators like us, we shared the hard work and we shared a day of easier work, what are they doing now?, they are doing almost nothing and still they get more wages than we do". A lot of complaints and conflicts emerged because of the team leaders who had got the privilege of more pay for less work and were keen to retain their newly won status. Some workers said that the management had created this new system in order that workers should forget their major issues and begin quarrelling among themselves at the lower level. The major issues the workers had, stayed where they were, and new issues sprang up which were these, "the team leader has said this, the team leader has said that, the team leader has done this, the team leader has done that". The operators no longer had direct conflicts with the supervisor but they began considering the supervisor their patron and went to him for complaining against the team leaders.

Our major issues were issues such as not getting a break at the right time, or that one wanted to go to the toilet but no one came to take his place and so he had to continue work in discomfort - now our machines are automatic machines and you cannot stop them, they have to carry on working, no operator can leave his station unless someone else takes his place. In this context, where the work is very hard, routine and continuous, going to the toilet is a big relaxation because it enables one to straighten his back and relax for four or five minutes. There was another issue that the Asian workers wanted a permanent holiday in Ramadan. The management had allowed us one holiday on the Eid day but we had to work an extra day to make up for this holiday. But it was not reasonable to ask the management to close the factory for a day, or add one leave for us especially because the Eid day depends upon the lunar calendar and therefore has no fixed date. Among other issues was one that when the machines are malfunctioning, the setters do not come exactly when called and sometimes they delay for as long as two hours and it is frustrating to run a malfunctioning machine and then get blamed for low or faulty production. The operators get the blame when basically it is the setter's negligence in adjusting the machine. Other major issues were related to the over-time; there was another rota system under which all operators got overtime on their turn; sometimes the rota system was ignored and those who couldn't get overtime resented the loss of overtime wages.

The team leaders were getting 50p an hour more than a machine operator though their work was less than the operators'; on top of that, they began getting the rota overtime that was the due only of the operators; now this was unfair because they in fact were not operators. They were team leaders and if one team leader was on leave and another worked overtime at his place, no one would have objected. But when the overtime is available on a machine, only a machine operator should get it. When a team leader was given overtime to work on a machine, that meant taking due overtime work from a machine operator and the operators resented it. The team leaders felt that they were a high status rank, that they were different from the operators, and so they ignored the requests of the workers, they won't do a thing for them, and won't give them a break when they deserved, won't relieve them at the proper time when they rang the bell for going to the toilet. The operators now forgot the major issues and bickered about toilet breaks and tea breaks. They were entangled in the unfair treatment from the team leaders so that petty squabbles went on. We had a mutual understanding among the team leaders and machine operators that in between the two tea breaks, they would relieve us, for five minutes, to go to the toilets; there was no rule or regulation about such arrangement but we had agreed upon it for our convenience. The operators used to cooperate in that even if they needed to go to the toilet, they would wait for the toilet break and did not call the team leaders every now and then. Now, when the resentment about the unnecessary creation of a team leader position among the operators was at its peak, and the former used to exchange hot words with the latter, the team leaders decided to show their authority over the operators by refusing to allow them the toilet breaks. They said there would be no fixed toilet breaks but the operators should call us to replace them when they want to go to the toilets. When this issue sprang up, the operators resented the decision of the team leaders not to allow them fixed toilet breaks. They could not understand why this routine was changed. But none had the courage to challenge the team leaders and so they came to me, talked about it along with other issues, and asked me to talk to the management.

First, I talked with the supervisor about the issue of the toilet breaks. He said there was no such rule that we should be given a toilet break at a fixed interval. I said that convenience should be the guiding force behind such issues; it was not necessary to write regulations for everything. And besides, the system of toilet breaks was operating very well and everyone was happy with it, why should the team leaders suddenly decide to abolish it? The supervisor said that there was no way that we could have the arrangement back and that if one wants to go to the toilet, he should ring the bell for the team leader to come and take his place. He refused on account that once such an arrangement gets going, it would become a rule which could not be changed. I then talked to the manager and explained all our problems to him. I said to him that some problems were related to the setters, some to the supervisors, and some to the team leaders, and won't it be appropriate if he called in a meeting of all these people, or call representatives of operators, team leaders, setters, and supervisors. The manager called in the meeting and I was asked to represent all the operators. The supervisor was also there. Two men represented the team leaders and two represented the setters. I narrated all the problems, toilet breaks, setters not responding to the operators when called for adjusting the machines, undue castigation such as criticizing the operators for not properly handling the machines; this said criticism had a psychological effect on the operators in that they felt afraid and were reluctant to ring the bell to call the setters. The operators were getting a rough deal from all sides; the inspection personnel would reproach them for not ringing the bell in case of machine troubles, the setters would chastise them for 'undue disturbance' if they rang the bell; "you don't know how to run the machines and that is why you have to disturb us now and then". I narrated all the problems to the manager including the complaint that why the team leaders were given overtime from the rota meant to be for the operators, that the distribution of work between the team leaders and the operators was uneven in the favour of the team leaders. I suggested that the old system was better because it enabled all operators to have a day of easier work once a week. Either the team leaders should also work on the machines, or should have their own rota for overtime. The manager accepted some of my suggestions and instructed the setters to respond quickly to the operators' calls. About the toilet breaks, he argued that it was not possible to have such a thing as a toilet break, but without declaring

it on paper, a mutual arrangement would do no harm, or otherwise the person who rings the bell should be responded to. He also said that such complaints as I had raised had never been raised before and therefore he would like to talk to all operators one by one and see if the complaints were raised by all or was it just me who had the complaints. But when the manager called the operators individually, almost all denied that they had any problems; the typical Pakistani fear when confronted individually by a senior manager; "it was not me, it was the others": I was shocked at their first sending me in with a list of complaints and then absolutely denying that they had any complaints. The management would consider many demands realistic and if we pressed them for acceptance, they would surely accept them but the workers have become so afraid of any kind of protest that they didn't press ahead. But because such an event had happened to me for the first time, I was shocked; the manager said to me, "you were raising such a hue and cry about these problems but the operators say they have absolutely nothing against the team leader system". I discovered later that most operators had close relations and friendships with the team leaders and hence they didn't want to talk directly about the latter's disorderly conduct, but because I was a new comer in the factory, they had thought that they could fire a shot by placing the gun on my shoulder; that their complaints would reach the management through me and no blame from the team leaders would come to the operators; in case the manager had decided to abolish the privileges of the team leaders, the operators could assuage the resentment of the team leaders by saying, "we didn't say anything, it was 'he' who got the team leader system abolished", and thus have the advantage of first, having the team leaders brought back to their proper station of being an operator, and secondly, keeping their relations and friendships intact. The reason for not speaking up was to avoid spoiling good relations with the team leaders and so they said to the manager that they had no conflict with the team leaders. They had made me the scape goat and the team leaders got furious at me so that they stopped talking to me, they won't exchange greetings with me. And because I had complained against the setters as well for not responding in proper time, they too got offended. Had the operators propped me, I could have got all our demands accepted by the management; the team leaders would have been out of our rota because the manager had agreed with me in principle that the team leaders should not get the rota overtime from the operators' due. The consequence of the operators' back-out was that even those demands with which the manager had agreed with me in principle, he did not implement. He not only forgot the whole list of requests but considered them a figment of my imagination and said that I was just making a fuss for nothing real. I was disappointed from the operators and refused to take part in any protests, or negotiations in future. I said I would not be their advocate in future. The problems for which I had taken all this trouble were still there; there was bickering about toilet breaks and nasty remarks going on and because we had failed in getting anything done about it, the team leaders and the setters felt victorious and exonerated from blame; they become more courageous and ignored the operators' calls even more than they did before.

The team leader system was not only for the Asians. It was for all workers. In the morning shifts, there were all Whites and so the team leaders were Whites too, in the evening shifts, they were all Asians. Now what happened, I have seen that the White workers, it is very rare that they have complaints, it is very rare that they need to go to the management and ask that something should be done for them; their demands are automatically accepted as a matter of routine and that is why the morning shift in which only Whites work, is considered a very favourable shift to work in.

From then on, I didn't complain to the manager directly because I knew that the Asian workers would never back me up; they are all illiterate and are so fearful in front of the manager that they won't say anything even if the machines are too fast, even if they are badly loaded with work. Whatever the burden on their backs, they would try to finish the work but seldom protest. The Whites are different; you press them and they would straight away protest, give them extra work and they would refuse, "it is not my job". Asian workers, there was a time when one would operate one molding machine, then another machine was added for him to work on two, and then he has to pack as well but they do. The faster you make the machines work, the faster they work and none calls the setter to say, "this speed is too fast". They try to cope but do not take demands to the management.

Asian Workers' Attitudes Towards Unions in Native British/English Firms; Chaotic Behaviour; Pseudo Leaders; Leadership as Status Symbol; Misconception of Union Functions; Abuse of Powers; Inaptitude for Union Formation; Fear of Management; Individual Betrayal of Collective Decisions; Ineffectiveness of Unions; Strikes for Wage Increases; (Analysis given on pages 209 to 213)

I-A retired group training officer at Courtauld, narrated the following events:

There was one thing which was very unfortunate. That the majority of the Asian people that were recruited, were illiterate. They did not understand what a trade union meant and what the trade unions were for. Despite that they paid the trade unions their dues, when ever the conflict came, they never took advice from the unions. They jumped into the situation themselves and developed confrontation with the management - head-on collision themselves. This is true only of the Asian people. The Asian people, when ever there was a conflict, they always created a situation where the trade unions were left out.

English people - they never took their decisions without consulting the trade unions. But by that time they were in such small numbers that even if they took decisions without consulting somebody, they couldn't be effective. Some departments were manned hundred percent by Asians. Especially the Ring Room and the Cadre Room.

The Asian workers went on strikes a number of times. Mostly they would complain about the wages. I will give you one example about the wages. How they tackled it, and what happened. There was a mill called the Moston Mill on the outskirts of Manchester. The workers over there decided that they were not happy with the pay scales that they would like to have more money. The management said, "okay, we will discuss it". They asked them, "can you have three persons as representatives - those who are good in speaking and could discuss on your behalf with the management, and whatever decisions we would come up with them on mutual agreement, we will abide by it". I was instructed, as a training officer, by the personnel director that I should present myself at the meeting during discussions, sit on a side so that should anyone need assistance in interpretation, or something like that, I should be able to help. Otherwise, I had no part to play in the matter. This thing went on for three consecutive nights. Discussions went on. Those three people used to come in to the Board Room, the management's office, there was the group manager, local manager, and an accountant or something like that. So the discussions went on for three nights. At the end of the third night they were told, "now that we have heard everything from you, will you go back to your friends, the workers, explain them the situation and let us have the answer on the fourth night". They went. I was asked to come on the fourth night also and make sure that there was no misunderstanding. All workers were gathered in one big room. The managers and the assistant managers came and they were asked, "we have had the discussion for three nights, what do you say?". The workers representatives said that they disagreed. The manager asked me, "could you ask these people if they understood what has been discussed - because they have come up with a straight answer straight away without any discussion amongst themselves (it was the first time that they were all together after the representatives' last meeting with the managers). They must first know what has been discussed. Do they really understand what was discussed?". So I asked them, "you have given your verdict that you don't accept but do all workers know what has been discussed over the last three nights?; and if there is anything which you don't understand, you can tell me". They said, "we don't accept", and they all took their aprons off and walked out.

They walked out. I, on my part, approached them again and said, "look brothers, what are you doing? At least discuss". They just pushed me away and went out. They went out and the next morning they reported at the Employment Exchange that they were unemployed. Because they had walked out of the mill at ten o' clock at night, they went to the Employment office the next morning. The Employment Office people, at eleven o' clock in the morning, phoned the manager at the mill and said, "look there are twenty odd people here - they have been sacked last night". He was amazed, "what? who sacked them?". He said, "they say they have been sacked". The manager said, "they

walked out last night and we haven't done anything yet". The workers took it to the Industrial Tribunal that they had been sacked and the Industrial Tribunal rejected their case outright: These three people who were there in the discussions as the spokesmen, when they went to the Tribunal, they wanted an interpreter! Can you explain that? For three nights, three hours solid, they had discussed the wage scales on their own with the management, but when the Tribunal came, they wanted an interpreter. And then they swore on the Quran that they will tell the truth, but the Tribunal found that there were thirteen people in the room who were saying exactly, word by word, perfect statements, the same thing - there is something wrong somewhere. They had learnt by heart the statement they were going to make. So the Tribunal threw them out. Who got the blame? Me. And I took no part in the whole thing; my simply being present there, that's what happened. All I spoke was, "friends, do you know what you are saying no to, have you discussed this thing with your friends who have now come back after three nights?". Those were the only words that I spoke. So who do you blame? Should you blame the union? or the management? or the workers?

Some people were taken back later. They were told that if anybody wanted to come back to work, they would have to sign a contract, a new contract; they had to give up their past service and start all over again; they lost all the privilege they had accrued before and had to start all over again. So that, at the end of the day, they lost.

I will give you another example. There was a case in Dee Mill in Shaw. There was a conflict about wages and the workers wanted to discuss it with the management. The management asked them to go and consult the union and then they would discuss it. They said no, they simply, everybody walked out and stood on the gate. The management sent for the union. When they came they were asked, "what is the matter". They said, "this has nothing to do with the union. This is not our problem". They were all sacked. The funny thing is that because I was the only Asian who was in the position of some authority on the management side, despite that I was part of the management team, I was there only to help the management and to help the workers as an interpreter. I will tell you one thing confidential; that while we were discussing this thing and the workers were standing outside, the union and the management got together and said, "lets bring them into a situation where they have to say either yes or no. Because it's no use discussing, as they do not understand discussions. If they want to go on head-on-clash, so be it". So they were asked to send four or five representatives, but they won't have it because everybody wanted to be present. The management said, "but there is no room in the Board Room, we can't entertain hundred people at the same place. You bring five people - those who understand the rules", but the Asians won't have it. Eventually the management agreed to have everybody. The moment they all came in, I told one of the leading chaps in our own language, "look friend, don't answer in a hurry. If you don't want to answer, keep quiet. If you do answer, be very very careful in what you say". I spoke to him in our own language so that others won't understand what I was saying. I was trying to help them but they suspected my intentions. The one who was their spokesman, the criteria for his selection was that he was the biggest idiot of all. He came forward. The managers asked, "do you want to work here?" He says, "No".

"Do you want to go outside?". "No".

"What do you want then?". "No".

"Do you understand a thing?". "No".

"Do you want to work here?". "Yes".

He did not know what to say. The union people said, "we are prepared to have these people to consult us but they do not accept our help". Thus the union was fed up with them and so the union jacked the management. Because the union officials were all English, the Asian workers suspected them as a part of the management but at the same time, the union also had to play a bigger part - they have to take some blame for that because the union was always willing to take money from them but never took a representative out of them in their meetings. There was no representation of the Asian workers in the union. Despite the fact that there were ninety percent Asian workers on the shop floor, the union management committee always comprised of the White people. Regarding elections or ballot or any system of electing union representatives, the Asians never knew of such things. Nobody even

knew when the meetings were held. The White people knew when the meeting was and they used to go and they would appoint the officials themselves. The union claimed that they informed the workers but actually there were no genuine or serious efforts made to inform the Asian people what their rights were, where did they stand, what they could do, what they could not do. If ever a person went to the union office with a complaint, they would say go and bring an interpreter with you. Now the chap has worked all night, if he has a problem at ten o' clock in the morning and he is asked to bring an interpreter, where is he going to find an interpreter? So they lost faith in the union, and when a conflict arose, they left the union out and take it on direct with the management. (Manchester).

2-There was a union there. The management used to offer a pay rise which, at first the union would reject and demand a greater pay rise. There used to be voting in which normally the workers would vote against the management offer. The management would then come with a bit more such as half percent or one percent and that would settle it. There was never a question of strike and no strike ever happened; no significant conflict between union and management But then the union there was just nominal and it didn't have much powers. It was not a strong union...[because] there was never a strike and that is because the union there was almost as if there was none. The power of the union had been lost ... its word was not considered important and, the important thing I tell you is that many among the union colluded with the management.

But it was the union which arranged for the ballot to see if the pay rise was acceptable to workers; how can you say that they colluded with the management?

Voting was for opinion sake to see if the workers agreed or not for the pay rise. But there was never a strike because the workers had no choice. (Slough).

3-Because I have been involved for long in Pakistan in trade union activities, and I knew about trade unionism, some Asian workers in our factory who were keen to make a union and were active about it, came to me and asked for my opinion in this matter. I told them that the management won't allow the formation of a union. I told them that I was not against trade unions but ever since Thatcherism began, unions do not have significant powers and are generally ineffective; all that has been left of the trade unions is the trade union bureaucracy which collects and consumes funds without achieving much for the workers. The unions are incapable of solving our problems. But even then, I said, if a union was made and allowed, I would definitely join it. These fellows insisted that I should join their union even before a permission from the management was sought. They had made some contacts with TGWU who, they said, was supporting their move to make a union. I told them that because I was still in my probationary period, and though I was an experienced trade unionist and could work better for a union than many, I could not play an active role. I could not afford a direct conflict with the management because, on account of being in service for only three months, it was very easy for the management to sack me. However, I was willing to be a silent and passive member of the union and therefore I filled in the form and handed them the fee for membership. There were seven workers who were playing an active role in the formation of the union and they had talked to nearly all the workers, Whites as well as Asians. I don't know what response they received from other workers or how many members they could make. The representative from the TGWU had not yet contacted our management. He had told these seven workers to make a large enough number of members for the union and only then he would talk to our management that they had registered our union with them. Meanwhile, when this secret activity, whispers and rumours, for a union was going on, a certain Asian worker, who was weak-willed for the union, told his Pakistani supervisor that boys were trying to make a union. This supervisor considered himself more a part of the management than that of the workers. To score high marks in the eyes of the management, he immediately informed the management that so and so, all the names, were trying to form a union. When the secret was disclosed, and there were no points to be gained by further secrecy, the workers went ahead and the TGWU wrote to the management that they had registered a union made by their workers. The management wrote back saying that they do not recognize any workers union in their

factory, and then, immediately, they made fourteen workers redundant. At that time, I had been with the firm only three months, and I saw fourteen workers made redundant. I don't think there was any need at that time to make fourteen people redundant because the factory was running well and in normal routine. But the management said that there was a shortage of work and hence they were making fourteen people redundant.

Regarding how the management ensured that it was those workers who wanted to make a union, the production manager and the shift manager were very much involved into workers and they knew very well who were active, who stood up for protest, and who were more challenging than others. Besides, the worker who let the cat out of the bag, supplied the names of all those who were organizing a union, and, on top of that, when these workers were questioned, they did not deny that they were forming a union. They did not deny but said that making a union was there right and that the management could not stop them from making a union. The manager called me as well, because I too was a member, and he said to me, "I have heard that you are actively participating in the formation of a union". I said, "I was not actively participating but the truth is that some workers had come to me and asked if I wanted to become a member of the union. Because I believed that forming a union or becoming a member of a union was not against the British law, I therefore filled in the form. I haven't done anything else and I haven't participated in any activities; if you think that what I have done is illegal, please tell me". He said, "it is not illegal to form a union, but that is all". Any way, he spared me and I was not dismissed. But because I was new and I presented myself in a very innocent manner, that I had no special interest with the union, and that I had only filled in the membership form believing there was nothing against the law in it, I was saved, and many others too were saved. Now there, I was a new comer and the management knew how desperately I had sought the job, and they perhaps thought what could this poor man do?; he has just joined the factory and he has too many personal problems. But they sacked fourteen men. These included workers who had been with the factory for four, five or six years, and had all the employment rights.

Regarding why they wanted to make a union, I think they had neither proper reasons nor a plan and because of this I had differed with them when they came to me. They had neither done a thorough study of unionism nor they had any genuine complaints. They were making a union under a belief that they would have a status and prestige if they became 'shop stewards'. Other than seeking status and power, they had little of a clear picture of what actually a trade union is and what are the objectives of a trade union. We need a union only if the management does not listen to complaints and does not try to solve problems. I don't think that they had any major problems which could be solved only through a union. They just had a belief that they would get authority and prominence through union leadership. That union representative were dignitaries was the basic reason for which they wanted to form a union.

4-It has happened on numerous occasions and in many worker meetings, that in the company of other workers they say, "we work seven days a week, lets take a day off"; but one by one they go to the manager and say that only the others don't want to work: They decide one thing collectively and betray it individually by showing, personally, "see how loyal I am, what a good worker I am, I work more than others, I am willing to do a favour that others are not prepared to do, I am more cooperative than the others; the problems do not arise because of me; its the others" (Brentford)

5-Many times the manager has a meeting with us and he asks, "are you willing to work in the holidays?", and while outside the workers had decided not to work, none volunteers to communicate this to the manager. At his best one would say, "if others are willing to work, I have no objection to work myself as well". (Slough).

6-When the Asian workers do take a collective action, they do it in an irrational manner. Like for example the strike we once had; the management was trying to reduce working hours as well as wages and the workers just decided they would go on strike and went home. (Manchester).

7-We used to have a day off but with wages. The management decided that the day off would be without wages. The workers got angry, didn't think with a cool head and just went home when in fact what they needed doing was to go to the management and discuss and negotiate or at least express that there was a dispute arising there which needed solving. But they just went home thinking that they were so important for the factory that the management would not only revert its decision but call them back to work. Instead of getting called back, they were all sacked. When they were sacked and the management hired new workers, they went to the Industrial Tribunal. They also went to the labour advisors who didn't support their case because these workers had just went home without even talking to the management. Finally, they got a bit of money but lost their jobs because they hadn't given in any notice of strike, placed no demands but just left work and went home. After losing their jobs they regretted it very much. (Brentford).

8-Our client American company is said to have set conditions that if we have a union, we would lose the contract with them. American companies usually do not allow unions. They treat workers as individuals; everybody for himself. I have seen some performance appraisal forms of some workers. After the appraisal is written on the form, they ask the worker to write his/her own view of his performance. They ask what would the worker like to do to improve, what sort of training he wants to do; "do you want to do any external courses, how can we improve your life", they ask all sorts of questions. But there is always a need for unions because the management would primarily look after their interests first. If there was a union, the management won't get away with few things; sometimes they can actually let things happen that they should not. Like in our company they used to give us a bonus sum on Christmas. But last year, they took this bonus away from the workers but the management still received this bonus. They kept it for the management. There has been so much propaganda against the unions for the last decade people have to take influence. I am personally not for unions because unions did a lot of damage to this country, but on the other hand, some times, with a limited power, they can do good. Originally, unions were getting away with a lot. Like for example, at MOD, every time, if you wanted to get promotion, you joined the union, and you go up and you become a shop steward and then a top union man and you got promoted to management. So every time you wanted to be promoted, you go that way that you go against the management and then, in order to get you aside, they promote you. I was not really for unions, you see, because they had too much power, anytime they would say, "well lads, put your tools down, lets go", and they did abuse their powers. I personally know that unions have exploited the management. At the MOD, we had one worker in the tool room. The MOD police stopped this tool worker when he was going out and said, "can we search you", to see whether he was stealing or anything. And he refused to let them search him and he just went out and as soon as he was off the MOD property they could not search him, so when he came back to work the next day, the MOD police stopped him and said, "right, you did not stop, you did not let us search you, you are suspended from work for three days because we have to carry out an inquiry". The union said, "right, you asked him out, tools down, everybody out". And whole of the tool room staff, fifty tool makers making tools for whole of the factory, were at a stand still. And if the factory doesn't get the new tools, whole of the factory is at a stand still and that is about two thousand people. And that's what I mean when I say unions were getting away with murder. It was outrageous. Eventually, they went on a strike and they were on strike for three or four days and then the management said, well, three days, he could still work and we will carry out the investigation and then it was watered down. He got a bit of warning and that was it because the union backed him. The MOD police were told by the management, well, don't worry, next time. Now, those were the days, when I say that unions were getting away with murder, that was one extreme, right, but here now, it is the opposite, now we have no unions and the management keeps vacancies free for three or four months, others work double, and the management sometimes can get away with it and during these three or four months, they save that salary. They are getting away, aren't they? But if there was a union, they couldn't do that, they would have to fill in the vacancy. The union would have said, look, this person is doing this job which is not his job.

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